वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

30 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 3.
ADH. 3.]
by the scriptural texts: 'Not the sense-organs, nor inference,' ' "This
knowledge is not attainable through inference, dearest!¹ It leads to
proper knowledge only being told by another" ' (Kaṭha 2 9). That
is, 'Dearest!' 'this knowledge' concerning Brahman, is not to be
overthrown by reason, or, is not capable of being attained thereby.
'Told' by 'another', i.e by an omniscient teacher who is versed in the
Veda, it leads to right knowledge, as declared by the aphorism 'On
account of reasoning having no ground' (Br Sū. 2 1.11); by the
Manu Smṛti: 'One should not apply reasoning to those conceptions
which are verily inconceivable'; and by the Mahā-bhārata: 'One
should not arrive at those conceptions which are verily inconceivable
through reasoning. There can be no ascertainment of any deep
meaning through reasoning which is without a basis'. Moreover,
who but a mad man should say that Brahman, the cause of the world,
who is not known entirely and in every way even by omniscient
mantras and sages, who is difficult to be understood and who is
possessed of infinite inconceivable qualities and powers, can be known
through inference.
It is not to be apprehended: what then will become of such
texts as: 'From whom speech turns back' (Tait. 2.4; 2.9) and so
on?—for the meaning of these is that Brahman is not limited as
being so much. This the author will state under the aphorism:
'For the so-muchness of the topic mentioned' and so on (Br. Sū.
3.2.22).
(An alternative explanation of the sūtra:) If the compound
"Śāstra-yoni" be disjoined as: 'The source of Scripture', then, too,
the very same meaning is arrived at.¹ The resulting meaning is that
Brahman can be known through the Vedas alone,—breathed forth
by Him, the omniscient, and (as such) standing in an intimate and
internal relation with Him,—and not through any external inference
and the rest, imagined by others. In that case, (i.e. on the second
interpretation), the topic of this aphorism will be the scriptural text,
viz. 'Breathed forth by this Great Being is the Ṛg-veda, the Yajur-
veda and the Sāma-veda' (Bṛh. 2.4.10; Maitrī. 6 32). And, on this
interpretation, the eternity of the Vedas are not negatived, for what
we admit is the issuing forth only (and not new creation) of what is
eternally established, in accordance with the following scriptural
¹ Cf. Ś B. 1.1.3.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 4.
ADH 4 ] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 31
and Smṛti passages, viz : 'By means of speech, which is devoid of
form and eternal' (Ṛg. V 8.75.6 ¹, Tait Sam. 2 6 11 2 ²), 'Speech,
without beginning and end, eternal, consisting of the Veda and celestial,
was created by the Self-born in the beginning, whence proceeded all
activities' (Mahā. 12 8534 ³). Hereby, the eternal and non-derived
form of Brahman is indicated, since the Veda, which is prior to all
derivative creation, was breathed forth by Him ⁴ This we shall
explain later on.⁵ Hence, it is established that Brahman has the
Veda as His sole proof.
Here ends the section entitled 'That which has Scripture for its
source' (3)
Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled 'Concord-
ance'. (Sūtra 4)
SŪTRA 4
"BUT THAT (VIZ. THAT BRAHMAN HAS SCRIPTURE AS HIS SOLE
PROOF) FOLLOWS FROM THE CONCORDANCE (OF ALL SCRIPTURAL
TEXTS WITH REGARD TO BRAHMAN)"
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If an objection be raised, viz.: In as much as the entire Veda is
concerned with action (i.e. injunctions and prohibitions), the Vedānta-
texts too, which are concerned with a different topic, are solely
concerned with injunctions by way of establishing the excellence of
the agent, who is a part of sacrifices,—just as the artha-vāda texts ⁶
are indirectly unanimous with the injunctive-texts, by way of estab-
lishing their excellence. Hence, how can Brahman have Scripture
as His sole proof ? ⁷—the correct conclusion is as follows:
¹ P 162. ² P. 241, vol 1.
³ P. 666, line 22, vol. 3
⁴ That is, if Brahman were to breathe forth the Vedas, He must have a
body (nose, etc.), but this body is not evidently composed of matter, but is
non-material, since when He breathes forth the Vedas, there is no matter.
⁵ See V.K 1.3 28–30.
⁶ An artha-vāda is the explanation of the meaning of a precept, or eulogism.
⁷ The sense of the objection is: All Vedas set forth injunctions or prohibitions
with regard to action But besides the texts which directly or explicitly set
forth the above, there are in the Vedas some texts which are merely indicative,

[sū. 1. 1. 4
32 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 4.]
‘That’, ie Brahman alone, the object of enquiry and the
cause of the universe, has Scripture for His proof, and not action and
the rest, since the entire Veda is in concordance in proving Him
alone. (The word) “samanvayāt ” is to be explained thus. “Sama-
nvaya” means concordance in respect of the primary import,—on
account of that—“samanvayāt” Or else, because there is concord-
ance among the Vedas in point of proving Him alone,—so much in
brief
It cannot be said that such a concordance exists with regard to
actions, since actions fulfil their purpose by simply giving rise to a
desire for knowledge ¹ To say that Brahman is a subsidiary factor
of sacrifices is a mere childish prattle, since He is an independent
Being as the regulator of all works, their agents and so on, and their
instruments, and is the giver of fruits. On the contrary, works
themselves are in concordance (with regard to Brahman) as assisting
indirectly the rise of knowledge—which is a means to attaining Him,—
by way of generating a desire for knowledge ² This is ascertained from
the text concerning the desire for knowledge.³
If it be objected: It being established in Scripture that Brahman
is not an object of the proof, viz. Word, just as He is not an object of
the proofs, viz. perception and the rest,—Brahman has not Scripture
as His sole proof,—we reply: Brahman, the object of enquiry, has
Scripture alone as His proof and not anything else, on account of the
concordance of all the scriptural texts, directly or indirectly, with
regard to Him alone. Among these, there is a direct concordance
among the texts concerning His characteristic marks, proof and the

and not injunctive. And, these latter kind of texts are to be explained, not
literally, but as eulogising the direct injunctive texts and thereby indirectly
forming a part of injunctions, etc., otherwise the integrity of the Vedas cannot
be maintained. Hence, the Vedānta-texts too must be taken as not establishing
Brahman, but as simply extolling the sacrificer by identifying him with the
Supreme Soul and so on, and as such really concerned with sacrificial acts.
¹ That is, the proper function of karmas is simply to purify the mind, and
thereby create a desire for knowledge. Karma, thus, is a means and not an end,
the way to truth and not truth itself Hence the Vedānta-texts, dealing as they
do, with the Supreme Truth, cannot be concerned with mere karmas. Vide
V.P.S. 3.4.26.
² I e. knowledge is not an aṅga of karma, on the contrary, karma is an
aṅga of knowledge. Vide V.P.S. 3.4.8.
³ Viz Bṛh. 4.4.22.

[sū. 1. 1. 4.
ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 33
rest, since they are (directly) concerned with Him; and there is an
indirect concordance among the texts concerning the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā,¹
the Pañcāgni-vidyā,² the Madhu-vidyā ³ and so on, as well as among
those which are symbolic in nature.⁴ Or rather, there is a direct
concordance alone among all the texts whatsoever, though leading to
different procedures,⁵ since the topics of all these different texts being
equally Brahman in essence, they are all to be understood in their
primary and literal sense.⁶ It is not to be feared that in that case,
the texts which are concerned with the denial of the object (viz.
Brahman) will be precluded,⁷ since they too, as being concerned with
denying any limit with regard to Brahman's nature, attributes and the
rest, refer to the very same topic (viz Brahman).⁸
Moreover, we ask your Worship: Do you or do you not mean that
Brahman is the object of the statement: 'Brahman is not an object
of knowledge'? If the first, then Brahman is proved to be describable
and hence the proposition that He is not describable is set aside. If
the second, then Brahman is describable all the more. Hence, the
object of enquiry is Lord Vāsudeva alone, omniscient, possessed of all
inconceivable powers, the cause of the origin and the rest of the
universe, known through the evidence of the Veda alone, different
and non-different from all and the soul of all. All Scriptures are in
concordance with regard to Him alone—this is the settled conclusion of
the followers of the Upaniṣads (viz. the Vedāntins).
1 Vide Bṛh. 5.6.1, Chānd 3.14.1–4.
2 Vide Chānd. 5.5.4–10. Also V.K. 3.1 1.
3 Vide Bṛh. 2.5.1–19 (whole section), Chānd. 3.1–11.
4 Vide e g Brh. 5 7–9, etc.; Chānd 3 18–21, 7.1–12, etc.
5 The sense is that the various kinds of texts may impel a man to different
procedures. Some may lead a man to meditate on Brahman directly as the self,
others to meditate on Him as the sun and so on.
6 That is, even the texts concerning the various meditations and symbols,
are to be understood as directly referring to Brahman, i.e. to be interpreted
literally, and not as referring to Brahman indirectly, i.e. to be interpreted
figuratively, as suggested before. This modifies the statement made immediately
before that some texts are direct and primary, some indirect and secondary, and
takes all to be equally direct and primary.
7 Viz. 'Neti, neti' (Bṛh. 2.3.6) and so on.
8 That is, the view that all texts are concerned with Brahman directly in
no way precludes the negative texts, since these negative texts also are concerned
with Brahman equally.

34 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 4.
ADH. 4.]
Vedānta-kaustubha
Thus, it has been said that Lord Krsna, the substratum of great
qualities and powers and the non-distinct material and efficient cause
of the world, has the Veda alone for His proof. Now, with a view to
confirming it, the author, by showing the concordance of the entire
Veda with regard to that very Brahman, refutes the following objection,
viz.; The entire Veda has been associated with action by Jaimini who
holds: 'Since Scripture is concerned with action, there is purport-
lessness of what does not refer to it (viz. action)' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.2.1 ¹).
Hence, what is not concerned with action being laid down as purport-
less, the Vedānta-texts, too, all refer to action (otherwise they will all
become purportless). Consequently, how can Brahman have the Veda
as His sole proof?
The term "but" disposes of the (above) prima facie view. "That",
i e. Brahman alone, the object of enquiry and the cause of the world,
has Scripture for His sole proof. Why? "On account of concord-
ance", i.e. because there is concordance among all the Vedas with
regard to Him alone. (The word "samanvayāt" is to be explained
as follows:) "Samanvaya" means 'Concordance in point of entirety
of statement',—on account of that,—"samanvayāt", i.e. the entire
Veda is in concordance with regard to denoting Brahman entirely or
Lord Krsna, the object to be enquired into by one who desires salvation,
the one identical material and efficient cause of the world, having
Scripture as His source (i.e. proof), the controller of matter, soul, time
and works, having His footstool honoured by the crowns (i.e. the bowed
heads) of Brahmā, Rudra, Indra and the rest, having His greatness
untouched by any odour of fault, the abode of infinite qualties like
omniscience and the rest and to be approached by the freed. The
following groups of texts are in concordance with regard to Him
alone:—'From whom verily all these beings arise' (Tait. 3.1), 'From
bliss alone, verily, do these beings arise' (Tait. 3.6), 'From Him
arise the vital-breath, the mind, and all the sense-organs' (Muṇḍ.
2.1.3), '"The existent alone, my child, was this in the beginning,
One only, without a second"' (Chānd. 6.2.1). "He thought: May I
be many, may I procreate"' (Chānd. 6.2.3), 'From Nārāyaṇa arises
the vital-breath, . . . from Nārāyaṇa arises Brahmā, from

¹ P. 36, vol 1.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 4.
ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 35
Nārāyaṇa arises Rudra’ (Nār. 1), ‘There was verily, Nārāyaṇa
alone, neither Brahmā nor Īśāna (Mahā. Up. 1.2), ‘Brahman, verily,
was this in the beginning, one only’ (Bṛh. 1.4.10.11). ‘Brahman,
verily, was this in the beginning; he knew that self alone thus: “I am
Brahman”’, ‘From Him arose all this’, ‘The self, verily, was this
in the beginning, one only’ (Ait. 1.1.1), ‘From this self, verily, the
ether originated’ (Tait. 2 1), ‘The word which all the Vedas record’
(Kaṭha 2.15), ‘That, in regard to which all the Vedas are unanimous’
(Tait. Ār. 3.11.1 ¹), ‘Entered within, the ruler of man’ (Tait. Ār.
3.11.1.2 ²), ‘To whom all the gods bow down’, ‘Brahman is truth,
knowledge and infinite’ (Tait. 2 1), ‘Knowing the bliss of Brahman’
(Tait. 2 9), ‘Brahman is knowledge and bliss’ (Bṛh. 3 9 28), ‘All
this, verily, is Brahman’ (Chānd. 3.14.1), ‘The self that is free from
sins, without decay, without death, without grief, without hunger,
without thirst’ (Chānd. 8.7 1.3), ‘Who is omniscient, all-knowing’
(Muṇḍ. 1.1.9; 2.2.7), ‘The knower of Brahman attains the highest’
(Tait. 2.1), ‘Brahman, verily, is all this’ (Bṛh. 2.5.1–14, 14 times)
and so on.
(Prima facie view.)
An objection may be raised here:—The entire Veda is but a collec-
tion of five kinds of texts, called, injunction, prohibition, explanation
or eulogy, sacred formulæ and name.³ Of these, ‘One, who desires
heaven should perform the Jyotiṣṭoma ⁴ sacrifice’ and so on, are
injunctive texts. ‘A Brāhmaṇa should not be killed’ and so on, are
prohibitive texts. ‘The wind, verily, is the quickest deity’ (Tait.
Saṁ. 2.1.1 ⁵), and so on are explanations or eulogisms. ‘Oblation to
you’ (Tait. Saṁ. 1.1.1 ⁶), ‘O, heavens, having the fire as your head’
(Ṛg. V. 8.44.16a; ⁷ Śat. Br. 2.3.4.11a ⁸), and so on are sacred formulæ.
‘Jyotiṣṭoma’,⁹ ‘Aśva-medha’ ¹⁰ and the rest are names,—thus we
distinguish them. Thus, in the beginning, in the aphorism: ‘Then,
¹ P. 19. Reading: ‘Yatrārkaḥ’.
² P. 181.
³ Vidhi, niṣedha, artha-vāda, mantra, nāmadheya.
⁴ Name of a Soma-sacrifice, consisting divisions, Agniṣṭoma and the rest.
M.W., p. 427.
⁵ P. 125, lines 1-2, vol 1. ⁶ P. 1, line 1, vol. 1.
⁷ P. 132, line 7. ⁸ P. 163, line 16.
⁹ See footnote 4, above. ¹⁰ The horse-sacrifice.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 4.
36 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 4.]
therefore, an enquiry into religious duties' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.1.1 ¹), it is
said that the Veda has meaning as possessing the fruit to be attained
through the injunctions regarding conceptions which are instrumental
to the Vedic studies. In the second aphorism which is concerned
with mark, viz. 'A religious duty has injunction for its mark' (Pū.
Mī. Sū. 1.1 2 ²), it is established, on the ground of the vyāpti: 'What-
ever has the Veda for its proof, refers to action', that in the sphere
of religious duties, injunction is the authority ³ Here a doubt arises
as to whether the artha-vāda-texts like 'The wind is the swiftest
deity' (Tait. Sam. 2 1.1 ⁴) are authoritative in the sphere of religious
duties, or not With regard to it, the prima facie view is as follows:
We have a text: 'Since Scripture is concerned with action, there is
purportlessness of what does not refer to it (viz. action)' (Pū. Mī. Sū.
1.2.1 ⁵). (It means.)—'Scripture, i e. the Veda, is 'kriyārtha', i.e.
has 'action' alone as its 'purport', or subject-matter or topic,—for
this reason, the artha-vāda-texts are not authoritative. What then
are they?—anticipating this question, the text goes on to say that
'there is purportlessness of what does not refer to it', i e. let there be
simply 'purportlessness' or 'meaninglessness' of that which has not
'action' for its 'purport', viz. of artha-vāda and the rest, and in the
very same manner, of the Vedānta-texts as well. Even those (Ve-
dānta-) texts which comprise injunctions regarding study: viz. 'One's
own text should be studied', cannot be reasonably said to be autho-
ritative, since they are (really) concerned with Brahman, leading to
no fruit.⁶ (Here ends the prima facie view within the original prima
facie view.) With regard to this, we state the correct conclusion:
'Because of their unanimity with the injunctions, let (them be
authoritative) through having the glorification of injunctions as their

¹ P. 1, vol. 1.
² P. 3, vol. 1.
³ That is, the inference is as follows:—
Whatever has the Veda for its proof, refers to action.
A religious duty has the Veda for its proof.
∴ a religious duty refers to action, i.e. is concerned with injunctions and
prohibitions.
⁴ P. 125, lines 1-2, vol. 1. ⁵ P. 39, vol. 1.
⁶ That is, there are some Vedānta-texts, which do refer to action, i.e. to
injunction, yet they are not to be taken as authoritative, since they really refer
to Brahman who is outside the sphere of actions and fruits.

[sū. 1. 1. 4.
ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 37
purport’ (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.2 7¹). That is, since the artha-vādas are
unanimous with the injunctive texts, let them be authoritative
‘through having glorification as their purport’, i.e. by way of glorifying
the matters to be enjoined. Similarly, in order to prevent the absolute
purportlessness of the Vedānta-texts which are wanting in injunction
and prohibition and teach an accomplished object (viz. Brahman), it
is reasonable to take them too as indirectly connected with action,—
which is something to be accomplished,—as included under the
very mantras and artha-vādas, since they (viz. the Vedānta-texts)
admit injunctions regarding the study of the Veda. But if they be
taken to be independent (of action) they would lead to no fruit, and
hence they must be understood to have fulfilled their purpose through
establishing the agent, who is a part of a sacrifice (and not to be
independent of action). Among these, the texts concerning the
‘that’ (viz. Brahman) and ‘thou’ (viz. the individual soul)² glorify
the deity and the agent of the sacrificial act, and the knowledge
concerning it (viz. the ‘that’) called the ‘higher knowledge’,³ glorify
the fruit. (Thus, we conclude :) The Vedānta-texts are not concerned
with Brahman, but are like the artha-vāda-texts, since they are con-
cerned with proclaiming the excellence of the agent, who is a subordi-
nate factor in a sacrifice. (Here ends the original prima facie view.⁴)
(Author’s conclusion.)
To this we reply:⁵ No, because this is a mere imagination, in-
vented by you; and because (on the contrary), works, being generative
of knowledge which is a means to salvation, indirectly refer to Brahman
alone, as declared by the scriptural text:—‘The Brāhmaṇas desire
to know this self through the study of the Veda, through sacrifice,
through penance, through fasting’ (Bṛh. 4.4.22). Here, if in the
statement ‘They desire to know through sacrifice’, there be a direct
connection of the instrument, viz. ‘sacrifice’, with the meaning of the
root,⁶ as in the sentence ‘He desires to go by the horse’, then the
sacrificial act should be known to be serving the purpose of knowledge
(i.e. helping the rise of knowledge), and thereby referring to Brahman.

¹ P. 42, vol. 1.
² Cf the famous text ‘Thou art that’ (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc)
³ Vide e.g. Mund 1.1 4-5.
⁴ It began on p. 35.
⁵ The correct conclusion begins here ⁶ Viz. ‘vid’=to know.

[sū. 1. 1. 4.
38 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 4.]
If, on the other hand, owing to the primacy of the desiderative suffix,¹
there be a connection with the meaning of the suffix, it should be known
to be serving the purpose of desire, (i.e. helping the rise of a desire
for knowledge), to be a subordinate factor of knowledge through
that desire and to be referring to Brahman thereby. And, the fact
that action is a part of knowledge will be stated under the aphorism
'And, there is dependence on all, on account of the text concerning
sacrifice, as in the case of a horse' (Br. Sū. 3.4.26).
It cannot be said, also, that the reality to be known from the
Vedānta (viz. Brahman) is a subordinate factor of sacrifices,—since
He is self-dependent as the controller of all works, their agents and
their instruments. Nor can it be said that the Vedānta-texts are
subsidiary parts of injunctions like the artha-vādas, since the former
have been referred to in a different context and are not in proximity to
injunctions. Nor can it be said that the Vedānta-texts lead to no fruit,
teaching, as they do, something which is neither an injunction nor a
prohibition,—since the knowledge of Brahman, who is to be known
from the Vedānta, leads to a supremely excellent fruit, viz. salvation.
If it be said: As we read in texts like 'Undecaying, verily, is the
good deed of one who performs the Cātur-māsya ² sacrifice' (Āp.
Ś.Ś. 8.1.1.1 ³) that works too have the same fruit like it (viz. knowledge),
so there is nothing objectionable (in taking the scriptural texts) to be
referring to works,—
(We reply :) No, because the scriptural text: 'Just, as here, the
world gained through work perishes, so exactly does hereafter the
world gained through merit perish' (Chānd. 8.1.6 ⁴) is of a greater
force; is in conformity with the inference, viz. 'The world gained
through mere work is non-permanent, because it is gained through
work alone, as in the case of tilling and the rest'; and is confirmed by
another scriptural text as well, viz. 'Frail, indeed, are these boats
of sacrifices' (Muṇḍ. 1.2.7); because the text: 'Undecaying, verily'
(Āp. Ś.Ś. 8.1.1) and so on is a weaker one, and because it is improper
to (take the scriptural texts) to be referring to works, which form
the object of such texts wanting in force. On the other hand, the

¹ Viz. 'san', implying 'desire'.
² See footnote 2, p. 5 ³ P. 1, vol. 1.
⁴ Correct quotation: 'Karma-cita' and not 'karma-jita', which is translated
here. Vide Chānd. 8 1.6, p. 415.

[Sū. 1. 1. 4.
ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 39
texts: ‘Those who know this, become immortal’ (Bṛh. 4.4 14; Kaṭha
6.2.9; Śvet. 3.1.10 13, 4.17.20), ‘The knower of Brahman attains the
highest’ (Tait 2.1), are not contradicted by any scriptural text, and
cannot be set aside by a thousand inferences. Further, the text:
‘Undecaying, indeed’ and so on (Āp. Ś.Ś. 8.1.1) is not really set
aside, since it refers to the relative (permanence of works) ¹, and since
the holy Bhāgavata-smṛti (i.e. the Bhāgavad-gītā), which is a version
of the Veda, is the authority in both the cases (viz. regarding the non-
permanence of karma, and the permanence of Brahman) thus:—
‘“The worlds, beginning from the world of Brahman, come and go,
O Arjuna! But, on attaining me, O Son of Kuntī! there is no re-birth”’
(Gītā 8.16).
If it be objected: It may be that the Upaniṣadic portion is somehow
or other concerned with Brahman, since we see it to be so. But the
prior portion (viz. the Karma-kāṇḍa) is known from the texts: ‘He
performs the Agnihotra ² as long as he lives’, ‘One who desires
heaven should perform the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice’ (Āp. Ś.Ś. 10.2.1)
and so on, to fulfil its purpose by enjoining obligatory and optional
works and the rest; and hence how can they be concerned with
Brahman?—
(We reply:) Not so. The entire Veda is concerned only with
Brahman, and although some part of it is found to refer to action
somehow, its complete concordance is found in Brahman alone.
Among these the Upaniṣadic portion refers directly to Brahman,
directly concerned, as it is, with demonstrating His nature, attributes
and the rest. Among these, again, the statements of difference refer
to Brahman by way of being concerned with the nature of the sentient,
the non-sentient and Brahman; the statements of non-difference, by
being concerned with proving that everything has Brahman for its
essence; the statements of creation and the rest, by being concerned
with proving attributes like creatorship and the rest; the statements
that Brahman is non-qualified, by being concerned with the denial
of the qualities due to māyā; the statements that Brahman is qualified,
by being concerned with proving the natural qualities of the Lord;
¹ That is, this text simply shows that the deeds of one who performs the
Cātur-māsya sacrifice are relatively more permanent than the deeds of one who
does not, and not that they are absolutely permanent.
² Sacrificing to Agni. Cf. Athar. V. 6.97.1, p. 130.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 4.
40 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 4.]
and the statements like: 'That which is not manifested through
speech' (Kena 1.4), by being concerned with proving that Brahman
is not limited by so-muchness.
The texts, concerned with the daily and occasional duties,¹ too,
refer to Brahman alone, by way of effecting the purification of the
nature of the person entitled (to the study of Brahman) and being
thereby co-operative towards the rise of knowledge and so on concern-
ing Brahman, while (the texts) concerned with the optional duties,²
by way of being an atomic bit of the bliss of Brahman, since the text:
'Other beings subsist on a portion only of His bliss alone' (Bṛh
4.3.32) declares even worldly pleasure to be an atomic portion of the
bliss of Brahman. Moreover, the optional duties are in concordance
(with regard to Brahman), since they are concerned with the knowledge
of Brahman by way of giving rise to a pure body, like that of a god
and the rest, entitled to salvation. Moreover, just as in accordance
with the maxim of 'connection and disconnection',³ curd, used in
connection with daily duties (nitya),—as laid down in the passage:
'He performs a sacrifice with curd',—brings about the attainment
of objects of sense,—as laid down in the passage: 'One who desires
for objects of sense should perform a sacrifice with curd' (Tait. Br
2.1 5.6⁴),—so the sacrificial acts, though bringing about heaven and
the rest, should yet be known to be serving the purpose (i.e. helping
the rise) of knowledge.⁵ And (finally) texts like 'Golden right from
the tip of His nails' (Chānd. 1 6.6⁶) refer to Brahman as being
concerned with His divine body.
Or else, since the entire mass of objects has Brahman for its
essence, the mass of texts, denoting them, directly refer to Him.⁷
¹ The daily or nitya karmas are ablution, prayer and so on, to be performed
every day, while the occasional or naimittika karmas are the ceremony in honour
of the dead and so on, to be performed on special occasions. Both of these kinds
are obligatory.
² The optional or kāmya karmas are sacrifices and the rest, undertaken with
special objects in view, viz. heaven and the rest.
³ A term applied to express the disconnection of what is optional from what
is a necessary constituent of anything. Vide Pū. Mi. Sū. 4.3.5, and Śabara's
commentary, pp. 493 and ff., vol. 1.
⁴ P. 180, line 3, vol. 2. ⁵ Vide V.K. 3.4.26.
⁶ Correct quotation ‘Apraṇakhāt sarva eva suvarṇaḥ’. Vide Chānd.
1 6.6, p. 43.
⁷ That is, instead of the laborious explanation given above, it is simpler to
accept this alternative explanation.

[sū. 1. 1. 5.
ADH. 5 ] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 41
Hence it is established that the entire Veda is in concordance
with regard to Brahman alone or Lord Kṛṣṇa the Highest Person,
omniscient, possessing infinite natural and inconceivable powers,
the cause of the world, and different and non-different from the sentient
and the non-sentient, as declared by the Lord Himself in the passage :
‘“By all the Vedas, I alone am to be known”’ (Gītā 15 15).
The four aphorisms constituting the basis of Scripture are hereby
explained. This treatise (viz. the Vedānta) is but an expounding of
these.
Here ends the section entitled ‘Concordance’ (4).
Here ends the explanation of the four aphorisms in the first
quarter of the first chapter in the commentary Vedānta-kaustubha,
composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, the incarnation of the
Pāñcajanya and dwelling under the lotus-feet of the reverend Lord
Nimbāditya, the founder of the sect of the reverend Sanatkumāra.
Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled ‘He sees’.
(Sūtras 5–12)
SŪTRA 5
“BECAUSE (THE CREATOR OF THE WORLD) SEES, (PRADHĀNA IS)
NOT (THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD) (SINCE) IT IS NON-SCRIPTURAL.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
But pradhāna, admitted by the Sāṁkhyas, is “non-scriptural”,
i.e. is devoid of scriptural evidence. Hence it is “not” the cause of
the world, as in Scripture seeing, which is a characteristic of a sentient
being, is predicated of the cause of the world.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Thus, it has been pointed out that Brahman, great in attributes,
powers and nature, omniscient, and the one object of all the Vedas,
is the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. Now, the Sāṁ-
khyas,—who hold that Brahman is not the cause of the world, since
He is of a dissimilar form; while the non-sentient pradhāna, consisting
of the three guṇas, is the cause of the world, since it is of a form

42 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 5.
ADH. 5.]
similar to the effect,—also relate the Vedānta-texts like ‘“The
existent, alone, my dear, was this in the beginning”’ (Chānd. 6.2.1)
and so on, to it alone (viz. pradhāna). The reverend author of the
aphorisms is now refuting this view.
Pradhāna, which is derived through inference,¹ is not fit to be
the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. Why? Because
it is “non-scriptural”, i.e. that with regard to which there is no
“word”, i.e. Scripture, as authority. This adjective denotes the reason.
If it be objected that in the Chāndogya, pradhāna is meant by
the term ‘existent’ in the passage: ‘“The existent alone, my dear,
was this in the beginning”’ (Chānd. 6.2.1). Hence, how can it be
said that pradhāna is non-scriptural?—we reply: “Because (the
creator) sees”, i.e. because from the text, beginning: ‘“Existent
alone, my dear, was this in the beginning”’ (Chānd. 6.2.1), and con-
tinuing: ‘He thought, “May I be many, may I procreate”’ (Chānd.
6.2.3), we find that the creator of the world perceives. The same
thing is mentioned in the Aitareya as well in the passage: ‘The self,
verily, was this in the beginning, one only. Nothing else was apparent.
He thought: “Let me create worlds”. He created these worlds’
(Ait. 1.1.1). Here the word “sees”, denotative of the root, must be
understood, by indirect application, to be referring to ‘seeing’, which
is the meaning of the root. ‘Seeing’ means deliberating, i.e. deter-
mination; and that, being the attribute of a conscious being, is not
appropriate on the part of the pradhāna. Hence, pradhāna, devoid
of perception, is not mentioned by Scripture. Accordingly, it has
been rightly said by his Holiness that it is “non-scriptural”. There-
fore, it is neither the cause of the world, nor knowable through the
Veda.
It cannot be said also that pradhāna possesses the power of
knowledge through its attribute of sattva, and as such, perceiving is
appropriate on its part,—since it is impossible that a non-sentient
substance and a non-sentient attribute can possess knowledge, and
be knowledge (respectively). Nor should it be said that this is appro-
priate through the connection of pradhāna with puruṣa,—because
there being (at hand) Brahman, mentioned before and possessed of
¹ That is, we cannot directly perceive the primary matter, but we argue
that every effect must have a cause, that cause too another cause and so on, and
thus finally, we must admit a primary cause which has no cause. This is the
pradhāna.

[sū. 1. 1. 5.
ADH. 5.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 43
ever-present knowledge, as a simple (explanation of the fact in hand),—
it involves unnecessary complications to drag in something which is
the substratum of knowledge, only through its conjunction with
another, (and not by itself), because such a view is utterly negligible;
and, finally because during its state of equilibrium, it does not possess
that attribute.¹ So stop labouring the point. Hence, the cause
corresponding to the effect, viz. the cause of the origin and the rest
of the world, is none but Brahman, who is denoted by the term
'existent' and is capable of perceiving, possessed as He is of natural,
inconceivable and infinite powers, as declared by the scriptural text:
'Supreme is His powers, declared to be of various kinds, and natural
is the action of His knowledge and power' (Śvet. 6.8.) and so on.
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara
Reading and interpretation same, but Śaṃkara develops, in this
connection, his doctrine of upādhi, or limiting adjunct, viz.—that
there is really nothing besides Brahman, the individual soul and the
rest being due to the limiting adjuncts of body, and the rest, like the
all-pervading ether, limited by pots and the rest. Hence difference is
mithyā through and through.²
Rāmānuja
Reading and interpretation same, but Rāmānuja also develops
his own view, viz. that the universe of the sentient and the non-
sentient constitutes the body of the Lord ³
Baladeva
Reading same, interpretation different,—viz. 'Because (Brahman
is) seen (i.e. designated by Scripture), (He is) not inexpressible'.⁴
1 That is, if knowledge arises through the pre-dominance of the sattva-guṇa,
then prior to creation, all the guṇas being in a state of equilibrium, no knowledge
can arise in pradhāna.
2 Ś.B 1.1.5, p. 203.
3 Śrī. B. 1.1.5, p. 160, Part 1.
4 G.B. 1.1.5, pp. 46-47, Chap. 1.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 6.
44 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 5.]
SŪTRA 6
"IF IT BE SAID THAT (THE WORD 'SEEING' IN THE ABOVE CHĀN-
DOGYA-TEXT) IS SECONDARY, (THEN WE REPLY) NO, BECAUSE OF
THE TERM 'SELF' (BEING APPLIED TO THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD)."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
It is not reasonable to say that the 'seeing' is (only) "secondary".
Why? "On account of the term 'self'."
Vedānta-kaustubha
Anticipating the objection, viz.—
As we often find the metaphorical transference of the qualities
of a sentient being to non-sentient objects like a bank or tilling,
e g. when referring to a bank about to fall, it is said: 'The bank is
about to fall',¹ or when referring to the tilling of dry soil, it is said:
'Tilling is awaiting rain'; and as we read in Scripture about perception
on the part of non-sentient objects like water and light, in the passages.
'That light perceived' (Chānd. 6.2.3), 'Those waters perceived'
(Chānd. 6.2.4),—there may very well be a metaphorical perception
on the part of pradhāna in the very same manner,—the author disposes
of it here.
If it be said that the attribute of perception, belonging to pradhāna
is "secondary", (we reply.) "No." Why? "On account of the
term 'self'", i.e. on account of the scriptural mention of the term 'self'
which establishes the absence of perception on the part of pradhāna.
Thus, if by taking the term 'existence' to mean the non-sentient
pradhāna, a metaphorical perception be admitted on its part, then in
the texts: 'All this has that for its self, that is true, that is the self'
(Chānd. 6.7.8; 6.9.4, 6.10.3; 6.11.3; 6.12.3; 6.13.3; 6.14.3; 6 15.3;
6.16.3), the term 'self' must refer to the non-sentient substance, which
is the meaning of the terms 'existent' and 'perceiver', mentioned
before in the texts: '"The existent, alone, my dear!"' (Chānd. 6 2.1),
'He perceived' (Chānd. 6.2.3). That is, on the view, viz. 'He alone
is the existent and the perceiver, the self which is pradhāna',—the
identity between the terms 'existent' and the rest denoting the non-
sentient and bearing a different sense and the term 'self' denoting the
¹ Here the desiderative suffix does not imply 'wish' but 'imminent danger'
(āśaṅkā), in accordance with K.V S 1707 quoted in SD.K. 2622, pp. 335, vol. 2.

[sū. 1. 1. 7.
ADH. 5 ] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 45
Supreme Self and bearing a different sense, will involve a contradiction,
it being impossible for the term 'self' denotative of the Supreme Lord,
to refer to pradhāna Hence, to say that the perception is even meta-
phorical is unreasonable. And owing to the entering of the Deity
(into them), (the perception) on the part of water and light is not
metaphorical ¹—this is the sum and substance.
COMPARISON
Baladeva
Reading same, interpretation different, viz.—'If it be said (that
the creator of the world is) the gauṇa (or the Saguṇa Brahman,
connected with the guṇas of prakṛti, possessing the sattva guṇa as his
vesture), (then we reply,) No, on account of the term "self"'. That is,
the term 'self' has been used in Scripture in connection with the
creator of the world, and this term can be applied only to the infinite
Nirguṇa Brahman, unconnected with the guṇas of prakṛti.²
SŪTRA 7
"(PRADHĀNA CANNOT BE MEANT BY THE TERM 'SELF',) BECAUSE
SALVATION IS TAUGHT OF ONE WHO RELIES UPON THAT."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
As salvation, characterized by the attainment of His (i.e. Brah-
man's) nature, is taught of a knower, who relies on the cause, the
meaning of the terms 'existent', 'perceiver', 'self' and the rest,—
so pradhāna cannot be denoted by the terms 'existent' and 'self'.
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz in that case, let the term 'self' stand equally
for the sentient and the non-sentient, like the term 'light' ³ which
¹ That is, it is not water or fire that really perceives, but the Lord who has
entered into them, as mentioned in the passage: 'That Divinity thought:—
"Come, let me enter these three divinities" (i.e, fire, water and food)' and so
on. (Chānd. 6.3 2 )
² G B. 1.1.6 (p. 48, Chap. 1.).
³ Jyotis.

46 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 7.
ADH. 5.]
denotes equally a sacrifice ¹ and fire; hence, no inconsistency is in-
volved here,—the reverend Bādarāyaṇa replies here:
The non-sentient pradhāna is not the object denoted by the term
'self'. Why? "Because salvation is taught of one who relies on
Him" i. e. of one who has reliance (or devotion), otherwise called
'meditation', with regard to Him, i.e with regard to one who is
denoted by the terms 'existent' and the rest, who is a perceiver and
who is the creator of fire, water and food ² Thus, after having
taught an investigation, by one who is desirous of salvation, into the
effect as consisting of the Cause (viz Brahman) in essence, in the text:
'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8 7, 6.9.8; 6.10.3; 6 11.3; 6 12.3; 6.13.3; 6.14.3;
6.15.3, 6 16.3), Scripture goes on to teach salvation, characterized
by the attainment of the nature of Brahman, in the text: 'For him
there is delay, so long as I am not freed, then I shall attain (Brahman)'
(Chānd. 6 14.2). (The meaning of this text is:) So long as a person,
who desires for salvation, is not freed from his body and is impeded,
being compelled to undergo the fruits of works which have already
begun to produce results, there is delay for him; but when the fruits
of works will be fully enjoyed, he will attain the nature of Brahman
at once, owing to the absence of impediments. The use of the first
person in both the cases, viz. 'I shall be free', and 'I shall attain'
should be known to be implying the third person in accordance with
Vedic use.
If in the text 'He is the Self' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.), the term 'self'
is to refer to pradhāna, then in the text 'Thou art that' (Chānd.
6.8.7, etc.), the very same thing must be referred to by the term 'that'.
Hence the text: 'Thou art that' would mean: 'Thou hast pradhāna
for thy soul', whereby a great mishap would take place, since through
the meditation: 'I have the non-sentient as my soul', one would be
obstructed from salvation for ever. In the present case, on the other
hand, Brahman, having the stated characteristics, is denoted by the
term 'that'; and the meaning of the term 'thou' is the individual soul,
His part, otherwise called His power, and possessed of the stated
marks. Here, between the part and the whole, there is a relation of
difference and non-difference,—well-known everywhere in ordinary
life and in the Veda,—as between the attribute and its substratum.
¹ Viz. Jyotiṣṭoma.
² This explains the compound: 'tan-niṣṭhasya'

[sū. 1. 1. 8.
ADH. 5.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 47
Although the individual soul is different from Brahman, in nature,
it is also non-different from Him, having no existence and activity
apart from Him. On account of being enveloped by the beginningless
māyā, the individual soul has no knowledge of such a non-difference.
Hence it is said 'Thou art that', i.e. you are non-different from the
object denoted by the term 'that'. Even during the state of salvation,
one who has attained the nature of Brahman is of a different nature
(from Brahman), but should yet be known to be non-different from
Him, because of having no existence and activity separately from Him;
because from the text: 'He attains the highest identity' (Muṇḍ.
3 1 3) we learn that Brahman alone is one that is to be approached,
while the individual soul only one that approaches; and, finally, because
we find the words 'together with' in the text: 'He enjoys all objects
of desire together with Brahman, the all-knowing' (Tait. 2.1). Hence,
Brahman alone is denoted by the terms 'existent', 'self' and the rest
COMPARISON
Baladeva
Reading same, interpretation different—viz:—'(The creator of
the world is not the Saguna Brahman, but the Nirguṇa Brahman ¹),
for salvation is taught of him who relies on Him (viz. the Nirguna
Brahman)'.²
SŪTRA 8
“AND (PRADHĀNA CANNOT BE DENOTED BY THE TERMS
'EXISTENT', 'SELF' AND THE REST), BECAUSE THERE IS NO
(SCRIPTURAL) STATEMENT OF ITS HAVING TO BE ABANDONED.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
That the non-sentient substance, taught by the terms 'existent'
and the rest and to be abandoned in salvation, is to be abandoned, as
well as the purpose of the teaching ³ ought to have been pointed out
1 For the explanation of the terms Saguna and Nirguna, see G.B.
2 G B 1.1.7, pp. 49-50, Chap. 1.
3 That is, if pradhāna be denoted by the terms 'existent', 'self' and the
rest, then evidently, such a self, etc., cannot serve the purpose of salvation.
Hence there must be some other purpose for the teaching of pradhāna, since
Scripture does not teach anything which does not fulfil an end. But there is no
indication in Scripture what this other purpose is.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 8.
48 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 5.]
by Scripture, omniscient and the well-wisher of men. Because of the
absence of these two kinds of texts, pradhāna is not denoted by the
terms 'existent' and the like.
Vedānta-kaustubha
If the non-sentient pradhāna alone were taught as that which is
denoted by the terms 'existent', 'perceiver' and the like, then, in
order to prevent reliance upon that, Scripture, omniscient, well-
wishing, and intending to instruct Brahman, should have told that
it is to be rejected, just as a mother says to her son, about to take
something not good, 'Son, this is not good'. But there is no statement
that it is to be rejected; on the contrary, an identity with it is taught
in the passage: 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8 7; 6.9.8; 6.10.3; 6.11.3;
6.12.3; 6.13.3; 6.14.3, 6.15.3; 6.16.3). The term "and" is meant for
including (another reason, viz.) the absence of statement indicating
the purpose of such a teaching.
COMPARISON
Śamkara
Reading same, interpretation same on the whole. Only, while
Nimbārka interprets the term "Ca" to mean 'the purpose of such a
teaching', Śamkara takes it to mean 'the contradiction of the initial
proposition', viz. the cause being known, the effects are also known.¹
Evidently, through the knowledge of the non-sentient pradhāna, there
can be no knowledge of the sentient souls. Hence pradhāna cannot
be the cause of the universe.²
Rāmānuja
Reading and interpretation same. He gives no special meaning
of the term "ca", but takes it to mean simply 'also', and not a second
reason.³
Bhāskara
Reading and interpretation same on the whole. Bhāskara inter-
prets this sūtra exactly after Śamkara, taking the term "ca" to mean
'contradiction of the initial proposition'.⁴
1 Vide Chānd. 6.1. 2 Ś.B. 1.1.8, p. 209.
3 Śrī. B. 1.1.8, p. 163, vol. 1. 4 Bh. B. 1.1.8, p. 23.

[sū. 1. 1. 9.
ADH 5.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 49
Baladeva
Reading same, interpretation different, viz. 'And because there
is no statement of the rejectibility (of the Saguṇa Brahman)' That
is, Scripture declares the inferiority and worthlessness of all saguna
objects, or objects connected with the gunas of prakrti, viz. all worldly
objects. Hence, if the Saguna Brahman were the creator of the world,
then Scripture would have designated him as inferior and fit to be
rejected.¹
SŪTRA 9
"(PRADHĀNA CANNOT BE THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT
OF THE CONTRADICTION OF THE INITIAL PROPOSITION."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Moreover, "on account of the contradiction of the initial proposi-
tion" as well, viz. through the knowledge of one, there is the know-
ledge of all ²,—the doctrine of the causality of the non-sentient is not
right.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Pradhāna is not the cause of the world. Why? "On account
of the contradiction of the initial proposition", viz. that through the
knowledge of one, there is the knowledge of all. Thus, the scriptural
text "'Did you ask for that instruction whereby the unheard becomes
heard, the unthought becomes thought, the unknown becomes
known?'" "What is that instruction, my reverend Sir ?"" (Chānd.
6.1 2-3), introduces the doctrine that through the knowledge of one,
there is the knowledge of all, and this will be contradicted. Although,
through the knowledge of pradhāna, there may be knowledge of its
effects, yet the proposition that there is knowledge of all the effects,
consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, is not established,
since the sentient not being the effect of pradhāna, its knowledge is
not possible (through the knowledge of pradhāna).
¹ G B. 1.1 8, pp 50-51, Chap. 1.
² Vide Chānd 6 1.
4