पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

110 PANIPAT 1761
yond the Ganges The original plan of Bhau when proceeding towards Kunj
pura in October was frustrated by Abdali's daring in crossing the Jamuna at
his back This fact changed the strategy in such a manner that Bhau had to
fall back on Govindpant s support because he found it impossible to return to
Delhi in the face of Abdali Herein Bhau was completely non plussed
Abdalis daring could have been met only by a counter daring on the part of
the Marathas Bhau's original plan was to proceed farther north from Kunj
pura and replenish his army He expected Abdali to follow him towards the
north in a parallel line across the Jamuna through the Doab, as his calcula
tion for the subsidence of the Jamuna waters made him believe When he
heard on his way to Kurukshetra that Abdali had begun crossing above Bagh
pat, he should have proceeded farther north and crossed over into the Doab
by the Budhia Ghat as first intended Instead, he returned by the same path
and found to his dismay that it was impossible to pass by Abdali towards Delhi
or to defeat him by direct attack in an open pitched battle Because he re-
ceived this first check, he had to fall back on Panipat and dig trenches there
so as to follow a different mode of warfare to suit Ibrahim Khan's Gardi
troops Looking historically, it seems that in this Bhau took a wrong decision.
Once taken, the only strategy which remained open was to make Abdali at
tack him in his strong, almost impregnable, entrenched position, but who was
to make Abdali attack? No single valiant captain could have succeeded in the
move So Bhau expected hunger to do the work If somebody in the rear could
cut off Abdali's supplies he would have to move and either attack the Mara
thas as Bhau wanted him to do or return to Afghanistan without offering a
battle Placed in such straits, Bhau was found urging Govindpant to do the
needful Govindpant came into the rear as ordered and tried his luck He
lost his life in the attempt, proving that the work was beyond his strength and
that Abdali was a far more consummate general than Bhau imagined him to be.
This discussion should prove that Govindpant cannot be charged with not obey
ing orders and doing his best We believe that any other captain would have met
the same fate and could not have succeeded in cutting off the supplies, as the
Ruhelas in that region were well organised and vigilant
The charge of not sending the sums called for stands on a different
level There is no evidence available on the point of Govindpant's ability to
pay As a Kamavisdar of thirty years' standing, the public as well as the
Peshwa probably took him to be a rich man Whether he had funds at his
disposal when Bhau called for them is a moot point We suspect that the ideas
about his riches were ill founded Like all other mamlatdars of the time, he
was also very cautious in money matters and would not easily part with money
But there is no external evidence, as in the case of Naro Shankar, for Govind
pant's having spent money lavishly on any work or in any matter There are
no temples or ghats or forts built by him, which would prove his ever having
been an opulent man On the other hand, complaints about non realisation
of Government dues in his rented Mahals is a theme found repeated through
out the period under discussion We do not suggest that Govindpant was above
board in all his money dealings But the Peshwas estimates about his vast
riches seem to be ill founded Nor do we think him to be an efficient mam