पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)
Panipat 1761 with Historical Commentary
टी. एस. शेजवलकर / शास्त्रीय अनुवाद द्वारा
पृष्ठ 149, कुल 197 में से
संदर्भ में पढ़ेंCHAPTER VII
THE JUDGMENT
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PANIPAT DISASTER
THE MARATHA survivors from the Panipat disaster seem to have com-
bined in taking advantage of the death of the commander in-chief and ascrib-
ing the defeat to his incorrect strategy, wrong tactics and, in general, to his con-
ceit, arrogance and blindness to the facts of the situation. Our narrative should
have made it clear by now that most of these grounds of condemnation are
flimsy after thoughts. As Bhau was not a free man in diplomatic talks, the
responsibility is shifted to the shoulders of the Peshwa. Sadashivrao Bhau's
strategy or planning was not incorrect, but its execution devolved upon per-
sons who were not strong enough or wise enough to carry it out. Bhau cer-
tainly cannot be pronounced a first-rate general in history. Three-fourths of
his mental mould was civil in composition, and only one-fourth can be treated
as military in form. Ahmad Shah Abdali, his rival, bore a reverse proportion
in his mental make up. The sort of expertness in any matter which comes to
a man by single minded absorption in one kind of work only, is not possible
in a man whose life is divided and shared by various interests. Sadashivrao
was, no doubt, trained as any other Maratha sardar of the day for war, but
that does not seem to be his favourite occupation. His mind was diplomatic
in formation and his expertness was to be seen in his management of finance
and administration. Ahmad Shah had led the life of a slave under such a
military master as Nadir Shah from his childhood, and spent practically every
minute of his life amidst war. His expertness was born of this long, all ab-
sorbing experience. Such an experience and such period of candidateship
seldom fall to the lot of an average man. Certainly none of the Marathas
could boast of such training. The historic Marathas were war-like no doubt,
but when compared to the Afghans, must be judged more as civil than military.
Civil men can also become good soldiers if they are imbued with high ideals.
If the cause for which a man fights is after his own heart, he can put all his
faculties into the affair and see to it that it ends in success. Unfortunately
such was not the state of the Maratha army at Panipat as a whole. Bhau and
others siding with him fought for the name of the Marathas, but there were
many others, perhaps the majority, who thought otherwise. Malharrao Holkar
and others, who escaped by running away from the battle field in good time,
held a different opinion. They thought that they were not fighting for a
supreme cause like the defence of one's motherland. It was the life long con-
viction of Malharrao and men of his type that the Marathas outside Maha-
rashtra were fighting for profit and not for a cause. If they succeeded in the
attempt without scratching their skin, so much the better. But if they had to
fall back in face of higher odds, there was no disgrace for the name of the
Marathas in case of a reverse. Sadashivrao Bhau's declared ideal—India
for the Indians, governed by the Indians themselves—was scarcely under-
stood by anyone besides a few near friends, and none in the enemy camp. Le-
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