पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

THE JUDGMENT 117
gap in the weak infantry under the trans Ganges Ruhelas. Their duty was
silently to wait for some two hours, though keeping themselves ready on horse-
back for any eventuality. Had this order been properly carried out, Bhau and
the magnificent Hujrat cavalry which was behind them would have had no
occasion to offer a front battle to the Durrani Wazir. They would themselves
have followed the rushing cavalry of these three sardars into the gap created
by the Gardi fire. Bhau's generalship failed not because his strategy was in-
correct, but the tactics were not properly understood by his captains and they
seem to have acted as if it was only a cavalry battle. Bhau had till then fol-
lowed "the school which taught that actual fighting must not be resorted to
until the use of brains has been exhausted, that the battle comes in when the
manœuvre has failed, the seizure of the strategic position is the first defence
of the armies, so that a force which is tactically inferior may be strategically
superior."² Now when all these alternatives had been tried and failed, Bhau
was following Fredric in his new doctrine "to act on the principle that noth-
ing can destroy the enemy except a pitched battle, and the destruction of the
enemy, not the weakning of the enemy, is the right object of war,' knowing
that 'even a successful defence weakens the victor." Unfortunately for Bhau
he was possibly the only person in the Maratha camp who had understood
this principle and the overwhelming majority of his lieutenants were trained
in different tactics. They thought Bhau almost a madman to follow this
method, their heart was not in it and they deviated from the order of the bat-
tle at the first shock and followed their own mind in the later half of the day.
Those who were loyal and devoted died with the Commander in Chief, while
the rest fled back from the field as soon as it was possible for them to quit the
field unnoticed by Bhau.
NOT INDIVIDUALS BUT THE SYSTEM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
PANIPAT DISASTER
Pānipat was a national disaster. A national disaster exhibits all the
weak points together with some of the good points of a nation. A national
war fought for the prestige of a nation is like an examination for a student.
Though the examination lasts for less than a week it is supposed to show the
preparation of a year. The physical, the intellectual and the moral capacities
all have their play in an examination. Weakness on any of these sides is
likely to prove fatal. There are good students who fail in the nick of time or
are too weak to complete a paper. There are clever students whose intellect
often fails them at the proper time. There are nervous students who have shown
their capacity throughout the year but still are found leaving the examination
hall all of a sudden. War is a similar test for a state. All the weak points ex-
hibited in the Panipat campaign had not cropped up all of a sudden, but were
inherent in the Maratha system under the best of the Peshwas. These inherent
defects have been very convincingly pointed out by a deep student of Maratha
history, Vasudev Vamanshastri KHARE in his invaluable introduction to the
2 Ibid, p. 293.