पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

whole truth I regret much that I have not been able to prevail upon you to
relinquish your plan You may depend upon it you will never make it a
satisfactory work I will get you the list of the French army, generals, etc
Just to show you how little reliance can be placed even on what are supposed
the best accounts of a battle I mention that there are some circumstances men
tioned in General -------'s account which did not occur as he relates them He
was not on the field during the whole battle particularly not during the latter
part of it The battle began I believe at eleven It is impossible to say when
each important occurrence took place, nor in what order These are an
swers to all your queries but remember I recommend you to leave the battle
of Waterloo as it is
With the words of these quotations ringing in his ears how dare an
Indian writer take up the well worn theme of the battle of Panipat and hope
to succeed in the attempt? Waterloo was fought between two most advanced
nations represented by such extraordinary men as Napoleon and the Duke of
Wellington Everything about it was going on in the most civilized and up to
date manner There was no dearth of official despatches reports, explana
tions plans memoirs affirmations and contradictions And still we have the
comments of the chief actor in the field on the victorious side as quoted above
How much more unsatisfactory the state of affairs must be when dealing with
Panipat—a battle fought between two parties one of which was backward
and the other barbarous! One party could not write an official report of the
battle because it simply ceased to exist the other would not write about it be
cause it thought it superfluous As for private writings survivors from the
defeated and annihilated party could write only apologetically and sometimes
with a guilty conscience the members of the victorious party wrote with ex
aggeration and bombast, sometimes without any regard for truth knowing
that nothing succeeds like success The result is that the historian has to de
pend on later gathered partial reports individual memoirs and chronicles
written with a purpose, none having a complete vision of the whole affair
Even then the material available is very scanty, leaving many lacunæ in the
connected story One has to do without maps plans official orders, chits from
the generals in their hand writing before the end of the battle as well as later
confirmations or denials Such is the basis for Panipat
But an historic event on which hung the fate of a nation the destiny
of a continent and the future trend of world affairs for centuries cannot, and
ought not to go unrelated And it will be granted that the story can best be
related by one of the nationals preferably by one belonging to the losing side
For thus only can the whole truth about the event come out or find expression
With this idea I have ventured to take up the theme and write the follow-
ing pages
xvii 1

THE PESHWA FAMILY
1 Balaji Vishwanath = Radhabai
(1713-1720)
2 Bajirao (1720-40) Chimaji Apa
Sadashivrao Bhau
(killed at Panipat)
3 Balaji alias Nanasaheb Raghunathrao alias = Parvatibai
= Gopikabai (1740-61) Raghoba Dada
Vishwasrao 4 Madhavrao 5 Narayanrao
(killed at Panipat)
SHINDE GENEALOGY
1 Ranoji (died 1745)
2 Jayapa (1745-55) Dattaji Tukoji Mahadji
(assassinated) (killed 1760 (killed at (wounded and
at Buradi) Panipat) made lame
3 Janakoji (1755-61) for life)
(slaughtered in captivity)
xix

CONTENTS
Preface
Introduction
CHAPTER Page
I The Marathas in the Panjab and Beyond 1
II Sukartal, Buradi and After 18
III Sadashivrao's Appointment for Northern India 31
IV Kunjpura 52
V Panipat 62
VI The Battle 86
VII The Judgment 106
Critical Bibliography 128
List of Maps
1 India—Mughal Subahs 6
2 Panipat Route March 36
3 Panipat Vicinity at Present 62
4 Positions of the Rival Camps I 65
5 Positions of the Rival Camps II 68
6 Positions of the Rival Camps III 72
7 Battle of Panipat—First Stage 87
8 Battle of Panipat—Second Stage 90
9 Battle of Panipat—Third Stage 96
xx

SYNOPSIS OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
Pages
THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND, 1758-59 1-17
Ahmad Shah Abdali's invasions of India and the contract between the Emperor of
Delhi and the Peshwa, 1; Effect of the transfer of the Subahs to the Peshwa 2; How Deccan
Politics affected the Peshwa's policy towards Delhi, 3; Abdali's arrangement for the govern-
ment of India and the Panjab, 5; How his plan came to be thwarted 5 The Maratha
slogan for the governance of the Indian empire, 6; Raghunathrao's letter to the Peshwa
reiterating the Maratha ideal, 6; Note his invasion of the Panjab and the Maratha entry
into Lahore 7; The Peshwa recalls Raghoba to the Deccan and Adina Beg dies, 8; Tukoji
Holkar pushes on to Peshawar, to support Abdul Rahim Khan, Ahmad Shah's nephew and
a claimant to the Afghan throne 9; Dattaji and Janakoji Shinde go upto the Satlaj, but
soon return towards Delhi 10; The flaw in the Maratha policy in the Panjab 10; Their
line of communication stretched by 500 miles, 11; The Poona Court had no correct idea of
the adventure they were entering in 12; Sabaji Shinde not a fit man to counteract the
personality of Ahmad Shah Abdali 12; Abdali's return from Khorasan and Jahan Khan's
invasion of the Panjab 13; The Peshwa's recall of Dattaji Shinde, a disastrous step,
14 Financial loss to the Marathas in their Panjab glory, 14; Raghunathrao's advice to
Dattaji and Janakoji to beware of Najib Khan 15; Malharrao's advice to the contrary
15; Ghaziuddin's treacherous behaviour towards the Marathas, 15; Dattaji enters into
negotiations with Najib 15; Najib's plot against the Marathas and his invitation to
Ahmad Shah Abdali—The Marathas had no information of this plot—Dattaji duped as a
result, 16; Najib pins down Dattaji for four months—Sabaji's return from the Panjab—
Bapuji Trimbak meets with disaster in the Satlaj Doab—End of the Panjab episode 17
CHAPTER II
5
SUKARTAL, BURADI AND AFTER, 1749-60 18-30
Dattaji Shinde alienates Ghaziuddin but cannot win over Najib, who has both the
means and the freedom to create mischief, 18; The strategic position of Sukartal—Dattaji
besieges Najib in it 19; Abdali enters the Panjab—Madhavsingh of Jaipur makes his stand
against Malharrao Holkar—Shuja comes to the help of Najib—Dattaji sends Govindpant
Bundele to attack the Ruhela lands beyond the Ganges—He precipitately runs back at the
coming of Shuja's troops and the rumours of Abdali's coming, 20; Sabaji joins Dattaji—
The emperor Alamgir murdered at the instigation of the Wazir and a new emperor Shah
Jahan brought to the throne—The Wazir joins Dattaji—Dattaji raises the siege of Sukartal
and goes to meet Abdali 21; Abdali catches Dattaji unprepared and eludes him after-
wards joining Najib—Dattaji retreats towards Delhi and calls in Malharrao to his help
22; Malharrao delays—Ahmad Shah and Najib advance towards Delhi—The guarding of
the fords by Dattaji—Abdali eludes and crosses over to Buradi—Its situation 23; Dat-
taji's plan—Has no idea of engaging with the Afghans till the arrival of Malharrao—Is
obliged to meet in the difficult terrain on the bank of the Jamuna—Is overpowered and
slain 24; The wounded Janakoji with the whole Shinde contingent runs back and is pursued
by the Afghans 25; The description of the retreat he meets Malharrao at Kot Putali—
Malharrao's life philosophy—Its contrast with the temperament of the Shindes 26 Mal-
harrao's new strategy to meet the Afghan menace—Ghaziuddin's double dealing 27;
The Peshwa's dire need of money—Seems to auction the Wazir's post between Ghaziud-
din and Shuja—Surajmal Jat makes a common cause with the Marathas—Ahmad Shah
invites the northern states to rise against the Marathas but all sit on the fence 28
Abdali's campaign south of Delhi—The Marathas enter the Doab but surprised at Sikandra-
bad—Run back to Agra after heavy massacre 29; Holkar and Shinde retreat into the
Jaipur territory and wait for the help from the Deccan—Abdali takes Ramgad and can-
tons in the Doab—Diplomatic talks with trans-Ganges Ruhelas 30
CHAPTER III
SADASHIVRAO'S APPOINTMENT FOR NORTHERN INDIA, 1760 31-51
None in the Deccan prepared for Dattaji's death—Peshwa in the thick of fight with
the Nizam—His position thought to be of a dictator in India, 31; Bussy recalled from
Hyderabad—Terminates the French influence in the Deccan—The Peshwa succeeds in de-
taching Ibrahim Khan a pupil of Bussy and begins hostilities against the Nizam—The bat-
tle of Udgir where the Nizam brothers are completely overpowered 32; Half the dominions
xxi

of the Nizam surrendered to the Peshwa—Sadashivrao Bhau becomes the hero of the day—
The futility of the Peshwa's victory—Prestige overrules perspection, 33, The squabbles
in the Peshwa's family—Raghunathrao refuses to take command of the north—Bhau or-
dered by the Peshwa to the north—Vishwasrao the eldest son of the Peshwa placed at
the head—Bhau's hands tied throughout the campaign, 34, Bhau's foibles—The divisions
selected by Bhau—The difficulties in the march from Patdur to Delhi 35, Bhau's progress
hampered by various causes—The Marathas have left Shivaji and Bajirao behind and
follow the Mughal manners 36, Bhau invites all northern Indian states to send contin-
gents in the fight against Abdali but none comes to his help—Tribes rise in rebel-
lion against the Marathas—An epidemite amongst the horses 37, Abdali's plans to return
held over through the machinations of Najib—Shuja-ud-daulah was wooed by both parties—
Suspicions of Maratha aims 38, The difficult position of the Marathas in all directions—
The Peshwa and his advisers cannot grasp the real situation—They miscalculate the enemy
forces and attempt a wrong solution 39 Bhau's progress through Central India—Zeitgeist
of the 18th century—No common policy for the whole of India—Fissures in the Maratha
camp 40, Wisdom in Holkar's advice—Women and pilgrims clog the Maratha march—
Nature also goes against the Marathas 41 The meeting with Shinde and Holkar—Dis-
cussion of future plan—Bhau chalks out his line of action and proceeds to Delhi, 42, Delhi
taken and its government settled 43 44, Peace parleys through the medium of Shuja—
Bhau tries to win over Abdali's allies—He misjudges the motives of the various parties
and also the abilities of Govindpant Bundele and others, 45, Bhau's army suffers from
want of money—Minting down the silver of the Diwan i-khas 46, The Maratha collectors
in the north fool both the Peshwa and Bhau—Bhau's legs pulled from Poona, 47, Loose
administrative system of the Marathas—Shinde and Holkar fall in with Bhau's line of
thought—Surajmal Jat goes back disgruntled—Surajmal's defection due to his selfishness
and not to Bhau's insult 49 Abdali's movement in the Doab—Change of his camps—
Going and coming of ambassadors 50, Nothing comes out of the peace talks—The condi-
tion of the Maratha camp deplorable and deteriorating day by day, 51

CHAPTER IV
KUNJPURA (October 1760) 52-61
The terrain to the north of Delhi 52, The sufferings of the Maratha army 53, Bhau
takes steps to counteract Najib's propaganda against the Marathas—Shah Jahan Sani
deposed and Shah Alam declared emperor—The good results of this step—The Sikhs in Lahore
proclaim Bhausaheb and pray for his victory, 54, Alasingh of Patiala promises to join
Bhau—Abdali's hold over the Panjab lost—A last effort at peace—Bhau proceeds to Kunj-
pura for intercepting Abdus Samad Khan 55, Falling down of the Jamuna waters—Bhau's
calculations based on wrong information—Attack on Kunjpura 56, Defeat and massacre
of the Afghans—Marathas secured booty and wheat collected for Abdali—The idea of a
pilgrimage to Kurukshetra miscarries Bhau's plan 57, Abdali crosses the Jamuna at
Bhau's back and blocks Bhau's return to Delhi—Bhau orders a march back 58, Abdali
crosses with his whole army at Gauripur before Bhau could intercept him 59, The Marathas
receive their first rebuff at the hands of Abdali—A retrospect of Abdali's movement in the
Doab and a contrast with the state of his army with that of the Marathas 60 Abdali's
parallel move towards the north and coming to Baghpat—Search for a ford on the river—
Abdali's daring in crossing the Jamuna 60 Description of his crossing—He comes to-
wards Panipat 61

CHAPTER V
PANIPAT (November-December 1760) 62-85
The Marathas confident of victory at the beginning—They had enough corn 62, Bhau
puts his faith in Ibrahim Khan and fortifies himself at Panipat—He expects Govindpant
Bundele to do the impossible, 63, Why Bhau waits after Govindpant's death not known—
Perhaps waiting for help from the Deccan as previously promised 64, Strategic posi-
tion at Panipat—Bhau aggressive during November, 65, Abdali obliged to retreat to the
river side—Abdali's decision not to attack the Marathas in their fortified position and
waste his power 66 Kashiraj's incorrect forebodings, 67, Balwantrao Mehendale's death
—His wife goes Sati—The turning point in the struggle 68, the "Bakhar" criticism of
Balwantrao wrong—Sir Jadunath's incorrect translation, 69, Abdali intercepts letters from
the Maratha camp to Delhi and the Deccan—Thus knowing the Maratha plans, Govind-
pant comes at last with money to Delhi and invades the Doab 70, Taken by surprise by
Atai Khan and killed—He atones for all his sins with his life 71, Abdali tightens the
siege and assumes offensive—Shifts his camp and blocks the Maratha road to Delhi—
The party of Parashar Dadaji with money loaded on horses cut to pieces by the Afghans
—The difficulties of the Marathas, 72, Their misfortunes by fire and scarcity—Cold, rain,
and disease add to their sufferings 73 No knowledge of Bhau's plans and waiting—Con-
flicting reports in the chronicles, 74 The decision to fight and Bhau's plan decided in
consultation with Ibrahim Khan Gardi, 75; A retrospect of the trans-Ganges plans of the
xxii

Marathas—Gopalrao Barves raid on Oudh—Delay to the end of December—Veni bahadur
guards Oudh in Shuja's absence, 76, Barve's lightning campaign of a fortnight—He takes
Bhojapur, Dalmau and Nawabganj—Veni bahadur descends upon him with a big force—
The Zamindars allied with the Marathas run away—The Maratha army dispersed—Barve
returns to Korah, 77, Panipat locality not favourable to the Marathas—Maratha manners
give scope to mischievous elements, 78, Bhau created a tremendous impression and is still
remembered in this locality—Legends about Bhau in the surrounding area—Bhau fort near
the village of Isapur, 79, No correct information about it available—The imperial canal
flowing to the west of Panipat, 80, The canal water stopped at the head led to the
scarcity of water—The existence of the canal need not be doubted 81, The numbers and
the Sardars in the Maratha army—Abdalis forces at the beginning of July 1760—Latter
additions and subtractions, 82, The final figures engaged in the last battle—Sir Jadunath's
estimate tallys with ours—The number of camp followers capable of building the armis
in the Afghan camp 83, The number of camp followers—The composition of the Maratha
camp, pilgrims and candidates, priests and tradesmen—Women in the Maratha camp—
Exaggerated accounts, 84, The chronicles of the 18th century, both Persian and Marathi
have no sense of direction and no visualization of the shape of land due to want of maps—
• Sir Jadunath misses this point and so is led astray—He has no sense of correct time also
from which his description of the battle suffers—He does not understand the lunar calendar
and so miscalculates the period of moon light, 85
CHAPTER VI
THE BATTLE (14th January 1761) 86-105
'
The Maratha army marches out early in the morning—Their arrangement—The dis
tribution of the various captains—The hollow square formation—The arrangement of the
Afghan army, 86, The battle begins—Ibrahim khan Gardi leads the vanguard and at
tacks the Ruhelas—The Maratha cavalry appointed to support Ibrahim Khan—Acts rashly
and out marches of Gardi infantry—Meets with sharp fire and runs back broken in spirit
—The aim of the march was to reach the Jamuna and not to offer battle, 87, The orders not
understood or followed by the Maratha captains—The Maratha ammunition wasted, the
whole responsibility at the front falls on Ibrahim Khan's musketeers—The superiority of
the Ruhela fire—The Maratha cavalry fails to take the advantage of the gap created by

The disaster minimised by the Marathas in political interest—Rumours of Bhau and
Janakoji being alive—Its good effect—Ahmad Shah completely disillusioned—Returns to
Afghanistan 98 99, Loss of human lives in the battle, 100, The massacres of the fugitives
after the battle—The spoils of the battle 101, Exaggerated account of captured booty—
The after events beli the reports—It was a Pyrrhic victory, 102, Maratha food arrange-
ments during the battle—And their mode of warfare, 103, The Maratha appearance and
their camp and arms 104 105
CHAPTER VII
THE JUDGMENT 106-127
The death of the Commander in chief was made use of by the survivors and renegades
by making him a scape goat—Bhau not a free man in peace talks—The Peshwa's share in
diplomacy—Bhau not a first rate general—His mould more civil than military—Ahmad
Shah on the other hand a completely military man—The Marathas not warlike in the
same sense as the Afghans 106, Bhau's ideal and aim different from those of the other
Marathas—The guerilla mode handed down by Shivaji—No pitched battle—Useful for de-
fence but not for conquest—Malharrao Holkar differs from Bhau and so cannot be con-
demned 107, His behaviour throughout his life similar 108 Not treacherous but lukewarm
—Govindpant Bundele's case—Rajwade's charges against him—He was a revenue col-
lector and not a military captain—His age and habits of life against military dash—
Geographical factor makes him all important 109 Abdalis daring puts Bhau in a quandary
—Only a similar counter daring could have saved Bhau—Govindpant not a fit man for
military duty—Bhau's suspicions about Govindpant—Not a rich man nor efficient not
above board 110 Acting hand in glove with various administrative officers—Boastful man-
ner, procrastinating—All Maratha officers took the air of chiefs or partners in the empire
111, The Peshwa's system of recruitment for the services defective—No trained staff—
Nepotism—Govindpant made a scape goat because he died—Rajwade begins with preju-
dice against him 112 Lights upon a sheaf of papers and carried away by the partial
presentation of the affair—Changes dates to suit his interpretation—Caste prejudice—
Govindpant intimate with the Peshwa family 113 Rajwade's charge proved only as far
as the accounts were concerned—Peshwa ought to have devised a better system 114,
Level of the population low the main defect—Bhau not proud but prejudiced—Feared but
not loved by the surrounding people 115, The misfortune of the Marathas—Bhau not
below the average as a General—His sound pleas in advance of the times—The initial
mistake of the cavalry at the back of Ibrahim Khan who led the vanguard of the marching
hollow square 116 Ideas and orders not understood nor followed because there was no
previous training in the new system—Bhau was going on systematically, but he suc-
cessively failed in diplomacy, manoeuvring, daring and was trying the final ordeal of
pitched battle to destroy the enemy—No unity of thought, no co ordination of effort—The
inherent defects of the Maratha system exhibited at Panipat 117, Marathas imitators
and not inventors—No proper assimilation of foreign models—Waywardness no comrade-
ship—Individual initiative but no collective effort—Personal prosperity the aim—Not indi-
viduals but system responsible for the disaster 118, The death of Nanasaheb Peshwa—
Not a consequence of the disaster—his health failing for a number of years—Hereditary
defect—Addicted to women—Second marriage 119 Probable causes—Medical, astrological,
personal 120, Panipat only gave the last shock—Nanasaheb was not in a position to help
Bhau—Marathas unconscious of the things surrounding them 121, The Marathas fought
for a cause creed and country—The victory did no good to Abdali but ruined the Marathas
—Bajirao took a wrong step and it was blindly followed by his sons—Consolidation neg-
lected—Ignorance of political forces—No progressive education 122 Defective geographical
knowledge, no maps—No written documents or books for the education of younger peo-
ple—In short backward civilisation—Marathas no robbers but aspiring to be rulers—
Fight for a higher principle 123, Keeping their word sanctity of contract—Bhau requested
by the Mughal emperor to relieve him from the burden—Marathas become enemies of all
and friends of none—They would have been more successful if they had not accepted the
burden of running the Mughal State 124, They were the most powerful forward tolerant,
civil and ethical amongst the Indian people of those days—And still they failed 125 The
Marathas took to arms as the last alternative—They were ranked non-martial by the
British in the 19th century—Fight for a cause but no useless spilling of blood by them—
War a moral necessity under certain circumstances—But the military force of a nation
not necessarily the manifestation of its moral force—War not a school for virtues—
Marathas fought for a cause a principle and not for material gain or glory at Panipat,
126, Abdali also fought for a cause disinterestedly—Derived no benefit from his victory—
The Maratha aim was fulfilled one foreigner went away—But another entered by the
back door as a result—The irony of history best illustrated by Panipat, 127
XXIV

CHAPTER I
THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND
THE historic document printed at the very beginning of Rajwade's
first volume of original letters marks a turning point in Maratha history. Un-
fortunately the document is only a copy in Perso-Marathi of the original con-
tract between the Emperor of Delhi and the Peshwa represented by Malharrao
Holkar and Jayapa Shinde. The date of the document can now be fixed with
certainty. It is May 1752.¹ Ahmad Shah Abdali, the new king of Afghanistan
and the successor to Nadir Shah's eastern dominions, then loomed large on
the Indian horizon. He had been beaten off in his first attempt of 1748. But
he was not a man to be discouraged by one failure. He again invaded the
Panjab in 1749 and secured a promise of tribute from its governor. Not re-
ceiving the tribute, he invaded for the third time in 1752 and laid siege to
Lahore. But Mir Mannu,² the Mughal Subahdar of the province, was a
clever man, not devoid of valour. He did not shrink from having a trial of
strength with Abdali. Lahore fell, however, at the end of March and Mir
Mannu consented to act in future as Abdali's agent. Ahmad Shah, the
Mughal Emperor, allowed his governor to pay 50 lakhs of rupees³ to Abdali,
being the surplus revenue of the province after defraying all expenditure. The
Emperor's consent had been given through the mediation of his favourite,
Khoja Jawed, who acted as a sort of unofficial rival to the Wazir in all his
dealings. The Emperor had been obliged to accede to the spoliation of his
dominions as he could not help Mir Mannu in time. Khoja Jawed had
alienated the Mughal grandees so effectually during the last four years, that
none was ready to take upon himself the duty of defending the Empire against
the Afghans. Wazir Safdar Jang had just then completely overpowered the
Ruhelas with the help of Shinde and Holkar. The Wazir had returned to
Oudh and the Marathas were on the point of going to the Deccan, when the
Emperor's peremptory call obliged the Wazir to go to Delhi with the Marathas
so as to bring pressure on Abdali. Before he could come, however, the timid
Khoja and the terrified Emperor had acceded to transfer the revenues of the
north-western subahs to Abdali, who took it to be a permanent arrangement.
When the Marathas with their victorious army came to Delhi, the Khoja
thought of counteracting the wrong step that he had taken under pressure.
He, in conjunction with the Wazir, prevailed upon the Emperor to enter into
a contract with the Marathas by which they would take upon themselves the
duty of defending the Empire against its internal and external foes. It is not
correct to say that the Wazir was the sole originator of this arrangement as
wrongly read by most historians (e.g. Fall 1, p. 306). The flaw in the in-
terpretation has arisen on account of not minutely studying the document.
The Peshwa had consented to remain loyal to and was to take orders from
1 Shinde 3.203-4
2 His title was Muin-ul-mulk.
3 SPD 21.53.
P. F.—1 [1]

2 PANIPAT 1761
the Emperor and the Khoja in preference to the Wazir It is important to
note this fact because on the basis of it the Peshwa's ambassador at the Delhi
Court and the military guard under Antaji Manakeshwar had to take the side
of the Emperor and fight for him against the Wazir in 1753, when Safdar
Jang rebelled against his master, though by that time Khoja Jawed had been
assassinated The Marathas were to receive the Chauth of the north western
provinces already usurped by the Afghans These included the Mughal Subahs
of Sind, Multan, and Lahore, as well as the districts of Hissar, Sambal, Morada
bad and Budaun then under the control of the Ruhelas and other refractory
nobles The claim to one fourth of the revenues of these lands could be made
good only by conquest, of which there was only a remote possibility To induce
the Marathas to accept this hazardous adventure, something more tangible was
necessary Therefore the other two refractory Subahs of Ajmer and Agra in
the possession of the Rajput and Jat chiefs were given to the Peshwa Previous
to this, the Emperor had tried to make good his claim to these lands by send-
ing Mir Bakhshi Salabat Khan in 1749, but he had to return disappointed
after spending more than two years in those regions without collecting any sub-
stantial amount of tributes After ruining this great nobleman, Khoja Jawed
had bestowed the Subahs on Ghazi ud din Khan, the eldest son of the Great
Nizam ul mulk and Intizam ud daulah, the eldest son of the late Wazir
Qamar ud din Khan These two noblemen, though heads of the Turani party
after their fathers' deaths, were militarily of no consequence When it was
found in the crisis of Abdali's invasion that none of them was useful to the
State, the Khoja had to make a compromise with the rival Wazir and bestow
the Subahs on the Peshwa, while entering into a contract with him, as related
above
The transfer of the Subahs was facilitated because the dispossessed
Ghazi ud din had another move in his mind, to make good his claim to the
Viceroyalty of the Deccan as the eldest son of the Great Nizam The Wazir
Safdar Jang wanted to get his son, the boy Shuja ud daulah nominated to
the post, but the Peshwa had to set up a rival to Salabat Jang, a son of the
Nizam, for which purpose Shuja was not useful, as the grandees of the Dec-
can, especially the Maratha Sardars of the Nizam, would not side with a per-
son who bore no relationship with him The Khoja had in fact created a coun-
terpoise to the Irani Shia party of the Wazir by buying the Maratha support
to the Turani Ghazi ud din and the Emperor The Muslim party had gained
a great point in bestowing the Subahs of Ajmer and Agra on the Hindu Mara-
thas as against the overbearing and refractory Rajputs Thus they had set
the Hindus against each other and made a common, solid, Hindu front against
the Muslims impossible The far reaching effects of this fundamental move
were seen in the next decade (1752 61) The refractory Rajputs came closer
to the Muslim party and fought with the Marathas incessantly Panipat was
an outcome of it
The Peshwa's desire to get complete control of the Deccan by setting up
a weak pro-Maratha son of the Nizam as Viceroy, was foiled by the usual
Muslim tactics of assassinating the person and calling in foreign help as that

THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND 3
of the French. Bussy dominated the Deccan politics during this decade, and
all the efforts of the Peshwa were directed towards checkmating his moves and
machinations. He had to take the false step of joining with the English as a
result of it. Thus Indian politics came to be dominated by the moves and in-
terests of the foreigners instead of by the sons of the soil whether Hindu or
Muslim. The Afghans, the English and the French decided the fate and shaped
the future of India during this crucial epoch.
The Wazir Safdar Jang clandestinely got Khoja Jawed murdered in
August 1752, with a view to bring the Emperor completely under his thumb.
But his aim of governing the whole Empire with the Maratha aid was not to
be fulfilled. Ghazi-ud-din Firuz Jang, the Viceroy-designate of the Deccan,
was also murdered by his step-mother in Aurangabad in October 1752, lead-
ing to a collapse of the Peshwa's arrangement as noted above. Salabat Jang
had to be acknowledged as the de facto Viceroy, and the French influence be-
came fully established at the Nizam's Court. Another unexpected outcome of
this untoward happening was the emergence of a new character on the political
stage of Delhi. This was Ghazi-ud-din the younger, a son to the murdered
man. By playing upon the good feelings of Safdar Jang, this boy of fifteen
got himself appointed as the Mir Bakhshi of the Empire. Soon after, he be-
came the leader of the conspiracy against his benefactor, and in this he se-
cured the help of the Marathas in the name of the Emperor on the basis of
the agreement mentioned above. By making war on the Wazir and his allies
the Jats, under the walls of Delhi, he succeeded in driving away Safdar Jang to
his governorship of Oudh and Allahabad by the end of 1753. But in doing
this he also created a future rival to himself, the wily Najib Khan Ruhela.
With the help of the Ruhela contingent under Najib and Malharrao Holkar
with his master, the Peshwa's brother, Raghoba (Ragunathrao), Ghazi-ud-din
went through another revolution at Delhi in June 1754. He deposed the
Emperor Ahmad Shah, after first getting himself nominated as the Wazir in
place of his cousin Intizam-ud-daulah⁴. Alamgir II was crowned the new
Emperor.
Safdar Jang's downfall had been hastened because the Irani Shia party
of which he was the head was proclaimed as pro-Hindu by the Turani Sunni
party of Mughal grandees. The popular opinion in Delhi held the Empire as
well-nigh handed over to the Marathas. A plausible colour is given to this
opinion by certain unverified clauses of the agreement of 1752, noted in the
beginning. Besides the provinces actually mentioned in that agreement, it is
mentioned in contemporary private letters that the Chauth of all the twenty-
two provinces⁴ of the Mughal Empire had also been granted to the Marathas,
together with the administration of the holy cities of Benares, Brindavan and
Mathura. Antaji Manakeshwar is found confirming this information a year
later in his despatch⁵ to the Peshwa. But these important clauses are not
found in the document published by Rajwade. Perhaps it was a personal un-
derstanding with the Wazir and an administrative concession or favour. What
⁴ Shinde 3.203-4.
⁵ SPD 21.53.

4 PANIPAT 1761
ever the case, it worked against the interests of Safdar Jang as well as his al-
lies, the Marathas.
Having once supported the Emperor against their former ally, the
Wazir, the Marathas should have consistently supported him thereafter. In-
stead they joined the upstart and unscrupulous new Wazir in deposing the
Emperor and placing a new man on the throne. This method of changing
their policy and allies to suit the interests of the intriguers at the Delhi Court
ultimately cost the Marathas very dearly. They successively alienated the
Rajputs, the Jats, the Oudh Wazir, as well as the Ruhelas, leaving not even one
constant and staunch supporter of their cause. This looseness further increased
on account of the conflicting self-interests of the various Maratha commanders
and statesmen. All this has to be borne in mind when we come to judge the
Maratha vicissitudes in north India, and its final culmination in the disaster
of Panipat.
After the fourth invasion of Ahmad Shah Abdali, which came like an
avalanche on the Delhi monarchy in 1757, the Empire was as good as broken.
The Marathas came on the scene when the whole region from Agra northward
had been looted to the last pie by Abdali. Even Ghazi-ud-din, their own
nominee, had become disgusted with the Maratha behaviour. So he accepted
the arrangement of Abdali, who appointed Najib as his military agent in the
Delhi affairs. Following the advice of Abdali, he had started with two young
Delhi princes to establish the Mughal rule in the lost dominions of Oudh and
Allahabad. Just when he was about to attack Shuja-ud-daulah who had suc-
ceeded Safdar Jang, the Marathas entered the field, dispersed the Wazir's army,
and again established their own supremacy at Delhi by ousting Najib. It
seems that after this new revolution, they entered into a new treaty with Ghazi-
ud-din. In place of the right to Chauth (one-fourth), they fixed their share
at half of all the revenues that they might gather from the erstwhile Mughal
dominions. Of course, there was no possibility of their getting anything with-
out the application of force, which meant war on all fronts of Delhi. With
a view to prevent Abdali from ever entering India, they now thought of
establishing the Mughal rule in the lost region of the five rivers and beyond.
Ahmad Shah Abdali, while returning to his own country with immense
loot in May 1757, left his son, the boy Taimur Shah, at Lahore as his Viceroy,
with Jahan Khan, his best general, as his guardian. Besides the Afghan party
of Abdali, there were two other claimants to the land of the five rivers. One
was the Mughal party headed by Mughlani Begum, the ambitious, self-willed
and profligate widow of Mir Mannu, the other was the democratic party of
the persecuted Sikhs. Mughlani Begum had at first tried to rule with the help
of her favourites, but in 1756 Ghazi-ud-din brought her under his control.
He married her daughter, Umda Begum, and made Adina Beg Khan, who had
already made himself powerful by raising a vast army to include the Sikhs, his
deputy. Later on, when Ghazi-ud-din found out his mother-in-law's real char-
acter, he got her kidnapped by one of his assistants and brought her back to
Delhi. He thereby also secured for himself her vast fortune. The Wazir's
deputy ruled at Lahore for six months but was soon ousted by Abdali's nominee.

THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND 5
At the end of the year 1756, Ahmad Shah himself followed, as mentioned
above, and returned after leaving Taimur to rule the Panjab. It seems that
Jahan Khan was only a blunt soldier and not a diplomat such as one needed
to be in the disturbed conditions of the Panjab of those times. Adina Beg
Khan, who had been baulked in his ambition to be the chief administrator by
the Afghan intrusion, now came out of his hiding in the hills. With the help
of his Sikh allies, he carried on a guerrilla war-fare and made Abdali's rule a
precarious one in that area. Another complication arose on account of
Mughlani Begum who had joined Abdali against her son-in-law, Ghazi-ud-din,
with a view to rule the Panjab herself. She had acted as Abdali's spy and
agent in digging out the buried wealth of the Delhi nobles. Ahmad Shah was
immensely pleased with her and carried her back to Lahore with him on his
return. He had promised the Jalandar Doab containing the best land in the
Panjab with Jammu and Kashmir to the north of it as her jagir. This ar-
rangement could not succeed for military reasons. Ahmad Shah revoked it
and thus Mughlani Begum became a pauper, because she was too proud to
receive a small pension instead. Her jagir was in the occupation of Adina Beg,
and probably she began to intrigue with him against the Afghan deputy. The
matters came to the point of Jahan Khan beating the Begum with his own
hand and confining her. The military power of Adina Beg was strong enough
to baffle the Afghan ruler, and therefore, Jahan Khan thought it best to leave
Adina Beg in his post of the revenue collector for a payment of thirty-two
lakhs. While Adina Beg wisely remained within his bounds, the Sikhs, perhaps
with his connivance, scourged throughout the province expelling Afghan col-
lectors. The Marathas who were at this time driving out Abdali's outposts in
the Jamuna valley naturally supported this movement against Abdali and
opened correspondence with Adina Beg. When the Marathas had completed
their work in the Doab, news came that the Sikhs had defeated two Afghan
generals, followed by a complete massacre and loot. Abdali's rule in his own
country was also challenged by some local parties and the Shah of Iran.
Finally, Adina Beg, who had the ambition to become the sole administrator in
the Panjab, called in the help of the Marathas. They had already chalked out
a policy of blocking Abdali at the Indus for fulfilling their responsibility of
defending the Empire against both internal and external foes. At the be-
ginning of 1758 they seriously devoted their attention to the problem and
planned the campaign in consulation with the Wazir Ghazi-ud-din.
A clear idea of the extent of the Mughal Empire is necessary for us to
understand this campaign. What has been called the Panjab in the British
regime was not a Mughal province. The area between the water-sheds of the
Satlaj and the Jamuna had been bifurcated by the Mughals. The southern
and the eastern parts of that area were included in the metropolitan province
of Delhi. The northern part of the land of the five rivers proper from At-
tock to Sarhind was included in the Subah of Lahore. The south-western
Panjab, with districts beyond the Indus adjoining to it, formed the Multan
province. The modern Sind was called Thattha province, and Kashmir was
also a separate province. Beyond the Indus, Kabul and Kandahar-formed
two separate provinces, out of which Kandahar was lost by Aurangzib in 1652,

6 PANIPAT: 1761
and Kabul was annexed by Nadir Shah in 1738. But all along, the idea of
these two provinces forming part of the Mughal's Indian Empire continued to
exist. All these provinces had separate Governors and Diwans in the best days
of the Mughal Empire. As gradual decay set in, sometimes more than one
province was placed under the charge of one person, and occasionally the
whole area came to be controlled by a single strong hand. During the anar-
chical times which followed Nadir Shah's invasion, Sind with portions of Mul-
tan as well as Kabul and Kandahar completely passed out of Indian hands.
Only the Panjab proper continued to be a debatable land for some time.
We have briefly noted the condition after Mir Mannu's death in 1753.
The Marathas cast the last die in the tragic drama with the slogan of the
complete integrity of the Indian Empire as built up by the Mughals with their
ancient boundaries. Unfortunately the Indian political world was not sufficiently
intellectually or morally advanced to grasp this fundamental idea and fight for it.
The Marathas had risen higher in transcending the bounds of race, language,
religion and sect. They took their stand on the basis of India for the Indians
to be governed and defended by themselves without foreign aid or interference.⁶
Malharrao Holkar accompanied Raghoba in this famous campaign,
while Sakharam Bapu was the Diwan and chief diplomatic adviser. The
⁶ I S—Aitihasik Sphuta Lekh 411.
Translation of Raghoba's letter, dated 4th May, 1758, from Lahore, received on 18th
June, 1758, by the Peshwa (Lele archives) :
“ We have already brought Lahore, Multan, Kashmir and other subahs on this
side of Attock under our rule for the most part and places which have not come under
our rule we shall soon bring under us. Ahmad Khan Abdali's son Taimur Sultan and
Jahan Khan have been pursued by our troops, and their troops completely looted. Both
of them have now reached Peshawar with a few broken troops. Ahmad Khan had invaded
Ispahan with his troops. But Jabar Shah (?), the Padshah of Iran, came out to meet him
and looted some troops of Abdali. So Ahmad has returned to Kandahar with some 12-14
thousand troops. Irani troops have come at their rear pursuing them. Jabarast Khan,
Mukarab Khan and other sardars and zamindars of those regions, who had joined Abdali
under compulsion, are now rebelling against his rule. They have written supplicatory
letters to me and are ready to enrol under us, so as to chastise Abdali. Thus, all have
risen against Ahmad Khan who has lost control over the regions. Even if Abdali goes to
Herat, he cannot hold on. In short, Abdali cannot get any more support from that side,
and so his power must wane. On that side, the Padshah of Iran has driven him into a
corner. On this side, we should do the same so as to establish our rule beyond Attock.
Your Honour had sent Abdul Rahim Khan Ahmad Khan's nephew and the (legal) heir
to the dominion of the Abdalis who had gone to Poona to seek your support, to us. We
have decided to establish him at some small place on this side of Attock to serve as his
base, and to appoint him to the subah of Kabul and Peshawar beyond. I am sending him
with Abdul Samad Khan whom we have captured at Sarhind with his Abdali troops, to-
gether with additional Irani and Mughal troops to support him. I hope that they will
begin the work of bringing those regions under control and with the (divine) support of
your Highness' auspicious valour, defeat Ahmad Khan once for all, so as to begin
our rule there. Myself and Malharba have received letters in his own handwriting from
the Padshah of Iran, inviting us to Kandahar soon so as to completely overpower Ahmad
and fix the boundary (between Iran and Hindustan) at Attock (the Indus). But we are
appointing Abdul Rahim, sent by Your Honour, to the subah of Kabul and are helping
him with troops and necessaries. Kabul and Kandahar—these two subahs were in the pos-
session of India from the times of Akbar to these of Alamgir. Why should (How can?)
we hand these over to the ruler of Vilayat (Iran)? Therefore we are giving those subahs
to Abdul Rahim here. He (the Padshah of Iran) also must not be caring very much for
these (rocky, unproductive, recalcitrant) provinces, he will rule over (his) Iran. We have
decided to establish our rule upto Kandahar (as in times of yore) and to despatch sweetly-
worded replies to the letters from Iran. Envoys from the rulers of Lati (Sind), Jammu
and Kashmir have arrived here (to settle the government of those regions)..”

TO FACE PAGE 6
KANDAHAR 1
KABUL 2
KASHMIR 3
LAHORE 4
DELHI 5
MULTAN 6
THATTHA 7
AJMER 8
AGRA 9
OUDH 10
BIHAR 11
BENGAL 12
ALLAHABAD 13
MALWA 14
GUJRAT 15 (CUTCH, SORATH)
KHANDESH 16
BERAR 17
AURANGABAD 18
BEDAR 19
ORISSA 20
HAIDRABAD 21
BIJAPUR 22
GONDWANA
ASSAM
ARCOT
SINHALDWEEP
BAY OF BENGAL
THE REGION WHICH WAS TRODDEN BY MARATHA HORSES
MAP OF INDIA
SHOWING MUGHAL SUBAHS
SCALE

THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND 7
Maratha army first approached Sarhind which was governed by Abdus Samad
Khan, a valiant general of Abdali He was at this time on a punitive expedi-
tion against Alasingh Jat, the founder of the Patiala State Hearing that the
Marathas were advancing, he settled accounts with Alasingh, quickly returned
to Sarhind and made preparations for defending it The Maratha troops were
not more than fifty thousand in number, though rumour had swelled it to two
lakhs In the first week of March 1758, they began the siege of Sarhind which
does not seem to have continued long Abdus Samad Khan tried to escape
but was captured along with Jang Baz Khan and other Afghans The Mara-
thas and the Sikhs thoroughly looted Sarhind and afterwards destroyed it
• Hearing of the fall of Sarhind, Jahan Khan, who had advanced from Lahore
to help Abdus Samad, returned precipitately The Maratha forces advanced
further, Adina Beg Khan leading them on the way Seeing them rapidly
advancing with confidence, Jahan Khan and his ward, the boy Timur, lost
heart, as they had not more than twenty five thousand troops with them to de-
fend themselves The valiant captain Manaji Paygude led the vanguard of
the Marathas with ten thousand horse along with one thousand Mughals un-
der Khwajah Mirza On the 20th April, 1758, the Marathas entered Lahore
Prince Taimur and Jahan Khan had already evacuated it on the day previous
and carried all their property beyond the Ravi The Marathas, after taking
charge of the fort, quickly crossed the river and pursued the Afghans upto the
river Chinab Only the Durrani troops of Taimur escaped hurriedly with
Jahan Khan at their head All his other troops, Turkish, Afghan and Indian,
were over powered by the Marathas, who took vast spoils in their camp The
Marathas would have pursued Jahan Khan still further, but fortunately for
him the river was deep and unfordable and all the boats necessary for crossing
the river had been taken to the other side by Taimur Sultan ⁷
Raghoba stayed in Lahore only for a month and then prepared to re-
turn to the Deccan at the express orders of the Peshwa leaving the administra-
tion of the whole province in the hands of Adina Beg who agreed to pay
seventy five lakhs a year to the Marathas An equal revenue was to go to the
Wazir at Delhi as his half share in the bargain The Maratha corps engaged
in this famous campaign were those of Manaji Paygude Gangadhar Bajirao
Retharekar, Gopalrao Ganesh Barve, Rayaji Sakhdeo, Renuko Anaji and
• Bapuji Trimbak, besides the Holkars contingent Hari Raghunath Bhide, a
fast friend and supporter of Raghoba, had also accompanied them Why
Raghoba was not allowed to continue in the Panjab is difficult to say In his
only available letter (Note 6) he writes that he was returning because the
Peshwa had recalled him
As a matter of fact the five years from 1757 to 1761 were the most
critical years in Indian history The Marathas who aspired to take into their
hands the political control of the whole continent, had to keep their attention
on the problems arising in all corners of India The Peshwa had recalled his
brother from Lahore probably because he thought the Deccan politics were
more important, and wished to end the French influence at the court of the
⁷ SPD 27.218, 220 Shinde 3 93, 94

8 PANIPAT: 1761
Nizam by fomenting an internal revolution there, through the agency of the
minister Shah Nawaz Khan The Peshwa was in the very thick of the con-
spiracy just at this juncture, but Bussy proved more than a match for the
Peshwa in this move He took the fort of Daulatabad from the hands of Shah
Nawaz Khan's retainer, in April 1758 Nizam Ali, the younger brother of the
Nizam Salabat Jang, was slowly and cautiously feeling his way and coming
forward under his brother's cover He caused the murders of Haidar Jang
the chief native assistant of Bussy, Shah Nawaz Khan and his son, thus ending
the French as well as the Maratha influence at the Nizam's Court at one
stroke Anticipating these developments, the Peshwa seems to have called back
his brother to be at his elbow in any crisis likely to arise from there
But as things then stood, this meant the weakening of the Maratha
strength in the Panjab just when it was most needed Raghoba and Malharrao
had acted wisely in choosing a proper time for pushing forward upto Lahore,
just when Abdali's troops there had been reduced to a small force But once
having pushed so far, it was necessary to build there an impregnable line across
Abdali's path Instead, they chose the wrong path—which has often been
repeated by the Marathas in their history—of returning home They had al-
ready made over the management of the conquered parts to Adina Beg and
left only a small force to aid him in any eventualities Their whole plan mis-
carried as later developments showed Raghoba and Malharrao returned at the
end of May 1758 They were conscious that the Maratha troops left behind
were inadequate While returning, they ordered certain other Maratha bri-
gades to proceed to the Panjab to canton there Malharrao despatched Tukoji
Holkar and Khandoji Kadam, Raghoba ordered Vitthal Shivdev to repair
there Janakoji Shinde, after his meeting with Raghoba in Rajputana on his
way back, sent the old and experienced Sabaji Shinde to take over the whole
charge of the Maratha affairs in the Panjab as a deputy governor Of these,
Vitthal Shivdev⁸ seems to have continued there only up to October, together
with his colleague Satvoji Jadhav Sabaji reached Lahore some time after
But in the interval Adina Beg died on the 16th September, 1758⁹ He was
the only experienced and influential man in the Panjab not altogether ill dis-
posed towards the Marathas After his death began again the vicious scramble
for power in that region Khwajah Mirza tried to assume the governorship at
Lahore and renew his broken career With the help of Tukoji and Khandoji
he beat back an invasion of some Afghans and Gakkhars in concert This was
before Sabaji's arrival and his taking over the charge of the Panjab Tukoji
and Khandoji pushed on beyond the Jehelum¹⁰ and the Indus in pursuit of the
Afghans and thus carried the Maratha standards beyond Attock This was
sometime in October 1758, before the severe winter in those regions began
Sabaji followed them after a short interval and joined them in Pesh.... ¹¹
8 SPD 21 146
9 SPD 2 96
10 BISM (Persian Mss) No 696
11 Ibid No. 699

THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND 9
This forward march of the Marathas was probably to place Abdul
Rahim Khan, a nephew of Ahmad Shah Abdali and a claimant, on the Afghan
throne. This Khan, though his name is not mentioned anywhere else, had
proceeded to Poona to seek the Peshwa's help in re-instating him in Afghanistan.
The Marathas seem to have taken him with them to Peshawar and tried to
establish him there. They continued in Peshawar during the whole of that
winter and returned to Lahore in March 1759, due probably to the Afghan
pressure. The internal politics of the province deteriorated still further in the
interval. The Maratha generals, left in the various parts of the province to
help the local collectors and maintain peace, began to take sides amongst the
rival factions for power in that province. Siding with Khwajah Mirza's
enemies they ousted him from Lahore, whence he fled with his Sikh allies to
the hills of Jammu. Bapuji Trimbak who had been placed at Multan to help
the local governor, seems to have been entangled between the local parties of
the Afghans and the Mughals in that region. Khwajah Mirza tried to take
shelter in the Jammu state, but Ranjit Dev, who was ruling there, asked him
to clear out by threatening him with dire consequences if he persisted in his
attempt to continue there. 12 He seems to have become a champion of Hinduism
at the instance of the Marathas, and openly declared his intention of brooking
no impediment from the Muslims in his province. The Mirza, therefore, re-
turned to Sialkot and made a common cause with his erstwhile enemies, the
wild Gakkhars. In the meantime Abdus Samad Khan, who had been cap-
tured at Sarhind by Raghoba and afterwards sent back to Kabul to help Abdul
Rahim Khan in his attempt to establish himself in those regions, again re-
turned to India in the wake of the returning Maratha troops. He tried to
create trouble for the Marathas by joining the opposite parties. He made com-
mon cause with Khwajah Mirza, and tried to make the Maratha hold impos-
sible in the regions beyond the Ravi. Next he suddenly swooped down on
Multan, held the city at ransom, and established his deputy there in opposition
to Muhammad Ali Khan, who was governing there with the help of Bapuji
Trimbak. Under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Khan, the people of Mul-
tan rose against the barbarous Afghan rule, drove that deputy out of the city,
and looted his army. This happened in March 1759.
Abdali had by this time freed himself from his western engagements
with the Shah of Iran and the affairs of Khorasan which had occupied him
for two years. He sent Jahan Khan to re-establish his rule in the Peshawar
region. His pressure and the failure of Abdul Rahim Khan's cause obliged
the Marathas to recross the Indus and come back to their base at Lahore.
After his return Sabaji joined his forces with others and thus reinforced, was
able to beat back an invasion of Jahan Khan at the end of August 1759. The
Afghan general lost his son in the attempt and many of his troops were killed
or wounded. He himself was also wounded and had to retreat across the Indus.
The summer of 1759 was the decisive time for the Marathas to make good
their hold on the Panjab if they wished to keep it. But Dattaji and Janakoji
Shinde who had gone up to the banks of the Satlaj in April that year re-
12 Ibid.

8 PANIPAT: 1761
Nizam by fomenting an internal revolution there, through the agency of the
minister Shah Nawaz Khan The Peshwa was in the very thick of the con-
spiracy just at this juncture, but Bussy proved more than a match for the
Peshwa in this move He took the fort of Daulatabad from the hands of Shah
Nawaz Khan's retainer, in April 1758 Nizam Ali, the younger brother of the
Nizam Salabat Jang, was slowly and cautiously feeling his way and coming
forward under his brother's cover He caused the murders of Haidar Jang
the chief native assistant of Bussy, Shah Nawaz Khan and his son, thus ending
the French as well as the Maratha influence at the Nizam's Court at one
stroke Anticipating these developments, the Peshwa seems to have called back
his brother to be at his elbow in any crisis likely to arise from there
But as things then stood, this meant the weakening of the Maratha
strength in the Panjab just when it was most needed Raghoba and Malharrao
had acted wisely in choosing a proper time for pushing forward upto Lahore,
just when Abdalis troops there had been reduced to a small force But once
having pushed so far, it was necessary to build there an impregnable line across
Abdalis path Instead, they chose the wrong path—which has often been
repeated by the Marathas in their history—of returning home They had al-
ready made over the management of the conquered parts to Adina Beg and
left only a small force to aid him in any eventualities Their whole plan mis-
carried as later developments showed Raghoba and Malharrao returned at the
end of May 1758 They were conscious that the Maratha troops left behind
were inadequate While returning, they ordered certain other Maratha bri
gades to proceed to the Panjab to canton there Malharrao despatched Tukoj

THE MARATHAS IN THE PANJAB AND BEYOND 11
of the ill-clad and unadaptive Marathas. An average Maratha soldier of those
days wished to return home after eight month's service and very few were willing
to continue in foreign lands for more than two camping seasons. Their prepa-
ration, their equipment, their physical stamina, not to say home sickness, would
not possibly make their sojourn tolerable beyond that period. These were very
real and basic difficulties and unless the Marathas became successful colonizers in
distant lands their hope of ruling India was bound to fail. The Muslims spread
their rule over the whole continent by this method of establishing self sufficient
colonies, however small, in the provinces they entered, one by one. And still
they took centuries to spread over the whole continent. They were, moreover,
proselytising and intermarrying with the various local people, thus always
strengthening and increasing their outposts. The Marathas, on the other hand
had not shown any of these characteristic virtues nor were they endowed with
progressive ideas, methods, or instruments—in short a higher civilization like
that of the British. How could they, under these circumstances make them
selves good as successful conquerors in foreign climes?
To hold this new stretch of five hundred miles from Ambala to Peshawar
would have required a permanent garrison of one lakh of soldiers judiciously
distributed at the various key points. This stretch is itself geographically
divisible into two almost equal parts, one from Ambala to the Chinab and the
other from the Chinab to Peshawar. Up to the Chinab the land is a vast,
sandy, level plain. One can scarcely see any hill on the horizon unless one
goes north. Beyond the Chinab, hills begin on a small scale, and beyond the
Jehelum, the region is mountainous, rocky and comparatively barren, the pro-
portion of cultivable land becoming less and less. In the time of Akbar, the
whole of this western tract was included in the three Mughal Subahs of Lahore,
Multan (to include Sind), and Kabul which included both Kashmir and
Kandahar in those days. Afterwards, Sind or Thattha Kashmir and Kandahar
became separate governorships, due probably to their distance from the centre
and the exigencies of military defence. Anybody wanting to rule over these
territories would have required good cavalry with horses inured to hot and cold
climates, camel corps carrying guns to run through the arid deserts, as well
as good mountaineers to pass through dangerous and sometimes snow clad
regions. When Raghoba is found seriously discussing the sovereign rights of
the Mughal government or the correct policy for their agents, the Marathas,
in these regions, it is doubtful whether he had visualised all these prospects or
calculated their cost. The Marathas also employed camels in carrying express
despatches kettle drums as well as baggage, but they had never taken the
trouble to create an efficient, fighting camel corps, much less organise a mobile
artillery of swivel guns carried on these animals, like Abdali. In fact, Abdali's
chief and most successful innovation seems to be this mobile artillery which
was always handy when compared to guns carried on carts drawn by bul-
locks. In the camel corps, both the gunner as well as the driver were seated on
the same animal, there was absolutely no impediment to its movement. Bul-
lock drawn artillery, on the other hand needed a pioneer force of sappers and
miners to prepare a tolerably good road to carry these heavy guns, requiring
in many cases as many as fifty bullocks to draw each gun. The chief adviser

10 PANIPAT 1761
turned to Delhi after appointing Sadik Beg, a deputy of Adina Beg, as the
chief revenue collector in the regions around Sarhind There was an idea of
appointing Naro Shankar¹³ in place of Sabaji Shinde, but it never materialized
After camping at Bahlulpur and Machhiwada on the south bank of the Satlaj
for a month or so, the Shindes returned with Naro Shankar Their return this
time was also due like the return of Raghoba in the previous year, to the
Peshwas advice cum orders The Peshwa was overburdened with debts He
was writing letter after letter to Dattaji Shinde to take up some new venture
which would fill the Peshwas treasury and add a new province to the Maratha
dominions Lahore Allahabad Benares, Patna and lastly Bengal were to be
taken over one after the other This meant dealing with Najib Khan, Shuja-
ud daulah Ghazi ud din the Prince Ali Gauhar and last but not least, the
English Sitting at ease in his cosy citadel in Poona and ruminating over the
thoughts of conquest over the whole of India was all right as a chamber pas
time but the Peshwa never seems to have realized the actual difficulties in that
path That a man of Ahmad Shah's type would take the ousting of his son
from the Panjab lying down was obviously impossible, still, the Peshwa in
sisted on the Shindes returning to Delhi instead of proceeding to Attock and
holding that line against all attacks
The Marathas remained in the Panjab only for a brief period, from
April 1758 to October 1759 They were, constitutionally, acting as agents of
the Mughal Emperor and were normally trying to make use of the local ma
chinery of government in carrying on the administration and collecting the
revenues They had to dismiss the Afghan nominees, no doubt, but in their
place they generally appointed the Mughals Whether the Marathas had
acted wisely in taking upon themselves such a hazardous adventure as trying
to conquer the Panjab and hold it out against such an exceptional man as
Abdali must be judged by the result, which is history A thoughtful historian
will always consider that it was a wrong step for the Peshwas to cross the
Narmada without first taking possession of the south up to Rameshvaram
After having crossed that river, they should have at least stopped at the Chambal
and first secured the overwhelmingly Hindu provinces of Allahabad and Oudh
which were just adjoining to the north, instead of touching the hornet's nest
at Delhi The Peshwa thought of first grasping the reins of the central govern
ment at Delhi and thus getting legal control over the whole empire That it
was a wrong step, impossible of fulfilment on account of the selfish, unpatriotic
and pusillanimous attitude of the ruling Muslims is proved at the bar of his
tory and no amount of casuistry can take away the blame from the Marathas
for the fundamental mistake of choosing the wrong path
From the military point of view, it was no wise step for the Marathas to
lengthen their line of communication by five hundred miles at one stretch Al
ready the distance of one thousand miles from Poona to Ambala was long
enough for them to defend successfully To step beyond Sarhind was almost a
mad man's behaviour The climate of the regions, with its extremes of heat
and cold, was not very propitious and was well nigh beyond the endurance
¹³ SPD 2.100