पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

THE BATTLE 95
emergency. In one sense they were in a position to act better than others,
having a first-hand experience of the Abdali tactics. This time they were
acting accordingly, never breaking their line and never acting impetuously
as in a Maratha charge. It means they obeyed the orders of the Commander-
in-Chief and would not offer battle themselves unless attacked. Najib could
gain only one and a half kos, i.e., not more than two miles in four hours by
this method, according to Kashiraj's measure. By one o'clock, he came within
the firing distance of the Shinde contingent and began his attack on it. This
had the effect, it seems, of pushing the front ranks of the Shinde line to its left
towards the centre and separating them from their rear. The news of Vish-
wasrao's fall by this time had created terror in the Shinde contingent also.
Janakoji and Tukoji, as the most intimate and loyal servants of the Peshwa,
pushed themselves to Bhau's side to see what had happened and rally the cen-
tre. Sabaji and Mahadji turned back towards Holkar's contingent and thus
created a gap in the line through which Najib's Ruhelas pressed forward. Shah
Pasand Khan, who was to the left hand side of Najib and had been ordered
to support the flank attack of the Ruhelas on that side, followed close at the
heels of Najib so as not to allow the Marathas to run that way. It is not
known when the Holkar and Shinde contingents, which fled away from the
field of battle, actually left the field. Certainly it was not before the news of
Vishwasrao's fall became known, i.e., 2 P.M. But after that they seem to have
soon taken to their heels,⁹ and never once came into direct contact with the
Afghans or the Ruhelas. We have no faith in the widely expressed belief that
Malharrao had an understanding with Najib who allowed him to escape
unscathed. He had, perhaps, selected his own position in the rear, or Bhau
had wisely and knowingly placed him there. Fortunately for him, the opposite
side under Shah Pasand Khan would not leave their original position at the
front astride the Mughal Grand Trunk Road near the village of Siwa. Had
Shah Pasand Khan left his place he would have allowed a clear passage to
the Maratha troops at the rear along the easiest road. Shah Pasand Khan
could not break the battle array, and Malharrao would not swerve to the right
and break the marching square. But after 1 P.M., when Ahmad Shah ordered
simultaneous flank attack on Bhau's centre to aid the frontal attack of the
Wazir, Shah Pasand Khan naturally swerved obliquely to the right. As Najib
had also by this time advanced systematically on the flank of Shinde, there was
no problem for Shah Pasand Khan to break the fighting line and create a gap
for the Marathas to escape, though its natural result was to free the Maratha
right rear from the watch of Shah Pasand Khan's flank advance. Malharrao's
whole life philosophy was based not on honour and prestige but on profit and
escape. The Marathi adage which says that 'if the head remains whole, one
can have eighty five turbans to wear," seems to have been old Malharrao's
guiding principle which he naturally followed at this juncture. Half the
Shinde contingent under Sabaji Shinde, Khanaji Jadhav and Janrao Wable,
which had separated itself from Janakoji and Tukoji, also joined Holkar in
his flight. Unless they had a clear start of two hours, it is difficult to believe
that they could have escaped unhurt to the extent they did. Malharrao was
⁹RAJ. 6.409