पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

TO FACE PAGE 90

BATTLE OF PĀNIPAT 1761
SECOND STAGE 1 PM

SCALE

1 MALHĀR JĪ HOLKAR
2 SINDHIĀ
3 HUZURĀT & BHĀU'S BANNER
4 DĀMĀJĪ, VITTHAL SHIVDEV & YESHVANT PUĀR, ANTĀJĪ MĀNKESHWAR
5 IBRĀHĪM GĀRDĪ
13 SCATTERED TROOPS OF BHĀU

6 BARKHURDĀR & AMĪR BEG
7 RUHELĀS
8 SHĀH WALĪ
9 SUJĀ
10 NAJĪB
11 SHĀH PASAND
12 ABDALĪ'S RESERVED TROOPS OF SLAVES
14 SCATTERED TROOPS OF ABDĀLĪ

Foot note —Ahmad Shah was viewing the Maratha line, it seems, with a telescope (dur
bīn, vide Irvine p 246, note 1)

THE BATTLE 91
nihilation of their five Gardi troops, nor could they succeed in reinforcing
Ibrahim Khan in his time of need and distress
The right centre under Bhau also could not, or rather would not, reap
a tactical advantage, being encumbered with the women folk. There was a
distance of about a mile between Ibrahim Khan's vanguard troops at the left
of the Maratha line and the centre under Bhau It is not clear from the
scanty descriptions of the actual battle whether a line of communication was
maintained from the one end of the line to the other, whether Bhau knew the
condition of Ibrahim Khan's corps or the behaviour of Vitthal Shivdeo and
others Had he with his remaining victorious troops galloped at full speed
for one mile to the left and stood behind Ibrahim Khan's hard pressed mus
keteers confronting the broken Ruhelas, it is certain that he would have suc
ceeded in creating a breach there, and run behind the Ruhela camp Had he
cared to save his life together with that of Vishwasrao and his nearest women
folk, he would have possibly taken such a line of action, and escaped along
the river Jamuna past the Abdali camp But that would have meant a breach
of promise he had entered into with Ibrahim Khan The previous night he
had told on oath to Ibrahim Khan that he would under no circumstances
flee away from the battle field forsaking the Gardi infantry under Ibrahim
Khan, but would rather stand as if entrenched behind him and take the risk
of being cut to pieces rather than leave the field Secondly, it would have
meant a break of the marching square formation, leaving the non combatants,
camp followers and the bazar people to the tender mercy of the Afghan
troops Looking to the result, however, it seems as if that would have been
a better alternative, because, after all, the camp was left to be looted and
slaughtered by the Afghans at the end of the day By it the Maratha defeat
would have been felt less, as it would have resulted in the survival of politi
cally and militarily the most important people in the army
The behaviour of the Maratha rear guard under the Shinde and Holkar
contingents is not known When, actually, Malharrao Holkar and the cap
tains in the Shinde cavalry left the field is not recorded But we take it that
they never came in contact with the enemy throughout the main period of
the battle from 9 A M to 3 P M Exception must, however be made for the
• personal troops under Janakoji, Tukoji and Mahadji Shinde They kept
their eye on the movements of the centre under Bhau and after Vishwasrao's
accidental death ran to his rescue It was an unfortunate necessity of the plan
that these veteran troops practically did nothing in this final battle They
merely neutralised the opposite camps under Shah Pasand Khan, and Shuja
But many of them escaped the last slaughter by taking to their heels just in
time to get their way westwards
The main difference in the position of the two armies was created by
the necessity of the Marathas They had, if they wished to move from Pani
pat, to come out in a body all together, leaving no base with reserves behind
Ahmad Shah's position was the reverse He stood on his ground well en-
trenched He was not out to carry his bag and baggage with womenfolk past

92 PANIPAT 1761
the enemy line, as the Marathas had to do His defensive position was now
as strong as that of the Marathas at Panipat Ahmad Shah took full ad
vantage of this situation Only the fighting force was first sent to the front,
the rest doing all their duties in the usual manner They could cook their
food and have their meals before the Maratha onslaught could reach them
The Shah s personal troops had, as usual, been kept as a reserve Ahmad
Shah seems to have taken the precaution to keep his main body of troops in
tact in all his battles and not only at Panipat He would make the second
rate troops face the enemy first and wear them out Later on, at the critical
juncture, he would rush in with his fresh, unexhausted troops and complete
the victory His methodology was thus quite different from the Indian practice
since the days of the Mahabharata battle In all the noted Indian battles in
history, the chief general was always at the fore front, and at his fall the bat-
tles ended in a rout The battles were fought for the general, and with his
fall no motive remained for the troops to fight any longer Ahmad Shah, in
fact, was the precursor of the European mode of warfare, wherein a general
seldom takes a personal part in the fight In a composite fight he would make
his allies face the brunt of the battle and expose them to severe casualties
He himself would come in last when the result hung in the balance, thus leaving
a preponderating force with him to take charge of the spoils and not leave an
upper hand to others in case of a dispute later on The original Hindu prac-
tice of fighting with a general at the head of the army had been handed down
even to the Muslim rulers of India They also followed the same mode The
Marathas revolutionised the old system by their guerilla mode in which a
face to face battle was to be avoided But Sadashivrao Bhau had now again
brought the original vogue into fashion with the help of the trained infantry
and its park of artillery Unfortunately for him he had to practise this mode
under very adverse circumstances now
Thus the critical hour of the battle, when the Marathas could pos-
sibly have given a different turn to it, passed away with the army standing ex-
hausted and bewildered by the very first effort Sir Jadunath thinks⁵ that be-
cause 'Bhau had no squadron of cavalry in heavy armour and mounted on
powerful horses ready to charge in close order and cut its way like a solid
wedge through the shaken Durrani ranks," he could not complete his initial
success He also thinks that because the Maratha troops did not carry roast ,
meat and dry bread in their saddle bags and water in leather bottles to refresh
and reinvigorate themselves easily in the field on account of their caste suscepti
bilities with its dread of its defiling touch, they could not recoup themselves
in time so as to follow their initial success with further advantage Though these
causes are true so far as they go, we do not think that these decided the line
of action taken by Bhau He knew that Ahmad Shah with his entrenched
camp was behind the Wazir's line, and the possibility of marching through
it was very remote At the same time he was neither prepared to expose his
camp to Afghan butchery as long as he lived, nor would he break the square
formation decided upon the previous night, and run past Ibrahim Khan's in-
⁵ Fall 233, See the appendix on food arrangements

fantry through the gaps created by it and forsake him, going back on his
promise Anyway, the possibility of saving the main centre with the most
important personages on the Maratha side, passed away by one o'clock when
the Wazir rallied his troops and began the fight again
Now the battle entered its most desperate stage The fight was a close
combat with sword, spear, lance, dagger and knife, both sides vehemently
charging each other This went on for an hour or so, and then 'by Ahmad
Sultan's good fortune" an arrow struck Vishwasrao, killing him outright He
fell from his horse The news of Vishwasrao's death spread like wild fire
throughout the Maratha camp in a very short time, and it had a very dis-
astrous effect on the morale of the fighters thenceforward When Bhau heard
of it, he also was very much affected He ordered that the corpse should be
placed on an elephant so as to keep it safe from being trodden upon, and then
ordered a last charge But by this time the news was beginning to have its
effect Timid men, it seems, fell back and began to leave the field, saving them-
selves as best as they could, and in a short time Bhau's flanks seem to have
completely deserted Kashiraj writes that, all of a sudden, the field became
clear, the Maratha army having vanished entirely, and none remained in the
field except heaps of corpses here and there
Besides the news of Vishwasrao's death, another cause which created
panic in the Maratha camp was the behaviour of 2,000 Afghans, employed
by the Marathas and working under Vitthal Shivdeo The sentiment and aim
of the Marathas in this war under discussion is incidentally well illustrated
thereby They were not fighting against the Muslims, not even the foreign
Afghan Muslims, but against Ahmad Shah Abdali who wished to interfere
in Indian politics and bring foreign pressure on the solution of Indian problems
This existence of the Afghan troops serving under the Marathas is not men-
tioned by Kashiraj at all But it is found in both the Ka fijat and Bakhar of
Bhau in Marathi ⁵ᵃ It is also testified by Bhau's correspondence with Govind-
pant Bundele ⁶ It is not clear to which of the Afghan tribes these dissatisfied,
renegade troops belonged They may even be Indian Ruhelas Be that as
it may, these troops, employed without forethought, became a source of great
havoc at this critical juncture To distinguish them from the Afghans on
Abdali's side, they had been given a badge of an ochre coloured headdress⁷ after
the Maratha fashion They were standing behind Vitthal Shivdeo's troops to
the left hand side of Bhau As soon as they heard of Vishwasrao's fall, they
treacherously threw away their badges and began to loot the Maratha camp
adjoining them, circulating the news of the Maratha defeat with exaggerated
accounts The non combatants, consisting of two lakhs of persons, naturally
thought that the Afghans had now penetrated the Maratha lines, and they
took to their heels Vitthal Shivdeo also began to fall back as a result, in-
stead of trying to check these Afghans in their nefarious activities Thus it
was that Kashiraj found the Maratha side suddenly deserted and the field
⁵ᵃ Pp 23 and 143 respectively
⁶ RAJ 1.237, 242, 244
⁷ Bhau Bakhar 143, Bhau Kaifiyat 23

94 PANIPAT 1761
cleared. Now only a few hundred troops surrounding Bhau remained at the
front in the centre of the line.
On the left hand side the Ruhelas now reinforced with fresh troops,
began their attack simultaneously with that of the Wazir at the centre. In
the consequent battle Damaji Gaikawad, Antaji Manakeshwar and Yashwant
rao Pawar fell back defeated unable to stand the heavy slaughter by the con-
secutive rounds of match lock fire from the Ruhela side. They could not
make a united stand in one place. Ibrahim Khan went forth and mixed his
troops amongst the Ruhelas heavily firing his last salvoes but was himself
wounded and carried a prisoner by the Ruhelas. His son and brother in-law
died in the effort. Practically the whole of his corps seems to have died on the
battle field fighting to the last. Yashwantrao Pawar also was cut to pieces.
Damaji Gaikawad received three wounds but retreated safely with his im-
mediate civil assistants.⁸ Antaji Manakeshwar also with his usual cautious-
ness retreated just in time to save himself uncovering the left side of the
Marathas. The Ruhelas now closed upon the left flank of Bhau's personal
cavalry.
On the left hand side of Bhau, Samsher Bahadar was standing. He
behaved on that day as a worthy scion of the Peshwa family and fought to
the last. To his right were standing the Shindes, Tukoji, Mahadji and Janakoji.
Their opposites on the Abdali side were Shuja ud daulah and Najib Khan.
At the beginning of the battle at 9 A. M. the distance between the Ruhela front
and the Shinde line was more than three miles. Najib was the coolest brain
on the Abdali side, never losing his head and never acting impetuously. On
this day he seems to have acted with perfect calculation. As the Maratha
plan of the battle was to march on to the river side before the evening and
not to fight a battle, naturally no one from the Shinde side advanced to at-
tack Shuja or Najib. Besides, there was a great distance intervening between
them. Najib used this respite to act in a systematic manner. He turned all
his troops into infantry, dismounting even his cavalry from their horses. Then
with his 15,000 troops he slowly advanced on foot, throwing up earth works in
front at each quarter of a mile. That is to say, the sappers and others raised
a breast-work of sand and earth a few steps in front of the line, one cubit high,
which afforded a shelter to the stooping infantry and prepared trenches where
the Ruhela infantry advanced and crouched down. Najib had a vast quantity
of rockets with him. He would fire a volley of 2,000 rockets all at once from
his advanced trenches. This had the effect of darkening the ground and the
sky with their smoke and their noise created a sort of terror very useful for
frightening away any advancing force. Kashiraj says that the troops of the
Shinde contingent wanted to attack Najib, but they got no chance on account
of this fire. We think otherwise. Bhau had wisely kept the Shinde and Holkar
contingents with their beaten troops—beaten by Abdali himself in three or four
fights during the last two years—to the rear flanks of his advancing square so
as not to demoralise other troops by their chicken-hearted behaviour in an
*8 SPD 21.200

THE BATTLE 95
emergency. In one sense they were in a position to act better than others,
having a first-hand experience of the Abdali tactics. This time they were
acting accordingly, never breaking their line and never acting impetuously
as in a Maratha charge. It means they obeyed the orders of the Commander-
in-Chief and would not offer battle themselves unless attacked. Najib could
gain only one and a half kos, i.e., not more than two miles in four hours by
this method, according to Kashiraj's measure. By one o'clock, he came within
the firing distance of the Shinde contingent and began his attack on it. This
had the effect, it seems, of pushing the front ranks of the Shinde line to its left
towards the centre and separating them from their rear. The news of Vish-
wasrao's fall by this time had created terror in the Shinde contingent also.
Janakoji and Tukoji, as the most intimate and loyal servants of the Peshwa,
pushed themselves to Bhau's side to see what had happened and rally the cen-
tre. Sabaji and Mahadji turned back towards Holkar's contingent and thus
created a gap in the line through which Najib's Ruhelas pressed forward. Shah
Pasand Khan, who was to the left hand side of Najib and had been ordered
to support the flank attack of the Ruhelas on that side, followed close at the
heels of Najib so as not to allow the Marathas to run that way. It is not
known when the Holkar and Shinde contingents, which fled away from the
field of battle, actually left the field. Certainly it was not before the news of
Vishwasrao's fall became known, i.e., 2 P.M. But after that they seem to have
soon taken to their heels,⁹ and never once came into direct contact with the
Afghans or the Ruhelas. We have no faith in the widely expressed belief that
Malharrao had an understanding with Najib who allowed him to escape
unscathed. He had, perhaps, selected his own position in the rear, or Bhau
had wisely and knowingly placed him there. Fortunately for him, the opposite
side under Shah Pasand Khan would not leave their original position at the
front astride the Mughal Grand Trunk Road near the village of Siwa. Had
Shah Pasand Khan left his place he would have allowed a clear passage to
the Maratha troops at the rear along the easiest road. Shah Pasand Khan
could not break the battle array, and Malharrao would not swerve to the right
and break the marching square. But after 1 P.M., when Ahmad Shah ordered
simultaneous flank attack on Bhau's centre to aid the frontal attack of the
Wazir, Shah Pasand Khan naturally swerved obliquely to the right. As Najib
had also by this time advanced systematically on the flank of Shinde, there was
no problem for Shah Pasand Khan to break the fighting line and create a gap
for the Marathas to escape, though its natural result was to free the Maratha
right rear from the watch of Shah Pasand Khan's flank advance. Malharrao's
whole life philosophy was based not on honour and prestige but on profit and
escape. The Marathi adage which says that 'if the head remains whole, one
can have eighty five turbans to wear," seems to have been old Malharrao's
guiding principle which he naturally followed at this juncture. Half the
Shinde contingent under Sabaji Shinde, Khanaji Jadhav and Janrao Wable,
which had separated itself from Janakoji and Tukoji, also joined Holkar in
his flight. Unless they had a clear start of two hours, it is difficult to believe
that they could have escaped unhurt to the extent they did. Malharrao was
⁹RAJ. 6.409

TO FACE PAGE 96
76° 55' | 77° 0' | 77° 5' | 77° 10'
29° 30'
BATTLE OF PANIPAT 1761
THIRD STAGE 4 30PM
SCALE

1. MALHARJ HOLKAR
2. SINDHIA
3. HUZURĀT & BHĀU'S BANNER
4. DĀMĀJI VITTHAL SHIVDEV
   YESHVANT PUĀR & ANTĀJI
   MĀNKESHWAR.
5. IBRĀHĪM GĀRDI
6. SCATTERED TROOPS OF BHĀU
   AZ ZULLĀPUR
   JUMNĀ RIVER
   PĀNĪPAT
   CAMPING SITE
   OF MARĀTHAS
   CAMP-FOLLOWERS
   CUT DOWN
   CAMPING SITE OF ABDĀLI
7. BARKHURDĀR & AMIR BEG
8. RUHELAS
9. SHĀH WALI
10. SUJĀ
11. HĀJI B.
    SHĀH PASAND
12. RESERVED TROOPS OF ABDĀLI'S SLAVES
13. SCATTERED TROOPS OF ABDĀLI
    76° 55' | 77° 0' | 77° 5' | 77° 10' | 29° 15'
    M. K. BAR. | H. B. SHAH

96 PANIPAT 1761
very old now and had scarcely strength to ride swiftly enough to save his
life $^{10}$ It was only because of his early start that he was not overtaken by the
pursuing Afghans after the final rout
In the meantime at the centre, Bhau tried to rally as many of his
troops as he could, and fought to the last Janakoji and Tukoji joined him
in this last effort Najib had succeeded in separating half the Shinde contin-
gent from the other and closing upon its heels His position at 3 P M was
in the gap created by the escape of the Shinde contingent, and Shah Pasand
Khan was immediately at his back This position meant that Bhau's escape
was now closed The main attack on Bhau came from the personal slaves
of Ahmad Shah He had divided his 6,000 slaves into three parties, and
placed each of them on the flanks of Bhau Bhau's front was now closed by
the Wazir and the rear by Shah Pasand Khan and Barkhurdar Khan On
the flanks, the 6,000 fresh troops began to fire incessantly and simultaneously
This, combined with the frontal fire of swivel guns, made it impossible for the
centre to swerve to any side, and they were turned into a knot which twisted
itself this way and that at each attack until completely withered away by
death Nana Fadnis reports that Bhau was fighting to the last, till fifty horse-
men remained by his side After that Nana Fadnis was separated from Bhau and
went back towards Panipat What happened to Bhau afterwards nobody ex-
actly knows Tukoji Shinde, Sonaji Bhapkar and many other captains of note
lost their lives in the last desperate fight Bhau would not take even a last
chance of escape though advised to do so by Tukoji Shinde, and was thus
slaughtered by someone somewhere at last We take Kashiraj's account of
the finding of Bhau's trunk first and his head afterwards as true, though we
do not believe in the story of Bhau's last struggle as reported by a Durrani
soldier and put down in writing by Kashiraj, because it would not stand criti-
cism Janakoji was wounded and was made a prisoner by Barkhurdar Khan
The battle seems to have ended finally by 4 P M, when Nana Fadnis,
separated from Bhau, turned his face towards Panipat Already many of the
civilians had gathered there after early separating themselves from the centre
Thus it was that Ramaji Anant Dabholkar, Bapuji Ballal Phadke and Nana
Fadnis met together These three had good horses and therefore they were
able to cut their way back to Panipat When Nana Fadnis reached Panipat
it was already 5 P M ' Taking the advice of experienced Ramajipant, all of
them left their horses and baggage and donned the garbs of ill clad beggars
As Ramajipant knew the geography of those parts well, he led the party out,
going west After it was dark they started their trek, but before they could
cover one kos they were attacked three or four times and searched by the
Afghans Each time they could they cut off ten or twenty of the party till they
covered a great distance, some twelve or more miles to the south west. Upto
this point the three had kept together But again the Afghans came and wounded
Ramaji and Bapuji who thus fell behind Weak Nana Fadnis swerved into
tall grass and was thus saved, his frail figure probably creating compassion
• $^{10}$ Ibid. 3.516, dated 11 3 1760
1

TO FACE PAGE 96
76° 55' | 77° 0' | 77° 5' | 77° 10' (29° 30')
BATTLE OF PANIPAT 1761
THIRD STAGE 4 30PM
SCALE
FURLONGS 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 MILES

1. MALHARJI HOLKAR
2. SINDHIA
   3 HUZURAT & BHAU'S BANNER
   4 DAMAJI VITTHAL SHIVDEV
   YESHVANT PUAR & ANTAJI
   MANKESHWAR
   5 IBRAHIM GARDI
   3 SCATTERED TROOPS OF BHAU
   AZTULLIPUR
   BAPOLI
   JUMNA RIVER
   PANIPAT
   CAMPING SITE OF MARATHAS
   CAMP-FOLLOWERS CUT TO LOOT
   CAMPING SITE OF ABDALI
   6 BARKHURDAR & AMIR BEG
   7 RUHELAS
   8 SHAH WALI
   9 SUJA
   10 NAJIB
   11 SHAH PASAND
   3 RESERVED TROOPS OF ABDALI'S SLAVES
   14 SCATTERED TROOPS OF ABDALI
   76° 55' | 77° 0' | 77° 5' | 77° 10' (29° 20')

THE BATTLE 97
amongst the assailants He proceeded still farther when again a party at-
tacked him, drawing him out of the tall grass where he was hiding Here
again some old soldier took pity on the boy and thus he was finally saved
Because it was the eighth day of the bright half of the lunar month, the moon
was shining overhead in the evening till she set after midnight This circum
stance, while it was useful to some in covering their flight, was also responsible
for the long pursuit by the Afghan troops over that plain and the heavy
slaughter of non combatants running on foot for their lives But many more
were killed by the surrounding villagers who had suffered terribly during the
last three months by the constant tramp of soldiers The Karnal Gazetteer has
recorded that the villages of Phurlak (twelve miles to the north), Bala (fifteen
miles to the north west), and Dahar (six miles to the south west of Panipat)
had migrated to other areas forsaking their sites This will give an idea of
the devastation wrought in the surrounding area It is not recorded as to
when the elephant on which Bhau's wife, Parvatibai, Nana Fadnis's mother
and wife were seated, got itself separated from the other troops From the
Maratha chronicles it appears that this elephant was not far behind Bhau's
line of battle Once her elephant touched the elephant on which Vishwasrao's
corpse had been placed covered under some cloth Then only she came to
know of Vishwasrao's death and began to weep and wail If this fact is truly
reported, it means that she was half a mile behind the fighting line The
chronicles report that one captain with 500 shepherds¹¹ had been specially ap
pointed for the protection of Parvatibai The name of this captain is given as
Visaji Krishna Jogdand, a name which is not found mentioned in any original
document He had been ordered to follow the army to Delhi if it success
fully cut its passage through the Afghan lines, but if the battle turned into
a defeat, as soon as Bhau's fall was reported, he should cut off Parvatibai so
as to avoid her falling into the hands of the Afghans But neither this Visaji
nor his shepherds seem to have done anything according to order They ran
away at the first shock and tried to save their lives! Only a personal servant,
Janu Bhintade, never left her for a moment and tactfully brought her back
to Panipat out of the turmoil¹² when only half an hour of the day remained
She got down from her elephant and followed Janu Bhintade for some time
on foot Fortunately they met one Virsingrao Baravkar with his good horse
He took her on his horse and fastening her at his back, carried her out of a
sea of Afghans with rocks of corpse heaps in the middle Being a skilful horse
¹¹ Why the Marathi chronicles have reported the fact of 500 shepherds (Dhanagar
in Marathi) as specially appointed for the protection of Parvatibai is a mystery Many of
the followers of Malharrao Holkar were by caste like him Dhanagars (shepherds) Was
it is to suggest that Malharrao had a hand in the protection of Parvatibai? If so why is the
name of the captain specifically given as Visaji Krishna Jogdand? The mystery of this
reference is rendered still more mysterious by the tale of Parvatibai as we found current in
the region surrounding Panipat. A septuagenarian Gaud Brahmin told us the same fact
of shepherds (Gujars) being specially charged with the protection of Parvatibai We think
that Bhau who was prepared for all eventualities had done some such thing for extricating
his wife out of the turmoil by some safe comparatively unfrequented path only known
to these local Gujars many of whom must have been certainly serving in the Maratha camp
during all these months. It is not unlikely that because some of them acted as guides
through the jungle to the south west of Panipat that Janu Bhintade and other loyal Marathas
were able to cut their way out of the danger zone.
¹² SPD 2 149 (p 171)
P F—7

98 PANIPAT. 1761
man, he carried her safely across When his horse was exhausted by its dou˙
weight he got her down, when another cavalryman, Piraji Raoot, got her
his horse and thus carried her twelve miles farther on When his horse l
came exhausted he also left her behind, but all along Janu Bhintade kept ]
company, walking or riding along by her side No Maratha would refuse he
place on his horse on the road, and thus she was thirty miles to the south
Delhi when she met Malharrao Holkar and Nana Purandare We have relat
this event in detail because it falsifies Malharrao Holkar's plea as put do
in Holkar's Thaili 13 Malharrao Holkar was neither charged by Bhau w
the special defence of Parvatibai nor did he himself of his own accord do an
thing to bring her out of the field Only casually and accidentally th
met to the south of Delhi, a circumstance of wh ch Malharrao took full ˙
vantage in preparing his apology
The description of the actual battle is very scanty in Marathi, th
given in the chronicles being more or less personal and not useful for milita
study The only eye-witness who speaks of the last effort of Bhau is the trut
ful Nana Fadnis who was only nineteen years old at the time His au
biography is a document by itself throwing considerable light on the who
campaign It clearly sets forth his own prejudices but none can say that
is anywhere untruthful From his writing it seems that Bhau was not u
aware of the possibility of defeat, and had, therefore, made provision for t
special protection of the women folk As a last resort, it had been decided
kill them before they should fall into the hands of the Afghans From Na
Fadnis's words, it looks as if Bhau had prepared himself for death But th
was personal As a general he had taken care that none other should ha
any scent of his personal decision except Nana Fadnis and one or two oth
persons like Nana Purandare He had made every provision that was humar
possible for the ensuing battle with minute care for all eventualities, but all i
precautions came to nothing because the plan was not understood, and, if u
derstood, not followed by anyone with zest, except by Ibrahim Khan Gar
who was the author of it It is clear that the last fight was fought between t
Maratha cavalry and the Afghan infantry But the majority of the Marath
generals had, it seems, no faith in Ibrahim's plan and its possible success Th
were expecting defeat rather than victory, and as such were more prepar
for immediate flight, than for a fight to the finish by sticking to their pos
At the same time they knew that precipitous flight at the very beginning w
quite impossible, the other troops being engaged at the front It is curio
to note that of all those who survived the battle, there is an overwhelmi
majority of old men amongst the notables Malharrao Holkar, Vitth
Shivdeo, Satvoji Jadhav, Damaji Gaikawad, Antaji Manakeshwar, Sabaji Shin
Khanaji Jadhav, Janrao Wable and Gangoba Chandrachud were all age

THE BATTLE 99
certain extent, though they were massacred on the way, like Antaji Manakesh-
war and Baji Hari Supekar who were killed¹⁴ by the Baluch Zamindars near
Farukh nagar to the south west of Delhi Not all who ran away survived
rather the majority died as a result of slaughter or by starvation and cold It
is certain that some two lakhs of people died during those two or three weeks,
but more died from hunger and cold than by wounds in the battle We do
not believe that the Maratha camp had five lakhs of people as reported in
BROWNE'S translation of Kashiraj, much less can it be ten lakhs as trans
lated by Sir Jadunath ¹⁵
Another important thing to note in this affair is the absence of any de
tailed account of the campaign or of the final battle from the pen of any of
these renegades Malharrao Holkar's supposed confession is only an example
of specious pleading specially written to order by some clever scribe Other
wise no one else even tries to give the whole account Nana Purandare who
was very intimate with Bhau, and was supposed to belong to his party in
politics, is ominously silent about the battle, though he had occasion to write
of the event From the whole tenor of the various writings about the battle,
it is clear that the survivors had come to an understanding among themselves
to report it in a particular manner Their additional excuse of doing so was
on account of the personal and political necessities of the case The personal
necessity arose out of the respect for the feelings of Parvatibai, Bhau's wife
who survived and returned in the company of the renegades, as well as anxiety
for the health of the Peshwa Though Nana Fadnis, Nana Purandare, Mal
harrao Holkar and others seem to have been convinced very early of Bhau's
death by the letters they receivd from Kashiraj, Anupgir Gosawi, Purushot
tam Hingne, Ganesh Vedanti and others, they were afraid to disclose the fact
for its effects on Parvatibai and Nanasaheb The political necessity was still
greater The Marathas tried as far as possible to minimise the disaster by
starting rumours about the safe running away of Bhau, Janakoji and others,
thus trying to keep an atmosphere of expectancy for the sudden emergence of
Bhau and Janakoji at any time and from anywhere, as long as they could
By this method they did succeed in rallying the survivors and making a bold
stand from the base at Gwalior Its definite political effect is seen in the re
turn of Ahmad Shah Abdali after waiting for two months at Delhi, and still
more by his political arrangement He bestowed the Wazirship of the Mughal
Empire-be it noted-not on his ally Shuja ud daulah but on the regicide
Ghazi ud din Khan, a protege of the Marathas He tried to conciliate the
Peshwa by sending condolence messages couched in an apologetic tone, and
also by opening negotiations for a political settlement ¹⁶ In response the Peshwa
also tried to look at the matter in a political manner without revengeful feel
ings He also sent Mir Anvarulla Khan Trimbakkar to Delhi with dresses of
honour for Abdali and his Wazir Shah Wali Khan ¹⁷ But by the time Anvarulla
Khan had reached Kota, he got the news of Abdali's sudden return to his own

¹⁴ KHARE 1.71
¹⁵ IHQ 10.265
¹⁶ SPD 21.202.
¹⁷ Ibid. 2.168.

100 PANIPAT. 1761
country due to the rebellious attitude of his Durrani troops, and had, there-
fore, to come back with the elephant which was being carried as a present to
Abdali. 18
Estimate of the Loss of Human Lives in the Battle
The last trace of resistance on the battle-field ceased at 4 P. M. on that
day, when two hours of day-light still remained. This fact, together with the
fact of the day being the eighth of the bright moon on which the moon was over-
head in the evening casting no shadow and setting after midnight, gave ample
time and scope for the Afghans to pursue the fugitives and kill as many of
them as possible. It is difficult to estimate the number of Maratha soldiers and
non-combatants slaughtered, but the total was not less than one lakh. Out of
the 60,000 soldiers, possibly half the number died on the battle field fighting
face to face. Some 10,000 more must have died in the pursuit. Of the re-
maining 20,000, 10,000 definitely reached Gwalior in safety after a fortnight.
The rest died on the way fighting with the villagers or on account of heavy
wounds, exhaustion, starvation and disease. Of the survivors, too, half only
had run away with their horses, the rest had slowly trudged back on foot losing
their horses to the robbers on the way. Amongst the soldiers who lost their lives,
Bhau, Vishwasrao, Samsher Bahadur (who had extricated himself out of the
final struggle after receiving heavy wounds and run back upto Deeg in the
Jat's dominion to die there), Yashvantrao Pawar, Janakoji Shinde (who was
slaughtered in captivity), Ibrahim Khan Gardi with his brother-in law and
son, Santaji Wagh, Manaji Paygude, Khanderao Nimbalkar, Sonaji Bhapkar,
Tukoji Shinde, Dadji Darekar and Narayan Bapuji Rethrekar were the most
notable, though practically all the soldiers who died on the battle-field were ex-
perienced men who had fought in more than one battle.
In the camp were probably one lakh and a half of non combatants. Of
these some 6,000 found their way to the non hostile camp of Shuja-ud-daulah
and got a shelter there. They were protected from the fury of the Afghans and
safely sent back to Jatwada after the return of Ahmad Shah to Delhi. Some
22,000 persons were captured as slaves by the Afghans the next day. Of these
a considerable number were women belonging either to the servant or concu-
bine class with perhaps a few hundred of married women, who had accom-
panied their husbands for pilgrimage. These were sold by their Afghan cap-
tors to Indian soldiers. Of the rest, possibly some 50,000 were slaughtered
in cold blood by the Afghans on the day after the battle for religious merit.
According to Kashiraj, every Durrani soldier slaughtered a hundred or two
in this way, which is obviously a gross exaggeration, because if we take even
10,000 Durranis to have done this, it would bring the total slaughter to
10,00,000! Many persons who had foolishly returned to Panipat in the even-
ing of the battle and taken shelter in the walled town, were, the next day,
hunted out and put to the sword by the hostile townsmen themselves. The
Bhau Bakhar reports a curious permission granted by Ahmad Shah to the sons
18 Raj. 6 472

THE BATTLE 101
of Mian Qutb Shah and Abdus Samad Khan who were beheaded by the
Marathas at Kunjpura with ignominy They sought permission to slaughter
captured men to avenge their fathers' deaths Ahmad Shah gave them the
permit to go upto 20 kos and slaughter for four ghatikas only, but not more
Thus permitted, Qutb Shah's son slaughtered 4,000 fugitives near Sonepat
and Samad Khan's son killed 5 000 near Bahadurgad to the west of Delhi
None of those who were captured alive at Panipat on the next day were
slaughtered Their property was looted but they were allowed to get them
selves freed by paying a ransom Shuja ud daulah and his Hindu officers,
like Anupgir Gosawi and Kashiraj, paid the ransom for many and sent them
back with a safe escort Many of the fugitives possibly lost their lives because
they would not part with what they possessed on their body Only those who
like Nana Fadnis threw away all property and assumed the dress of beggars
were able to return unmolested, unless they were caught in the cold massacres
related above
The loss on the Afghan side can be estimated at some 20,000, practically
all dying on the battle field Three fourths of this number were possibly the
Indian Ruhelas, the rest being Afghans and other foreign allies
THE SPOILS OF THE BATTLE
If it is impossible to estimate the total number of men who died at
Panipat, it is still more impossible to estimate the spoils which came into the
hands of the Afghans and the Ruhelas The definite loss on the Maratha side
as stated by Nana Fadnis¹⁹ was 50,000 horses, the number of all the elephants
and camels and bullocks is nowhere definitely stated 300 elephants, 3,000
camels and about a lakh of bullocks would be, we believe, a fair estimate All
the artillery as well as the weapons possessed by the various soldiers and non-
combatants fell into the hands of the victors and brigands The total number
of cannon, great and small, heavy and light, should be some 300, 25,000 match
locks and muskets of the French pattern wielded by the Gardi troops of Ibrahim
Khan must have fallen into the hands of the Ruhelas and the Durranis One
lakh of swords, shields and spears in the possession of both combatants and non
combatants must have been looted by the victors A similar number of javelins,
axes daggers and knives of many varieties also must have been captured from
the camp by the victors A few thousand armours, worn by some of the noted
Marathas and the Gardis of Ibrahim Khan also must have fallen into the hands
of the various captors This is as far as the war material is concerned Of
these, most of the horses and bullocks and elephants were in a half starved con-
dition, unable to walk even a short distance These were sold by the Afghans
to the Indian soldiers at almost nominal prices Many of these must have
perished before reaching the homes of their buyers as no fodder was available
anywhere in the vicinity of Panipat and Delhi Many of the bullocks must
have been slaughtered for food by the victorious Muslims
¹⁹ Purandare 1 417

102 PANIPAT: 1761
How much property fell into the hands of the captors is very difficult
to estimate The personal kit of an average Maratha soldier was very meagre
It would be one big brass lota and a small vessel for drinking water, an iron
pan for baking bread and a brass plate on which to dine A few hundred
big vessels for storing water or cooking rice and vegetables in volume would
naturally be found in this big camp where occasionally even Brahmins must
have been fed on religious occasions, or when on visits to places of pilgrimage
on the way The clothing and bedding of an average Maratha soldier and
camp follower could not have been worth much, except for some big sardars
and officials who were probably well clad, wearing costly apparel The tents,
big and small, screens and other material of an official nature, worth some lakhs,
also came into the possession of the Afghans What the bazar accompanying
the Maratha army possessed on the last day, it is difficult to say But taking
into consideration the famine conditions subsisting in the Maratha camp, there
could not have been much of corn, grain and other articles of food and drink
The only item left worth noting was cash and jewellery A certain amount of
accumulated coin should have been found in the possession of the bazar merchants
and artisans who had received fabulous returns for their goods But most of
the army and camp followers, as well as the state treasury accompanying the
army on the march, had possibly exhausted their treasure in buying things at
fabulous prices, and many had to sell their jewellery and trinkets in order to
subsist, thus leaving comparatively very little in their pockets or on their per-
sons Possibly the accumulated sales money of the merchants had been bor-
rowed by the starving individuals in the camp and also perhaps by the state
If this surmise is true, then even the merchants' money must have disappeared
from the camp in buying victuals and fodder or other necessities Only the
unsold and unsalable articles must have remained in the camp and fallen into
the hands of the Afghan soldiers Some 20,000 slaves, male and female, were
also appropriated by the victors
Taking into consideration what has been said above, we do not think
the estimate of various writers about loot as correct "Every trooper brought
away ten or even twenty camels laden with money" is the description of
Kashiraj We think it a gross exaggeration It is true that the Marathas lost
everything they possessed, but no Maratha soldier would have on his person or
in his pocket precious metal worth more than a hundred rupees on an average
It is doubtful whether even this much had been left with him after ten months
of march through a foreign country, when looting had been forbidden, salaries
and wages not paid for the most part, and all subsisted by selling what they
possessed We know the aftermath of war Ahmad Shah Abdali found it im-
possible to pay the accumulated salaries of his soldiers and hence they mutinied
They were, so reports Nur ud din, completely dissatisfied with what they had
received as spoils, which they considered very meagre after two years of hard
campaigning The conquered territories were bestowed on the Ruhelas The
booty had also to be sold to them at nominal prices on account of the want of
cash with which to buy the necessaries The captured horses were worth only
ten or twenty rupees each¹ As a result, the unruly Durrani troops were on the
point of plundering the camp of Shuja ud daulah who decamped from Delhi

THE BATTLE 193
without even taking leave of the Afghan monarch! It will be seen from these
descriptions that this great victory had not brought much cash into the coffers
of the Afghans, and was thus a financial failure. While the Marathas had lost
their all in the immediate as well as distant sense, there was no commensurate
gain to the victors Verily it was a Pyrrhic victory!
FOOD ARRANGEMENTS DURING THE BATTLE
Sir Jadunath's charge (Fall 2.337) that the Marathas did not carry
"roast meat and dry bread" in their saddle is due to his ignorance of the
Maratha manners. Roasted gram and rice were generally carried by the
Marathas when on travel, together with raw sugar (gur) to be eaten before
drinking water after a long journey. Flour for baking bread was carried on
the person to be used at halt. The Marathas were vegetarians to a great ex-
tent, but they also knew the sustaining power of meat in preference to bread.
At least one reference mentioning its use is available in RAJWADE 10-59, dur-
ing the war between Janoji Bhonsle and Madhavrao Peshwa in 1769. Janoji
for one month was continually on the march every day with Madhavrao close
at his heels During a march of three or four days in succession, he could not
make a halt so as to bake bread. The Bhonsle army subsisted on mutton only
and thus gave the slip to the Peshwa. This clearly proves that occasionally,
when available, the Marathas made use of roast meat to subsist on. Of course,
it is more than we can say whether the Marathas on the field of Panipat were
actually carrying ready-made food on their persons, but our surmise is that
they did.
MARATHA MODE OF WARFARE
That the historic Marathas had perfected an individual mode of
cavalry movement is clear from its adoption by Col. Skinner in his later famous
"Skinner's Horse." General G. C. MUNDY²⁰ who accompanied Lord COMBER-
MERE, the Commander-in-Chief in India in 1830, on his tour through northern
India, writes of it in the following manner:
"The peculiar evolution of the 'Skinner's Horse' and which is most striking to a Eu-
ropean eye is the Maratha charge. In this movement the whole corps advances in line,
two deep, at a canter or trot, which, like John Gilpin's, becomes 'a gallop soon'; and as
they approach their object, the files open out, and every man, uttering a wild, shrill scream,
comes thundering on with his sword waving above his head In spite of the apparent
disjointed irregularity of the charge, and the amazing speed of their approach, at the word
'halt' every horse is brought upon his haunches within ten paces of the reviewing General.
The Maratha charge is certainly well calculated to strike terror into a foe already wavering,
but its real physical effect upon staunch troops must be far inferior to the close combined
charge of our cavalry" (Page 165)
The Marathas were known as superb spearmen and their mode can be
judged from the Skinner's Horse trained in the same tradition
²⁰ MUNDY's Pen and Pencil Sketches in India, 3rd ed. (1858).

THE BATTLE 105
housings, the fringe of which reached nearly to the ground, were of velvet embroidered in
gold and silver . The Mahratta elephants have a style of gait and carriage peculiar to
themselves, and are as superior in appearance to ours, as the English thorough bred racer
is to the earth-stopper's hack. The Company's elephants, probably from having been rode
too young, and oppressed with burthens, shuffle along with short step , their necks bent,
and their heads hanging with the melancholy air of an Oxford street hackney coach horse.
The Mahratta elephant strides majestically along, his head elevated far above his shoulder,
and his tusks standing out horizontally. The chiefs pride themselves greatly on these ani-
mals, and take pleasure in teaching them a variety of tricks." (Pages 213, 4 )
Though these descriptions are dated seventy years after Panipat, they can as well serve
for the visualisation of the Maratha army on that fatal field.

CHAPTER VII
THE JUDGMENT
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PANIPAT DISASTER
THE MARATHA survivors from the Panipat disaster seem to have com
bined in taking advantage of the death of the commander in chief and ascrib-
ing the defeat to his incorrect strategy, wrong tactics and, in general, to his con
ceit, arrogance and blindness to the facts of the situation Our narrative should
have made it clear by now that most of these grounds of condemnation are
flimsy after thoughts As Bhau was not a free man in diplomatic talks, the
responsibility is shifted to the shoulders of the Peshwa Sadashivrao Bhau's
strategy or planning was not incorrect, but its execution devolved upon per-
sons who were not strong enough or wise enough to carry it out Bhau cer-
tainly cannot be pronounced a first rate general in history Three fourths of
his mental mould was civil in composition, and only one fourth can be treated
as military in form Ahmad Shah Abdali, his rival, bore a reverse proportion
in his mental make up The sort of expertness in any matter which comes to
a man by single minded absorption in one kind of work only, is not possible
in a man whose life is divided and shared by various interests Sadashivrao
was, no doubt, trained as any other Maratha sardar of the day for war, but
that does not seem to be his favourite occupation His mind was diplomatic
in formation and his expertness was to be seen in his management of finance
and administration Ahmad Shah had led the life of a slave under such a
military master as Nadir Shah from his childhood, and spent practically every
minute of his life amidst war His expertness was born of this long, all ab-
sorbing experience Such an experience and such period of candidateship
seldom fall to the lot of an average man Certainly none of the Marathas
could boast of such training The historic Marathas were war like no doubt,
but when compared to the Afghans, must be judged more as civil than military
Civil men can also become good soldiers if they are imbued with high ideals
If the cause for which a man fights is after his own heart, he can put all his
faculties into the affair and see to it that it ends in success Unfortunately
such was not the state of the Maratha army at Panipat as a whole Bhau and
others siding with him fought for the name of the Marathas, but there were
many others, perhaps the majority, who thought otherwise. Malharrao Holkar

THE JUDGMENT. 107.
lieved in his professions at all. This was the real tragedy of the Pánipât cam-
paign. Actually, it was Malharrao who, in the company of Raghunathrao,
had gone to the Panjab and stretched the Maratha sphere of influence upto
Attock and even beyond. It was this expansion by driving Abdali's forces out

CHAPTER VII
THE JUDGMENT
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PANIPAT DISASTER
THE MARATHA survivors from the Panipat disaster seem to have com-
bined in taking advantage of the death of the commander in-chief and ascrib-
ing the defeat to his incorrect strategy, wrong tactics and, in general, to his con-
ceit, arrogance and blindness to the facts of the situation. Our narrative should
have made it clear by now that most of these grounds of condemnation are
flimsy after thoughts. As Bhau was not a free man in diplomatic talks, the
responsibility is shifted to the shoulders of the Peshwa. Sadashivrao Bhau's
strategy or planning was not incorrect, but its execution devolved upon per-
sons who were not strong enough or wise enough to carry it out. Bhau cer-
tainly cannot be pronounced a first-rate general in history. Three-fourths of
his mental mould was civil in composition, and only one-fourth can be treated
as military in form. Ahmad Shah Abdali, his rival, bore a reverse proportion
in his mental make up. The sort of expertness in any matter which comes to
a man by single minded absorption in one kind of work only, is not possible
in a man whose life is divided and shared by various interests. Sadashivrao
was, no doubt, trained as any other Maratha sardar of the day for war, but
that does not seem to be his favourite occupation. His mind was diplomatic
in formation and his expertness was to be seen in his management of finance
and administration. Ahmad Shah had led the life of a slave under such a
military master as Nadir Shah from his childhood, and spent practically every
minute of his life amidst war. His expertness was born of this long, all ab-
sorbing experience. Such an experience and such period of candidateship
seldom fall to the lot of an average man. Certainly none of the Marathas
could boast of such training. The historic Marathas were war-like no doubt,
but when compared to the Afghans, must be judged more as civil than military.
Civil men can also become good soldiers if they are imbued with high ideals.
If the cause for which a man fights is after his own heart, he can put all his
faculties into the affair and see to it that it ends in success. Unfortunately
such was not the state of the Maratha army at Panipat as a whole. Bhau and
others siding with him fought for the name of the Marathas, but there were
many others, perhaps the majority, who thought otherwise. Malharrao Holkar
and others, who escaped by running away from the battle field in good time,
held a different opinion. They thought that they were not fighting for a
supreme cause like the defence of one's motherland. It was the life long con-
viction of Malharrao and men of his type that the Marathas outside Maha-
rashtra were fighting for profit and not for a cause. If they succeeded in the
attempt without scratching their skin, so much the better. But if they had to
fall back in face of higher odds, there was no disgrace for the name of the
Marathas in case of a reverse. Sadashivrao Bhau's declared ideal—India
for the Indians, governed by the Indians themselves—was scarcely under-
stood by anyone besides a few near friends, and none in the enemy camp. Le-
[ 106 ]