वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

42 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 5.
ADH. 5.]
similar to the effect,—also relate the Vedānta-texts like ‘“The
existent, alone, my dear, was this in the beginning”’ (Chānd. 6.2.1)
and so on, to it alone (viz. pradhāna). The reverend author of the
aphorisms is now refuting this view.
Pradhāna, which is derived through inference,¹ is not fit to be
the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. Why? Because
it is “non-scriptural”, i.e. that with regard to which there is no
“word”, i.e. Scripture, as authority. This adjective denotes the reason.
If it be objected that in the Chāndogya, pradhāna is meant by
the term ‘existent’ in the passage: ‘“The existent alone, my dear,
was this in the beginning”’ (Chānd. 6.2.1). Hence, how can it be
said that pradhāna is non-scriptural?—we reply: “Because (the
creator) sees”, i.e. because from the text, beginning: ‘“Existent
alone, my dear, was this in the beginning”’ (Chānd. 6.2.1), and con-
tinuing: ‘He thought, “May I be many, may I procreate”’ (Chānd.
6.2.3), we find that the creator of the world perceives. The same
thing is mentioned in the Aitareya as well in the passage: ‘The self,
verily, was this in the beginning, one only. Nothing else was apparent.
He thought: “Let me create worlds”. He created these worlds’
(Ait. 1.1.1). Here the word “sees”, denotative of the root, must be
understood, by indirect application, to be referring to ‘seeing’, which
is the meaning of the root. ‘Seeing’ means deliberating, i.e. deter-
mination; and that, being the attribute of a conscious being, is not
appropriate on the part of the pradhāna. Hence, pradhāna, devoid
of perception, is not mentioned by Scripture. Accordingly, it has
been rightly said by his Holiness that it is “non-scriptural”. There-
fore, it is neither the cause of the world, nor knowable through the
Veda.
It cannot be said also that pradhāna possesses the power of
knowledge through its attribute of sattva, and as such, perceiving is
appropriate on its part,—since it is impossible that a non-sentient
substance and a non-sentient attribute can possess knowledge, and
be knowledge (respectively). Nor should it be said that this is appro-
priate through the connection of pradhāna with puruṣa,—because
there being (at hand) Brahman, mentioned before and possessed of
¹ That is, we cannot directly perceive the primary matter, but we argue
that every effect must have a cause, that cause too another cause and so on, and
thus finally, we must admit a primary cause which has no cause. This is the
pradhāna.