वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

[SŪ. 2. 1. 1.
270 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 1.]
about Viṣṇu, with eyes like lotus, unchangeable, the creator who is
not created, the origin and dissolution of beings, about Nārāyaṇa,
Hṛṣīkeśa, Govinda, the unconquered, about Keśava, O best among
the Bhāratas!'" (Mahā. 12.7518-19 1), (the answer given was:)
'"The Highest Person, the great-souled one, the soul of beings, fashion-
ed the great elements, the air, the light and likewise the water, and
the ether and the sky"' (Mahā. 12.7825 2). In the Dāna-dharma,
Śiva says: '"Higher than even the reverend Father (i.e. Brahmā)
is Hari, the eternal Person, Kṛṣṇa, of a golden appearance and arisen
like the sun in the cloudless sky, designated as Śrīvatsa, Hṛṣīkeśa
worshipped by all the deities. Brahmā has sprung up from his belly,—
likewise I from his forehead, the lights from the hairs on his head, the
gods and the demons from his body-hairs, the sages have arisen from
his body, likewise, the eternal worlds. He is the veritable abode of
the reverend Father (i e. Brahmā), as well as the abode of all the
gods. He is the creator of this entire world, the Lord of all the three
worlds, the destroyer of all beings, of the immobile as well as of the
mobile. He is directly perceived at all times indeed by one who has
conquered his passions. He is the Lord of the gods and higher
than the high, omniscient, connected with all, moving everywhere
and turned towards all. He is the Supreme Soul, Hṛṣīkeśa, all-
pervading, the Supreme Lord"' (Mahā. 13.6507–6512 3). In that
very section, the omniscient Devavrata, too, says, beginning '"For
I know Kṛṣṇa in truth"' (Mahā. 13.7659 4) and continuing: '"Know
everything, the movable, as well as the immovable, all souls and the
universe as Kṛṣṇa.5 Whatever is honoured in the worlds as a
meritorious act, whatever is auspicious or inauspicious,—all that is
Keśava, the inconceivable, everything else is the reverse. Such a
Keśava is self-born, He is Nārāyaṇa supreme and unchangeable;
the middle, the beginning and the end of the universe which existed;
knowable by all; the origin as well as the dissolution of beings"'
1 P. 631, lines 18-19, vol. 3. 2 Op. cit., line 25.
3 Pp. 237-238, vol. 4. Reading different in some places, viz. ‘Sa hi deva-
varaḥ sākṣād deva-nāthaḥ parantapaḥ. Sarvajñaḥ sa hi saṁśliṣṭaḥ . . .’
Vaṅgavāsī ed. reads sarva-saṁśliṣṭaḥ otherwise it is the same as the above.
P. 2006, vol. 2.
4 P. 256, line 26, vol. 4.
5 Reading: 'Sarvaṁ kṛtsnaṁ . . viśvam enam . . ', P. 258, line 7
Reading in the Vaṅgavāsī ed. exactly similar. P. 2017.

[sū. 2. 1. 1.
ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 271
(Mahā. 13.7391; 7399–7400¹). And the statements by Him whose
feet are worshipped by all the composers of Smṛtis are as follows:
‘“I am the source of all, from me everything arises”’ (Gītā 10.8),
‘“I am the source, likewise, the dissolution of the entire universe”’
(Gītā 7.6). Parāśara, too, declares: ‘“The universe has arisen from
Viṣṇu, and in Him alone it is grounded. He is the cause of the sub-
sistence and control of the universe and He is the universe”’ (V.P.
1.1.35²). The sense is that if the view of Kapila be accepted as
conducive to the Vedānta, then all those above and other texts must
be contradicted. But the Manu-Smṛti and others are acceptable, since
they establish religious duties, which are meant to the knowledge of
Brahman, designated in the Veda, since they establish the qualities,
nature and the rest of Brahman, and since they are composed by those
who know the Veda. And in the Veda the cause of the world is
designated to be a sentient principle, in fact, none but Brahman.
Because of their opposition to this, the Sāṁkhya-Smṛti and the rest
are not acceptable. As the reverend Manu says: ‘Whatever Smṛtis
are outside the pale of the Veda, whatever heterodox doctrines there
are,—all of them are fruitless after death; these Smṛtis are given to
ignorance’ (Manu 12.95³). Further, the composer, too, of the Smṛti
which is opposed to the Veda (viz. the Sāṁkhya-Smṛti) is a certain
sage, called Kapila, like Kaṇāda and the rest, but is not the lord Kapila,
called Vāsudeva. As is declared by the Padma-purāṇa: ‘Kapila, called
Vāsudeva, told the principle of the Sāṁkhya, supported by the meaning
of all the Vedas, to the gods like Brahmā and the rest, and likewise
to Bhṛgu and others, likewise to Āsuri. Another Kapila told the
Sāṁkhya, opposed to all the Vedas and supported by false arguments,
to another Āsuri’. Kapila, mentioned in the scriptural text, should
be known to be Hiraṇyagarbha.
――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――
¹ P. 258, lines 7, 18-19. Reading: ‘Etādṛśaḥ, Keśavo’taś ca bhūyo Nārā-
yaṇaḥ . . sambabhūsatāṁ . . . .’. Vaṅgavāsī ed. exactly similar,
only ‘babhūsatāṁ’ in place of ‘sambabhūsatāṁ’. P. 2017.
² P. 8.
³ P. 483.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 2.
272 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 1.]
SŪTRA 2
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-PERCEPTION ON THE PART OF
OTHERS."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"And on account of the non-perception on the part of others",
i.e. on the part of Manu and the rest, that the Veda is concerned with
pradhāna, Smṛti which is opposed to the Veda is unauthentic.
Vedānta-kaustubha
"And on account of the non-perception on the part of others",—
i.e. on the part of men like Manu and the rest, other than Kapila and
best among those versed in the Vedas,¹—that the Veda is concerned
with pradhāna, the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti is to be disregarded. Hence,
it is established that the rejection of the Smṛti which is opposed to
the Veda is not in conflict with the stated concordance.
Here ends the section entitled 'Smṛti' (1).
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara and Bhāskara
Interpretation different, viz. 'On account of the non-perception
(in Scripture and ordinary experience) of others (viz. of the principles
of mahat and the rest, other than pradhāna), (the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti
is not to be accepted)'.²
Baladeva
His interpretation too is very similar to the above one;
viz. 'On account of the non-perception (in Scripture) of others (viz.
of many other doctrines found in the Sāṃkhya system, such as, the
doctrine that the souls are pure consciousness and all-pervasive, and
so on)'.³
¹ I.e. as men like Manu and others reject pradhāna, pradhāna cannot be
the cause of the world.
² Ś.B. 2.1.2, p. 443 ; Bh. B. 2.1.2, p. 88.
³ G.B. 2.1 2, p. 11, Chap. 1.

[sū. 2. 1. 3.
ADH. 2.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 273
Adhikaraṇa 2. The section entitled: 'The re-
futation of the Yoga'. (Sūtra 3)
SŪTRA 3
"HEREBY THE YOGA IS REFUTED."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
By the refutation of the Sāṁkhya-Smṛti, the Yoga-Smṛti, too
is refuted.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now, the author points out the unauthenticity of the Yoga-
Smṛti.
This aphorism is of the form of a formal extension (atideśa).
A formal extension means the intimation of similarity when such
a similarity is not known. Thus, at first, the Yoga-Smṛti is taken
to be concerned with making the Veda clear, accepting as it does
the word 'Yoga', which is accepted by Scripture, too, in the text:
'This they think to be the Yoga, the firm holding back of the senses'
(Kaṭha 6.11); and hence its similarity to the Sāṁkhya-Smṛti is not
known. Therefore, this aphorism intimates the similarity of the
Yoga-Smṛti to the Sāṁkhya-Smṛti. "Hereby", i.e. by this very
refutation of the Sāṁkhya-Smṛti which establishes a non-sentient
cause, the Yoga-Smṛti, too, should be known to be refuted. In the
statement. "The Yoga is refuted", by the term "yoga", the Smṛti
which establishes it is understood. The purpose of the mention of the
term "Yoga" in the statement: 'The Yoga-Smṛti is refuted' is this:
Although the Lord is admitted in the Yoga doctrine, yet He is not
established primarily, as He is in the aphorism and texts like: "Then,
therefore, an enquiry into Brahman' (Br. Sū. 1.1.1), '"O, the soul,
verily, should be seen"' (Bṛh. 2.4 5; 4.5.6); The primacy of the
Yoga alone is found in the beginning: 'Now, an instruction with regard
to the Yoga' (Y S. 1.1), and in the aphorism, laying down its definition,
viz.: 'The Yoga is the suppression of the functions of the mind'
(Y.S. 1.2¹). And, this mere suppression of the functions of the mind,
devoid of any connection with the Lord, is, indeed, of no avail in
crossing the world, any more than a dog's tail is in crossing the ocean.
¹ P. 4.
18

274 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 1. 4.
ADH. 3.]
So, it is to be rejected, opposed as it is to Scriptural and Smṛti texts
like '"O, the soul, verily, should be seen"' (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5 6), 'The
knower of Brahman attains the highest' (Tait. 2 1), '"By knowing
me, one attains peace"' (Gītā 5.29), 'The binder with the noose
of the world, and the liberator from the noose of the world', 'This
one thing is well-established that the object to be worshipped is
Nārāyaṇa, Hari' and so on. Salvation being impossible through
a mere suppression of the functions of the mind, the Yoga doctrine
which deals with the primacy of that only is, indeed, non-acceptable.
Its view is that pradhāna, devoid of any connection with Brahman,
is the material cause of the world, and the Lord is merely the efficient
cause of the world, and this, too, being opposed to the Veda, is certainly
unreasonable. There are many other faults in the Yoga doctrine,
but they are not quoted here needlessly. And the term 'Yoga'
found in Scripture and Smṛti, refers to the meditation and the rest
on the Lord. The eulogizing statement in the Mokṣa-dharma, etc.,
on the contrary, is intended only for referring to that portion of Yoga,
etc. which is not opposed to Scripture. Hence, it is established that
the stated concordance, indicating the causality of Brahman, is not
contradicted by the Yoga-Smṛti.
Here ends the section entitled 'The refutation of the Yoga' (2).
Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled 'Difference'
(Sūtras 4-11). Prima facie view (Sūtras 4-5)
SŪTRA 4
"(THERE IS) NO (HAVING BRAHMAN AS THE CAUSE) ON ITS PART,
ON ACCOUNT OF DIFFERENCE, (ITS) BEING SO (IS KNOWN) FROM
THE TEXT."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
We object ¹ to your view on the ground of reason. The world
has not Brahman as its material cause "on account of difference".
¹ Correct reading: 'pratyavatiṣṭhate' which is translated here. Vide C.S.S.
ed., p. 24 and Brindaban ed., p. 378.

[sū. 2. 1. 4.
ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 275
And the difference is to be known also "from the text", viz. 'He
became knowledge and non-knowledge' (Tait. 2 6 1).
Vedānta-kaustubha
Thus, the objection based on Smṛtis has been disposed of by the
preceding two sections. Now, the objection based on reasoning is
being disposed of.
It has been stated under the aphorism: 'From whom (arise) its
origin and the rest' (Br. Sū 1 1.2) that it (viz. the world) has
Brahman for its material cause. The prima facie objector objects to
it on the ground of reason thus: 'no'. This world has not Brahman
for its material cause Why? "On account of difference " That
is, Brahman possesses the attributes of sentience, non-grossness,
infinity, purity, and the rest, while the world possesses just the
opposite attributes of non-sentience, grossness and so on,—on account
of such a dissimilarity between the two. Whatever is different from
something has not that for its material cause, just as the pot, which is
different from the ether, has not the ether as its material cause; just
as the pot. the dish and the rest, which are different from the potter,
have not the potter as their material cause.
If it be objected. It is found that the attributes of a material
cause recur in its effects as well. Similarly, in the case under discussion,
too, Brahman is the material cause; and the universe, His effect,
consisting of sentient beings like men, animals and the rest, must
be similar to Him. Hence the reason (viz.: "On account of difference ")
does not hold good,—
(We reply) No, because that there do exist the attributes of
non-sentience, grossness and the rest in the effect, viz. in stones, wood
and the rest, is known from the evidence of direct perception.
If it be objected: It is possible to imagine that there is sentience
in them, too, though unmanifest; hence there is no difference.
(We reply:) No, because it is unreasonable to take what is known
through direct perception to be otherwise on the ground of mere
imagination.
The difference is known "from the text" as well,—this is stated
by the phrase: "its being so", i.e. "its being so", or its difference,
is known "from the text" as well, i.e. from the following texts: 'He
1 Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.

|sū. 2. 1. 5.
276 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 3.]
became Knowledge and non-knowledge' (Tait. 2.6), 'On the same
tree, a person, immersed, grieves for his impotence, bewildered'
(Muṇḍ. 3 1 2, Śvet 4 7), 'And the soul, which is without the Lord,
is bound, because of being an enjoyer' (Śvet. 1.8) and so on.
COMPARISON
Baladeva
Interpretation absolutely different He takes this sūtra as
forming one adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with demonstrating the
eternity and infallibility of the Veda. He thus does not take this
sūtra as representing a prima facie view. Thus, this sūtra means,—
according to him,—'(The Veda is) not (unauthoritative like the
Sāṁkhya and the rest), on account of (its) difference (from them),
(i.e. because it is a non-human origin unlike the Sāṁkhya and the
rest), (its) being so (i e its eternity) (is known) from the text '.¹
PRIMA FACIE VIEW (concluded)
SŪTRA 5
"BUT (THERE IS) THE DESIGNATION OF THE PRESIDING (DEITIES)
ON ACCOUNT OF SPECIALITY AND FOLLOWING."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"But" in the texts. 'The earth spoke' (Tait Saṁ 5 5 2, 3²),
'These sense-organs, disputing about self-supremacy, went to Brahma'
(Bṛh. 6 1 7 ³) and so on, there is the designation of their presiding' ⁴
deities, 'on account of the specification', mentioned in the passage.
'"Very well, let me enter into these three divinities"' (Chānd.
6 3.2 ⁵); and 'on account of the following', or entering, mentioned
in the passage: 'Fire, becoming speech, entered the mouth' (Ait.
2.4 ⁶).
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz : From the scriptural texts: 'The earth
spoke to him' (Tait. Saṁ 5.5 2, 3), 'The earth spoke' (Śat. Br.

¹ G.B 2.1.4, p 18, Chap. 2.
² P. 76, line 9, vol. 2. ³ Ś, R, B.
⁴ C.S.S. ed. reads 'tat-tat', meaning 'their respective deities', p. 24.
⁵ R, ŚK, B. ⁶ Ś, R, Bh, SK

[sū. 2. 1. 5.
ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 277
6 1 3, 4¹), 'The waters spoke' (Śat. Br. 6 1.3, 2²), 'These sense-
organs, disputing about self-supremacy, went to Brahmā' (Bṛh
6 1 7), 'They said to speech "Do you sing for us"' (Bṛh 1.3.2)
and so on, it is known that of the effects too are sentient; and hence
they have no difference from the material cause—
We reply: The word "but" disposes of the stated objection.
There is no designation of sentience on the part of the effects, and
so they cannot have Brahman for their material cause; but there
is the designation of only the presiding deities of earth and the
rest in the passages, 'The earth spoke to him' (Tait. Sam. 5.5.2, 3)
and so on. Why? "On account of speciality and following", i e.
on account of the specification of the earth and the rest by the word
'deity' in the passage "'Very well, let me enter into these three
deities'" (Chānd. 6.3.2), and on account of the specifications of the
sense-organs by the word 'deity' in the passages 'These deities,
verily, disputing about self-supremacy' (Kauṣ. 2.14), 'These deities,
verily, having known superiority in the vital breath' (Kauṣ 2 14),
as well as 'on account of the following' of fire and the rest as the
presiding deities of speech and the rest, i.e on account of the scrip-
tural mention of following, or entering, in the passage: 'Fire, becoming
speech, entered the mouth,—the sun, becoming sight, the eyes
(Ait. 2 4) Hence the world being different from Brahman, Brahman
is not its material cause.
COMPARISON
Baladeva
Literal interpretation same, but import different, since he takes
this Sūtra as an adhikaraṇa by itself, not laying down a prima facie
view, but the correct conclusion. Thus, the Sūtra means according
to him "(If it be objected: How to reconcile the absurd sayings of
the Vedas, such as 'Fire willed to be many' and so on?). We reply: (In
those passages) there is the designation of the presiding (deities) (of
fire and the rest), on account of speciality and following (i.e. entering
into)".³
¹ P. 505, line 12.
² Op. cit., line 9.
³ G.B. 2.1.5, p. 18, Chap. 2.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 6-7.
278 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH 3 ]
CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sutras 6-7)
SŪTRA 6
“ BUT (IT) IS SEEN.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
With regard to it, we reply: “It is seen” that there is the origin
of hairs on the head and so on from a person from whom they are
different, and of dung-beetles from the cow-dung from which they are
different. Hence it is not to be said that the universe, because of
being different from Brahman, has not Him as its material cause.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The author points out that such a prima facie view is based on a
fallacious reason (viz. ‘on account of difference’).
The word “but” is for disposing of the prima facie view The
statement that this universe has not Brahman as its material cause
on account of being different from Him, is not tenable, since it “is
seen” that there is the origin of nails, body-hairs and the rest from a
person from whom they are different, and that of the dung-beetles
from the cow-dung, from which they are different,—on account of
this,—this is the sense.
COMPARISON
Baladeva
Interpretation same, but he takes this sūtra as forming an
adhikaraṇa by itself.
—————
(CORRECT CONCLUSION (end))
SŪTRA 7
“ IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (IN THAT CASE THE EFFECT MUST BE)
NON-EXISTENT (WE REPLY :) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING A
NEGATION MERELY ”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be objected: If the effect be different from its material cause,
it must be “non-existent” prior to its origination,—(we reply.) No
such objection can be raised, “on account of there being a negation

{SŪ. 2. 1. 7}
ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 279
merely ”, in the previous aphorism, of the rule that there is a similarity
between the material cause and its effect in every respect
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be objected : Having admitted an absolute similarity between
the material cause and its effect in the aphorism : ‘(There is) no
(having Brahman for its cause) on its part, on account of difference ’
(Br. Sū 2.1.4), it has been objected by the opponent that the world
being different from Brahman, He is not its material cause with a
view to disposing of that objection, it has been established in the
aphorism. ‘But (it) is seen’ (Br Sū. 2.1 6) that there can be a cause-
effect relation even between two different objects. With regard to
it, the question is whether prior to creation the universe was non-
different from its cause, or different. What is your opinion ? If you
say, Non-different,—then, just as the origin of a different world is
admitted, like the origin of hairs on the head and body hairs from a
person from whom they are different, so why there may not be the
origin of a similar world, like the origin of a gold-bracelet and the rest
from gold ?
If you say : Different,—then, the world must have a material
cause different from Brahman, and hence pradhāna must be the
cause of the world. If it be said that this cannot be admitted, as
pradhāna has been already refuted,—(we point out) in the texts.
‘Brahman ¹ is one only, without second’ (Chānd. 6.2.1), ‘There
was, verily, Nārāyana, the one’ (Mahā. Up. 1 2), ‘Then there was
Viṣṇu, Hari alone, without parts’,—there is the mention of a single
reality; and hence, it follows that there was the absence of anything
else prior to creation. Therefore, the world must be non-existent
prior to creation.
(Here ends the original prima facie view)
(Author’s conclusion.)
(We reply :) ‘No’. Why ? “On account of there being a
negation merely.” The aphorism ‘But (it) is seen’ (Br. Sū. 2.1.6)
negates merely,—by way of mentioning the difference between the
material cause and its effect,—the rule, admitted by the opponent, viz.
that there is similarity between a material cause and its effect in every

¹ The word ‘Brahman’ is not included in the original text.

280 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 1. 8.
ADH. 3.]
respect; but it never establishes any difference between the two in
every respect Hence, because of having Brahman as its soul, the
universe is existent even during its causal state.
Or an alternative explanation of the phrase "On account of
there being a negation merely". The statement, viz 'The universe
is non-existent' is a negation merely, i e without any meaning, in
accordance with the scriptural text. ' "The existent alone, my dear,
was this in the beginning" ' (Chānd. 6 2.1)
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara
Interpretation different, viz · 'If it be said that (the effect) is
non-existent (prior to its actual creation), (we reply) No, since (it)
is a mere negation (without an object to be negatived)'. That is,
the negation by the opponent, viz. . 'The world is non-existent' has
no object, for it certainly cannot have for its object the existence of
the effect prior to its actual creation, as the effect always exists in its
cause, whether before or after its actual creation 1
PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 8)
SŪTRA 8
“ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING THE CONSEQUENCE OF (BECOMING)
LIKE THAT DURING DISSOLUTION, (THE DOCTRINE OF THE CAUSALITY
OF BRAHMAN) IS INCONSISTENT.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
An objection is raised: As at the time of dissolution, the cause,
like the effect, will become non-sentient, the view that Brahman is
the material cause of the universe is “inconsistent”.
Vedānta-kaustubha
An objection is raised once more.
It is objected. “Inconsistent”, indeed, is the view which admits
Brahman to be the material cause of the world—Brahman who
1 Ś.B. 2.1.7, 'Pratiṣedham hīdam nāsya pratiṣedhasya pratiṣedhyam asti',
p. 453.

[sū. 2. 1. 9.
ADH. 3] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 281
possesses the attributes of sentience, infinity, freedom from sins and
the rest, and is established by the scriptural texts 'Brahman is
truth, intelligence, infinite" (Tait. 2.1), "Free from sins, ageless,
deathless" (Chānd. 8.1.5, 8 7.1, 3; Maitrī. 7.7), "Who is omniscient,
all-knowing" (Muṇḍ. 1 1.9, 2.2.7) and so on. Why? "On account
of there being the consequence of (becoming) like that during dissolu-
tion." That is, because "during dissolution", or during reabsorption,
non-sentience, limitedness, impurity and the rest will occur on the
part of the material cause as well, "like that", i.e as on the part of
the effect The sense is that during dissolution, the world, possessing
non-sentience and the rest, and merged into its material cause in an
order reverse to that of creation, i.e merged into Brahman, possessing
the attribute of sentience and the rest, is sure to defile Him with its
own attributes, as does butter-milk dropped in milk
CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 9-10)
SŪTRA 9
"BUT NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING PARALLEL IN-
STANCES."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The reply is as follows: There is indeed no "consequence of (be-
coming) like that". Just as the evolutes of the earth do not defile
it when dissolved into it, so the universe, the evolute of Brahman,
also does not.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The author refutes the objection.
"But no", i.e. no such consequence follows, and hence our
view does not involve any inconsistency. Why? An effect does
not defile its material cause with its own attributes when dissolved
into it, there being parallel instances to this effect. Just as the evolutes
like bracelets, ear-rings and the rest, when dissolved, do not defile
the lump of gold with their own attributes; and just as the evolutes
of the earth, when dissolved into the earth, do not defile the earth
with their own attributes, so this universe, consisting of the sentient
and the non-sentient, when dissolved into Brahman, does not, indeed,

282 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ 2. 1. 10.
ADH. 3.]
defile Brahman, possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His
powers.
CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)
SŪTRA 10
"AND ON ACOUNT OF OBJECTION TO HIS OWN VIEW."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The Sāṁkhya, maintaining a doctrine opposed to the Veda,
cannot raise any objection, since the stated objections apply to his
own view as well.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The author points out that the Sāṁkhya cannot even object that
there is any inconsistency in our view which is based on the Veda.
There is no inconsistency in our view based as it is on Scripture.
It has been alleged by the Sāṁkhya, unacquainted as he is with the
settled conclusion of the Vedānta, firstly, that a cause-effect relation
between Brahman and the world is inappropriate, as there is a
difference between the cause and the effect in this case, secondly,
that, in our view, the effect becomes non-existent prior to creation,
and thirdly, that Brahman becomes like the world during the time of
dissolution. All these objections are of equal force against the
Sāṁkhya doctrine as well. The sense is. The origin of the effect,—
which possesses colour and the rest and possesses parts,—from pra-
dhāna, which is colourless and devoid of parts, is admitted. Hence,
a cause-effect relation between pradhāna and its effects is inappro-
priate, there being here a difference between the cause and the effect.
There being nothing gross prior to creation, the effect itself becomes
non-existent; and during dissolution, prakṛti, like the world, becomes
gross.
COMPARISON
All others, except Baladeva, read. "sapakṣa-doṣāc ca" ¹
¹ Ś B 2.1.10, p. 357; Śrī. B 2.1.10, p. 13, Part 2; Bh. B. 2.1.10, p. 91;
ŚK. B. 2.1 10, p. 14, Parts 7 and 8.

[sū. 2. 1. 11
ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 283
SŪTRA 11
“IF IT BE SAID THAT ON ACCOUNT ALSO OF REASONING HAVING
NO SOLID GROUND, IT IS TO BE INFERRED OTHERWISE, (WE REPLY )
IN THAT WAY, TOO, THERE WILL BE THE CONSEQUENCE OF NON-
RELEASE ”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
On account also of the instability of reasoning, there is no
inconsistency in the stated conclusion; since, if pradhāna and the rest
be inferred to be the cause of the world by means of a strong reasoning,
then a counter-argument is possible by means of another equally
strong reasoning. As there will be the “consequence of non-release
thus also”, owing to disagreement among the logicians, so, that alone
which is mentioned in the Veda is acceptable—this is established.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The word ‘api’ means ‘and’. There is no inconsistency in the
stated conclusion, which is based on Scripture. There is inconsistency
in the Sāṁkhya conclusion itself which is based on reasoning, since the
stated objections apply thereto, “on account also of reasoning having
no solid ground”, i.e on account of the instability of reasoning. The
sense is that the thing inferred by one expert logician is set aside by
another, proved to be otherwise by another,—on account of the
instability of reasoning in this way. But the thing mentioned in the
Vedānta in the beginning and the end cannot be refuted even by
hundreds of reasonings
If it be objected. Even though reasonings like ‘on account of
difference’ ¹ be refutable, having no solid ground, yet in order that
there may not be any infinite regress, it is perfectly proper to infer,
in that way, a non-sentient material cause of the non-sentient effects,
like the ether and the rest—
(We reply:) “in that way too”, the primacy of reasoning is
upheld, and hence the conclusion stated in the Veda is regarded as but
of a secondary importance. As a consequence, non-release will result
owing to the mutual opposition among Kapila, Kaṇāda and the
rest It cannot be said that if victory be won by one of them at
some time or other, there will be no non-release as a consequence,—
¹ Vide Br. Sū. 2.1 4

284 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [sū. 2. 1. 12.
ADH 4]
it being impossible for one among many persons to be ever-victorious.
If it be said that the Supreme Soul is such, you fall in with our view;
so be happy by giving up reasoning which is opposed to the Veda.
Thus the Lord Vāsudeva, the sole topic of all the Vedas, being
established to be the material cause of the world, no opposition, based
on reasoning which is opposed to the Veda is of any avail—this is
established.
Here ends the section entitled “Difference” (3).
COMPARISON
Śamkara
He reads: “Vimokṣa-prasaṅga” instead of “Anirmokṣa-pra-
saṅga”.¹
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
They break it into two different sūtras—viz. “Tarkāpratiṣṭhānād
api” and “Anyathā . . . prasaṅgaḥ”.²
Adhikaraṇa 4. The section entitled “The Non-
acceptance of the rest”. (Sūtra 12)
SŪTRA 12
“HEREBY THE REMAINING (PERSONS) TOO WHO DO NOT ACCEPT
(THE VEDA) ARE EXPLAINED (I.E. REFUTED).”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
“Hereby”, i.e. by the refutation of the Sāṁkhya view, the
remaining ones, i.e. others who maintain a cause which is opposed to
the Veda, “too”, are refuted.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now, the author is extending the above refutation to the remaining
views.
“Hereby”, i.e. by the above refutation of the doctrine of pra-
dhāna as the cause of the world, “the remaining (persons) who do not
¹ Ś.B. 2.1.11, p. 458.
² Śrī. B., p. 13, Part 2, ŚK B., p. 14; Parts 7 and 8.

[sū. 2 1. 13.
ADH. 5.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 285
accept (the Veda)", too, should be known to be refuted The word
"śiṣṭāḥ" means 'the remaining ones', i.e persons other than Kapila ¹
and Patañjali ². The word "parigrahāḥ" means all who do not accept
the Veda.³
It is thus established that the doctrine of the causality of Brahman
is not contradicted by their views as well.
Here ends the section entitled "The Non-acceptance of
the rest" (4)
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha
According to them the word "śiṣṭāparigrahāḥ" means (the doc-
trines like Atomism and the rest) which are not accepted by the wise ⁴
Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled "Becoming
the enjoyer". (Sūtra 13)
SŪTRA 13
"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF (BRAHMAN) BECOMING
AN ENJOYER, (THERE WILL BE) NON-DISTINCTION, (BETWEEN
BRAHMAN AND THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL), WE REPLY, IT MAY BE
AS IN ORDINARY LIFE."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be objected that if Brahman be the material cause, then
Brahman Himself will become an enjoyer of pleasures and pains in
the form of the individual soul, so that there will be no distinction
¹ The founder of the Sāṃkhya doctrine.
² The founder of the Yoga doctrine.
³ This explains the compound: "śiṣṭāparigrahāḥ".
⁴ Hence they explain the compound as "Śiṣṭaiḥ aparigrahāḥ" and not as
śiṣṭhāś ca aparigrahāś ca", as done by Nimbārka, Śrīnivāsa, Rāmānuja and
Baladeva. Vide ŚB. 2.1.11, p. 461; Bh. B. 2.1.12, p. 92; ŚK. B. 2.1.13, p. 18,
Parts 7 and 8.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 13.
286 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 5.]
between the enjoyer (viz. the individual soul) and the controller (viz.
Brahman) as well-known from the Veda,—
(We reply:) In spite of there being a non-distinction, there is
a distinction as well between the two, as between the sea and the
wave, and between the sun and its ray.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now, having apprehended an objection once more, the author
is disposing of that here.
If it be objected: If Brahman who is without an equal or a superior
be the material cause of the world, then there must be no distinction
between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed. Why? “On account
of becoming the enjoyer” That is, all effects whatsoever being non-
different from their causes, the enjoyer, i.e. the individual soul, will
become the object enjoyed; and the object enjoyed, i.e. the body,
the sense-organs and the sense-objects, will become the enjoyer; and
hence, the distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed,
well-known in ordinary life and in the Veda, will not be possible on
this doctrine of the causality of Brahman. Moreover, there will not
be any distinction between the enjoyer and the controller, because
the group of enjoyers being non-different from the controller, the
enjoyer will become the controller, and the controller, the Supreme
Soul, will become the enjoyer. In ordinary life, to begin with, the
distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed is well-known,
thus ‘The individual soul is the enjoyer, the body and the rest are the
objects enjoyed’, and in the Veda too, thus: “Eats the sweet berry”
(Muṇḍ. 3.1.1; Śvet. 4.6). Similarly, the distinction between the
enjoyer and the controller, too, is well-known in ordinary life, as is
evident from the conduct of the good who always regard their pleasures
and pains as dependent on the Lord, and in the Veda too; thus: “He
alone makes one do good deeds” (Kauṣ. 3.8), “The soul which is
without the Lord is bound, because of being an enjoyer” (Śvet. 1.8)
and so on. Thus, “on account of becoming an enjoyer, there is non-
distinction”; and hence the doctrine of the causality of Brahman
cannot be accepted,—
The author states the correct conclusion in the words “It may be,
as in ordinary life”. That is, on our view, too, there may, indeed,
be a distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed, as well as
between the enjoyer and the controller, “as in ordinary life”. In

[sū. 2. 1. 13
ADH. 5 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 287
ordinary life, although pots, dishes and the rest, having the lump of
clay as their material cause, bracelets, ear-rings and the rest, having
gold as their material cause; foams, waves and the rest, having the
sea as their material cause; and leaves, fruits and the rest, having the
tree as their material cause, are all non-different from their respective
causes, there is still a mutual distinction amongst the particular
effects themselves In exactly the same manner, there may be
a mutual distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed,
although they are non-different from Brahman, having Brahman
as their material cause Similarly, in spite of their non-distinction,
there may still be a distinction between the enjoyer and the controller ,
just as pots, dishes and the rest, though by nature non-different from
the clay, as having no existence and activity apart from the clay,
are yet by nature different, too, from the clay possessing as they do
their own peculiar attributes which the clay lacks. The same should
be known to be the case with the gold and bracelets and the rest too.
Likewise, there is a natural relation of difference—non-difference
between Brahman and the individual soul. There is, indeed, no
inconsistency here. Hence it is established that the doctrine of the
causality of Brahman is not open to the above objections.¹
Here ends the section entitled “Becoming the enjoyer” (5).
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and Bhāskara
Interpretation different, viz. they interpret the sūtra like Śrīni-
vāsa, although while Śrīnivāsa understands the word “bhoktrā-
patteḥ” to mean ‘because the enjoyer will become the object enjoyed
and vice versa, as well because the enjoyer will become the controller
and vice versa’, they understand it to mean only ‘because the enjoyer
will become the object enjoyed and vice versa’. Each develops his
own peculiar theory in connection.²
¹ Note the different interpretations given by Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa.
² Ś.B. 2.1.13, pp. 461 et seq.; Bh. B. 2.1.13, p. 92.

288 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 1. 14.
ADH. 6.]
Adhikarana 6 The section entitled "The begin-
ing" (Sūtras 14-19)
SŪTRA 14
"(THERE IS) NON-DIFFERENCE (OF THE EFFECT) FROM THAT
(VIZ THE CAUSE), ON ACCOUNT OF (THE TEXTS) BEGINNING WITH
THE WORD 'BEGINNING' AND THE REST."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
There is "non-difference" between the effect and the cause, and
not absolute difference. Why? On account of the texts. '"The
effect having its beginning in speech, is a name, the reality is just the
clay"' (Chānd. 6.1.4 ¹), '"All this has that for its soul. That is
true . . . Thou art that"' (Chānd. 6.8.7, 6.9.4, 6.10.3–
6.16.3 ²), "All this, verily, is Brahman" (Chānd 3.14.1 ³).
Vedānta-kaustubha
In the first chapter, Brahman has been described many times as
different from the sentient and the non-sentient, in order that there
may be a proper discrimination between the peculiar natures of these
three realities respectively.⁴ Here, on the other hand, the non-
difference of the world, the effect, from Brahman, the cause, resulting
from the absence of separate existence, activity and the rest (on the
part of the former), has been established under the aphorism. "If
it be objected that (in that case the effect must be) non-existent,
(we reply:) no, on account of there being a negation merely" (Br
Sū. 2.1 7) and so on. Now, with a view to confirming the stated
conclusion, the author is refuting the view of the Vaiśeṣikas who hold
that the effect is not non-different from the cause, but is something
which originates (i.e. is an absolutely new creation).⁵
The compound ("tad ananyatvam") is to be explained as follows:
There is non-difference between the two, viz. the cause and the effect,
or, there is non-difference of that, viz. the world, the effect, from
¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B. ² Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B. ³ R.
⁴ Vide e.g. V.K. 1.1.1, p. 11; 1.1 18, p. 32; 1.1.22, p. 36; 1.2.3, p. 50, etc.
K S.S.
⁵ This is the doctrine of Asat-kāryya-vāda.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 14.
ADH. 6 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 289
Brahman, the cause; or, there is non-difference of the effect from that,
viz. the cause. That is, the effect, which is of the form of the sentient
and the non-sentient, which is limited, has many names and forms,
and is dependent, is non-different from Brahman, the Supreme
Cause, possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers,
unlimited, denoted by words like 'one', 'without a second' and so
on, capable of abiding voluntarily in the causal state and in the effected
state, and prior to the entire universe. The author states the proof
with regard to it in the words: "on account of (the texts) beginning
with the word 'beginning' and the rest". (The compound "āram-
bhaṇa-śabdādibhyaḥ" is to be explained thus:) The texts of which
the beginning is the word 'beginning', on account of them. That is,
on account of the texts. '"The effect, having its beginning in speech,
is a name, the reality is just the clay"' (Chānd 6.1.4), '"The exis-
tent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one, without a second"'
(Chānd. 6.2.1), '"He thought, 'May I be many', may I procreate"
He created the light' (Chānd. 6.2.3), '"All that has this for its soul.
That is true. That is the soul. Thou art that"' (Chānd. 6.8.7,
etc.), "All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from Him, disappearing
into Him and breathing in Him" (Chānd. 3.14.1), "That was
unmanifest then. It became manifest by name and form" (Bṛh.
1.4.7) and so on. There are many texts of such kinds which establish
the non-difference of the world, the effect, from Brahman, the cause,
but which are not quoted here for avoiding prolixity.
Among these, the meaning of the text beginning with the word
'beginning' (ārambhaṇa) is as follows.
The Chāndogas, having made an initial statement to the effect
that through the knowledge of the material cause there arises the
knowledge of all the effects, in the passage: '"Whereby the unheard
becomes heard, the unthought thought, the unknown known"'
(Chānd. 6.1.3), state a parallel instance to establish it, in the passage:
'"Just as, my dear, through one lump of clay, everything made of
clay may be known,—the effect, having its beginning in speech is a
name, the reality is just the clay"' (Chānd. 6.1.4¹). That is, just
as 'through one lump of clay' being known as clay, 'everything made
of clay', i.e. the group of the evolutes of clay, may be known, since
1 The passage is "Yathā saumya! ekena mṛt-piṇḍena sarvaṁ mṛnmayaṁ
vijñātaṁ syāt, vācārambhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyaṁ mṛttikēty eva satyam".
19