वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

[SŪ. 1. 1. 4.
36 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 4.]
therefore, an enquiry into religious duties' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.1.1 ¹), it is
said that the Veda has meaning as possessing the fruit to be attained
through the injunctions regarding conceptions which are instrumental
to the Vedic studies. In the second aphorism which is concerned
with mark, viz. 'A religious duty has injunction for its mark' (Pū.
Mī. Sū. 1.1 2 ²), it is established, on the ground of the vyāpti: 'What-
ever has the Veda for its proof, refers to action', that in the sphere
of religious duties, injunction is the authority ³ Here a doubt arises
as to whether the artha-vāda-texts like 'The wind is the swiftest
deity' (Tait. Sam. 2 1.1 ⁴) are authoritative in the sphere of religious
duties, or not With regard to it, the prima facie view is as follows:
We have a text: 'Since Scripture is concerned with action, there is
purportlessness of what does not refer to it (viz. action)' (Pū. Mī. Sū.
1.2.1 ⁵). (It means.)—'Scripture, i e. the Veda, is 'kriyārtha', i.e.
has 'action' alone as its 'purport', or subject-matter or topic,—for
this reason, the artha-vāda-texts are not authoritative. What then
are they?—anticipating this question, the text goes on to say that
'there is purportlessness of what does not refer to it', i e. let there be
simply 'purportlessness' or 'meaninglessness' of that which has not
'action' for its 'purport', viz. of artha-vāda and the rest, and in the
very same manner, of the Vedānta-texts as well. Even those (Ve-
dānta-) texts which comprise injunctions regarding study: viz. 'One's
own text should be studied', cannot be reasonably said to be autho-
ritative, since they are (really) concerned with Brahman, leading to
no fruit.⁶ (Here ends the prima facie view within the original prima
facie view.) With regard to this, we state the correct conclusion:
'Because of their unanimity with the injunctions, let (them be
authoritative) through having the glorification of injunctions as their

¹ P. 1, vol. 1.
² P. 3, vol. 1.
³ That is, the inference is as follows:—
Whatever has the Veda for its proof, refers to action.
A religious duty has the Veda for its proof.
∴ a religious duty refers to action, i.e. is concerned with injunctions and
prohibitions.
⁴ P. 125, lines 1-2, vol. 1. ⁵ P. 39, vol. 1.
⁶ That is, there are some Vedānta-texts, which do refer to action, i.e. to
injunction, yet they are not to be taken as authoritative, since they really refer
to Brahman who is outside the sphere of actions and fruits.

[sū. 1. 1. 4.
ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 37
purport’ (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.2 7¹). That is, since the artha-vādas are
unanimous with the injunctive texts, let them be authoritative
‘through having glorification as their purport’, i.e. by way of glorifying
the matters to be enjoined. Similarly, in order to prevent the absolute
purportlessness of the Vedānta-texts which are wanting in injunction
and prohibition and teach an accomplished object (viz. Brahman), it
is reasonable to take them too as indirectly connected with action,—
which is something to be accomplished,—as included under the
very mantras and artha-vādas, since they (viz. the Vedānta-texts)
admit injunctions regarding the study of the Veda. But if they be
taken to be independent (of action) they would lead to no fruit, and
hence they must be understood to have fulfilled their purpose through
establishing the agent, who is a part of a sacrifice (and not to be
independent of action). Among these, the texts concerning the
‘that’ (viz. Brahman) and ‘thou’ (viz. the individual soul)² glorify
the deity and the agent of the sacrificial act, and the knowledge
concerning it (viz. the ‘that’) called the ‘higher knowledge’,³ glorify
the fruit. (Thus, we conclude :) The Vedānta-texts are not concerned
with Brahman, but are like the artha-vāda-texts, since they are con-
cerned with proclaiming the excellence of the agent, who is a subordi-
nate factor in a sacrifice. (Here ends the original prima facie view.⁴)
(Author’s conclusion.)
To this we reply:⁵ No, because this is a mere imagination, in-
vented by you; and because (on the contrary), works, being generative
of knowledge which is a means to salvation, indirectly refer to Brahman
alone, as declared by the scriptural text:—‘The Brāhmaṇas desire
to know this self through the study of the Veda, through sacrifice,
through penance, through fasting’ (Bṛh. 4.4.22). Here, if in the
statement ‘They desire to know through sacrifice’, there be a direct
connection of the instrument, viz. ‘sacrifice’, with the meaning of the
root,⁶ as in the sentence ‘He desires to go by the horse’, then the
sacrificial act should be known to be serving the purpose of knowledge
(i.e. helping the rise of knowledge), and thereby referring to Brahman.

¹ P. 42, vol. 1.
² Cf the famous text ‘Thou art that’ (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc)
³ Vide e.g. Mund 1.1 4-5.
⁴ It began on p. 35.
⁵ The correct conclusion begins here ⁶ Viz. ‘vid’=to know.

[sū. 1. 1. 4.
38 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 4.]
If, on the other hand, owing to the primacy of the desiderative suffix,¹
there be a connection with the meaning of the suffix, it should be known
to be serving the purpose of desire, (i.e. helping the rise of a desire
for knowledge), to be a subordinate factor of knowledge through
that desire and to be referring to Brahman thereby. And, the fact
that action is a part of knowledge will be stated under the aphorism
'And, there is dependence on all, on account of the text concerning
sacrifice, as in the case of a horse' (Br. Sū. 3.4.26).
It cannot be said, also, that the reality to be known from the
Vedānta (viz. Brahman) is a subordinate factor of sacrifices,—since
He is self-dependent as the controller of all works, their agents and
their instruments. Nor can it be said that the Vedānta-texts are
subsidiary parts of injunctions like the artha-vādas, since the former
have been referred to in a different context and are not in proximity to
injunctions. Nor can it be said that the Vedānta-texts lead to no fruit,
teaching, as they do, something which is neither an injunction nor a
prohibition,—since the knowledge of Brahman, who is to be known
from the Vedānta, leads to a supremely excellent fruit, viz. salvation.
If it be said: As we read in texts like 'Undecaying, verily, is the
good deed of one who performs the Cātur-māsya ² sacrifice' (Āp.
Ś.Ś. 8.1.1.1 ³) that works too have the same fruit like it (viz. knowledge),
so there is nothing objectionable (in taking the scriptural texts) to be
referring to works,—
(We reply :) No, because the scriptural text: 'Just, as here, the
world gained through work perishes, so exactly does hereafter the
world gained through merit perish' (Chānd. 8.1.6 ⁴) is of a greater
force; is in conformity with the inference, viz. 'The world gained
through mere work is non-permanent, because it is gained through
work alone, as in the case of tilling and the rest'; and is confirmed by
another scriptural text as well, viz. 'Frail, indeed, are these boats
of sacrifices' (Muṇḍ. 1.2.7); because the text: 'Undecaying, verily'
(Āp. Ś.Ś. 8.1.1) and so on is a weaker one, and because it is improper
to (take the scriptural texts) to be referring to works, which form
the object of such texts wanting in force. On the other hand, the

¹ Viz. 'san', implying 'desire'.
² See footnote 2, p. 5 ³ P. 1, vol. 1.
⁴ Correct quotation: 'Karma-cita' and not 'karma-jita', which is translated
here. Vide Chānd. 8 1.6, p. 415.

[Sū. 1. 1. 4.
ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 39
texts: ‘Those who know this, become immortal’ (Bṛh. 4.4 14; Kaṭha
6.2.9; Śvet. 3.1.10 13, 4.17.20), ‘The knower of Brahman attains the
highest’ (Tait 2.1), are not contradicted by any scriptural text, and
cannot be set aside by a thousand inferences. Further, the text:
‘Undecaying, indeed’ and so on (Āp. Ś.Ś. 8.1.1) is not really set
aside, since it refers to the relative (permanence of works) ¹, and since
the holy Bhāgavata-smṛti (i.e. the Bhāgavad-gītā), which is a version
of the Veda, is the authority in both the cases (viz. regarding the non-
permanence of karma, and the permanence of Brahman) thus:—
‘“The worlds, beginning from the world of Brahman, come and go,
O Arjuna! But, on attaining me, O Son of Kuntī! there is no re-birth”’
(Gītā 8.16).
If it be objected: It may be that the Upaniṣadic portion is somehow
or other concerned with Brahman, since we see it to be so. But the
prior portion (viz. the Karma-kāṇḍa) is known from the texts: ‘He
performs the Agnihotra ² as long as he lives’, ‘One who desires
heaven should perform the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice’ (Āp. Ś.Ś. 10.2.1)
and so on, to fulfil its purpose by enjoining obligatory and optional
works and the rest; and hence how can they be concerned with
Brahman?—
(We reply:) Not so. The entire Veda is concerned only with
Brahman, and although some part of it is found to refer to action
somehow, its complete concordance is found in Brahman alone.
Among these the Upaniṣadic portion refers directly to Brahman,
directly concerned, as it is, with demonstrating His nature, attributes
and the rest. Among these, again, the statements of difference refer
to Brahman by way of being concerned with the nature of the sentient,
the non-sentient and Brahman; the statements of non-difference, by
being concerned with proving that everything has Brahman for its
essence; the statements of creation and the rest, by being concerned
with proving attributes like creatorship and the rest; the statements
that Brahman is non-qualified, by being concerned with the denial
of the qualities due to māyā; the statements that Brahman is qualified,
by being concerned with proving the natural qualities of the Lord;
¹ That is, this text simply shows that the deeds of one who performs the
Cātur-māsya sacrifice are relatively more permanent than the deeds of one who
does not, and not that they are absolutely permanent.
² Sacrificing to Agni. Cf. Athar. V. 6.97.1, p. 130.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 4.
40 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 4.]
and the statements like: 'That which is not manifested through
speech' (Kena 1.4), by being concerned with proving that Brahman
is not limited by so-muchness.
The texts, concerned with the daily and occasional duties,¹ too,
refer to Brahman alone, by way of effecting the purification of the
nature of the person entitled (to the study of Brahman) and being
thereby co-operative towards the rise of knowledge and so on concern-
ing Brahman, while (the texts) concerned with the optional duties,²
by way of being an atomic bit of the bliss of Brahman, since the text:
'Other beings subsist on a portion only of His bliss alone' (Bṛh
4.3.32) declares even worldly pleasure to be an atomic portion of the
bliss of Brahman. Moreover, the optional duties are in concordance
(with regard to Brahman), since they are concerned with the knowledge
of Brahman by way of giving rise to a pure body, like that of a god
and the rest, entitled to salvation. Moreover, just as in accordance
with the maxim of 'connection and disconnection',³ curd, used in
connection with daily duties (nitya),—as laid down in the passage:
'He performs a sacrifice with curd',—brings about the attainment
of objects of sense,—as laid down in the passage: 'One who desires
for objects of sense should perform a sacrifice with curd' (Tait. Br
2.1 5.6⁴),—so the sacrificial acts, though bringing about heaven and
the rest, should yet be known to be serving the purpose (i.e. helping
the rise) of knowledge.⁵ And (finally) texts like 'Golden right from
the tip of His nails' (Chānd. 1 6.6⁶) refer to Brahman as being
concerned with His divine body.
Or else, since the entire mass of objects has Brahman for its
essence, the mass of texts, denoting them, directly refer to Him.⁷
¹ The daily or nitya karmas are ablution, prayer and so on, to be performed
every day, while the occasional or naimittika karmas are the ceremony in honour
of the dead and so on, to be performed on special occasions. Both of these kinds
are obligatory.
² The optional or kāmya karmas are sacrifices and the rest, undertaken with
special objects in view, viz. heaven and the rest.
³ A term applied to express the disconnection of what is optional from what
is a necessary constituent of anything. Vide Pū. Mi. Sū. 4.3.5, and Śabara's
commentary, pp. 493 and ff., vol. 1.
⁴ P. 180, line 3, vol. 2. ⁵ Vide V.K. 3.4.26.
⁶ Correct quotation ‘Apraṇakhāt sarva eva suvarṇaḥ’. Vide Chānd.
1 6.6, p. 43.
⁷ That is, instead of the laborious explanation given above, it is simpler to
accept this alternative explanation.

[sū. 1. 1. 5.
ADH. 5 ] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 41
Hence it is established that the entire Veda is in concordance
with regard to Brahman alone or Lord Kṛṣṇa the Highest Person,
omniscient, possessing infinite natural and inconceivable powers,
the cause of the world, and different and non-different from the sentient
and the non-sentient, as declared by the Lord Himself in the passage :
‘“By all the Vedas, I alone am to be known”’ (Gītā 15 15).
The four aphorisms constituting the basis of Scripture are hereby
explained. This treatise (viz. the Vedānta) is but an expounding of
these.
Here ends the section entitled ‘Concordance’ (4).
Here ends the explanation of the four aphorisms in the first
quarter of the first chapter in the commentary Vedānta-kaustubha,
composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, the incarnation of the
Pāñcajanya and dwelling under the lotus-feet of the reverend Lord
Nimbāditya, the founder of the sect of the reverend Sanatkumāra.
Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled ‘He sees’.
(Sūtras 5–12)
SŪTRA 5
“BECAUSE (THE CREATOR OF THE WORLD) SEES, (PRADHĀNA IS)
NOT (THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD) (SINCE) IT IS NON-SCRIPTURAL.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
But pradhāna, admitted by the Sāṁkhyas, is “non-scriptural”,
i.e. is devoid of scriptural evidence. Hence it is “not” the cause of
the world, as in Scripture seeing, which is a characteristic of a sentient
being, is predicated of the cause of the world.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Thus, it has been pointed out that Brahman, great in attributes,
powers and nature, omniscient, and the one object of all the Vedas,
is the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. Now, the Sāṁ-
khyas,—who hold that Brahman is not the cause of the world, since
He is of a dissimilar form; while the non-sentient pradhāna, consisting
of the three guṇas, is the cause of the world, since it is of a form

42 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 5.
ADH. 5.]
similar to the effect,—also relate the Vedānta-texts like ‘“The
existent, alone, my dear, was this in the beginning”’ (Chānd. 6.2.1)
and so on, to it alone (viz. pradhāna). The reverend author of the
aphorisms is now refuting this view.
Pradhāna, which is derived through inference,¹ is not fit to be
the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. Why? Because
it is “non-scriptural”, i.e. that with regard to which there is no
“word”, i.e. Scripture, as authority. This adjective denotes the reason.
If it be objected that in the Chāndogya, pradhāna is meant by
the term ‘existent’ in the passage: ‘“The existent alone, my dear,
was this in the beginning”’ (Chānd. 6.2.1). Hence, how can it be
said that pradhāna is non-scriptural?—we reply: “Because (the
creator) sees”, i.e. because from the text, beginning: ‘“Existent
alone, my dear, was this in the beginning”’ (Chānd. 6.2.1), and con-
tinuing: ‘He thought, “May I be many, may I procreate”’ (Chānd.
6.2.3), we find that the creator of the world perceives. The same
thing is mentioned in the Aitareya as well in the passage: ‘The self,
verily, was this in the beginning, one only. Nothing else was apparent.
He thought: “Let me create worlds”. He created these worlds’
(Ait. 1.1.1). Here the word “sees”, denotative of the root, must be
understood, by indirect application, to be referring to ‘seeing’, which
is the meaning of the root. ‘Seeing’ means deliberating, i.e. deter-
mination; and that, being the attribute of a conscious being, is not
appropriate on the part of the pradhāna. Hence, pradhāna, devoid
of perception, is not mentioned by Scripture. Accordingly, it has
been rightly said by his Holiness that it is “non-scriptural”. There-
fore, it is neither the cause of the world, nor knowable through the
Veda.
It cannot be said also that pradhāna possesses the power of
knowledge through its attribute of sattva, and as such, perceiving is
appropriate on its part,—since it is impossible that a non-sentient
substance and a non-sentient attribute can possess knowledge, and
be knowledge (respectively). Nor should it be said that this is appro-
priate through the connection of pradhāna with puruṣa,—because
there being (at hand) Brahman, mentioned before and possessed of
¹ That is, we cannot directly perceive the primary matter, but we argue
that every effect must have a cause, that cause too another cause and so on, and
thus finally, we must admit a primary cause which has no cause. This is the
pradhāna.

[sū. 1. 1. 5.
ADH. 5.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 43
ever-present knowledge, as a simple (explanation of the fact in hand),—
it involves unnecessary complications to drag in something which is
the substratum of knowledge, only through its conjunction with
another, (and not by itself), because such a view is utterly negligible;
and, finally because during its state of equilibrium, it does not possess
that attribute.¹ So stop labouring the point. Hence, the cause
corresponding to the effect, viz. the cause of the origin and the rest
of the world, is none but Brahman, who is denoted by the term
'existent' and is capable of perceiving, possessed as He is of natural,
inconceivable and infinite powers, as declared by the scriptural text:
'Supreme is His powers, declared to be of various kinds, and natural
is the action of His knowledge and power' (Śvet. 6.8.) and so on.
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara
Reading and interpretation same, but Śaṃkara develops, in this
connection, his doctrine of upādhi, or limiting adjunct, viz.—that
there is really nothing besides Brahman, the individual soul and the
rest being due to the limiting adjuncts of body, and the rest, like the
all-pervading ether, limited by pots and the rest. Hence difference is
mithyā through and through.²
Rāmānuja
Reading and interpretation same, but Rāmānuja also develops
his own view, viz. that the universe of the sentient and the non-
sentient constitutes the body of the Lord ³
Baladeva
Reading same, interpretation different,—viz. 'Because (Brahman
is) seen (i.e. designated by Scripture), (He is) not inexpressible'.⁴
1 That is, if knowledge arises through the pre-dominance of the sattva-guṇa,
then prior to creation, all the guṇas being in a state of equilibrium, no knowledge
can arise in pradhāna.
2 Ś.B 1.1.5, p. 203.
3 Śrī. B. 1.1.5, p. 160, Part 1.
4 G.B. 1.1.5, pp. 46-47, Chap. 1.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 6.
44 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 5.]
SŪTRA 6
"IF IT BE SAID THAT (THE WORD 'SEEING' IN THE ABOVE CHĀN-
DOGYA-TEXT) IS SECONDARY, (THEN WE REPLY) NO, BECAUSE OF
THE TERM 'SELF' (BEING APPLIED TO THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD)."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
It is not reasonable to say that the 'seeing' is (only) "secondary".
Why? "On account of the term 'self'."
Vedānta-kaustubha
Anticipating the objection, viz.—
As we often find the metaphorical transference of the qualities
of a sentient being to non-sentient objects like a bank or tilling,
e g. when referring to a bank about to fall, it is said: 'The bank is
about to fall',¹ or when referring to the tilling of dry soil, it is said:
'Tilling is awaiting rain'; and as we read in Scripture about perception
on the part of non-sentient objects like water and light, in the passages.
'That light perceived' (Chānd. 6.2.3), 'Those waters perceived'
(Chānd. 6.2.4),—there may very well be a metaphorical perception
on the part of pradhāna in the very same manner,—the author disposes
of it here.
If it be said that the attribute of perception, belonging to pradhāna
is "secondary", (we reply.) "No." Why? "On account of the
term 'self'", i.e. on account of the scriptural mention of the term 'self'
which establishes the absence of perception on the part of pradhāna.
Thus, if by taking the term 'existence' to mean the non-sentient
pradhāna, a metaphorical perception be admitted on its part, then in
the texts: 'All this has that for its self, that is true, that is the self'
(Chānd. 6.7.8; 6.9.4, 6.10.3; 6.11.3; 6.12.3; 6.13.3; 6.14.3; 6 15.3;
6.16.3), the term 'self' must refer to the non-sentient substance, which
is the meaning of the terms 'existent' and 'perceiver', mentioned
before in the texts: '"The existent, alone, my dear!"' (Chānd. 6 2.1),
'He perceived' (Chānd. 6.2.3). That is, on the view, viz. 'He alone
is the existent and the perceiver, the self which is pradhāna',—the
identity between the terms 'existent' and the rest denoting the non-
sentient and bearing a different sense and the term 'self' denoting the
¹ Here the desiderative suffix does not imply 'wish' but 'imminent danger'
(āśaṅkā), in accordance with K.V S 1707 quoted in SD.K. 2622, pp. 335, vol. 2.

[sū. 1. 1. 7.
ADH. 5 ] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 45
Supreme Self and bearing a different sense, will involve a contradiction,
it being impossible for the term 'self' denotative of the Supreme Lord,
to refer to pradhāna Hence, to say that the perception is even meta-
phorical is unreasonable. And owing to the entering of the Deity
(into them), (the perception) on the part of water and light is not
metaphorical ¹—this is the sum and substance.
COMPARISON
Baladeva
Reading same, interpretation different, viz.—'If it be said (that
the creator of the world is) the gauṇa (or the Saguṇa Brahman,
connected with the guṇas of prakṛti, possessing the sattva guṇa as his
vesture), (then we reply,) No, on account of the term "self"'. That is,
the term 'self' has been used in Scripture in connection with the
creator of the world, and this term can be applied only to the infinite
Nirguṇa Brahman, unconnected with the guṇas of prakṛti.²
SŪTRA 7
"(PRADHĀNA CANNOT BE MEANT BY THE TERM 'SELF',) BECAUSE
SALVATION IS TAUGHT OF ONE WHO RELIES UPON THAT."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
As salvation, characterized by the attainment of His (i.e. Brah-
man's) nature, is taught of a knower, who relies on the cause, the
meaning of the terms 'existent', 'perceiver', 'self' and the rest,—
so pradhāna cannot be denoted by the terms 'existent' and 'self'.
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz in that case, let the term 'self' stand equally
for the sentient and the non-sentient, like the term 'light' ³ which
¹ That is, it is not water or fire that really perceives, but the Lord who has
entered into them, as mentioned in the passage: 'That Divinity thought:—
"Come, let me enter these three divinities" (i.e, fire, water and food)' and so
on. (Chānd. 6.3 2 )
² G B. 1.1.6 (p. 48, Chap. 1.).
³ Jyotis.

46 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 7.
ADH. 5.]
denotes equally a sacrifice ¹ and fire; hence, no inconsistency is in-
volved here,—the reverend Bādarāyaṇa replies here:
The non-sentient pradhāna is not the object denoted by the term
'self'. Why? "Because salvation is taught of one who relies on
Him" i. e. of one who has reliance (or devotion), otherwise called
'meditation', with regard to Him, i.e with regard to one who is
denoted by the terms 'existent' and the rest, who is a perceiver and
who is the creator of fire, water and food ² Thus, after having
taught an investigation, by one who is desirous of salvation, into the
effect as consisting of the Cause (viz Brahman) in essence, in the text:
'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8 7, 6.9.8; 6.10.3; 6 11.3; 6 12.3; 6.13.3; 6.14.3;
6.15.3, 6 16.3), Scripture goes on to teach salvation, characterized
by the attainment of the nature of Brahman, in the text: 'For him
there is delay, so long as I am not freed, then I shall attain (Brahman)'
(Chānd. 6 14.2). (The meaning of this text is:) So long as a person,
who desires for salvation, is not freed from his body and is impeded,
being compelled to undergo the fruits of works which have already
begun to produce results, there is delay for him; but when the fruits
of works will be fully enjoyed, he will attain the nature of Brahman
at once, owing to the absence of impediments. The use of the first
person in both the cases, viz. 'I shall be free', and 'I shall attain'
should be known to be implying the third person in accordance with
Vedic use.
If in the text 'He is the Self' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.), the term 'self'
is to refer to pradhāna, then in the text 'Thou art that' (Chānd.
6.8.7, etc.), the very same thing must be referred to by the term 'that'.
Hence the text: 'Thou art that' would mean: 'Thou hast pradhāna
for thy soul', whereby a great mishap would take place, since through
the meditation: 'I have the non-sentient as my soul', one would be
obstructed from salvation for ever. In the present case, on the other
hand, Brahman, having the stated characteristics, is denoted by the
term 'that'; and the meaning of the term 'thou' is the individual soul,
His part, otherwise called His power, and possessed of the stated
marks. Here, between the part and the whole, there is a relation of
difference and non-difference,—well-known everywhere in ordinary
life and in the Veda,—as between the attribute and its substratum.
¹ Viz. Jyotiṣṭoma.
² This explains the compound: 'tan-niṣṭhasya'

[sū. 1. 1. 8.
ADH. 5.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 47
Although the individual soul is different from Brahman, in nature,
it is also non-different from Him, having no existence and activity
apart from Him. On account of being enveloped by the beginningless
māyā, the individual soul has no knowledge of such a non-difference.
Hence it is said 'Thou art that', i.e. you are non-different from the
object denoted by the term 'that'. Even during the state of salvation,
one who has attained the nature of Brahman is of a different nature
(from Brahman), but should yet be known to be non-different from
Him, because of having no existence and activity separately from Him;
because from the text: 'He attains the highest identity' (Muṇḍ.
3 1 3) we learn that Brahman alone is one that is to be approached,
while the individual soul only one that approaches; and, finally, because
we find the words 'together with' in the text: 'He enjoys all objects
of desire together with Brahman, the all-knowing' (Tait. 2.1). Hence,
Brahman alone is denoted by the terms 'existent', 'self' and the rest
COMPARISON
Baladeva
Reading same, interpretation different—viz:—'(The creator of
the world is not the Saguna Brahman, but the Nirguṇa Brahman ¹),
for salvation is taught of him who relies on Him (viz. the Nirguna
Brahman)'.²
SŪTRA 8
“AND (PRADHĀNA CANNOT BE DENOTED BY THE TERMS
'EXISTENT', 'SELF' AND THE REST), BECAUSE THERE IS NO
(SCRIPTURAL) STATEMENT OF ITS HAVING TO BE ABANDONED.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
That the non-sentient substance, taught by the terms 'existent'
and the rest and to be abandoned in salvation, is to be abandoned, as
well as the purpose of the teaching ³ ought to have been pointed out
1 For the explanation of the terms Saguna and Nirguna, see G.B.
2 G B 1.1.7, pp. 49-50, Chap. 1.
3 That is, if pradhāna be denoted by the terms 'existent', 'self' and the
rest, then evidently, such a self, etc., cannot serve the purpose of salvation.
Hence there must be some other purpose for the teaching of pradhāna, since
Scripture does not teach anything which does not fulfil an end. But there is no
indication in Scripture what this other purpose is.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 8.
48 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 5.]
by Scripture, omniscient and the well-wisher of men. Because of the
absence of these two kinds of texts, pradhāna is not denoted by the
terms 'existent' and the like.
Vedānta-kaustubha
If the non-sentient pradhāna alone were taught as that which is
denoted by the terms 'existent', 'perceiver' and the like, then, in
order to prevent reliance upon that, Scripture, omniscient, well-
wishing, and intending to instruct Brahman, should have told that
it is to be rejected, just as a mother says to her son, about to take
something not good, 'Son, this is not good'. But there is no statement
that it is to be rejected; on the contrary, an identity with it is taught
in the passage: 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8 7; 6.9.8; 6.10.3; 6.11.3;
6.12.3; 6.13.3; 6.14.3, 6.15.3; 6.16.3). The term "and" is meant for
including (another reason, viz.) the absence of statement indicating
the purpose of such a teaching.
COMPARISON
Śamkara
Reading same, interpretation same on the whole. Only, while
Nimbārka interprets the term "Ca" to mean 'the purpose of such a
teaching', Śamkara takes it to mean 'the contradiction of the initial
proposition', viz. the cause being known, the effects are also known.¹
Evidently, through the knowledge of the non-sentient pradhāna, there
can be no knowledge of the sentient souls. Hence pradhāna cannot
be the cause of the universe.²
Rāmānuja
Reading and interpretation same. He gives no special meaning
of the term "ca", but takes it to mean simply 'also', and not a second
reason.³
Bhāskara
Reading and interpretation same on the whole. Bhāskara inter-
prets this sūtra exactly after Śamkara, taking the term "ca" to mean
'contradiction of the initial proposition'.⁴
1 Vide Chānd. 6.1. 2 Ś.B. 1.1.8, p. 209.
3 Śrī. B. 1.1.8, p. 163, vol. 1. 4 Bh. B. 1.1.8, p. 23.

[sū. 1. 1. 9.
ADH 5.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 49
Baladeva
Reading same, interpretation different, viz. 'And because there
is no statement of the rejectibility (of the Saguṇa Brahman)' That
is, Scripture declares the inferiority and worthlessness of all saguna
objects, or objects connected with the gunas of prakrti, viz. all worldly
objects. Hence, if the Saguna Brahman were the creator of the world,
then Scripture would have designated him as inferior and fit to be
rejected.¹
SŪTRA 9
"(PRADHĀNA CANNOT BE THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT
OF THE CONTRADICTION OF THE INITIAL PROPOSITION."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Moreover, "on account of the contradiction of the initial proposi-
tion" as well, viz. through the knowledge of one, there is the know-
ledge of all ²,—the doctrine of the causality of the non-sentient is not
right.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Pradhāna is not the cause of the world. Why? "On account
of the contradiction of the initial proposition", viz. that through the
knowledge of one, there is the knowledge of all. Thus, the scriptural
text "'Did you ask for that instruction whereby the unheard becomes
heard, the unthought becomes thought, the unknown becomes
known?'" "What is that instruction, my reverend Sir ?"" (Chānd.
6.1 2-3), introduces the doctrine that through the knowledge of one,
there is the knowledge of all, and this will be contradicted. Although,
through the knowledge of pradhāna, there may be knowledge of its
effects, yet the proposition that there is knowledge of all the effects,
consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, is not established,
since the sentient not being the effect of pradhāna, its knowledge is
not possible (through the knowledge of pradhāna).
¹ G B. 1.1 8, pp 50-51, Chap. 1.
² Vide Chānd 6 1.
4

50 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [sū. 1. 1. 10
ADH. 5.]
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara and Bhāskara
This sūtra is not found in their commentaries. The argument
contained herein is included by them, as we have seen, in the previous
sūtra.
Baladeva
This sūtra is not found in his commentary as well.
SŪTRA 10
"(BRAHMAN ALONE CAN BE THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON
ACCOUNT OF (THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL'S) ENTRANCE INTO ITSELF
(DURING DEEP SLEEP)"
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
As it is impossible that the object,—mentioned in the passage
referring to the cause of the world which is denoted by the term
'existent', viz. 'Understand from me, my dear, the state of deep sleep.
When a person sleeps here, as we say, my dear, then he has become
united with the Existent' (Chānd. 6.8 1¹), can be understood as a
non-sentient cause,² it is reasonable to hold that Brahman alone is the
cause of the world.
Vedānta-kaustubha
On account of the (soul's) "entrance", i.e. dissolution, into
"itself",³ i.e. into its own cause, viz. Brahman, introduced in the text:
‘"The existent alone, my dear!"’ (Chānd. 6 2 1), Brahman alone
is denoted by the terms 'existent' and the rest, and not pradhāna.
If it be the cause, then the text concerning dissolution would be
contradicted. Thus, there is a scriptural text to this effect, viz.
¹ Ś.R. Bh. Śk.
² A slightly different reading is given in the C S S ed.—which, when
translated, is as follows:—As the 'entering', which relates to a sentient being
and is mentioned in the passage referring to the cause of the world, denoted by
the term 'existent'—viz. 'Understand from me, my dear, . . .' is possible
in the case of Brahman alone, etc. (P. 3.)
³ This explains the word 'svāpyayāt'.

[sū. 1. 1. 11.
ADH 5.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 51
‘ ‘ “ When this person sleeps here, as we say, my dear, then he has
become united with the Existent, he has entered into his own. Hence
they say of him “ He sleeps ”, for he has entered into his own ” ’ (Chānd
6 8 1) There is also another scriptural text, viz. ‘ Just as a man, when
embraced by his dear wife, knows nothing external or internal, so
this person, when embraced by the intelligent soul, knows nothing
external or internal ’ (Bṛh. 4.3.21).
COMPARISON
Baladeva
This is sūtra 9 in his commentary. Reading different—viz.
‘ Svāpyāt ’. Interpretation too different, viz. ‘ (The creator of the
world is not the Saguṇa Brahman), because the Creator merges into
himself, (not so the Saguṇa Brahman, who merges into something
other than himself) ’ ¹
SŪTRA 11
“ (BRAHMAN ALONE IS THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT
OF THE UNIVERSALITY OF KNOWING (HIM AS THE CAUSE).”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
As a sentient cause is known from all the Vedāntas, the doctrine
of a non-sentient cause is untenable.
Vedānta-kaustubha
For this reason too, pradhāna is not denoted by the term ‘existent’,
viz. on account of the universality of ‘ knowing ’, i.e. apprehending.
One sentient cause of the world being known from all the Upaniṣads,
the sentient Brahman alone is the cause of the origin and the rest of
the world. Nor, again, even the slightest inconsistency is found in
the Vedāntas, such as, in some places a sentient cause is taught, in
others a non-sentient. The sense is that if here a non-sentient object
be understood by the term ‘existent’, the multitude of texts, speaking
of a sentient cause, will come to be contradicted.
¹ G.B. 1 1.9, pp. 51-52, Chap. 1.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 12.
52 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 5.]
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja
Reading same. Interpretation too is same, since although
according to Rāmānuja, the word 'gati' means 'pravṛtti' or primary
meaning and not 'avagati' or apprehension as held by Nimbārka, yet
the ultimate meaning is the same, viz. the meaning or import of all
the scriptural texts is uniform, i e from all of them Brahman alone
is known and nothing else, and hence Brahman alone is the cause ¹
Śrīkaṇṭha
Reading same, interpretation different. He connects this sūtra
more particularly with the preceding one, thus: 'On account of the
universality of knowing (the term "existent" as denoting the Supreme
Lord)'. That is, just as in this Upaniṣad, viz the Chāndogya, the
term 'existent' implies the Lord, and none else, so in all other Upani-
ṣads as well. Hence it can never stand for pradhāna. According to
him also, thus, the word 'gati' means 'avagati'. ²
Baladeva
This is sūtra 10 in this commentary Reading same, interpre-
tation different, viz.—'On account of the universality of knowing
(the Nirguṇa Brahman from all Scriptures)'. That is, Scripture
uniformly teaches the Nirguṇa Brahman, and never the Saguṇa.
Hence the Nirguṇa Brahman alone is the cause of the world. Accord-
ing to him also, the term 'gati' means 'avagati'. ³
SŪTRA 12
"(BRAHMAN ALONE IS THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ALSO BECAUSE
THIS IS DEFINITELY STATED IN SCRIPTURE."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Hence, the causality of the Universal Lord,—a sentient Being,
denoted by the terms 'existent' and the rest, omniscient, and the
¹ Śrī. B 1 1.11, p. 165, vol. 1.
² ŚK. B. 1.1.11, p. 202, Part 3.
³ G.B 1 1.10, p. 53, Chap. 1.

[sū. 1 1. 12.
ADH. 5 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 53
controller of all,—being definitely stated in Scripture, pradhāna can
by no means be accepted as such a cause
Vedānta-kaustubha
(Brahman alone is the cause of the world), because in this Upaniṣad
(viz. Chāndogya) that which is denoted by the term 'existent' "is
definitely stated" to be the cause of all as the self of all, in the passage:
'All this, verily, is from the self' (Chānd. 7.26 1), and also because,—
as denoted by the term "and",—the same thing is mentioned in
other Upaniṣads too Thus, there is a passage in the mantra-upaniṣad
of the Śvetāśvataras: 'Who is a knower, the time of time and omnis-
cient' (Śvet. 6 2.16), 'He is the cause, the Lord of the lord of sense-
organs.¹ Of him there is no progenitor, nor lord' (Śvet. 6.9).
The Kauṣītakins declare. 'From this self all the vital-breaths depart
to their respective places, from the vital-breaths the gods, from the
gods the worlds' (Kauṣ. 3 3, 4 20). Similarly, in other places too.
We stop here for fear of increasing the bulk of the book Hence, the
non-sentient pradhāna, which is an object of inference,² is not the
cause of the world, since it is unfit to be the cause of collocation
without an intelligent ruler; and because if pradhāna be admitted to
have the power of being such a ruler, you come over to our side.³
On the contrary, it is established that Lord Kṛṣṇa, denoted by the
words 'Brahman' and the rest, the one topic of all the Vedas, omnis-
cient, omnipotent, the non-distinct material and efficient cause of the
world, and denoted by the term 'existent', is the cause of the world.⁴
Here ends the section entitled 'He sees' (5).
¹ Correct quotation: 'Kāraṇā-dhipādhipaḥ', which is translated here. Vide
Śvet 6.9
² See footnote 1, p. 42.
³ That is, then pradhāna will become Brahman, and cease to be non-sentient,
as held by the Sāṁkhyas
⁴ Note the difference between the interpretations of Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa.
According to Nimbārka, the word 'śrutatvāt' means 'because this is mentioned
in Scripture', and he attaches no special and separate meaning to the word
'Ca' But according to Śrīnivāsa, the word 'śrutatvāt' means: 'because this
is mentioned in this Upaniṣad (viz Chāndogya)', and the word 'Ca' means:
'because this is mentioned in other Upaniṣads (viz. Śvetāśvatara, Kauṣītaki and
the rest)'.

54 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 13.
ADH. 6.]
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja
Reading and interpretation same. Rāmānuja points out in
conclusion that this adhikaraṇa is also a refutation of the theory of
the Nirguṇa Brahman, since it asserts 'perceiving' or 'willing' on
the part of the creator of the world, and 'willing' means being
possessed of the quality of intelligence ¹
Baladeva
This is sūtra 11 in his commentary. Reading same, interpretation
different, viz 'And because (the Nirguṇa Brahman) is mentioned in
Scripture'. That is, Scripture proves the Nirguṇa Brahman to be
the creator, and not the Saguṇa Brahman.²
The difference is that while according to Nimbārka (and others
too), this section is concerned with the question as to whether Brahman
or pradhāna is the creator of the world, according to Baladeva, the
question is as to whether the Nirguṇa Brahman or the Saguṇa Brahman
is the creator of the world.
Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled 'That which
consists of bliss'. (Sūtras 13–20)
SŪTRA 13
"(BRAHMAN IS) THAT WHICH CONSISTS OF BLISS, ON ACCOUNT OF
REPETITION."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"That which consists of bliss" is the Supreme Soul alone, but not
the individual soul. Why? On account of the repetition (in Scrip-
ture) of the word 'bliss' with reference to the Highest Self.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Thus, by way of refuting the doctrine of pradhāna, it has been
shown that scriptural texts like "'The existent alone, my dear!'"
¹ Śrī. B. 1.1.12, p. 166, vol. 1.
² G. B. 1.1.11, pp. 54-55, Chap. I

[sū. 1. 1] 13.
ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 55
(Chānd. 6 2.1) and the rest, all refer to Brahman. Now, the author
is showing that the texts about that which consists of bliss and the
rest also refer to Brahman who, as possessed of unsurpassed bliss,
is different in nature from the class of sentient beings also.
In the Taittirīya, four sheaths, viz. that which consists of food,
that which consists of the vital-breath, that which consists of mind,
and that which consists of understanding, are spoken of in a successive
order; and after that it is said: 'Verily, other than and within that
which consists of understanding is the self which consists of bliss. By
that this is filled' (Tait 2.5) Here a doubt arises, viz. whether by
the words 'consisting of bliss', the individual soul is denoted or the
Supreme Soul. What is reasonable here? If it be suggested, As
in the passage: 'Of him is this very embodied soul which belongs to
the previous one' (Tait. 2 5), an embodied soul is mentioned, as in
another scriptural text: 'May my (sheaths) consisting of food, con-
sisting of the vital-breath, consisting of the mind, consisting of under-
standing and consisting of bliss, be purified' (Mahānār. 20 21) it is
said that what consists of bliss is something to be purified, and as it
is impossible for the ever-pure Supreme Soul to be something to be
purified, so that which consists of bliss is the individual soul,—
We reply: "that which consists of bliss" is the Highest self alone,
possessed of unsurpassed bliss Why? 'On account of repetition',
i e. because the word 'bliss' has been repeated many times (in Scrip-
ture) in reference to the Highest Self alone, the Highest Person, in
texts like: 'If there were not bliss in the ether, for this alone causes
bliss' (Tait. 2 7),¹ 'He knows that Brahman is bliss' (Tait. 3.6)
and so on; and because, beginning thus: 'This is an investigation into
bliss' (Tait. 2.8), the concluding text: 'Knowing the bliss of Brahman,
he does not fear from anything' (Tait. 2.8), is found to end by
establishing that the bliss of Brahman alone is unsurpassable and
illimitable.
If it be said that here there is the repetition of the word 'bliss' ²
only, and not of the words 'consisting of bliss' ³—(we reply) no, be-
cause just as in the passage: 'In spring, he performs the jyoti-sacrifice'
¹ Complete quotation · 'For who indeed would breathe, who would live,
if there were not this bliss in the ether' and so on Vide Tait. 2.7, p 70.
² Ānanda
³ Ānanda-maya.