वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

586 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 3. 3. 6.
ADH. 2.]
he who is the chief vital-breath,—him they worshipped as the udgītha"
(Chānd. 1.2.7). They, further, state the fruit of the knowledge thus:
"So exactly he falls to pieces who wishes evil to one who knows thus"
(Chānd 1.2.8 ¹)
On the doubt, viz whether here the vidyās are identical or
different,—we (i.e. prima facie objectors) say: The vidyās are the
same. Why? "On account of the non-difference" of injunctions
and the rest. Thus, the injunction, expressed by the root 'to know',
is the same, the fruit too, viz the overcoming of the demons, is
the same; the form, as well, is the same as the object to be meditated
on, viz the udgītha viewed as the vital-breath, is so; and the name,
too, viz. 'udgītha-meditation' is the same.
If it be objected: There is "difference", i.e. there is difference
from the admitted sameness of the vidyās, i.e. the vidyās are not
identical. Why? In the text: " 'Sing the udgītha for us.' That
breath sang the udgītha" (Bṛh. 1.3.7), the vital-breath is indicated
as a subject by the Vājins by a word in the nominative case. But in
the text: "Him, the udgītha" (Chānd. 1.2.7), it is described as an
object, having the form of the udgītha, by the Chāndogas by a word
in the accusative case,—on account of such scriptural texts,—

¹ Vide the udgītha-vidyā or the doctrine of the udgītha in Bṛhadāraṇyaka
and Chāndogya.—
(a) Bṛh. 1.3.—The story begins: The gods and the demons, the offspring
of Prajāpati fought with one another for the worlds. The gods, then resolved
to overcome the demons at the sacrifice by the udgītha. So they asked speech
to sing the udgītha for them. But the demons, coming to know of this, rushed
upon it and pierced it with evil. Thereupon the gods successively approached
the in-breath, the eye, the ear and the mind, each of which was however corrupted
by the demons. Finally, they approached the chief vital-breath which sang
the udgītha for them, and when the demons rushed upon it, trying to pierce
it with evil, they themselves were scattered and perished (Bṛh. 1.3.1–1.3.7).
(b) Chānd. 1.2.—A very similar account given. The story begins: The
gods and the demons, the offspring of Prajāpati fought with one another, and the
gods took the udgītha, thinking that they would overcome the demons with it.
Then they worshipped the breath in the nose as the udgītha, but the demons
pierced it with evil. Thereupon, they successively worshipped as the udgītha
speech, the eye, the ear and the mind, each of which were, however, corrupted
by the demons. Finally, they worshipped the chief vital-breath as the udgītha,
and when the demons tried to corrupt it, they themselves fell to pieces (Chānd
1.2.1–1.2.7).

[sū. 3. 3. 7.
ADH. 2.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 587
(We, i.e the prima facie objectors, reply.) "no", because in the
texts: '"Let us overcome (the demons) by the udgītha"' (Bṛh. 1.3.1),
"They took the udgītha, (thinking) 'With this we shall kill them'"
(Chānd. 1.2.1), the udgītha alone appears to be the object to be medi-
tated on. Nor can it be said that this difference of case-endings
would make them differ in major points¹ In the text: '"Sing the
udgītha for us"' (Bṛh. 1.3.7), the udgītha which is really an object is
said to be a subject figuratively
COMPARISON
Baladeva
This is sūtra 7 in his commentary He does not take it to be
setting forth a prima facie view, and does not begin a new adhikaraṇa
here, but continues the topic of the coalescence of the different attri-
butes of the Lord. Hence the sūtra. "If it be objected that the con-
trary is the case (i.e. all the attributes of the Lord are not to be combined
while meditating on Him), (we reply.) no, on account of non-specifi-
cation, (i.e because there is no specific text to the effect)".²
CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 7-9)
SŪTRA 7
"OR (THERE IS) NO (SAMENESS OF THE VIDYĀS), ON ACCOUNT OF
THE DIFFERENCES OF THE SUBJECT-MATTERS, AS IN THE CASE OF
BEING HIGHER THAN THE HIGH."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
With regard to it we reply:
The vidyās are not identical. Having begun by designating
the praṇava, which is a part of the udgītha, as the object to be wor-
shipped, in the text: "Let one meditate on the syllable 'Om' as the
¹ E.g. the war between the gods and the demons; the approach of the
gods to speech, eye, ear and mind; the successful attempt of the demons to
corrupt them, their unsuccessful attempt to corrupt the chief vital-breath; the
final overcoming of the demons by the chief vital-breath as the udgītha, etc.
² G.B. 3.3.7, pp. 120-121, Chap. 3.
8

588 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 3 3. 7.
ADH. 2.]
udgītha” (Chānd. 1.1 1 ¹), the text goes on to say: “They took the
udgītha” (Chānd. 1 2.1 ²); and hence in the Chāndogya, the praṇava,
a part of the udgītha, is enjoined as the object to be viewed as the vital-
breath In the Vājasaneyaka, on the other hand, in accordance with
the introductory passage, containing no specification, viz. ‘ “Let us
overcome (the demons) by the udgītha” ’ (Brh. 1 3 1 ³), the entire
udgītha is the object to be viewed as the vital-breath. Hence,
the introductory parts being thus different, the vidyās themselves
must be so; just as in spite of the sameness of injunctions, viz. that
the praṇava, which is a part of the udgītha, is to be viewed as the
Highest Self,—the injunction that the udgītha is to be viewed as
the golden Person is different from the injunction that it is to be
viewed as quahfied by the attributes of being higher than the high and
so on.⁴
Vedānta-kaustubha
The author refutes the above view.
The words “or not” imply that the above view is to be rejected.
The udgītha-meditations are not identical. Why? “On account
of the difference of subject-matters”. The word ‘subject-matter’
means ‘introduction’, i.e. on account of the difference of the intro-
ductory parts. Thus, having begun with the praṇava,—which is a
part of the udgītha, the object of the action of the singer of the ud-
gītha,—as the object to be worshipped in the text: “Let one meditate
on the syllable ‘Om’ as the udgītha (Chānd 1.1.1), the text goes on
to say: “They took the udgītha” (Chānd. 1.2.1); and hence in the
Chāndogya, the praṇava, a part of the udgītha, is stated as the object
to be viewed as the vital-breath. In the Vājasaneyaka, on the other
hand, in accordance with the introductory passage, containing no speci-
¹ S, R, ŚK. ² Not quoted by others. ³ R.
⁴ I.e. in Chānd. 1.6.9 it is said that sāman, i.e the udgītha, is to be
viewed, i.e. meditated on, as the golden Person within the sun; while in Chānd.
1.9.2 it is said that the udgītha is to be meditated on as possessed of the attributes
of being higher than the high and so on. Now, although in both cases the
udgītha is the object enjoined to be meditated on, yet as it is to be meditated
on under two different aspects, in the one case as a golden Person and in the other
as higher than the high and so on,—the two udgītha-meditations are taken to
be different. In the very same manner, here although the same udgītha is en-
joined to be meditated on, yet since in the one case it is to be meditated on as a
part, in the other as the whole, the two udgītha-meditatons are not identical.
8B

[sū. 3. 3. 7.
ADH. 2 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 589
fication, viz. ‘ "Let us overcome (the demons) by the udgītha" ’ (Bṛh.
1 3 1), the entire udgītha is the object to be viewed as the vital-breath.
Hence as the introductory parts are different, the objects enjoined too
must be so, the things enjoined being different, the forms too must
be so, and on account of that, the vidyās themselves must be different;
just as, even in the same branch ¹, in spite of the sameness of injunc-
tions, viz that the pranava, which is a part of the udgītha, is to
be viewed as the Highest Self,—the injunction that it is to be viewed
as the golden Person is different from the injunction that it is to be
viewed as qualified by the attributes of being higher than the high
and so on.
COMPARISON
Baladeva
This is sūtra 8 in his commentary He begins a new adhikarana
here (two sūtras), concerned with an altogether different topic. It
has been pointed out in the previous adhikarana that while meditating
on the Lord, all His attributes are to be combined. Now it is
pointed out in this adhikarana that that is the case with the svaniṣṭha
devotees only, but in the case of the ekāntin devotees, there is no such
combination He interprets the word “prakaraṇa” in the sūtra as
“prakṛṣṭa karaṇam”, i.e. excellent act, viz devotion. Hence the
sūtra: “Or (there is) no (combination of attributes in the case of the
ekāntins) on account of the difference of devotion (i.e. because the
devotion of the ekāntins is one-pointed, while that of the svaniṣṭha
is universal), as in the case of being higher than the high, (i.e. just as
the ekāntin worshipper of the golden Person in the sun does not
combine the qualities of being higher than the high and so on).²
¹ The rule is that meditations are different when the objects meditated on
are different, whether in the same branch or in different branches. If the objects
meditated on are not different, then the meditations are identical, in spite of
repetition, and serve other purposes. See footnote 2, p. 578.
² G.B. 3.2.8, pp. 122-123, Chap. 3.

590 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 3. 3. 8.
ADH. 2.]
CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)
SŪTRA 8
“IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT (OF THE SIMILAR) NAME
(THERE IS SAMENESS OF THE VIDYĀS), (WE REPLY:) THAT HAS
BEEN SAID, ON THE OTHER HAND, (THERE IS) THAT TOO (I E THE
IDENTITY OF NAMES) (EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF IDENTITY OF THE
OBJECTS NAMED).”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
“If it be objected that on account of name” the vidyās must be
identical,—(we reply:) Under the aphorism: “Or not, on account of
the difference of subject-matter” (Br. Sū. 3 3.7) it has been shown the
mere identity of names is of no great force “On the other hand,”
names may be identical even when the subject-matters enjoined are
different; just as the name ‘Agni-hotra’ applies to the regular Agni-
hotra, and to the Agni-hotra which is a part of the ceremony called
‘Kuṇḍapāyinām ayanam’.¹
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be objected that “on account of name”, i.e. on account of
the name ‘udgītha-meditation’, the udgītha-vidyās are identical—
(we reply:) The reply to this has been given under the aphorism:
“Or not, on account of the difference of subject-matter” (Br. Sū
3.3.7). That is, the difference of vidyās being established on the
ground of the difference of introductory parts, mere identity of
names cannot make the vidyās identical. Moreover, even two dif-
ferent subject-matters may have identical names, just as the name
‘Agni-hotra’ applies to the regular Agni-hotra and to the Agni-hotra
which is a part of the ceremony called ‘Kuṇḍa-pāyinām ayanam’,
and just as the First-Day sacrifice is to be observed both in the
Twelve-Days’ sacrifice and in the Gavāmayana sacrifice.
1 A particular religious ceremony in which ewers or pitchers are used for
drinking.

[sū. 3. 3. 9.
ADH. 2.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 591
COMPARISON
Baladeva
This is sūtra 9 in his commentary. Here he concludes the topic
that in the case of the ekāntin devotees, there is no combination of
all the attributes of the Lord. Hence the sūtra: "If it be objected
that on account of (the similarity of) name (i.e. because both the
svaniṣṭha and ekāntin are called 'worshipper of Brahman') (the
ekāntin, too, must be called 'worshipper of Brahman') (the ekāntin,
too, must meditate on all the attributes of the Lord), (we reply,)
that has been said (under the previous sūtra), on the contrary, there
is that¹" That is, there is an instance to the effect, viz. the meditation
on the golden Person ² and that on the ether ³ have both the name
'udgītha-meditation', yet the attributes of the one are not combined
in the other.
—————
CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)
SŪTRA 9
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF UNIVERSALITY, (IT IS) APPROPRIATE."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
As the praṇava, mentioned in the beginning, is the object to be
meditated on, in all the udgītha-meditations in the Chāndogya, it
is "appropriate" that the word 'udgītha', mentioned in the middle
in the text: "They took the udgītha" (Chānd. 1.2.1), too should
really imply the praṇava. In the Chāndogya the praṇava, a part
of the udgītha, is to be meditated on under the aspect of the vital-
breath; in the Vājasaneyaka, the entire udgītha,—as such, the vidyās
are different.
Vedānta-kaustubha
In the first chapter of the Chāndogya, various udgītha-meditations
――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――
¹ G.B. 3.3.9, pp. 123-124, Chap. 3.
² Chānd. 1.6.9. ³ Chānd. 1.9.2.

[SŪ. 3. 3. 9.
592 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 2.]
are mentioned. Now, the praṇava,—introduced in the text: “Let one
meditate on the syllable ‘Om’ as the udgītha” (Chānd. 1.1.1),—
is the common object to be meditated on as a part of the udgītha.
So it is “appropriate” that the word ‘udgītha’, mentioned in the
middle in the text: “Then, forsooth, the gods took the udgītha”
(Chānd 1 2 1), too should really imply the praṇava. It is often found
that a word denoting the whole denotes its parts, as e g. when one
part of a piece of cloth is burnt, it is said that the cloth is
burnt. This being so, in the Chāndogya, the praṇava alone, denoted
by the term ‘udgītha’ and a part of the udgītha, is the object to be
meditated on under the aspect of the vital-breath. In Vājasaneyaka,
by the term ‘udgītha’ the entire udgītha, that which the singer of the
udgītha sings, is to be understood, i.e. that alone is to be meditated on
under the aspect of the vital-breath. Hence, it is established that
the udgītha-meditation mentioned in the Chāndogya is different from
the udgītha-meditation mentioned in the Vājasaneyaka.
Here ends the section entitled “Difference ” (2).
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and Bhāskara
They take it as an adhikaraṇa by itself. Interpretation different,
viz. It is said in the Chāndogya (1.1.1) that the ‘Om’ is to be medi-
tated on as the udgītha. Here the Om and the udgītha are designated
as standing in a relation of co-ordination (sāmānādhikaraṇa). Now
the problem is what exactly this co-ordination between the two
implies,—whether adhyāsa or conscious voluntary super-imposition
of one object upon another and thereby thinking the two as identical;
apavāda or bādha, i e. the negation of the former false knowledge of
a thing by the latter correct knowledge; or finally viśeṣaṇa, i e. quali-
fication, distinguishing the thing qualified from other things. The
last is the correct view. The udgītha here specializes and thereby
restricts the Om which extends over the entire Veda,—i.e. only that
Om which is a part of the udgītha is to be meditated on here and not
the Om which extends over the entire Veda. Hence the sūtra: “On
account of the extension (of the Om to the entire Veda), (the view

[SŪ. 3. 3. 9.
ADH 2.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 593
that the term udgītha expresses a specialization of the Om is) appro-
priate”.¹
Śrīkaṇṭha
He too takes this sūtra as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself.
Interpretation different, viz. In the text. “Let one meditate on the
syllable Om, the udgītha” (Chānd. 1.1.1), the Om and the udgītha
are mentioned separately. The problem is whether they are to be
meditated on separately or co-ordinately. The prima facie view is
that they are to be meditated on separately, since they are mentioned
separately. But the correct conclusion is that the udgītha qualifies
the praṇava and as such the praṇava is the object to be meditated
on here. Hence the sūtra: “And on account of the universality (of
the praṇava as the object to be meditated on), (the view that the
praṇava is qualified by the udgītha is) appropriate”. That is, just as
the praṇava is designated as the object to be meditated on in the
introductory passage, so in the subsequent passages too Hence
here the object to be meditated is the praṇava as qualified by the
udgītha, and not the praṇava and the udgītha.²
Baladeva
This is sūtra 10 in his commentary. He takes this sūtra as forming
an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with the question whether the
attributes of infancy and the like too are to be included in the medi-
tations on Him. Hence the sūtra: “And on account of all-pervasive-
ness, (this is) consistent”. That is, the Lord is all-pervading in spite
of His states of infancy and the like, since He is not limited by those
attributes of infancy and so on. Hence the meditation on the Lord
as possessed of these attributes is perfectly consistent.³
¹ Ś.B. 3.3.9, pp. 766 ff.; Bh. B. 3.3.9, pp. 177-178.
² Śk. B. 3.3.9, pp. 296–298, Part 9.
³ G.B. 3 3.10, pp. 127-128, Chap. 3.

[SŪ. 3. 3. 10.
594 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 3.]
Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled “Non-
difference of everything”. (Sūtra 10)
SŪTRA 10
“ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-DIFFERENCE OF EVERYTHING (I.E.
EVERYWHERE, VIZ. CHĀNDOGYA AND BṚHADĀRAṆYAKA), THOSE
(QUALITIES ARE TO BE INSERTED) ELSEWHERE (VIZ. IN THE
KAUṢĪTAKI).”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
In the Chāndogya as well as in the Vājasaneyaka, under the
dialogue of the sense-organs, the vital-breath, endowed with the
attributes of being the oldest and the best, is designated as the object
to be worshipped, and also speech and the rest are designated as
possessed of the attributes of being the richest and so on; and those
attributes are ascribed to the vital-breath. In the dialogue of the
sense-organs in the Kauṣītaki, on the other hand, the attributes of
speech and the rest are stated, but are not ascribed to the vital-
breath. With regard to it, we reply: “Elsewhere”, i.e. in the dialogue
of the sense-organs in the Kauṣītaki as well, they are to be ascribed
to the vital-breath, as in all the three dialogues speech and the rest
are said to be under the control of the vital-breath,—which is the cause
of the seniority and excellence of the latter
Vedānta-kaustubha
While in one place (viz. in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka) the word ‘udgītha’
refers to the whole, in another place (viz. in the Chāndogya) it refers
to a part only and as such does not relate to the whole,—hence the
two udgītha-meditations are different. Likewise since in some cases
the vital-breath is designated as endowed with the attributes of being
the richest and the like, in some cases, again, not so endowed, the medi-
tations on the vital-breath too are different,—the author is refuting
this view now by the maxim of the combination of special features.¹
In the dialogue of the sense-organs, the Chāndogas as well as the
Vājasaneyins demonstrate the vital-breath, endowed with the attri-
butes of being the oldest and the best, as the object to be worshipped
thus: “He who, verily, knows the oldest and the best, becomes, for-
¹ Designated under Br. Sū. 3.3.5

[SŪ. 3. 3. 10.
ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 595
sooth, the oldest and the best of his own people. The vital-breath,
verily, is the oldest and the best" (Bṛh. 6.1.1 ¹) and so on; and they
demonstrate the attributes of speech and the rest, such as: being the
richest and so on, thus: "These divinities, verily, disputed for self-
superiority" ² and so on, "Disputing for self-superiority" (Bṛh
6.1.7 ³) and so on; as well as establish the excellence of the vital-
breath on the ground that speech and the rest and the body have their
existence as well as activities under the control of the vital-breath,
and finally ascribe the attributes of speech and the rest, such as,
being the richest and so on, to the vital-breath, the oldest and the
best, thus: "Then, verily, speech said to him: 'If I am the richest,
you are the richest' " (Chānd. 5.1.13 ⁴) and so on. Thus, according
to them, the object to be worshipped is the vital-breath, endowed
with the attributes of being the oldest, the best, the richest and so on,
as subserving speech and the rest.
In the dialogues of the sense-organs in the branches of the
Kauṣītaki and the rest, on the other hand, the excellence of the vital-
breath is demonstrated, but the attributes of speech and the rest
are not ascribed to it (Kauṣ. 2. 14).
The attributes in question are those belonging to speech, the eye,
the ear and the mind,—namely, being the richest being the support,
being prosperity and being the abode (respectively), to be known from
the following texts: "He who, verily, knows the richest . . . . Speech,
forsooth, is the richest" (Bṛh. 6.1.2; Chānd. 5 1.2), "He who,
verily, knows the support . . . . The eye, forsooth, is the support"
(Bṛh. 6 1.3; Chānd. 5 1.3), "He who, verily, knows prosperity . . . .
The ear, verily, is prosperity" (Bṛh. 6.1 4; Chānd. 4.1.4), "He who,
verily, knows the abode . . . . The mind, verily, is the abode"
(Bṛh. 6 15; Chānd 5.1.5) and so on.
On the doubt, viz. whether these attributes are to be included in
the meditations on the vital-breath of the Kauṣītakins, or not, the
¹ An exactly similar passage—omitting only the word 'svānām', is Chānd.
5.1.1.
² This is evidently a mis-quotation, since it is traceable neither in the
Chānd nor in the Bṛh.
³ Cf. Chānd. 5 1.6.—"Now the sense-organs disputed among themselves
about self-superiority "
⁴ Cf Bṛh. 6.1.4.—"She (i.e. speech) said: 'Verily, wherein I am the richest,
therein you are the richest'."

596 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 3. 3. 10.
ADH. 3.]
prima facie view is that since they have not been mentioned in those
scriptural texts as belonging to the vital-breath, they are not to be
so included.
With regard to it, we reply "These," i.e. the attributes of being
richest and the best belonging to speech and so on, are to be accepted
as belonging to the vital-breath, "elsewhere" than in the Chāndogya
and the rest, i e in the meditations on the vital-breath of the Kauṣī-
takins as well. Why? "On account of the non-difference of every-
thing," i c because in all the three dialogues the cause of the seniority
and excellence of the vital-breath, the object to be meditated on, is the
very same Just as in the meditations on the vital-breath in the
Chāndogya and the rest, the dependence of speech and the rest and of
the body on the vital-breath, as well as the connection of the vital-
breath with the attributes of being the richest and the rest have been
stated with a view to establishing the seniority and excellence of the
vital-breath,—so in the meditations on the vital-breath in the Kauṣītaki
too, the attributes of speech and the rest, such as being the richest and
so on, have been stated with the same view to establishing the seniority
and excellence of the vital-breath. The text: "Then these divi-
nities said to Father Prajāpati 'Who among us is the best?' He,
Prajāpati, said: 'That one among you, on whose departure the body
appears to be most miserable, is the best'. Then speech went out",¹
and so on, shows that speech and the rest, their attributes, as well as
the body depend on the vital-breath. Here, their own attributes of
being the richest and the rest are not attributed to the vital-breath
by speech and the rest. Hence they are to be ascribed to the
vital-breath,—this is established
Here ends the section entitled "Non-difference of everything" (3).
COMPARISON
Śāṃkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha
The interpretation of the phrase: "Sarvābhedāt" different, viz.
"on account of the non-difference of the prāṇa-vidyā in the three
Upaniṣads". That is, the meditation on the vital-breath is every-
1 Cf the very similar passages in Chānd. 5.1 7–5.1.8.

{sū. 3. 3 11.
ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 597
where the same, and hence the special features mentioned in one place
are to be ascribed to others ¹
Baladeva
This is sūtra 11 in his commentary. He takes this sūtra as
forming an adhikarana by itself, concerned with an entirely different
topic, viz the acts of the Lord Hence the sūtra: "(The acts of the
Lord, viz. the deeds performed by him in His infancy and so on are
eternal) on account of the non-difference of all (viz. of the Lord and
His companions) they (manifest themselves) elsewhere (i.e. in another
place and time)". That is, the Lord and His companions, viz. the
freed souls, exist subsequently in other places and times and enact
the same parts In this sense, those acts of the Lord which He
performs through His cit-śakti are eternal, while those acts which
He performs through matter and so on are non-eternal ²
Adhikarana 4. The section entitled "Bliss".
(Sūtras 11–17)
SŪTRA 11
"BLISS AND THE REST (ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD EVERYWHERE),
(ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-DIFFERENCE) OF THE CHIEF."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The substratum of attributes (viz. Brahman) being the same,
the attributes like "bliss and the rest" are to be inserted in all the
meditations on the Highest.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now, the question of the combination of the essential attributes
of Brahman is being considered.
The phrase: 'On account of non-difference' is to be supplied (from
the preceding aphorism). On the doubt, viz. whether the attributes
of Brahman, such as, bliss and the rest, are to be included in
all meditations on Brahman or not—the suggestion is: these attributes
are not to be so included, because the texts of every Vedānta are
¹ Ś.B. 3.3.10, p. 770; Bh. B. 3.3.10, p. 171; ŚK. B. 3.3.10, pp. 298 ff.
² G.B. 3.3.11, pp. 130–133, Chap. 3.

598 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 3. 3. 12.
ADH. 4 ]
complete by themselves and do not require other texts to complete
their meaning, because there is no restriction with regard to the
inclusion of qualities not mentioned in a particular section; and
because the meditating devotees can attain their goals from that very
knowledge which they derive from a particular section where certain
attributes are recorded,—
We reply: On account of the sameness "of the chief ", i.e. as
Brahman, the substratum of attributes, is the common object to be
meditated on in all these Brahma-vidyās, His attributes, viz "bliss
and the rest", are to be comprised everywhere It being impossible
for texts to have a complete sense in isolation, the attributes, not
mentioned in a particular section, should, nevertheless, be inserted
there from another section for the benefit of meditating devotees
Baladeva
This is sūtra 12 in his commentary. He takes this sūtra as
forming an adhikarana by itself. Interpretation same.
SŪTRA 12
"(THERE IS) NO RELEVANCY OF (THE ATTRIBUTES OF) HAVING
JOY FOR THE HEAD AND THE REST, FOR (THERE WILL BE) IN-
CREASE AND DECREASE (ON THE PART OF BRAHMAN) IF (THERE
BE) DIFFERENCE (OF LIMBS ON HIS PART) "
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The attributes of having joy for the head and the rest do not
constitute the essential nature and attributes of the Highest,—since
"if there be difference" of limbs like the head and the rest, then
there will result increase and decrease on the part of Brahman.
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz. then, on account of the non-difference of
Brahman, the attributes, mentioned in the Taittirīya-text: "Of him
joy alone is the head, delight the right wing, excessive delight the
left wing, bliss the soul, Brahman the tail, the foundation " (Tait.
2.5), too should be comprised everywhere like His essential attributes
of bliss and the rest,—the author replies:

[sū. 3. 3. 13.
ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 599
The attributes of having joy for the head and the rest are not
necessary for a clear understanding of the nature and attributes of
Brahman,—since they are not His essential attributes. Otherwise, "if
there be difference" of limbs like the head and the rest, then there must
be "increase and decrease" on the part of Brahman. If that be so,
texts like "Brahman is truth, knowledge, infinite" (Tait. 2.1) will
come to be contradicted.
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara and Bhāskara
The interpretation of the last portion, viz. 'upacayāpacayau hi
bhede" different, viz. "because increase and decrease are possible
only if there be difference". That is, lower and higher degrees like
joy, delight, excessive delight, bliss and so on, which are all different,
are possible only if there be a plurality of beings, i e only on the part
of ordinary enjoyers, (and hence they are not possible on the part of
Brahman who is one only).
Śrīkaṇṭha
He takes this sūtra as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself
SŪTRA 13
"BUT THE OTHER (ATTRIBUTES ARE TO BE COMBINED), ON ACCOUNT
OF THE SAMENESS OF THE PURPORT."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"But" as the substratum of attributes (viz. Brahman) is the
same everywhere, the attributes like bliss and the rest are to be
combined.
Vedānta-kaustubha
"But" bliss and the rest, "other" than (the attributes of) having
the joy as the head and so on, are to be supplied everywhere, "on
account of the sameness of the purport", i.e. "on account of the
sameness", i.e. identity everywhere, "of the purport", i.e. of the
object to be demonstrated, viz. Brahman, the substratum of attributes.
As He is not described as a person everywhere, so those (attributes
of having the joy for the head and so on), if applied (everywhere),

600 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 3. 3. 14.
ADH. 4.]
would be purposeless. In order that there may be a clear
knowledge of the real nature of Brahman, bliss and the rest are to
be comprised everywhere, as they are connected with the real
nature of Brahman This aphorism is meant for indicating the
reason why bliss and the rest should be included everywhere, and
also for suggesting that it is simply meaningless to include others
everywhere
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
Interpretation of the phrase: “artha-sāmānyāt different, viz.
“on account of (their) equality with the object itself”. That is, the
attributes of bliss and the rest, determining the very nature of the
thing (viz. Brahman) are similar to the thing itself and are accordingly
included in all meditations just like the thing itself.¹
Baladeva
This is sūtra 14 in his commentary. Literal interpretation
different, though the conclusion is the same. Thus: “But others
(i.e. the other attributes mentioned in the Taittirīya) (are to be com-
bined everywhere), on account of the sameness of the result”. That
is, the meditation on Brahman, as possessed of the attributes of all-
pervasiveness and the rest, mentioned in the Taittirīya, leads to the
attainment of Brahman, just as the meditation on Him as possessed
of other attributes, mentioned in other Vedāntas, does.²
SŪTRA 14
“(THE DESIGNATION OF BRAHMAN AS HAVING JOY FOR HIS HEAD
AND SO ON IS) FOR THE PURPOSE OF MEDITATION, ON ACCOUNT OF
THE ABSENCE OF (ANOTHER) PURPOSE.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The designation: “Of him, joy alone is the head” (Tait. 2.5 ³)
and so on, on the other hand, serve the purpose of meditation, “on
account of the absence of ” any other “purpose”.
¹ Śrī B. 3.3.13, p. 277, Part 1; Śk. B. 3.3.13, Part 9.
² G.B 3.3.14, p. 137, Chap. 3. ³ R.

[SŪ. 3. 3. 14.
ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 601
Vedānta-kaustubha
In that case, the teaching of the attributes of having joy for
the head and the rest will have no meaning,—to this the author
replies.
The teaching, concerned with determining Brahman as a person,
viz. “Of him, joy alone is the head” (Tait. 2.5) and so on, on the other
hand, is “for the purpose of meditation”, i.e. for the sake of
helping easy comprehension. That is, in the absence of any other
purpose, this alone is the purpose of such a designation.
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara and Bhāskara
They begin a new adhikaraṇa here (two sūtras), concerned with
an entirely different topic, viz. a discussion about a text in the Kaṭho-
paniṣad Thus, in Kaṭha 3.10–3.11 it is said that sense-objects are
higher than the sense-organs, the mind is higher than the sense-objects
and so on and finally the Person is said to be the highest of all. The
question is as to whether each of these, viz. sense-objects and so on,
is high or only the Person. The answer is given in this sūtra thus:
“(The Person alone is designated as the High) for the purpose of
meditation, (and not others) on account of the absence of purpose”.
That is, there is no necessity for designating the sense-objects, the
sense-organs and the rest as high, while there is such a necessity for
designating the Person as high, viz.—meditation.¹
Śrīkaṇṭha
He also begins a new adhikaraṇa here (four sūtras), concerned
with the question, viz. whether the self consisting of food and the
rest (Tait. 2.2 ff.) too are to be meditated on constantly as the self
consisting of bliss is. The answer is: “(They aro not to be meditated
on constantly) on account of the absence of purpose (for such modi-
tations)”. That is, the meditations on the self consisting of food and
the rest have a purpose only so long as the self consisting of bliss is
not reached. But when it is reached, they becomo meaningless.
Hence, such meditations are not to be practised perpetually.²
¹ Ś.B. 3.3.14, pp. 773-774; Bh. B. 3.3.14, p. 180.
² ŚK. B. 3.3.14.

[SŪ 3. 3. 15.
602 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 4.]
SŪTRA 15
"ON ACCOUNT OF THE TERM 'SELF' ALSO"
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
As head, wings and the rest cannot possibly belong to the soul,
designated thus: "Another internal self" (Tait 2 5), that designation
serves the purpose of meditation on Him.
Vedānta-kaustubha
That the designation. "Joy alone is the head" (Tait. 2.5) in the
beginning of the text about that which consists of bliss serves the
purpose of meditation and is concerned only with demonstrating
(Brahman) as a person, is ascertained "from the term 'self' also".
Thus, as head of the form of joy, wings and the rest cannot
possibly belong to an object, which is denoted by the term 'self' in
the text "Another internal self is that which consists of bliss"
(Tait. 2 5), and the real nature of which is different from joy,
delight, excessive delight and the rest,—it is merely for helping one
to meditate on the self that in the text: "Of him, joy alone is the
head" (Tait. 2.5) (the self) is designated as a person,—this is known
from the term 'self' as well
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara and Bhāskara
They conclude here the discussion about the abovo Kaṭha-text.
The immediately following passage designates the Person as the self.
This also proves that the Person alone is intended to be designated
as high. The designation of the rest as high is simply for the purpose
of showing the supremacy of the Person.¹
Śrīkaṇṭha
He continues the topic whether the selves consisting of food,
consisting of the vital-breath and the rest are to be meditated on
perpetually or not, and gives the second reason why they are not to
be so meditated here. The term 'self' is applied to each of the selves,
consisting of food and so on. This shows that these denote the pre-
siding deities of food and the rest. Now, Brahman alone is to be
¹ Ś B. 3.3.15, p. 774; Bh. B 3.3.15, p. 180.

[SŪ. 3. 3. 16.
ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 603
meditated on and not any other deity. For this reason too the
selves consisting of food and so on are not to be meditated on.¹
SŪTRA 16
“(THERE IS THE) UNDERSTANDING OF THE SELF (IN THE TAITTI-
RĪYA) AS IN OTHER (PLACES), ON ACCOUNT OF WHAT FOLLOWS.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
In the text: “Another internal self” (Tait. 2.5²), by the term
‘self’ there is the “understanding of” the Supreme Soul alone, just
as in the passage: “The soul, verily, was this, one alone, in the begin-
ning” (Ait. Ār. 2.4.1³), by the term ‘self’ the Supreme Self alone is
meant. Further, another text too, subsequent to the text about that
which consists of bliss, viz. “He desired: ‘May I be many’ ” (Tait.
2.5⁴), supports this meaning.
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz. Since we know that in the preceding cases
the term ‘self’ refers to what is not the self, it cannot be said that in
the text: “Another internal self is that which consists of bliss” (Tait.
2.5) the term ‘self’ refers to the Self,—the author replies:
In the text: “Another internal self” (Tait. 2.5), by the term
‘self’ there is the “understanding of the self”, i.e. the apprehension
of the self, or the Supreme Soul alone. “As in other (places),” i.e.
just as in a text other than the text: “Another internal self is that
which consists of bliss” (Tait. 2.5),—viz. in the Aitareya-text: “The
self, verily, was this, one alone, in the beginning, there was nothing
else blinking. He thought: ‘Shall I create worlds?’ He created
these worlds” (Ait. Ār. 2.4.1), by the term ‘self’ the Soul is under-
stood, so is the case here. This is definitely ascertained also from a
text which is subsequent to the text concerned with the soul
,consisting of bliss, viz. from the text: “He desired: ‘May I be many’ ”
(Tait. 2.6).
¹ ŚK. B. 3.3.15, p 309, Part 9. ² R, ŚK.
³ P. 118. ⁴ R, B.
9

[SŪ. 3. 3. 17
604 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 4.]
COMPARISON
Saṁkara and Bhāskara
They begin a new adhikaraṇa here (two sūtras), concerned with
a different problem, viz. a discussion about a passage in the Aitareya-
āraṇyaka (2.4 1). The question is as to whether the term ‘self’ in
this passage stands for Brahman or for Hiraṇyagarbha. The answer
is: “(There is) the understanding of the self (i.e. Brahman) (by the
term ‘self’ in the passage), as in other (places) (i.e. in Tait. 2 1, etc ),
on account of what follows (1.e. the word ‘perceives’)”.¹
Śrīkaṇṭha
He continues the above topic, viz. whether the selves consisting
of food and so on are to be meditated on or not. The answer is that
as the self consisting of bliss is nothing but the Supreme Brahman,
that alone is to be meditated on and not the other selves. Hence the
sūtra. “(In Tait. 2.5 by the term ‘self’ there is) the understanding
of the self (i e. Brahman), as in other places (i.e. in Tait. 2.1, etc.),
(this is known also) from what follows”. Thus, literal interpretation
is the same, though import different.²
SŪTRA 17
“IF IT BE OBJECTED • ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONNECTION (OF THE
TERM ‘SELF’ WITH WHAT IS NOT-SELF, THERE IS NO UNDERSTANDING
OF SELF HERE, WE REPLY.) THERE MAY BE (SUCH AN UNDERSTAND-
ING), ON ACCOUNT OF ASCERTAINMENT.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be objected that since the term ‘self’ is found to refer to
the vital-breath and the rest in the previous cases, in the text: “The
self, consisting of bliss” (Tait 2.5³), the Supreme Self is not meant
by the term ‘self’—(we reply:) “There may be” indeed such an
understanding by that term,—as we know that in the previous cases
¹ Ś.B. 3.3.16, pp. 775 ff.; Bh. B. 3.3.16, p. 180.
² ŚK. B. 3.3.16, pp. 309-310, Part 9.
³ Not quoted by others.
9B

[sū. 3 3. 17.
ADH. 4 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 605
too, the term ‘self’ refers to the not-self simply because those not-

• selves are viewed as the Supreme Self.
  Vedānta-kaustubha
  If it be objected that as in the previous cases, e.g. in the text.
  “Another internal self is that which consists of the vital-breath”
  (Tait. 2 2) and so on, the term ‘self’ refers to the not-self, so in the
  text: ‘Another internal self is that which consists of bliss” (Tait. 2 5)
  the Highest Self is not referred to by the term ‘self’,—
  (We reply:) “There may be” indeed the apprehension of the
  Highest Self by the term ‘self’. Why? “On account of ascertain-
  ment.” That is, we have, first, in mind the idea of the Highest Self,
  mentioned previously in the passage: “From him, verily, the ether
  arose” (Tait. 2.1); then, with a view to determining His nature and
  attributes, the term ‘self’ is made to refer to the selves consisting of
  food and so on, simply because they are viewed as the Highest Self 1
  Hence it is established that attributes like bliss and the rest alone are
  to be combined for the sake of determining the real nature of the
  substratum of attributes (viz. Brahman), and not those of having joy
  for the head and the like which are not His (essential) attributes.
  Here ends the section entitled “Bliss” (4).
  COMPARISON
  Śaṁkara and Bhāskara
  Here they conclude the discussion about the above Aitareya-
  āraṇyaka text. “If it be objected that on account of the connected
  meaning (of the passage as a whole, i.e. because of the reference to
  the creation of the world and so on, Hiraṇyagarbha is here denoted
  by the term ‘self’), (we reply:) there may be (the understanding of
  Brahman here) on account of ascertainment (viz. that the self is said
  to be the one).” 2
  1 I.e. right from the beginning of the section we get the idea that the
  Highest Self is the topic of discussion, and hence the subsequent references to
  the not-self in the chapter are made with the Highest Self in mind.
  2 Ś.B. 3.3.17, pp. 777-778, Bh B. 3.3.17, pp. 180-181. For Śaṁkara’s
  alternative explanation of these two sūtras, vide Ś.B. 3.3.17, pp. 338 ff.