द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

CHAPTER XV
THE WHITE PAPER AND THE COMMUNAL AWARD¹
THE proposals contained in the White Paper issued in March,
1933, represented the tentative conclusions arrived at by the
British Government after three sessions of the Round Table
Conference. According to this scheme, India is no longer
to be divided into British India ruled directly by the British
Government, and the Indian States ruled by Indian Princes,
or Rulers or Maharajahs under the suzerainty of the British
Crown. India is to be a federation composed of the provinces
of British India, eleven in number including Sindh and
Orissa, and such of the Indian States as would voluntarily
join the Federation. Those Rulers who signify their desire
to join the Federation will have to execute a formal Instrument
of Accession transferring to the British Crown for the pur-
poses of the Federation their powers and jurisdiction in
respect of those matters which they are willing to recognise
as Federal matters. The powers and jurisdiction so trans-
ferred will be exercised by the appropriate Federal organs
created by the new Constitution Act. The Federation will
be brought into existence by the issue of a Proclamation by
His Majesty, the King-Emperor, but the proclamation will
not be issued until:
I. His Majesty has received intimation that the Rulers
of States representing not less than half the aggregate
population of the Indian States and entitled to not
less than half the seats to be allotted to the States
in the Federal Upper Chamber have signified their
desire to accede to the Federation.
and
¹ This chapter gives only a rough idea of the provisions of the White
Paper and the Communal Award. For further details which are uninter-
esting to the general reader, one should refer to—Proposals for Indian
Constitutional Reform 1933. printed and published by His Majesty's
Stationery Office, Adastral House, Kingsway London, W.C.2. Price 2s. nett.
310

THE WHITE PAPER 311
2. Both Houses of the British Parliament have presented
an address to His Majesty praying that such a Pro-
clamation may be issued. It is further provided that
before the first Federal Ministry comes into being,
a Federal Reserve Bank,¹ free from political influence,
will have been set up by Indian legislation and be
already successfully operating.
The White Paper also states, that ‘it is probable that it
will be found convenient or even necessary that the new
Provincial Government should be brought into being in
advance of the changes in the Central Government and the
entry of the States.’ It is therefore clear that the inaugura-
tion of the Federation may be indefinitely postponed even
after the new Constitution Act is passed by the British
Parliament.
The idea of bringing in the Princes into the constitutional
machinery is to provide a Conservative element in the Federal
Legislature which will counteract the radical forces in British
India. With this object in view, while the representatives
from British India in the Federal Legislature will be returned
through a director (or indirect) election² with the help of a
popular franchise, however restricted, the representatives from
the States will be nominated by the Indian Rulers. The
subjects of the Indian States comprising about one-fourth of
the total population of India³ will have no representation what-
soever in the Federal Parliament. The support of the Indian
Rulers (or their nominees) to the British Government in the
working of the Federal Constitution will be secured because
the British Government in its turn undertakes not to interfere
in the internal autocratic administration of the Indian States.
Thus, if the Federation is ultimately set up according to the
White Paper proposal, the Princes will retain their sovereignty
¹ The Reserve Bank Bill has been already passed by the Indian Legis-
lative Assembly.
² The White Paper recommended direct election in the case of the
Federal Assembly (Lower House) and indirect election in the case of the
Council of State (Upper House). The Joint Parliamentary Committee,
however, have recommended indirect election in both cases.
³ In the 1931 Census, the total population of India including Burma
is about 352 millions. British India excluding Burma has a population
of about 257 millions. The total population of the Indian states is about
81 millions.

312 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
over their internal affairs and will have a further hand in
working the Federal machinery. There will be no provision
in the new Constitution for a democratic or popular or con-
stitutional government in the Indian States. Moreover, the
Indian States will enjoy special concessions or exemptions in
the matter of Federal taxation and in the Federal Legislature
they will have representation far in excess of their population.
In spite of these baits thrown out by the British Government,
many of the Indian rulers are fighting shy of the constitutional
innovation.
According to the White Paper, the offices of the Viceroy
and the Governor-General will be separated, though the two
offices will be held by the same person. The Governor-
General will be the executive head of the Federation and will
have the supreme command of the military, naval and air
forces of India as well, while the Viceroy will be the represen-
tative of the British Crown and will exercise the powers of the
Crown in relation to the Indian States and all other matters
outside the scope of the Federal Constitution. The Governor-
General will himself direct and control the administration of
certain Reserved Departments—namely, Defence, External
Affairs and Ecclesiastical Affairs. In this administration he
will be assisted by not more than three Counsellors, who will
be appointed by himself and will be ex-officio members of
both the Legislatures, without the right to vote. For the
purpose of aiding and advising the Governor-General in the
exercise of other powers, there will be a Council of Ministers.
The Ministers will be appointed by the Governor-General,
will hold office during his pleasure and must be members of
one or other Chamber of the Federal Legislature. The
Counsellors will be responsible to the Governor-General
alone—but the Ministers will be responsible to the Legis-
lature, subject to such control as the Governor-General will
exercise over their departments. In regard to administration,
the Governor-General will make, in his discretion, any rules
which he regards as requisite to regulate the disposal of
Government business and the procedure to be observed in
its conduct. He will also be empowered in his discretion to
appoint a Financial Adviser to assist him in his special

THE WHITE PAPER 313
responsibility for financial matters. The salary of the Financial
Adviser will be fixed by the Governor-General and will not
be subject to the vote of the Legislature, nor will he be
responsible to the Legislature.
Apart from his exclusive responsibility for the reserved
departments, the Governor-General will be declared to
have a 'special responsibility' in respect of the following
matters:
(a) The prevention of any grave menace to the peace and
tranquillity of India or any part thereof.
(b) The safeguarding of the financial stability and credit
of the Federation.
(c) The safeguarding of the legitimate interests of minorities.
(d) The securing to the members of the public services
of any rights provided for them by the Constitution
Act and the safeguarding of their legitimate interests.
(e) The prevention to commercial discrimination.
(f) The protection of the rights of any Indian State.
(g) Any matter which affects the administration of any
department under the direction and control of the
Governor-General.
It will be for the Governor-General to determine in his
discretion whether any of the 'special responsibilities' here
described are involved by any given circumstances.
In the Instrument of Instructions which will be issued to
the Governor-General by the King-Emperor, it will be
provided that in the administration of the departments under
the direction and control of the Governor-General on his
own responsibility and of matters committed to his discretion
—he will be under the control of the Secretary of State for
India. Though in other matters the Governor-General
should ordinarily be guided by the advice of his Ministers, he
may not accept their advice if it is considered by him as
inconsistent with the fulfilment of a special responsibility
entrusted to him by law and in such a case the Governor-
General may take such action as he will judge requisite, subject
to the directions of the Secretary of State for India. It will

314 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
be clear that in such matters the responsibility of the Ministers
to the Legislature is non-existent.
The Governor-General will have the power to make and
promulgate Ordinances for a period of six months and renew
them for a second period if at any time he is satisfied that it is
necessary for the requirements of the reserved departments
or any of his 'special responsibilities.' He will also have the
power of making and promulgating Ordinances for the good
Government of British India or any part thereof, if at a
time, when the Federal Legislature is not in session, his
Ministers are satisfied that an emergency exists. Both kinds
of Ordinances while in operation will have the force and
effect of Acts of the Legislature. Further, in the event of a
breakdown of the Constitution, the Governor-General will
be empowered at his discretion, by Proclamation, to assume
to himself all such powers vested by law in any federal
authority as appear to him to be necessary for the purpose of
securing that the Government of the Federation shall be
carried on effectively.
The Federal Legislature will consist of two Chambers to
be styled the Council of State (Upper House) and the House
of Assembly (Lower House). Each Council of State will
continue for seven years and each House of Assembly for
five years, unless sooner dissolved. The Council of State will
consist of no more than 260 members, of whom 150 will be
elected from British India, not more than 100 will be appointed
by the Rulers of the Indian States and not more than ten
will be nominated by the Governor-General in his discretion.
Out of 150 British Indian seats, 136 will be filled by election
by means of the single transferable vote by the members of
the Provincial Legislatures, the bigger provinces being entitled
to 18 seats and the smaller to 5 seats each. Out of the remain-
ing 14, Europeans, Indian Christians and Anglo Indians will be
entitled to 7, 2 and 1 seats respectively—while Coorg, Ajmer,
Delhi and Beluchistan will be entitled to one seat each.
One-third of the British-Indian seats in the Council of State
will be reserved for the Moslem community, though their
population is approximately only one-fourth of the entire
population of British India. The House of Assembly will

THE WHITE PAPER 315
consist of not more than 375 members of whom 250 will be
elected from British India and not more than 125¹ will be
appointed by the Rulers of Indian States. The number
earmarked for British India will be allocated to the several
communities and interests as follows: Depressed Classes
(Hindus), 19; Sikh, 6; Moslem, 82; Indian Christian, 8;
Anglo-Indian, 4: European, 8; Women, 9; Commerce and
Industry, 11 (of whom approximately 6 will be Europeans²);
Landholders, 7; Labour, 10; General (Hindus and others),
105. The Depressed Classes seats will be filled up in the
manner prescribed in the Poona Pact adopted after the fast of
Mahatma Gandhi in September 1932. Bills will be introduced
in either Chamber, but Money Bills and Votes of Supply will
be initiated only in the Assembly. No Bill will become law
until it has been agreed to by both Chambers and has been
assented to by the Governor-General, or in the case of a
Reserved Bill until His Majesty in Council has signified his
assent. Any Act assented to by the Governor-General will
within twelve months be subject to disallowance by His Majesty
in Council. The Governor-General will, however, have the
power to enact at his discretion as a Governor-General's Act
any Bill which is not passed by the Chambers within a specified
date in spite of a message from the Governor-General that that
Bill should become law by that date. A Governor-General's
Act will have the same force and effect as an Act of the
Legislature. The Governor-General will be further empowered
in his discretion, in any case in which he considers that a
Bill introduced or proposed for introduction or any clause
thereof or any amendment to a Bill moved or proposed, would
affect the discharge of his responsibility, to direct that the
said Bill, Clause or Amendment shall not be further pro-
ceeded with. It will thus be seen that the Governor-General
has been vested with extraordinarily wide powers in the
matter of modifying any legislation under consideration,
¹ With a population less than one-fourth of India, the Indian States
will have 33⅓ per cent. of the seats in the assembly and more than 38 per
cent. of the seats in the Council of State.
² The European population in India is 168,134 out of a population of
about 352 millions. Nevertheless, they are to have 14 seats in the Assembly
and 7 seats in the Council of State.

316 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
withholding legislation completely and enacting fresh legis-
lation. Such powers he does not possess even to-day.
The White Paper further says: 'Apart from the Reserved
Departments and the 'special responsibilities' of the Governor-
General outside the sphere of those departments, there is a
third category of matters in which the Governor-General will
not be under any constitutional obligation to seek or having
sought, to be guided by ministerial advice. For this purpose
certain specified powers will be conferred by the Constitution
on the Governor-General and will be expressed as being
exercisable 'at his discretion.' In this category of 'dis-
cretionary powers' . . . His Majesty's Government anticipate
that the following matters will be included:
(a) The power to dissolve, prorogue and summon the
Legislature.
(b) The power to assent to, or withhold assent from Bills
or to reserve them for signification of His Majesty's
pleasure.
(c) The grant of previous sanction to the introduction of
certain classes of Legislative measures.
(d) The power to summon forthwith a joint session of the
Legislature in cases of emergency where postponement
till the expiration of the period to be prescribed by the
Constitution Act might have serious consequences.
With regard to Legislative procedure the Governor-
General will be empowered to make rules:
(a) Regulating the procedure of and the conduct of
business in the Chamber in relation to matters arising
out of, or affecting, the Administration of the Reserved
Departments or any other special responsibilities with
which he is charged.
(b) Prohibiting, save with the prior consent of the
Governor-General given at his discretion, the dis-
cussion of or the asking of questions on:

1. Matters connected with any Indian State other
   than matters accepted by the Ruler of the State
   in his Instrument of Accession as being Federal
   subjects, or
2. Any action of the Governor-General taken in his
   discretion in his relationship with a Governor.

THE WHITE PAPER : 317
3. Any matter affecting relations between His
Majesty or the Governor-General and any
foreign Prince or State.
In the event of conflict between a rule so made by the
Governor-General and any rule made by the Chamber, the
former will prevail and the latter will, to the extent of the
inconsistency, be void.
From the above it will be clear that in order to nullify the
effect of ‘responsibility of the executive to the Legislature’
—not only have numerous reservations been made in the
matter of responsibility, but the powers of the Legislature
have been severely curtailed. The net result is that the
Federal Legislature will be more helpless than the Indian
Legislature of to-day and the Governor-General of the future
will be more powerful than the Governor-General of to-day.
The Governor-General will cause a statement of the
estimated revenue and expenditure of the Federation,
together with a statement of all proposals for the appropriation
of those revenues, to be laid, in respect of every financial
year, before both Chambers of the Legislature. Proposals
for appropriation of revenues will not be submitted to the
vote of either Chamber of the Legislature if they relate to
heads of expenditure like—Interests, Sinking Fund Charges,
Expenditure fixed by the Constitution Act, etc., salary and
allowances of the Governor-General, of Ministers, of Coun-
sellors, of the Financial Adviser, etc., expenditure required
for the Reserved Departments, etc., salaries and pensions of
the Judges of the Federal or Supreme Court, etc., salaries
and pensions payable to, or to the departments of, certain
members of the Public Services, etc.¹ The statement of
proposals for appropriation will specify those additional
proposals whether votable or non-votable, which the Governor-
General regards as necessary for the discharge of any of his
special responsibilities. The proposals for the appropriation
¹ In the light of legislative experience, the expectation or rather ap-
prehension is that the non-votable items will cover about 80 per cent.
of the total expenditure.
The White Paper provides that the Governor-General will decide which
item is non-votable as falling under one of these heads.

318 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
of revenues, other than proposals relating to heads of expen-
diture enumerated above and proposals made by the
Governor-General in discharge of his special responsibilities,
will be submitted to the vote of the Assembly. The Council
of State, by a motion duly passed, may require that any
demand which is reduced or rejected by the Assembly shall
be brought before a joint session of both Chambers for final
determination. At the conclusion of the budget proceedings,
the Governor-General will authenticate by his signature all
appropriations, whether voted or non-votable. In the
appropriation so authenticated, the Governor-General will be
empowered to include any additional amounts which he
regards as necessary for the discharge of any of his special
responsibilities—provided that the total amount authenticated
under any head is not in excess of the amount originally laid
before the Legislature under that head in the statement of pro-
posals for appropriation. Thus if any grant is refused by the
Legislature, the Governor-General will be empowered to re-
store it. The respective legislative fields of the Centre and of the
provinces will be defined in terms of the subjects which will
be scheduled in the Constitution Act. It is proposed further
to include in the provincial list a general power to legislate on
any matter of a purely local and private nature in the province.
But in order to provide for the possibility that a subject which
in its inception of a purely local or private character may
subsequently become of All-India interest, it is proposed to
make that power subject to a right of the Governor-General
in his discretion to sanction general legislation by the Federal
Legislature on the same subject-matter.
With regard to the position of the Federal Ministers, the
White Paper says that 'the number of ministers and the
amounts of their respective salaries, will be regulated by Act
of the Federal Legislature.’¹ Nevertheless, there is a further
provision that the salary and allowances of the Federal Ministers
will not be submitted to the vote of either Chamber of the
Federal Legislature.² (There are similar provisions with
regard to the Provincial Ministers.)
¹ Paragraph 15 of the White Paper Proposals.
² Paragraph 49 of the Proposals.

THE WHITE PAPER 319
With regard to the Federal Judiciary, the White Paper
provides for a Federal Court and a Supreme Court. The
Federal Court will have an original and an appellate juris-
diction and will deal with all disputes involving the inter-
pretation of the Constitution Act or any rights or obligations
arising thereunder. An appeal will lie to His Majesty in
Council from a decision of the Federal Court in any matter
involving the interpretation of the Constitution Act. There
will also be a Supreme Court for India, which will be a
Court of Appeal from High Courts in British India. An
appeal from the Supreme Court to His Majesty in Council
will be allowed in civil cases only by leave of the Supreme
Court. In criminal cases no such appeal will be allowed.
After the publication of the White Paper, while giving
evidence before the Joint Parliamentary Committee, Sir
Samuel Hoare stated that the idea of having a separate
Supreme Court might be abandoned and provision might be
made enabling the Legislature, if and when it was thought
desirable, to extend the jurisdiction of the Federal Court—so
as to make it the one final Court of Appeal, subject always
to the right of appeal to His Majesty in Council. According to
the White Paper, the Chief Justice and the Judges of the
Federal Court (as also of the Supreme Court if it comes into
being) will be appointed by His Majesty and will hold office
during good behaviour. Their salaries, pensions, etc., will
be fixed by Order in Council and will not be subject to the
vote of the Legislature.
After the commencement of the Constitution Act, the
present Council of the Secretary of State for India will be
dissolved. The Secretary of State will then appoint not less
than three and not more than six persons, who will form his
Advisory Council. Persons appointed by the Secretary of
State to any of the Services before the commencement of the
Constitution Act will continue to enjoy all Service rights
possessed by them at that date. After the commencement of
the Constitution Act, the Secretary of State will continue to
make appointments to the Indian Civil Service, the Indian
Police and the Ecclesiastical Department and the conditions
as to pay and allowances, pensions, discipline and conduct of

320 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
such persons will be regulated by rules, made by the Secretary
of State. Every person appointed by the Secretary of State
will continue to enjoy all service rights existing at the date of
his appointment. 'At the expiration of five years from the
commencement of the Constitution Act, a statutory inquiry
will be held into the question of the future recruitment for
those services except the Foreign Department and the Eccle-
siastical Department. The decision on the results of this
inquiry, with which the Governments in India concerned
will be associated, will rest with His Majesty's Government
and be subject to the approval of both Houses of Parliament.'¹
Thus the important services will continue to be under the
control of the Secretary of State for India in London, in spite
of the so-called responsibility granted to India. The Federal
and Provincial Ministers will have as subordinates, officials
over whose destiny they will have no control and against
whom they will not be able to take any disciplinary measures.
As for the other services, the Federal and Provincial Govern-
ments respectively will appoint and determine the conditions
of service of all persons in the Federal and Provincial services
respectively. For conducting competitive examinations for
appointments to the Federal and Provincial services respec-
tively, there will be a Federal Public Service Commission and
Provincial Public Service Commissions. The members of the
Federal Public Service Commission will be appointed by the
Secretary of State and of the Provincial Public Commission
by the Governor. The emoluments of the members of all
Public Service Commissions will not be subject to the vote
of the Legislatures. Thus the Public Service Commissions
will be quite independent of the popular will.
Some other provisions have been made to safeguard the
interests of Britishers. The Indian Reserve Bank² already
¹ White Paper Proposals, para. 189.
² An announcement has been made by the India Office, London, on
4th October, 1934 saying that the Indian Reserve Bank Bill will be con-
stituted early in 1935. The Governor, Deputy-Governors and the Central
Board of the Bank will of course be appointed by His Majesty's Govern-
ment. As a matter of fact, some appointments have already been made.
Sir Osborne Smith has been appointed Governor of the Bank; Mr. J. B.
Taylor, first Deputy Governor and Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan (some time
Acting Governor of the Punjab) second Deputy Governor.

THE WHITE PAPER 321
referred to, which is a condition precedent to the inauguration
of the Federation—will manage currency and exchange
according to the dictation of London. To administer the
Indian railways with their vast resources, there will be a
Statutory Railway Board which will be so composed, as 'to
perform its duties on business principles and without being
subject to political interference.' In the composition of the
Railway Board, the people will have no voice whatsoever.
Lastly, there is a very important provision meant to preserve
intact the vested interests of the British Mercantile com-
munity. The Federal Legislature or the Provincial Legis-
lature will have no power to make laws subjecting any British
subject domiciled in (or company incorporated in) the United
Kingdom to any disability or discrimination in the exercise
of certain specified rights—for instance—the right to enter,
travel and reside in any part of British India; to hold property
of any kind, to carry on any trade or business in, or with the
inhabitants of, British India and to appoint and employ at
discretion agents and servants for any of the above purposes.
Such restrictions on legislation do not exist even to-day.
The Indian Legislative Assembly to-day, for instance, can
enact laws giving Indians special advantages in the matter
of business and trade though they could be subsequently
vetoed by the Governor-General. It appears that the
British Government want to prohibit altogether legislation
like the Indian Coastal Shipping Bill, which sought to
reserve the coastal trade of India for Indian Shipping Com-
panies.
With regard to the 'fundamental rights' which Indian
public opinion so strongly demanded, the White Paper says:
'His Majesty's Government see serious objections to giving
statutory expression to any large range of declarations of this
character, but they are satisfied that certain provisions of this
kind such for instance as the respect due to personal liberty
and rights of property and the eligibility of all for public
office, regardless of differences of caste, religion, etc., can
appropriately, and should, find a place in the Constitution
Act.' There is no mention in this connection of such elemen-
tary rights as freedom of speech, freedom of association, etc.
X

322 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
—nor is there any assurance given that the scanty rights to
be conceded will be made altogether inviolable.¹
According to the White Paper the powers of the Governor
in relation to his ministers, to the Provincial Legislature and
to the Provincial Administration will be an exact replica of
those enjoyed by the Governor-General at the centre. Hence
it is not necessary to repeat all those provisions. The only
difference will be that in the Provinces there will be no
'reserved departments' managed by 'Counsellors' but cor-
responding to them there may be 'Excluded Areas' or 'Par-
tially Excluded Areas' the administration of which will be
beyond the control of the Legislature. Most of the provinces
will have only one Chamber—but in Bengal, the United
Provinces and Bihar there will be two Chambers. The term
of the Lower House—the Legislative Assembly—will be
five years, and that of the Upper House—Provincial Council
—will be seven years. The Provincial Council will be con-
stituted partly by nomination by the Governor and partly by
direct election from constituencies for Moslem and for non-
Moslem voters. In Bengal and Bihar a certain number will
also be elected by the Provincial Assembly by the method of
the single transferable vote. And in Bengal one member will
be elected by qualified European voters. The constitution of
the Provincial Legislative Assembly has been explained below.
The Franchise Scheme embodied in the White Paper is
based on the Lothian Committee's Report, the Prime Minister's
Communal Award and the Poona Pact. Talking, generally,
the present provincial franchise has been made the franchise
for the Lower House of the Federal Legislature. The present
ratio of women to male voters will remain unchanged. The
existing franchise in all the provinces is essentially based on
property. The White Paper proposes to supplement property
qualification by an educational qualification common to men
and women. There will be a differential franchise in the case
of the Depressed Classes in order to enfranchise about 2 per
cent. of their population. The White Paper proposes to
¹ For instance, it is not clear that imprisonment without trial will be
be rendered impossible in India as has been done in Great Britain owing to
the Habeas Corpus Act.

THE BENGAL SITUATION 335
people to say that the revolutionary movement is the result
of unemployment among middle-class youths.
At the outset it should be pointed out that the revolutionary
movement is not an anarchist movement, nor is it merely a
terrorist movement. The revolutionaries do not aim at
creating anarchy or chaos. While it is a fact that they do
occasionally resort to terrorism, their ultimate object is not
terrorism but revolution and the purpose of the revolution
is to install a National Government. Though the earliest
revolutionaries studied something about revolutionary
methods in other countries, it would not be correct to say
that the inspiration came from abroad. The movement was
born out of a conviction that to a Western people physical
force alone makes an appeal. It is not generally realised by
Britishers, that it is they who have been primarily responsible
for teaching the Indian people the efficacy of physical force.
Two or three decades ago (and even till to-day in some
cases) the average Britisher in India, especially when he was
a member of the army, or of the police, was so haughty in his
general behaviour towards Indians, that no Indian with a
grain of self-respect could help feeling the humiliation of
being under a foreign government. In the street, in the
railways, in the tram-cars, in public places and in public
functions, in fact everywhere, the Britisher expected the
Indian to make way for him and if he refused to do so, the
Indian would be assaulted. In such cases of friction, the
forces of the Government were always on the side of the
Britisher. Cases frequently happened in which Indians of the
highest position and rank—even Judges of the High Court—
would be insulted in this way. Even during the Great War,
when India was fighting on the side of England, such cases
of friction between Indians and Britishers would constantly
occur in the tram-cars in Calcutta,¹ No legal or constitutional
remedy could be found for such insults for neither the police
nor the subordinate Law Courts would venture to do justice.
Then the time came when Indians began to hit back and
when they did so, the effect was immediate and remarkable.
Ever since then, in proportion as they have been able to hit
¹ The writer has had personal experience of many such cases.

336 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
back, Indians have been able to move about in their own
country without losing their self-respect. Even in the colleges
in Calcutta, British members of the staff would often be
guilty of insulting behaviour towards Indian students and the
fact that to-day such cases are not frequent, is because Indian
students also made use of physical force in upholding their
self-respect.
This then is the psychology behind the revolutionary
movement; but a further explanation is necessary to show
why Bengal has, comparatively speaking, become its strong-
hold. The trouble began with Macaulay. When he was out
in India as a member of the Government, Macaulay wrote a
scathing denunciation of the Bengalis and called them a race
of cowards. That calumny went deep into the hearts of the
Bengali people. Simultaneously the Government took the
step of excluding the Bengalis from the army on the ground
that they were not sufficiently warlike or brave. The climax
came when the Grand Moghul, Lord Curzon of Kedleston,
attempted to crush the Bengalis by partitioning their province.
The people at first retorted with the help of Swadeshi and
boycott. But when brute force was used—as at Barisal in
1906—to break up peaceful processions and meetings, the
people felt that peaceful methods would not suffice. In sheer
despair, young men took to the bomb and the revolver.
The effect was immediate. The behaviour of the Britisher
began to improve. The impression gained ground that for
the first time the Bengali was being respected by the Britisher.
Many of the revolutionaries were hanged but they were able
to demonstrate that the race to which they belonged was not
a race of cowards. They were therefore regarded as martyrs
in many a Bengali home and they had the silent homage of
the Bengali race.
On this soil and in this manner has grown up the revolu-
tionary movement in Bengal. What is the remedy for it?
Two courses are open to the Government—firstly, to demon-
strate to the people that for winning political freedom it is not
necessary to resort to revolutionary methods and secondly,
to give individual revolutionaries a chance of serving their
country along peaceful and constructive lines. With regard

THE BENGAL SITUATION 337
to the first, the short-sighted policy of the Government has
served to strengthen the arguments of the revolutionaries.
The reforms introduced at the end of the Great War were so
meagre as to cause widespread discontent. The revolutionary
who came out of prison at the end of the war after years of
confinement, found that the promised liberty was an empty
dream and there was no opening for serving his country along
peaceful and constructive lines. Nevertheless, in response to
the appeal made by Mahatma Gandhi and Deshbandhu C. R.
Das, they promised to eschew the path of violence and give a
trial to the new method of non-violent non-co-operation and
it must be admitted that the vast majority did keep their
promise. But what did the Government do? On the plea
that some stray acts of violence had been committed in a
corner of a great province, the Government rounded up a
large number of men from all over the province in 1923 and
again in 1924, and kept them in prison for a number of years
without trial. The public feeling at the time was that there
were over-zealous officers in the Intelligence Branch of the
Bengal Police who in order to justify their existence and the
existence of their department, imagined more than they
actually saw. And it was even believed that agents provocateur
were employed for the purpose of entrapping innocent young
men. It will not do to ignore such complaints with an official
sneer, for if one really desires to go to the root of the problem,
he should investigate all such complaints with an open mind.
After some years, that is in 1927 and 1928, the Government
again began to release the détenus. But as in 1919-20, so
also in 1927-28, a real amnesty did not take place. Both
before and after his release, every détenu was harassed so
much by the police that the release instead of producing a
sense of relief, left bitterness in his mind. If the releases
had been ordered as a stroke of generous-hearted statesman-
ship, the effect would have been quite different. The 1930-34
phase of the revolutionary movement in Bengal could have
been possibly avoided if some special circumstances had not
cropped up. Firstly, the attitude of Mahatma Gandhi at the
Calcutta Congress had a very unfavourable effect on the
minds of the youths. It gave them the impression that the
Y

338 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
Mahatma was a spent force and that a mass movement under
the leadership of the Congress was highly improbable.
Owing to this feeling a section of the youths began to prepare
for independent action on their own behalf on revolutionary
lines. Thus it was that the Chittagong Armoury Raid took
place. This activity was, however, restricted to a very small
area and when the Mahatma launched his movement early in
1930, the youths all over the province were drawn towards it.
For the subsequent development of the revolutionary move-
ment in Bengal, and for the repeated acts of terrorism, the
Government themselves were to blame more than anyone
else. Whether in Midnapore or in Dacca or in Tipperah
District, in each case atrocities committed by the agents of
the Government and the failure of the public to secure any
redress by constitutional means were responsible for provok-
ing people to acts of terrorism as a retaliation. Even the
subsequent acts of terrorism in Chittagong District should
be attributed not to a desire to work up a revolution in the
country but to a desire to retaliate against what the revolu-
tionaries regarded as acts of official terrorism.
The question arises here—Is it possible in the circumstances
to come to an understanding with the revolutionaries? Yes,
it is, provided the approach is made in the right way and the
intentions are really sincere. A broad mind is required for
an understanding of the problem and courage is needed for
solving it. A direct negotiation with the Party is indispensable.
This necessity would not have arisen if Mahatma Gandhi or
any other public leader had volunteered to be their spokes-
man. Since that is not possible, direct negotiation is the only
alternative.
It is generally urged by police-officers, that the revolu-
tionaries are out for the severance of the British connection
and that they are altogether irreconcilable. There is no
doubt that the revolutionaries stand for independence; but so
also does the Indian National Congress. If an understanding
could be attempted with the Congress, it could be equally
done with the former. In 1931, the then Governor of Bengal,
Sir Stanley Jackson, thought it desirable to make the attempt
and he used the late Mr. J. M. Sengupta as an intermediary.

THE BENGAL SITUATION 339
The result was not altogether hopeless. That the negotiations
then proved to be abortive was due entirely to the fact that
the Government did not comply with the request of the state
prisoners in Buxa Detention Camp that the negotiations
should be conducted directly with them and not through any
police-officer.
There are two conditions essential to the success of an
attempt of this sort. Firstly, the Government should really
be able to demonstrate by their own liberal policy that it is
possible for the Indians to win their political rights without
any resort to violence. If their policy, however, be to resist
for all time the Indian demand for freedom, then no under-
standing will ever be possible. Secondly, the Government
must see to it that those who are to give up revolutionary
methods, are given other opportunities for serving their
country along peaceful and constructive lines. Merely to find
some employment for them will not be enough. It is foolish
to suggest, as many have done in order to please the Govern-
ment, that middle-class unemployment is the cause of the
revolutionary movement. If that had been the case, well-to-do
people would never have been drawn into the movement.
But while it is true that middle-class unemployment is not
the cause of the revolutionary movement, it is of course true
that if opportunities for public service had been open to
young men in Bengal, then the attempts of the revolutionaries
to obtain recruits would have failed. The present temper and
policy of the Government whereby every young man is
regarded as a potential revolutionary and treated as such, and
the present conditions in the province, whereunder it is quite
hopeless to win Swaraj by working along constructive lines,
are among the most fruitful causes of the revolutionary
movement. Revolutionary methods are in their ultimate
analysis, an expression of utter despair. If this despair is once
removed, an understanding with the revolutionaries is
certainly possible. That will not mean that they will cease
to be patriots or that they will give up serving their country.
It will only mean that they will direct their activities along
other channels.
Whether an understanding could be reached in the near
2Y

340 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
future depends largely on the personality of the present
Governor of Bengal, Sir John Anderson. Before he went out
to India, he made statements to the effect that he was going
out not merely to suppress the revolutionary movement but
with a view to understanding the deeper causes of it in order
to effect a reconciliation. Unfortunately since his arrival in
Bengal, he has hardly done anything towards a genuine
reconciliation. Nor has he given any proof of his desire to
understand the deeper causes of the movement, though in the
meantime he has done everything that a zealous police-officer
could hope to do. Sir John Anderson has the reputation of
being a strong man and that reputation is not without founda-
tion. Only a strong man can tackle a problem of this sort
which has baffled so many people. The diehards in the
Indian Civil Service and in the Indian Police Service are not-
the people who would welcome an understanding with any
party in the country—much less with the revolutionary party.
Therefore it is not unfortunate that the Governor of Bengal
is a strong man. It is only to be hoped that he will show his
strength of mind and firmness of resolve to better purpose
than in the past during the remaining years of his office.

CHAPTER XVIII
A GLIMPSE OF THE FUTURE
As the life of the present British House of Commons will
come to an end in '1936, the Constitution Bill for India will
certainly be put through Parliament before the next General
Election. There is at present a keen controversy going on in
England between the supporters of the White Paper and the
Conservative Diehards led by Mr. Winston Churchill. For
India, the controversy has no interest whatsoever. As we
have already seen, the White Paper contains precious little
and few people in India will be sorry if the scheme is whittled
down further, as seems likely, or suffers complete shipwreck.
What really interests India in connection with the White
Paper is the fact that it leaves no room for co-operation for
those who may feel tired of the prolonged struggle and
would like to settle down to some useful, constructive work.
The policy of the Government, therefore, will help to keep up
the present opposition.
The Government hope to stifle or ignore the Nationalist
opposition in the country with the help of the minorities—
the Moslems, the Depressed Classes, the Indian Christians
and the Anglo-Indians. But will they succeed? It is probable
that for a time a large section of the different minority com-
munities in India will be under official influence. This will
be their return for the concessions made to them in the
Communal Award. But this position cannot last long. The
Communal Award has at best given these communities better
representation in the Legislatures under the new Constitution.
But the new Constitution will give no power to the Indian
people as a whole or to any section of them. It will not
therefore take the representatives of the different com-
munities in the Legislatures long to realise that though the
Government gave them seats, they did not give them power.
Seats in the Legislatures are only meant for a few. These
341