पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

THE JUDGMENT. 107
lieved in his professions at all. This was the real tragedy of the Panipat cam-
paign. Actually, it was Malharrao who, in the company of Raghunathrao,
had gone to the Panjab and stretched the Maratha sphere of influence upto
Attock and even beyond. It was this expansion by driving Abdali's forces out
of the Panjab that had caused Ahmad Shah Abdali to seek revenge. But Mal-
harrao had stretched the line only when Ahmad Shah, after first looting Delhi
and Mathura, had returned back to Afghanistan. Taking advantage of the
absence of the main forces of the enemy in India, Raghunathrao and Malhar-
rao had proceeded to Lahore. Even in the Panipat campaign, Malharrao's
idea was similar. He had advised Bhau to remain behind the Chambal in the
Maratha dominions and wait till the departure of Abdali. Afterwards he would
have accompanied Sadashivrao Bhau even to the Panjab, had he so desired.
Malharrao and most of the Marathas thought this as the real guerilla mode
coming down from the days of Shivaji. Fighting open, face-to-face, pitched
battles on the result of which the fate of the Marathas would depend, was
against the fixed tenor of their minds. They would never run such risks. On
the other hand, it was the intention first of the Mughals and later on of the
Afghans under Abdali to bring the Marathas to a pitched battle so as to de-
cide the issue in a single fight. As long as the defence of their home-land and
the breaking up of the enemy's power were the primary aims of the Marathas,
their old mode was all right; but now that the Marathas had spread over the
length and breadth of India and aspired to take the reins of Government of
the whole continent in their hands, the original mode was out of place and
time. Sadashivrao Bhau had understood this point, especially after coming
into contact with the French under Bussy in 1751, but Malharrao had not.
Malharrao followed his life's conviction even after Panipat and succeeded
when not confronted by the new type of infantry. He received his coup-de-
grace finally at the hands of the English at Kora on 3rd May, 1765, and fled
back to Kalpi to save his life! Thus it will be seen that a conflict of ideals
and long cherished modes of warfare cut at the root of Panipat.
The late Vishwanath K. Rajwade in his oft-repeated and uncritically
accepted criticism of the Panipat campaign,¹ puts the whole blame for the
failure on two persons in the main, Malharrao Holkar and Govindpant Bun-
dele. We have seen above how a fundamental conflict of ideals and modes
was at the root of the whole difference. Just as Bhau's mind was already
prejudiced against Govindpant long before his starting for the Panipat cam-
paign, similarly Bhau's opinion about Malharrao from the beginning was any-
thing but favourable. Malharrao's way in politics was to keep on speaking
terms with all and not to antagonise anyone completely.² He had kept a simi-
lar attitude towards Najib Khan for the same reasons. Such an attitude was
possible for a secondary potentate like Malharrao, but impossible for men of
Bhau's position who had to take a decisive step one way or the other. In 1750-
51 the Peshwa had suspected Malharrao and even Jayapa Shinde of trying to
free themselves from the Peshwa's service and accepting service under the

¹ Raj. 1 Introduction.
² Purandare, 1.287, 293

CHAPTER VII
THE JUDGMENT
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PANIPAT DISASTER
THE MARATHA survivors from the Panipat disaster seem to have com-
bined in taking advantage of the death of the commander in chief and ascrib-
ing the defeat to his incorrect strategy, wrong tactics and, in general, to his con-
ceit, arrogance and blindness to the facts of the situation. Our narrative should
have made it clear by now that most of these grounds of condemnation are
flimsy after thoughts. As Bhau was not a free man in diplomatic talks, the
responsibility is shifted to the shoulders of the Peshwa. Sadashivrao Bhau s
strategy or planning was not incorrect, but its execution devolved upon per-
sons who were not strong enough or wise enough to carry it out. Bhau cer-
tainly cannot be pronounced a first rate general in history. Three fourths of
his mental mould was civil in composition, and only one fourth can be treated
as military in form. Ahmad Shah Abdali, his rival, bore a reverse proportion
in his mental make up. The sort of expertness in any matter which comes to
a man by single minded absorption in one kind of work only, is not possible
in a man whose life is divided and shared by various interests. Sadashivrao
was no doubt, trained as any other Maratha sardar of the day for war, but
that does not seem to be his favourite occupation. His mind was diplomatic
in formation and his expertness was to be seen in his management of finance
and administration. Ahmad Shah had led the life of a slave under such a
military master as Nadir Shah from his childhood, and spent practically every
minute of his life amidst war. His expertness was born of this long, all ab-
sorbing experience. Such an experience and such period of candidateship
seldom fall to the lot of an average man. Certainly none of the Marathas
could boast of such training. The historic Marathas were war like no doubt,
but when compared to the Afghans, must be judged more as civil than military.
Civil men can also become good soldiers if they are imbued with high ideals.
If the cause for which a man fights is after his own heart, he can put all his
faculties into the affair and see to it that it ends in success. Unfortunately
such was not the state of the Maratha army at Panipat as a whole. Bhau and
others siding with him fought for the name of the Marathas, but there were
many others, perhaps the majority, who thought otherwise. Malharrao Holkar
and others, who escaped by running away from the battle field in good time,
held a different opinion. They thought that they were not fighting for a
supreme cause like the defence of ones motherland. It was the life long con-
viction of Malharrao and men of his type that the Marathas outside Maha-
rashtra were fighting for profit and not for a cause. If they succeeded in the
attempt without scratching their skin, so much the better. But if they had to
fall back in face of higher odds, there was no disgrace for the name of the
Marathas in case of a reverse. Sadashivrao Bhau's declared ideal—India
for the Indians, governed by the Indians themselves—was scarcely under-
stood by anyone besides a few near friends, and none in the enemy camp. Le-
[ 106 ]

lieved in his professions at all This was the real tragedy of the Panipat cam-
paign Actually, it was Malharrao who, in the company of Raghunathrao,
had gone to the Panjab and stretched the Maratha sphere of influence upto
Attock and even beyond It was this expansion by driving Abdali's forces out
of the Panjab that had caused Ahmad Shah Abdali to seek revenge. But Mal
harrao had stretched the line only when Ahmad Shah, after first looting Delhi
and Mathura, had returned back to Afghanistan Taking advantage of the
absence of the main forces of the enemy in India, Raghunathrao and Malhar-
rao had proceeded to Lahore Even in the Panipat campaign, Malharrao's
idea was similar He had advised Bhau to remain behind the Chambal in the
Maratha dominions and wait till the departure of Abdali Afterwards he would
have accompanied Sadashivrao Bhau even to the Panjab, had he so desired
Malharrao and most of the Marathas thought this as the real guerilla mode
coming down from the days of Shivaji Fighting open, face-to-face, pitched
battles on the result of which the fate of the Marathas would depend, was
against the fixed tenor of their minds. They would never run such risks. On
the other hand, it was the intention first of the Mughals and later on of the
Afghans under Abdali to bring the Marathas to a pitched battle so as to de-
cide the issue in a single fight. As long as the defence of their home-land and
the breaking up of the enemy's power were the primary aims of the Marathas,
their old mode was all right, but now that the Marathas had spread over the
length and breadth of India and aspired to take the reins of Government of
the whole continent in their hands, the original mode was out of place and
time Sadashivrao Bhau had understood this point, especially after coming
into contact with the French under Bussy in 1751, but Malharrao had not.
Malharrao followed his life's conviction even after Panipat and succeeded
when not confronted by the new type of infantry He received his coup de-
grace finally at the hands of the English at Kora on 3rd May, 1765, and fled
back to Kalpi to save his life¹ Thus it will be seen that a conflict of ideals
and long cherished modes of warfare cut at the root of Panipat.
The late Vishvanath K RAJWADE in his oft repeated and uncriticaly
accepted criticism of the Panipat campaign,¹ puts the whole blame for the
failure on two persons in the main, Malharrao Holkar and Govindpant Bun-
dele We have seen above how a fundamental conflict of ideals and modes
was at the root of the whole difference Just as Bhau's mind was already
prejudiced against Govindpant long before his starting for the Panipat cam-
paign, similarly Bhau's opinion about Malharrao from the beginning was any-
thing but favourable Malharrao's way in politics was to keep on speaking
terms with all and not to antagonise anyone completely ² He had kept a simi-
lar attitude towards Najib Khan for the same reasons Such an attitude was
possible for a secondary potentate like Malharrao, but impossible for men of
Bhau's position who had to take a decisive step one way or the other In 1750-
51 the Peshwa had suspected Malharrao and even Jayapa Shinde of trying to
free themselves from the Peshwa's service and accepting service under the
¹ RAJ 1 Introduction
² Purandare, 1.287, 293

108 PANIPAT 1761
Wazir Safdar Jang * Malharrao was head strong but he had also the knack
of neatly and vigorously carrying out a piece of work on which he had set
his heart or on which a challenge was offered to him In the dispute for suc-
cession at Jaipur he had taken a different attitude from the Peshwa and Ram-
chandra Bawa, but ultimately he forced his will on the others and executed
the thing in his own manner Similarly, after Ghazi ud din s poisoning in
1752 when the Peshwa went back on his promise to his sardars, Malharrao and
Jayapa were suspected of being in collusion with Tarabai and Mahadoba
Purandare so as to checkmate the Peshwa s plans for the governance of the
Maratha Empire ³ Even that suspicion was ultimately found to be wrong
These examples will show the tenor of Malharrao s previous life, and can ac-
count for the suspicion which fell upon him during the Panipat campaign, of
acting hand in glove with Najib, Shuja and Surajmal In popular mind, this
suspicion proved correct as Malharrao could escape from the disaster un-
scathed with most of his troops but we have no faith in this judgment Sa-
dashivrao Bhau very well knew Malharrao's ways in politics, but had decided
to take a different line in this campaign on his own responsibility Not only
Malharrao but other sardars also were dissatisfied with Bhau on account of his
financial exactions To balance his budget after Raghunathrao's deficit cam-
paign of the Panjab, Bhau had put the burden of the Peshwa's debts on the
shoulders of the various Saranjamdars and Jagirdars Malharrao had to pay
30 lakhs for this debt tax ⁴ but due to the debacle after Dattaji Shinde s death,
Malharrao had not found it possible to pay it in time before the Panipat cam-
paign Holkar's Diwan Gangoba Chandrachud is found putting excuses⁵ for
the non payment of this accepted debt tax Bhau was naturally dissatisfied
with Malharrao and other sardars for their non payment of this tax which
had put a strain on his treasure purse Malharrao was always a man of tight
purse, but there does not seem to be any ground for suspicion that there was any
bickering between Bhau and his sardars on this point during the Panipat cam-
paign Those who think him acting in collusion with Surajmal Jat should
note the fact of his behaviour after the disaster Holkar's Kaifiyat,⁶ ostensibly
written to represent Malharrao's side, positively tells us that he would not put
his faith in Surajmal and remain in his territory to recoup himself When one
Jat zamindar tried to stop him in his flight by catching hold of the reins of his
horse, Malharrao asked his companion, Govindrao Bule, to cut off the Jat's
hand, and drove away precipitately for fear of treachery This anecdote
represents Malharrao s mind He would not put faith even in his friend, for
who could guarantee that the Jat Raja had not changed his mind as a result
of the disaster? Malharrao's whole manner was that of a very suspicious and
overcautious man taking no risks The anecdote is supported by the fact of
his flight through the Jat s territory south of Mathura without sojourning in
it He took a road skirting on the Jat dominion, but not through it, and went
direct to Bhind via Agra, crossing the Chambal and the Kuwari along the river

• Shinde 3.25
  3 Purandare 1.311
  4 Satara, 2.292.
  • 5 S P D 21 184
  6 Kavyetihasa Sangraha No 18, 2nd Ed. 1930 p 23

THE JUDGMENT 109
Jamuna to avoid the oft-trodden and direct road to Gwalior After Panipat
he fought against the rebels in Malwa and Bundelkhand In November 1761,
he decisively defeated Madhosingh of Jaipur, getting a wound himself He
fought in the Rakshasabhuwan campaign and helped in defeating the Nizam in
1763 Returning to the north, he again joined Jawahirmal Jat against—be
it noted—Najib All these incidents make it difficult to believe that Malhar-
rao was treacherous towards Bhau or the Peshwa A man's character ought to
be judged as a whole and not by his suspicious behaviour in one incident only
Govindpant Bundele has been made the chief scape goat for the Panipat
disaster One third of RAJWADE'S renowned introduction to his first volume
of letters is devoted to an analysis of Govindpant's behaviour and his down-
right condemnation, making him solely responsible for the miscarriage of Bhau's
plans RAJWADE'S charges against Govindpant are as follows Firstly, he was
not successful in bringing Shuja ud daulah to the Maratha side Next, he had
not made proper arrangements for Bhau's transport into the Doab Thirdly,
he had not sent the monies called for Fourthly, he would not invade Shuja's
dominions and create a diversion in that direction And last, but not least, he
did not cut off Abdali's supplies coming through the Doab, thus making Bhau's
plan futile We have seen in the course of the campaign how none of these
charges can be substantiated RAJWADE, and following him other critics also,
have wrongly assumed that Govindpant was a military captain On page 19,
RAJWADE puts Govindpant in the list of renowned generals of the time⁷ The
suffix Pant as opposed to Rao appended to the name of Govind is itself a proof
that the man was taken as a civilian and not a soldier He was not a Saran-
jamdar or Jagirdar maintaining troops out of the income of his Jagir He was
an ambitious mamlatdar who on account of a boastful temperament, aspired
to be a captain He had to call in various military captains like Antaji
Manakeshwar, Naro Shankar, Gangadhar Bajirao, Manaji Payagude and
others for helping him in meeting the rebels in his districts Occasionally he
had himself acted as a captain, but that was against insignificant opponents
and in the company of regular troops Even Bhau looked towards him as a
mamlatdar first and a military sardar afterwards In RAJ 1, Letter No 244,
Bhau specifically says, "You are not now only a Mahalkari You have with
you as many troops as with a sardar" This means that Bhau was bolstering
up Govindpant and asking him to take upon himself work which was nor-
mally not his His age (sixty five) and habits of life were against Bhau's ex-
pectation This was not a question of ordinary times but of a fight to the
finish Only exceptionally good captains could have done what Bhau asked
Govindpant to do The argument that as Bhau asked Govindpant repeatedly
to do certain things, it must have been in his power to do it, is faulty The
fact is, geographically, Govindpant was living in a region to the rear of Abdali,
and as such he was the only man who could have done anything in the mat-
ter Bhau could not detach a part of his army and send it to Abdali's rear, as
Abdali was sitting across the path Upto October, Sadashivrao had ordered
Govindpant not to come to the north⁷ but to invade the enemy dominions be-
⁷ RAJ 1.258, 260

112 PANIPAT: 1761
miss an unwanted officer or to replace him by a better one. If Govind-
pant did not prove serviceable enough during the Panipat campaign, the result
must be attributed to the defective system and not to the individual. But
supposing that Govindpant did not send the funds to Bhau even though
he did possess them, his non-compliance had little to do with the military side
in the Panipat affair. Ample funds in the hands of Bhau at Panipat would
not have brought him the necessary supplies which depended solely on the
military strength to fetch them. Even Bhau, writing to his son after Govind-
pant's death, is not found speaking anything against him. The Peshwa heard
the news of Govindpant's death after his crossing the Narmada in January
1761. Writing a letter⁸b of condolence to his son, the Peshwa eulogised his
faithful services unto death, a befitting end to a long life of faithful serv-
ice. The Peshwa wanted to treat the sons of Govindpant as children in
his own family. This shows that the Peshwa had no information or
suspicion of Govindpant's dereliction in the Panipat camgaign. Balkrishna
Dikshit, writing from Benares about Govindpant's end, remarked,⁸c "A great
man has passed away." Thus it would seem that contemporary opinion did
not condemn Govindpant. It was only when survivors from Panipat, who
wished to absolve themselves from all blame, began to put the whole responsi-
bility on those who had died, that Govindpant came in for his share in the
condemnation along with Bhau and Balvantrao. The Bhau Bakhar puts the
whole affair in such a dramatic form as to lead to the inevitable disaster. It has
made Govindpant a friend of Najib Khan⁹ from the beginning of the campaign,
where he is shown as an accessory of Malharrao in shielding Najib against
Dattaji Shinde's wrath! Govindpant is the agent who made Dattaji accept
Najib's treacherous proposal of building a bridge over the Ganges, so as to de-
lay the affair till the arrival of Abdali! Later on, Govindpant is represented
as having refrained from attacking Najib's family and treasure in his trans-
Ganges raid by accepting five lakhs as a bribe. Ultimately Govindpant is killed,
according to the Bakhar, not by Atai Khan, but by Najib's Ruhelas! Now
from what we know of Govindpant's relations with the Shinde family from the
very beginning, it cannot be imagined that he would do anything of the kind,
especially against the Shindes. There is positive proof in his letters to Ramaji
Anant, the Diwan of the Shindes, that Govindpant favoured Jayapa Shinde in
preference and perhaps as against Malharrao Holkar.¹⁰ In Dattaji's cam-
paign against Najib, Govindpant is throughout acting under his orders. He

THE JUDGMENT 111

latdar There is evidence of troubled times and consequent non realisation of
Government dues by him from 1750 onwards In 1755 a similar condition
is found repeated ⁸ From the unpublished Dabholkar papers (Nos 159, 163,
164, 165, 166) it is clear that Sadashivrao Bhau and even Raghunathrao who
was in the north at the time, were very suspicious of all the sardars and the
mamlatdars in the north ⁸ᵃ Gangoba Chandrachud the Holkars Diwan
Ramaji Anant Dabholkar the Shinde's Diwan, and Govindpant were sup-
posed to be acting in collusion, and grabbing Government dues by an under
standing among themselves Bhau seems to have threatened Govindpant with
an investigation into his revenue dealings even then Govindpant had not sub-
mitted accounts for some five years So he was peremptorily called to Poona
and Govindpant was very apprehensive of the result He wrote to Ramajipant
his fear of losing the credit and the fruit of his thirty years' service if the in
vestigation against him went wrong He asked Ramaji to help him in his dif-
ficulties as both were sailing in the same boat¹ His visit to Poona was de
layed for a year more on account of local difficulties After defeating Sayyad
Ali Askar Kubda sent by the Wazir Ghazi ud din to occupy the Mahals granted
to the Marathas at the beginning of 1756, settling the affairs in the north and
making arrangements for his absence, he came to Poona at the end of the
year and remained there for some ten months He seems to have satisfied the
Peshwa and his exacting Diwan, Bhau Bhau sent back with him two au
ditors, Janardan Apaji Erande and Trimbak Krishna Kanitkar, to check his
accounts and, in general, to control Govindpant in his revenue matters They
lived in the north for three years till Panipat, and still they could not succeed
in doing what they had been appointed to do Govindpant became entangled
in other political matters and went with Dattaji Shinde to the north The au
ditors, becoming hopeless, were on the point of returning to Poona at the end
of 1759, but somehow they were prevailed upon to remain in the north on
Govindpant's promise to come and settle the accounts to their satisfaction
The correspondence between Govindpant and the auditors proves that Govind
pant was not efficient in keeping his accounts nor could he be treated as blame-
less or above suspicion Why he was not dismissed for his negligence before
Panipat is again a moot point It may be that while Bhau was charging him
with embezzlement, the Peshwa was perhaps shielding him in the affair Even
after the Panipat disaster, the Peshwa is not found condemning Govindpant
or calling his sons to account for their father's negligence Thus it appears
that there was something wrong in the system of administration devised by the
Peshwa Every Government officer of some standing looked upon himself as
a small chief in those days Sardars like Shinde, Holkar, and Pawar, thought
themselves more as partners in the empire than as servants of the Peshwa
What was allowed by the Peshwa to these higher men out of necessity, was
usurped by lesser men Antaji Manakeshwar, Naro Shankar, Vitthal Shivdeo,
Gopalrao Barve, Govindpant Bundele, and the Hingne brothers tried to pose
as equals in some way with the fortunate sardars Their rivalry had vitiated
the whole atmosphere, and it was difficult for the Peshwa either to dis
⁸ SPD 2 19,30 Raj 3 158, 159 160
⁸ᵃ Shinde 3 310

THE JUDGMENT 111
latdar. There is evidence of troubled times and consequent non-realisation of
Government dues by him from 1750 onwards In 1755 a similar condition
is found repeated ⁸ From the unpublished Dabholkar papers (Nos 159, 163,
164, 165, 166) it is clear that Sadashivrao Bhau and even Raghunathrao who
was in the north at the time, were very suspicious of all the sardars and the
mamlatdars in the north ⁸ᵃ Gangoba Chandrachud the Holkar's Diwan,
Ramaji Anant Dabholkar the Shinde's Diwan, and Govindpant were sup-
posed to be acting in collusion, and grabbing Government dues by an under-
standing among themselves Bhau seems to have threatened Govindpant with
an investigation into his revenue dealings even then Govindpant had not sub
mitted accounts for some five years So he was peremptorily called to Poona
and Govindpant was very apprehensive of the result He wrote to Ramajipant
his fear of losing the credit and the fruit of his thirty years' service if the in
vestigation against him went wrong He asked Ramaji to help him in his dif-
ficulties as both were sailing in the same boat! His visit to Poona was de-
layed for a year more on account of local difficulties After defeating Sayyad
Ali Askar Kubda sent by the Wazir Ghazi ud din to occupy the Mahals granted
to the Marathas at the beginning of 1756, settling the affairs in the north and
making arrangements for his absence, he came to Poona at the end of the
year and remained there for some ten months He seems to have satisfied the
Peshwa and his exacting Diwan, Bhau Bhau sent back with him two au-
ditors, Janardan Apaji Erande and Trimbak Krishna Kanitkar, to check his
accounts and, in general, to control Govindpant in his revenue matters They
lived in the north for three years till Panipat, and still they could not succeed
in doing what they had been appointed to do! Govindpant became entangled
in other political matters and went with Dattaji Shinde to the north The au-
ditors, becoming hopeless, were on the point of returning to Poona at the end
of 1759, but somehow they were prevailed upon to remain in the north on
Govindpant's promise to come and settle the accounts to their satisfaction
The correspondence between Govindpant and the auditors proves that Govind-
pant was not efficient in keeping his accounts nor could he be treated as blame-
less or above suspicion Why he was not dismissed for his negligence before
Panipat is again a moot point It may be that while Bhau was charging him
with embezzlement, the Peshwa was perhaps shielding him in the affair Even
after the Panipat disaster, the Peshwa is not found condemning Govindpant
or calling his sons to account for their father's negligence. Thus it appears
that there was something wrong in the system of administration devised by the
Peshwa Every Government officer of some standing looked upon himself as
a small chief in those days Sardars like Shinde, Holkar, and Pawar, thought
themselves more as partners in the empire than as servants of the Peshwa
What was allowed by the Peshwa to these higher men out of necessity, was
usurped by lesser men Antaji Manakeshwar, Naro Shankar, Vitthal Shivdeo,
Gopalrao Barve, Govindpant Bundele, and the Hingne brothers tried to pose
as equals in some way with the fortunate sardars Their rivalry had vitiated
the whole atmosphere, and it was difficult for the Peshwa either to dis-
⁸ SPD 2.29,30 RAJ 1 158, 159, 160
⁸ᵃ Shinde 3.316.

110 PANIPAT 1761
yond the Ganges The original plan of Bhau when proceeding towards Kunj
pura in October was frustrated by Abdali's daring in crossing the Jamuna at
his back This fact changed the strategy in such a manner that Bhau had to
fall back on Govindpant s support because he found it impossible to return to
Delhi in the face of Abdali Herein Bhau was completely non plussed
Abdalis daring could have been met only by a counter daring on the part of
the Marathas Bhau's original plan was to proceed farther north from Kunj
pura and replenish his army He expected Abdali to follow him towards the
north in a parallel line across the Jamuna through the Doab, as his calcula
tion for the subsidence of the Jamuna waters made him believe When he
heard on his way to Kurukshetra that Abdali had begun crossing above Bagh
pat, he should have proceeded farther north and crossed over into the Doab
by the Budhia Ghat as first intended Instead, he returned by the same path
and found to his dismay that it was impossible to pass by Abdali towards Delhi
or to defeat him by direct attack in an open pitched battle Because he re-
ceived this first check, he had to fall back on Panipat and dig trenches there
so as to follow a different mode of warfare to suit Ibrahim Khan's Gardi
troops Looking historically, it seems that in this Bhau took a wrong decision.
Once taken, the only strategy which remained open was to make Abdali at
tack him in his strong, almost impregnable, entrenched position, but who was
to make Abdali attack? No single valiant captain could have succeeded in the
move So Bhau expected hunger to do the work If somebody in the rear could
cut off Abdali's supplies he would have to move and either attack the Mara
thas as Bhau wanted him to do or return to Afghanistan without offering a
battle Placed in such straits, Bhau was found urging Govindpant to do the
needful Govindpant came into the rear as ordered and tried his luck He
lost his life in the attempt, proving that the work was beyond his strength and
that Abdali was a far more consummate general than Bhau imagined him to be.
This discussion should prove that Govindpant cannot be charged with not obey
ing orders and doing his best We believe that any other captain would have met
the same fate and could not have succeeded in cutting off the supplies, as the
Ruhelas in that region were well organised and vigilant
The charge of not sending the sums called for stands on a different
level There is no evidence available on the point of Govindpant's ability to
pay As a Kamavisdar of thirty years' standing, the public as well as the
Peshwa probably took him to be a rich man Whether he had funds at his
disposal when Bhau called for them is a moot point We suspect that the ideas
about his riches were ill founded Like all other mamlatdars of the time, he
was also very cautious in money matters and would not easily part with money
But there is no external evidence, as in the case of Naro Shankar, for Govind
pant's having spent money lavishly on any work or in any matter There are
no temples or ghats or forts built by him, which would prove his ever having
been an opulent man On the other hand, complaints about non realisation
of Government dues in his rented Mahals is a theme found repeated through
out the period under discussion We do not suggest that Govindpant was above
board in all his money dealings But the Peshwas estimates about his vast
riches seem to be ill founded Nor do we think him to be an efficient mam

THE JUDGMENT 111
latdar There is evidence of troubled times and consequent non realisation of
Government dues by him from 1750 onwards In 1755 a similar condition
is found repeated 8 From the unpublished Dabholkar papers (Nos 159, 163,
164, 165, 166) it is clear that Sadashivrao Bhau and even Raghunathrao who
was in the north at the time, were very suspicious of all the sardars and the
mamlatdars in the north 8a Gangoba Chandrachud the Holkar's Diwan,
Ramaji Anant Dabholkar the Shinde's Diwan, and Govindpant were sup-
posed to be acting in collusion, and grabbing Government dues by an under-
standing among themselves Bhau seems to have threatened Govindpant with
an investigation into his revenue dealings even then Govindpant had not sub
mitted accounts for some five years So he was peremptorily called to Poona
and Govindpant was very apprehensive of the result He wrote to Ramajipant
his fear of losing the credit and the fruit of his thirty years' service if the in-
vestigation against him went wrong He asked Ramaji to help him in his dif-
ficulties as both were sailing in the same boat' His visit to Poona was de-
layed for a year more on account of local difficulties After defeating Sayyad
Ali Askar Kubda sent by the Wazir Ghazi ud din to occupy the Mahals granted
to the Marathas at the beginning of 1756, settling the affairs in the north and
making arrangements for his absence, he came to Poona at the end of the
year and remained there for some ten months He seems to have satisfied the
Peshwa and his exacting Diwan, Bhau Bhau sent back with him two au
ditors, Janardan Apaji Erande and Trimbak Krishna Kanitkar, to check his
accounts and, in general, to control Govindpant in his revenue matters They
lived in the north for three years till Panipat, and still they could not succeed
in doing what they had been appointed to do! Govindpant became entangled
in other political matters and went with Dattaji Shinde to the north The au-
ditors, becoming hopeless, were on the point of returning to Poona at the end
of 1759, but somehow they were prevailed upon to remain in the north on
Govindpant's promise to come and settle the accounts to their satisfaction
The correspondence between Govindpant and the auditors proves that Govind
pant was not efficient in keeping his accounts nor could he be treated as blame-
less or above suspicion Why he was not dismissed for his negligence before
Panipat is again a moot point It may be that while Bhau was charging him
with embezzlement, the Peshwa was perhaps shielding him in the affair Even
after the Panipat disaster, the Peshwa is not found condemning Govindpant
or calling his sons to account for their father's negligence Thus it appears
that there was something wrong in the system of administration devised by the
Peshwa Every Government officer of some standing looked upon himself as
a small chief in those days Sardars like Shinde, Holkar, and Pawar, thought
themselves more as partners in the empire than as servants of the Peshwa
What was allowed by the Peshwa to these higher men out of necessity, was
usurped by lesser men Antaji Manakeshwar, Naro Shankar, Vitthal Shivdeo,
Gopalrao Barve, Govindpant Bundele, and the Hingre brothers tried to pose
as equals in some way with the fortunate sardars Their rivalry had vitiated
the whole atmosphere, and it was difficult for the Peshwa either to dis-
8 SPD 2 79,30 Raj 3 158, 159, 160
8a Shinde 3 316.

112 PANIPAT 1761
miss an unwanted officer or to replace him by a better one If Govind
pant did not prove serviceable enough during the Panipat campaign, the result
must be attributed to the defective system and not to the individual. But
supposing that Govindpant did not send the funds to Bhau even though
he did possess them, his non compliance had little to do with the military side
in the Panipat affair. Ample funds in the hands of Bhau at Panipat would
not have brought him the necessary supplies which depended solely on the
military strength to fetch them. Even Bhau, writing to his son after Govind
pants death is not found speaking anything against him. The Peshwa heard
the news of Govindpant's death after his crossing the Narmada in January
1761. Writing a letter⁸ᵇ of condolence to his son, the Peshwa eulogised his
faithful services unto death, a befitting end to a long life of faithful serv-
ice. The Peshwa wanted to treat the sons of Govindpant as children in
his own family. This shows that the Peshwa had no information or
suspicion of Govindpant's dereliction in the Panipat campaign. Balkrishna
Dikshit writing from Benares about Govindpant's end, remarked,⁸ᶜ 'A great
man has passed away.' Thus it would seem that contemporary opinion did
not condemn Govindpant. It was only when survivors from Panipat, who
wished to absolve themselves from all blame, began to put the whole responsi-
bility on those who had died that Govindpant came in for his share in the
condemnation along with Bhau and Balwantrao. The Bhau Bakhar puts the
whole affair in such a dramatic form as to lead to the inevitable disaster. It has
made Govindpant a friend of Najib Khan⁹ from the beginning of the campaign,
where he is shown as an accessory of Malharrao in shielding Najib against
Dattaji Shinde's wrath! Govindpant is the agent who made Dattaji accept
Najib's treacherous proposal of building a bridge over the Ganges, so as to de-
lay the affair till the arrival of Abdali! Later on, Govindpant is represented
as having refrained from attacking Najib's family and treasure in his trans-
Ganges raid by accepting five lakhs as a bribe. Ultimately Govindpant is killed,
according to the Bakhar, not by Atai Khan, but by Najib's Ruhelas! Now
from what we know of Govindpant's relations with the Shinde family from the
very beginning, it cannot be imagined that he would do anything of the kind,
especially against the Shindes. There is positive proof in his letters to Ramaji
Anant, the Diwan of the Shindes, that Govindpant favoured Jayapa Shinde in
preference and perhaps as against Malharrao Holkar.¹⁰ In Dattaji's cam-
paign against Najib, Govindpant is throughout acting under his orders. He
escorts the women in the Shinde family after Dattaji's death. It will be seen
from these antecedents that there was no likelihood of his acting in collusion
with Najib as stated by the Bakhar and by RAJWADE. The Bakhar is thus
proved to be a prejudiced and partial document. It is worth noting that the
Bakhar does not condemn Holkar for the Panipat disaster, though earlier he is
shown as acting against the Shindes as well as the Peshwa. Beginning with a
prejudiced mind against Govindpant, mainly on the presentation of the Bakhar,
RAJWADE was simply carried away in his thought when he alighted on a big
⁸ᵇ Bundelkhand Prakarana p. 147
⁸ᶜ RAJ 3.511
⁹ Bhau Bakhar pp 50 60 130
¹⁰ Shinde 3.314 15 16

THE JUDGMENT 113
sheaf of papers connected with Govindpant. He thought that here was the key
to the understanding of the whole Panipat disaster! He so far forgot himself
as to change the dates of the original documents in his hand published in his
first volume (Nos 175, 181, 183, 184) He even went to the length of en-
tering into a discussion of a possibility of changed Eras¹¹ to suit his antedating
of the said letters! Even Govindpant's caste came in for criticism and was
tagged on to a letter of Naro Shankar, a Deshastha brahmin and not a Karhada!
When a critic is obliged to fall back on the caste of a man for explaining an
affair, he has fallen very low indeed! Govindpant as one of the most success-
ful Karhada brahmins of his time was naturally taken as a leader of his com-
munity In Benares, a large number of Karhada brahmins, well versed in
brahmanical lore, were residing during these times They formed, it seems,
more than half of the Deccani brahmins resident in that holy city During the
Panipat campaign and even before, a rivalry existed between these Karhada
brahmins and the Chitpavans headed by the Dikshit Patankar family, the mem-
bers of which acted as bankers, diplomats as well as the spiritual gurus to the
Peshwas! Sadashivrao wrote to Govindpant to settle the dispute as best he
could ¹² The language used by these spiritual gurus against other castes was
offensive and derogatory to their status Even the Peshwa is once found using
a word¹³ for the Karhadas (Ambhasta) which makes them rank lower in the
scale. As an individual, the Peshwa Balaji Bajirao, was a mild type of person,
paying attention mainly to politics and ignoring other squabbles Sadashivrao
Bhau, like his father Chimaji Apa,¹⁴ seems to be somewhat different, with caste
consciousness at the back of his mind Even the Peshwa Nanasaheb was
charged with being caste conscious by such an intimate family friend and serv-
ant as Mahadoba Purandare,¹⁵ his Diwan during the first half of his rule
Govindpant always tried to be on good terms with the Peshwa family from
the very beginning as he was a personal servant under Bajirao He was prob-
ably introduced into the Peshwa family by Radhabai, wife of Balaji Vishwa-
nath, who came from the Barve family of Newre from which Govindpant also
hailed Or it may be that he came to Bawdhan, near Wai, in the company of
Ramajipant Kolhatkar who also hailed from Newre But his previous intimacy
with the Peshwa family had by this time no value in the eyes of Sadashivrao
who was a strict task master The Peshwa was so overpowered with the sense
of indebtedness, that he had allowed a free hand to Sadashivrao in all state mat-
ters, and Sadashivrao Bhau seems to have antagonised one and all by his line
of conduct His opinion about Raghunathrao Dada and men of his persuasion
seemed to have steadily deteriorated for at least three years before he under-
took the Panipat campaign ¹⁶ Both military as well as civil sides in the state
were disaffected towards him Govindpant's statement in his letter to Janardan
Apaji that the Peshwa had then begun to search in small things, and that at
11 RAJWADE 1, note 265, RAJ 1, Introduction p 63, RAJ 1.282, note 325
12 Ibid 1 185
13 Ibid 3.501
14 Purandare 1 146
15 Ibid 1.275
16 Original letter in the Parasnis C.
P F—8

THE JUDGMENT 115
effectual in the end. Individuals, however great and towering, do not make
a nation. It is the level of the whole populace that ultimately tells.
SADASHIVRAO'S PERSONAL FACTORS
In the treatment of the Panipat campaign, Sadashivrao has been
shown as proud, capricious, self-willed, harsh and offensive in his dealings with
others. In this, both Kashiraj and the Marathi chronicles have combined in
the condemnation of Bhau, because both write after the event, keeping their
eye on the final disaster. But this seems incorrect. The personal letters of Bhau
in the Purandare Daftar¹ bear testimony to the quite different mould of his
mind He seems to be a straightforward, shy and guileless man in his cor-
respondence with his equals in the first half of his life before he became the
Diwan of the Peshwa in 1752. He is found referring every matter to Dhondo-
pant Purandare² who seems to be his guru in the beginning. Dhondopant
advised him on the points referred to for some time, but later on became weary
and stopped giving advice. A man who can write in the way he has written
to Dhondopant cannot be taken as proud or self-willed. He fears social ob-
loquy³ and is found currying favour with the Peshwa his cousin and his wife
Gopikabai, as well as Sakharam Bapu, Baburao Phadnis and Mahadoba
Purandare. These secretaries would not initiate Bhau into the state affairs for
fear of being ousted from their positions, as well as from their unwillingness to
interfere in the family squabbles of the Peshwa. Sakharam Bapu, the wisest
among them, clearly writes to Dhondopant that "Bhau is neither proud nor
easily led by anybody.⁴ Whatever wrong he does, he does through ignorance."
Of course Bhau naturally felt that he belonged to the Peshwa family and was
thus to some extent a master and not a servant like the other ministers, though
the Peshwa seems to have treated Bhau at first as only one of the secretaries
Only after Bhau had shown his capacity for administration and had played
a trick with the advice of Ramchandra Bawa, the Peshwa was brought to un-
derstand the real situation and consented to appoint him as the sole Diwan,
lest Bhau would go to Kolhapur and become a rival Peshwa there. As a
Diwan, Bhau is found to be an expert in financial matters and strict in admin-
istration. He antagonised most of the sardars and mamlatdars by his strict-
ness, since they were loose and undisciplined in their dealings. Nevertheless
the various Kamavisdars trembled before Bhau and would not get his con-
fidence. This had a disastrous consequence in the Panipat campaign. One and
all had to obey his orders, but none did it willingly. All would have liked to
run away from him at the first opportunity. A general must inspire not only
awe and respect, but should also be loved by his followers, a thing which was
not possible, it seems, in the case of Bhau. Bajirao with all his weaknesses was
loved by his followers; Sadashivrao was not This was the result not of his
1 Purandare, 1. 168, 169, 180, 181, 187
2 Ibid. 1. 171-3, 178, 180-1.
3 Ibid 1. 170, 176-8, 197, 211.
4 Ibid. 1. 182, 184.
Ibid 3.195.

114 PANIPAT 1761
the Poona Court nobody's reputation was safe, are true not only as far as
Govindpant himself was concerned, but are applicable to one and all The
whole trouble had arisen from the precedent of the Peshwa's own doings A
state servant (albeit the first minister) who had risen by flouting the orders of
his master could not hope to secure the willing obedience of his servants The
Peshwa had broken the unity of the state by concentrating power in his own
hands by all kinds of machinations and subterfuge, by relegating his co-minis-
ters in the state to a corner Now the same game was tried upon him by his
servants What is clearly seen by studying all the material and taking a com
prehensive view of the whole affair is that, both military as well as civil serv
ants in the Maratha State thought themselves in spirit more as partners in the
state than as servants who could be dismissed at will The trouble had been
growing for a long time, but seemed to be coming to a head just at this awkward
time when the state was engaged in a life and death struggle with a first class
enemy All the sins of commission and omission committed by the Peshwa
knowingly or unknowingly before, now came to visit him like the ghost at the
table of Macbeth Panipat thus proved to be the culmination of all previous
defects in the Maratha system, and was not the result of one man's misbe-
haviour or default That Sadashivrao Bhau was already prejudiced against
Govindpant, we have seen The Peshwa was conscious of this fact and so
had written to Govindpant, early in May 1760, to go to Sadashivrao Bhau per-
sonally and satisfy him about the accounts, so as to get into his favour,¹⁸ but
it was too late Govindpant was now acting on the defensive Sadashivrao
Bhau might have tried to assure him that there was no fear of dismissal in
store for him but his words had then exactly the opposite effect on Govind-
pant's mind ¹⁹ Even after this Govindpant did not turn a traitor He tried
his best, but perhaps he could not put as much heart and energy into the af-
fair as he otherwise might have done
To sum up, RAJWADE'S charge against Govindpant is proved as far as
his keeping of accounts goes, but not on any other count That the Peshwa
should have kept a man of Govindpant's type in such an important border
region as the Doab, was wrong and injudicious A far better and younger
sardar was necessary at such a key post A clerk grown into a mamlatdar and
exaggerated into a sardar was not a fit man for the post But it seems that
no better men were available to the Peshwa, which means he had neither
trained nor had engaged better men for the post, showing a defective system
of recruitment for filling in various posts To appoint men simply because they
are near at hand somehow, is not a proper mode for running an empire Those
who think of the rise of obscure and ill educated men into imperial diplomats,
governors and generals as an achievement of the Peshwas should bear this point
in mind The machinery devised by the Peshwa was not fit and sufficient for
carrying on an empire, even the constitution and machinery of a trading com-
pany like that of the English East India Company was found better adapted
to cope with the times and emergencies, but the Maratha system proved in-
17 Raj 11'3
18 RAJWADE 1 182
19 Ibid 1.242

THE JUDGMENT 115
effectual in the end. Individuals, however great and towering, do not make
a nation. It is the level of the whole populace that ultimately tells.
SADASHIVRAO'S PERSONAL FACTORS
In the treatment of the Panipat campaign, Sadashivrao has been
shown as proud, capricious, self-willed, harsh and offensive in his dealings with
others. In this, both Kashiraj and the Marathi chronicles have combined in
the condemnation of Bhau, because both write after the event keeping their
eye on the final disaster. But this seems incorrect. The personal letters of Bhau
in the Purandare Daftar¹ bear testimony to the quite different mould of his
mind. He seems to be a straightforward, shy and guileless man in his cor-
respondence with his equals in the first half of his life before he became the
Diwan of the Peshwa in 1752. He is found referring every matter to Dhondo-
pant Purandare² who seems to be his guru in the beginning. Dhondopant
advised him on the points referred to for some time, but later on became weary
and stopped giving advice. A man who can write in the way he has written
to Dhondopant cannot be taken as proud or self-willed. He fears social ob-
loquy³ and is found currying favour with the Peshwa his cousin and his wife
Gopikabai, as well as Sakharam Bapu, Baburao Phadnis and Mahadoba
Purandare. These secretaries would not initiate Bhau into the state affairs for
fear of being ousted from their positions, as well as from their unwillingness to
interfere in the family squabbles of the Peshwa. Sakharam Bapu, the wisest
among them, clearly writes to Dhondopant that 'Bhau is neither proud nor
easily led by anybody.⁴ Whatever wrong he does, he does through ignorance.'
Of course Bhau naturally felt that he belonged to the Peshwa family and was
thus to some extent a master and not a servant like the other ministers, though
the Peshwa seems to have treated Bhau at first as only one of the secretaries.
Only after Bhau had shown his capacity for administration and had played
a trick with the advice of Ramchandra Bawa, the Peshwa was brought to un-
derstand the real situation and consented to appoint him as the sole Diwan
lest Bhau would go to Kolhapur and become a rival Peshwa there. As a
Diwan, Bhau is found to be an expert in financial matters and strict in admin-
istration. He antagonised most of the sardars and mamlatdars by his strict-
ness, since they were loose and undisciplined in their dealings. Nevertheless
the various Kamavisdars trembled before Bhau and would not get his con-
fidence. This had a disastrous consequence in the Panipat campaign. One and
all had to obey his orders, but none did it willingly. All would have liked to
run away from him at the first opportunity. A general must inspire not only
awe and respect, but should also be loved by his followers a thing which was
not possible, it seems, in the case of Bhau. Bajirao with all his weaknesses was
loved by his followers, Sadashivrao was not. This was the result not of his
1 Purandare 1. 168-169, 180, 181, 182.
2 Ibid. 1. 171-3, 1. 8, 180-1.
3 Ibid. 1. 10, 1. 6-8, 197, 211.
4 Ibid. 1. 182, 184--
Ibid. 3. 196.

114 PANIPAT 1761
the Poona Court nobody’s reputation was safe, are true not only as far as
Govindpant himself was concerned, but are applicable to one and all The
whole trouble had arisen from the precedent of the Peshwa’s own doings A
state servant (albeit the first minister) who had risen by flouting the orders of
his master could not hope to secure the willing obedience of his servants The
Peshwa had broken the unity of the state by concentrating power in his own
hands by all kinds of machinations and subterfuge, by relegating his co-minis-
ters in the state to a corner Now the same game was tried upon him by his
servants What is clearly seen by studying all the material and taking a com
prehensive view of the whole affair is that, both military as well as civil serv
ants in the Maratha State thought themselves in spirit more as partners in the
state than as servants who could be dismissed at will The trouble had been
growing for a long time, but seemed to be coming to a head just at this awkward
time when the state was engaged in a life and death struggle with a first class
enemy All the sins of commission and omission committed by the Peshwa
knowingly or unknowingly before, now came to visit him like the ghost at the
table of Macbeth Panipat thus proved to be the culmination of all previous
defects in the Maratha system, and was not the result of one man's misbe
haviour or default That Sadashivrao Bhau was already prejudiced against
Govindpant, we have seen The Peshwa was conscious of this fact and so
had written to Govindpant, early in May 1760, to go to Sadashivrao Bhau per-
sonally and satisfy him about the accounts, so as to get into his favour,¹⁸ but
it was too late Govindpant was now acting on the defensive Sadashivrao
Bhau might have tried to assure him that there was no fear of dismissal in
store for him but his words had then exactly the opposite effect on Govind-
pant’s mind ¹⁹ Even after this Govindpant did not turn a traitor He tried
his best, but perhaps he could not put as much heart and energy into the af-
fair as he otherwise might have done
To sum up, RAJWADE’S charge against Govindpant is proved as far as
his keeping of accounts goes, but not on any other count That the Peshwa
should have kept a man of Govindpant’s type in such an important border
region as the Doab, was wrong and injudicious A far better and younger
sardar was necessary at such a key post A clerk grown into a mamlatdar and
exaggerated into a sardar was not a fit man for the post But it seems that
no better men were available to the Peshwa, which means he had neither
trained nor had engaged better men for the post, showing a defective system
of recruitment for filling in various posts To appoint men simply because they
are near at hand somehow, is not a proper mode for running an empire Those
who think of the rise of obscure and ill educated men into imperial diplomats,
governors and generals as an achievement of the Peshwas should bear this point
in mind The machinery devised by the Peshwa was not fit and sufficient for
carrying on an empire, even the constitution and machinery of a trading com-
pany like that of the English East India Company was found better adapted
to cope with the times and emergencies, but the Maratha system proved in-
¹⁷ RAJ 11’3
¹⁸ RAJWADE, 1 182
¹⁹ Ibid 1.242

THE JUDGMENT 115
effectual in the end Individuals, however great and towering, do not make
a nation It is the level of the whole populace that ultimately tells
SADASHIVRAO'S PERSONAL FACTORS
In the treatment of the Panipat campaign, Sadashivrao has been
shown as proud, capricious, self willed, harsh and offensive in his dealings with
others In this, both Kashiraj and the Marathi chronicles have combined in
the condemnation of Bhau, because both write after the event keeping their
eye on the final disaster But this seems incorrect The personal letters of Bhau
in the Purandare Daftar¹ bear testimony to the quite different mould of his
mind He seems to be a straightforward shy and guileless man in his cor
respondence with his equals in the first half of his life before he became the
Diwan of the Peshwa in 1752 He is found referring every matter to Dhondo-
pant Purandare² who seems to be his guru in the beginning Dhondopant
advised him on the points referred to for some time, but later on became weary
and stopped giving advice A man who can write in the way he has written
to Dhondopant cannot be taken as proud or self willed He fears social ob
loquy³ and is found currying favour with the Peshwa his cousin and his wife
Gopikabai as well as Sakharam Bapu, Baburao Phadnis and Mahadoba
Purandare These secretaries would not initiate Bhau into the state affairs for
fear of being ousted from their positions as well as from their unwillingness to
interfere in the family squabbles of the Peshwa Sakharam Bapu, the wisest
among them, clearly writes to Dhondopant that Bhau is neither proud nor
easily led by anybody⁴ Whatever wrong he does he does through ignorance
Of course Bhau naturally felt that he belonged to the Peshwa family and was
thus to some extent a master and not a servant like the other ministers, though
the Peshwa seems to have treated Bhau at first as only one of the secretaries
Only after Bhau had shown his capacity for administration and had played
a trick with the advice of Ramchandra Bawa the Peshwa was brought to un
derstand the real situation and consented to appoint him as the sole Diwan
lest Bhau would go to Kolhapur and become a rival Peshwa there As a
Diwan, Bhau is found to be an expert in financial matters and strict in admin
istration He antagonised most of the sardars and mamlatdars by his strict
ness, since they were loose and undisciplined in their dealings Nevertheless
the various Kamavisdars trembled before Bhau and would not get his con
fidence This had a disastrous consequence in the Panipat campaign One and
all had to obey his orders but none did it willingly All would have liked to
run away from him at the first opportunity A general must inspire not only
awe and respect, but should also be loved by his followers, a thing which was
not possible, it seems, in the case of Bhau Bajirao with all his weaknesses was
loved by his followers, Sadashivrao was not This was the result not of his
¹ Purandare I 168 169 180 181 182
² Ibid I 171-3 I 8 180-1
³ Ibid I 10 1 6-8 197, 211
⁴ Ibid. I 182 184
Ibid 3 196.

116 PANIPAT: 1761
behaviour during the ten months of the Panipat campaign, but of the im-
pression he had created during the previous ten years. It was singularly un-
fortunate for the Marathas that such should have been the case at this most
critical juncture. The respect and awe with which Shivaji seems to have been
looked upon by his contemporaries was not felt in the case of Bajirao and Bhau.
Bhau was not strict in his sex-life, as was wrongly assumed by SARDESAI in his
Panipat Campaign.⁵ The Purandare Daftar, Part I, bears ample testimony⁶
to Bhau's extra-marital sex life. Perhaps this fact had affected the contem-
porary opinion about Bhau in an adverse manner to a certain extent. We do
not know whether Kashiraj's statement⁷ that "one of the Bhau's wives escaped"
from Panipat on horseback was made under this misapprehension.
SADASHIVRAO BHAU AS A GENERAL
Sadashivrao Bhau has become the scape-goat of both the sides. He
is criticised not only by the opponents but also by his compatriots. The ma-
jority of the Marathas thought that the strategy he followed at Panipat was
wrong. The Marathas till then had never encamped behind the trenches and
arranged their fight on the basis of infantry tactics. The critics on the opposite
side think that the whole Maratha system was loose, insubordination being in-
grained in the Maratha ranks; there was no proper gradation, no link between
the commander-in-chief and the common soldier. But if we compare Bhau
with another renowned general of his times in Europe, there does not seem to
be any great difference in their ideas about the strategy and tactics of those
days. In the battle of Panipat, Abdali had definitely a superiority in the Ruhela
infantry under such a consummate captain as Najib Khan. His infantry
it was that decided the day by its last tactics. Bhau's infantry under
Ibrahim Khan had been used decisively in the beginning of the battle. But
it was not followed with advantage by the cavalry at the back. Bhau's per-
sonal effort was mainly based on his devoted cavalry, in the use of which he
seems to have followed the innovation attributed to Fredric the Great.
"Fredric had learnt its value, against the musket of those days, by experience;
and he believed that Seydlitz in the open, at the head of 70 squadrons, was
a thing which no infantry could resist."¹ But unfortunately for Bhau he first
came across the Afghan cavalry under Shah Wali Khan and not against the
infantry under Najib Khan, due to his formation of the oblique order in the
march out of Panipat. Had the cavalry divisions kept behind the infantry
of Ibrahim Khan to support it and take advantage of its invincible attack acted
in a valiant and correct manner, there would have been no occasion for Bhau
to deliver his side-attack on the Afghan front. Damaji Gaikwad, Vitthal
Shivdeo and Yashwantrao Pawar had been placed behind Ibrahim Khan to
do their duty. They inadvertantly rushed forward, before the full effect of
Ibrahim Khan's grand effort had reached its culmination and created a wide
5 SARDESAI, Marathi Riyasat, Panipat Prakarana, p. 253
6 Purandare 1.212, 241, 289, 293, 311, 345, 364.
7 KASHIRAJ, p. 50.
1 ACTON p. 293.

THE JUDGMENT 117
gap in the weak infantry under the trans Ganges Ruhelas. Their duty was
silently to wait for some two hours, though keeping themselves ready on horse-
back for any eventuality. Had this order been properly carried out, Bhau and
the magnificent Hujrat cavalry which was behind them would have had no
occasion to offer a front battle to the Durrani Wazir. They would themselves
have followed the rushing cavalry of these three sardars into the gap created
by the Gardi fire. Bhau's generalship failed not because his strategy was in-
correct, but the tactics were not properly understood by his captains and they
seem to have acted as if it was only a cavalry battle. Bhau had till then fol-
lowed "the school which taught that actual fighting must not be resorted to
until the use of brains has been exhausted, that the battle comes in when the
manœuvre has failed, the seizure of the strategic position is the first defence
of the armies, so that a force which is tactically inferior may be strategically
superior."² Now when all these alternatives had been tried and failed, Bhau
was following Fredric in his new doctrine "to act on the principle that noth-
ing can destroy the enemy except a pitched battle, and the destruction of the
enemy, not the weakning of the enemy, is the right object of war,' knowing
that 'even a successful defence weakens the victor." Unfortunately for Bhau
he was possibly the only person in the Maratha camp who had understood
this principle and the overwhelming majority of his lieutenants were trained
in different tactics. They thought Bhau almost a madman to follow this
method, their heart was not in it and they deviated from the order of the bat-
tle at the first shock and followed their own mind in the later half of the day.
Those who were loyal and devoted died with the Commander in Chief, while
the rest fled back from the field as soon as it was possible for them to quit the
field unnoticed by Bhau.
NOT INDIVIDUALS BUT THE SYSTEM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
PANIPAT DISASTER
Pānipat was a national disaster. A national disaster exhibits all the
weak points together with some of the good points of a nation. A national
war fought for the prestige of a nation is like an examination for a student.
Though the examination lasts for less than a week it is supposed to show the
preparation of a year. The physical, the intellectual and the moral capacities
all have their play in an examination. Weakness on any of these sides is
likely to prove fatal. There are good students who fail in the nick of time or
are too weak to complete a paper. There are clever students whose intellect
often fails them at the proper time. There are nervous students who have shown
their capacity throughout the year but still are found leaving the examination
hall all of a sudden. War is a similar test for a state. All the weak points ex-
hibited in the Panipat campaign had not cropped up all of a sudden, but were
inherent in the Maratha system under the best of the Peshwas. These inherent
defects have been very convincingly pointed out by a deep student of Maratha
history, Vasudev Vamanshastri KHARE in his invaluable introduction to the
2 Ibid, p. 293.

118 PANIPAT 1761
book Marathe va Ingraj by N C KELKAR, in 1918 The Marathas in the
18th century had nothing original to contribute for the benefit of the Indian
people They were imitators and not inventors They tried to imitate the
foreign model in war, but never made it their own in all its details The
Maratha Constitution was very loose Their military system was no better
The policy of nurturing strength by consolidation had given place to wayward
wandering on the basis of the line of least resistance The result was as KHARE
has tellingly put it "In peace times the Maratha empire was everywhere, but
during times of turmoil it was nowhere" (Page 15) Sadashivrao Bhau and
the Peshwa were depending upon the sympathy and help of the various states
which had paid them tributes, but not one amongst them actually helped the
Marathas during the critical Panipat campaign, exemplifying the truth of
KHARE'S indictment The Marathas tried to imitate the European war-
machine by engaging Bussy's pupils Ibrahim Khan and Muzaffar Khan, but
the danger to the Maratha State of this procedure has been clearly exhibited
in history Muzaffar Khan was all along a self-willed, arrogant and treacherous
person Once he left the Peshwa's service and joined the Nawab of Savnur
and was, after his defeat there, on the point of joining the Portuguese at Goa
or any one else who would engage him In 1759 he tried to assassinate Sa
dashivrao Bhau for personal or political reasons and was beheaded for the at-
tempt Ibrahim Khan was personally loyal, faithful and expert, but all along
he remained unassimilated in the Maratha mode of warfare The various
Maratha officers never felt any comradeship with him and treated him as a
foreigner Instead of co operating with him and supporting him in his dif-
ficulties, they would sit on the fence and see his effort wasted, all this because
he was paid punctually in cash after the European manner, because Bhau
treated him with special favour and tried to depend upon him to the heart-
burning of others! Because he was treated only as an adjunct to the Maratha
cavalry, his system was never understood, much less made their own, by the
Maratha Shiledars The result was seen in the battle of Panipat where his
superb effort was wasted because the other Maratha sardars never tried to de-
fend the square formation nor would they reap the harvest by taking the
proper advantage of his initial effort The Marathas did not try to assimilate
the foreign system then, nor have they done it subsequently Their political
effort and initiative were then, just as they are even now, individual and not
collective. The end to be secured was personal rise, prosperity and aggrandise
ment The leader is the sole loser in the effort, his followers having no con
cern with it except temporary loss of employment The Europeans have
perfected their system in such a manner that their united effort does not depend
on individual caprice Even amongst them incompetent and selfish individuals
occasionally come to the top, but they have little power to play mischief in
the perfected system With us the reverse is the case Occasionally good peo-
ple come to the top amongst us, but still they have no power to change the
system or rather the absence of system existing amongst us Amongst us the
individual effort of the best of men is only temporarily and partially effectual
for some time and ultimately wasted, the nation never deriving permanent bene-
fits therefrom Viewed in this philosophical light, it seems idle either to boom