वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

[SŪ. 2. 2. 36.
ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 375
hence) the doctrine (that the soul is of the) size of the body is set
aside.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The size as well as the real nature (which the soul attains) during
its state of salvation, after the destruction of the final body, are
eternal. At that time there is no assumption of a subtle or gross
body (by the soul), so there is no contraction or expansion of it. Thus,
“on account of the permanency of the final” size, as well as of the real
nature (of the soul), the permanency of both the initial and intervening
(sizes) too is meant by the Arhatas; and hence there must be “non-
distinction” everywhere,—this is the sense. In short, the soul must
have a permanent and constant size in a gross body as well as in a
subtle body, in its state of bondage as well as in its state of release;
and the doctrine that it is of the size of the body must be but a childish
prattle Hence, it is established that our conclusion is not contradicted
by the view of the naked (i.e. the Jainas), based on error.
Here ends the section entitled “Impossible in one” (6).
COMPARISON
Baladeva
Interpretation different, viz. “On account of the non-distinction
of the final state, (viz. salvation) (from the mundane state), both
being permanent”. That is, on the Jaina view, there is no difference
between the state of release and the mundane state, because the
former is, according to them, a constant progress upward, or remaining
in the alokākāśa. Now, motion, whether in the world or upward is
always mundane; and no one can possibly feel any pleasure in the
state of constant motion, or in standing still in a place without any
support. Hence there is no difference between release and bondage
on this view ¹
¹ G.B. 2.2.36, pp. 145-146, Chap. 2.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 37.
376 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH 7.]
Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled "Paśupati".
(Sūtras 37-41)
SŪTRA 37
"(THE DOCTRINE) OF THE LORD (IS UNTENABLE), ON ACCOUNT OF
INCONSISTENCY."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The Pāśupata doctrine is to be rejected, because it is opposed to
the Veda, which establishes a non-distinct efficient and material cause;
and because it initiates a false faith.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now, the Pāśupata doctrine is being disposed of.
The maintainers of doctrines opposed to the Veda have been
refuted above. The Māheśvaras, too, are such. They are of four
kinds, viz. Kāpālas, Kālāmukhas, Pāśupatas and Śaivas. The
basis of their doctrines is the treatise composed by Paśupati.
The 'Pañcādhyāyī' ¹ is celebrated to be composed by the great Lord
Paśupati Himself. Five categories are mentioned there, viz. cause,
effect, concentrated meditation, injunction, and end of suffering.²
The cause is pradhāna and the Lord. Among them, pradhāna is
supposed to be the material cause, the Lord the efficient cause. The
effect is mahat and the rest. Concentrated meditation is stated in
the passage; "Through the meditation on the Oṃ-kāra once, one
should hold (one's self)". Injunction consists in secret rituals like
three ablutions and the rest The end of suffering is salvation.
Among these, the Pāśupatas and the Kāpālas hold that during
its state of bondage, the soul becomes (non-sentient) like a stone.
And the Śaivas hold that the freed soul is consciousness. They have
minor treatises of their own, designating their mutual differences.
Those Māheśvaras, with their intelligence deluded by the Māyā
of the Lord, maintain and practise, just as they like—as the means
to the highest end—what is "opposed" to the Veda and not practised
by the wise. As the Kāpālas say: "He who knows the six mudrās,
he who is versed in the supreme mudrā, he attains nirvāṇa by
¹ Or having five chapters.
² Kāraṇa, Kāryya, Yoga, Vidhi, Duḥkhānta.

[sū. 2. 2. 37.
ADH. 7.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 377
meditating on himself as in the posture of bhagāsana. The necklace,
the gold ornament, the ear-ring, head-jewel, ashes, and the holy thread
are said to be the six mudrās He whose body is marked with (mudrās)
is not re-born on earth" and so on. Likewise, the Kālamukhas hold ·
"Using a skull (as the drinking vessel), besmearing one's self with the
ashes of a dead body, eating the flesh of such a body, carrying a heavy
stick, setting up a liquor-jar, worshipping the gods placed on it, and
the rest, are means to obtaining all desired results in this world, as
well as in the next". In the treatise of the Śaivas, too, it is said ·
"A bracelet made of the Rudrākṣa-beads on the arm, matted hair on
the head, a skull, besmearing one's self with ashes", and so on.
Moreover, it is clearly demonstrated in the Mahābhārata in the
story of the Mātaṅga, distressed by the sharp words of a she-ass ¹
and so on, that it is very difficult for a man of another caste to obtain
Brāhmaṇa-hood even by means of penance accumulated through
thousands of years. But they hold that it is easily obtainable by a
man of a different caste thus: "By merely entering in the initiatory
ceremony, one becomes a Brāhmaṇa at once. By understanding the
Kāpāla rite, a man becomes an ascetic".
(Correct conclusion:) With regard to this, we reply. "Of the
Lord" and so on The term 'no' is to be supplied "Of the
¹ The story of Mātaṅga and the she-ass is as follows: Once Mātaṅga, who
was endowed with all qualities and equal to a Brāhmaṇa by all means, while
travelling on a swift chariot drawn by a young ass and its mother, mercilessly
pierced the young ass in the nose again and again Thereupon its mother, being
much grieved, said to him that such an act certainly behoved a person who was
born of a Brāhmaṇa mother and a Caṇḍāla father, but had he been the son of a
Brāhmaṇa father his act would have been otherwise. Much aggrieved at this
painful information, Mātaṅga determined to attain Brāhmaṇa-hood, left home
immediately and engaged himself in a severe penance Therefore Indra being
pleased personally appeared before him to offer him a boon. Mātaṅga asked
for Brāhmaṇa-hood, which however, Indra declined to grant by reason of the
fact that he was the son of a Caṇḍāla. In spite of Indra's straight denial,
Mātaṅga went on performing austereties for a hundred years, standing on one
leg only. Very much pleased, Indra appeared once again only to go back after
saying that it was nnpossible for a Caṇḍāla to acquire Brāhmaṇa-hood, and that
Mātaṅga was most unwise to undergo penance for it. This time Mātaṅga went
on performing penance for a thousand years in the same way. Disappointed
once more, he performed the severest penance by standing on one finger only.
But in spite of this he was never able to attain his heart's desire, simply because
he was a Caṇḍāla by birth Vide Mahā. 13.1870 ff., pp. 85 ff., vol. 4.

[SŪ. 2. 2 38.
378 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 7.]
Lord," i.e. the view of Paśupati is not justifiable. Why? "On
account of inconsistency," i.e because of the inconsistency in their
view by reason of establishing two causes ¹ in direct contradiction to
the scriptural texts like "He thought: 'May I be many'" (Chānd.
6 2 3), 'He became existent and that' (Tait. 2.6), 'All this has
that for its soul' (Chānd 6.8.7, etc.). Moreover, since the practices
like meditation preceded by the pranava, besmearing one's self with
the ashes of a corpse and so on, are mutually contradictory, their
view is indeed inconsistent
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara and Bhāskara
This is sūtra 34 in Bhāskara's Commentary. They do not take
this adhikarana as a refutation of the Pāśupata doctrine only, but of
the Sāṃkhya-yoga as well, in fact of all the doctrines generally, which
maintain the Lord to be the efficient cause only and not the material
cause of the world.²
Śrīkaṇṭha
He takes this adhikarana to be concerned with the refutation of
the doctrine of the Ekadeśī Tāntrikas only or of those Śaivas according
to whom the Lord is the efficient cause only, while Māyā is the material
cause, śakti the instrument ³
SŪTRA 38
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELATION."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"And on account of the impossibility of relation" between
Paśupati, the instigator who is without a body, and pradhāna and the
rest, to be instigated, Paśupati is not the cause of the world.
¹ I.e. two causes of the world material and efficient, different from each
other.
² Ś.B. 2.2.37, p. 566; Bh. B. 2.2.34 (written as 2.2.37 in conformity with
Śaṃkara's number), p. 127.
³ ŚK. B 2 3.37.

[sū. 2. 2. 39.
ADH. 7.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 379
Vedānta-kaustubha
For this reason, too, the doctrine of Paśupati is not justifiable.
Why? A relation between Paśupati, the efficient cause, the instigator
and pradhāna and the rest, to be instigated, must be admitted,—
and this is impossible. Thus, the Māheśvaras are to be asked the
following. Do you, sirs, follow Scripture or follow what is observed ?
If the first, then the stated conclusion, being opposed to Scripture,
must be rejected. If the second, then it is observed that there is a
relation between potters and the rest only who are possessed of bodies,
and clay and so on. Hence no relation can be established between
Paśupati who is without a body and pradhāna and the rest, by you,
following what is observed. Hence it being not possible for a bodiless
being to have any relation with pradhāna and the rest, to be their
instigator and so on, he is not the cause of the world.
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha
This sūtra is not found in their commentaries.
SŪTRA 39
“AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A SUBSTRATUM
(I E A BODY) (ON THE PART OF THE LORD) ”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
“On account of the impossibility” of an eternal body—since it is
opposed to what is observed,—as well as of a non-eternal one—since
it arises later—Paśupati is not the cause of the world
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be argued: Let him then have a body, and hence the above
objection cannot be raised—(the author) replies:—
“The substratum” of all practical transactions is the body—
on account of the impossibility of that, their view is not justifiable.
Thus, the body of Paśupati cannot be eternal, because that is opposed
to what is observed. Otherwise the bodies of potters and the rest,
too, must become eternal. Again, his body cannot be non-eternal,

[SŪ. 2. 2. 40.
380 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 7.]
because a non-eternal body is not possible on the part of the cause of
the world, because all the non-eternal objects arise later as effects,
and because Paśupati, the cause, is prior to everything.¹
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara
Interpretation different, viz. “Because rulership (of pradhāna)
and the rest is impossible (on the part of the Lord)”. That is, pradhāna
which is non-perceived and devoid of colour and the rest, cannot be
ruled by the Lord, since it is found that clay and the rest alone, which
are possessed of colour and so on, are ruled by potters, etc.²
Rāmānuja, Bhāskara, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva
Interpretation different, viz. · “Because rulership (of pradhāna)
is not possible (on the part of the Lord)”. That is, Paśupati, who is
bodiless cannot be the ruler of the pradhāna, for only embodied beings
like potters and the rest can be rulers.³
SŪTRA 40
“IF IT BE ARGUED: AS IN THE CASE OF SENSE-ORGANS, (WE REPLY :)
NO, ON ACCOUNT OF ENJOYMENT AND THE REST.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
It is not possible to suppose that the Lord has sense-organs and
body like the individual soul, for there will result enjoyment and the
rest (on the part of the Lord).
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be argued: Just as the bodiless individual soul, existing from
all eternity, has a relation with subsequent sense-organs and body,
due to preceding sense-organs and body, so like it, Paśupati may have a
¹ I.e. non-eternal objects arise after creation. Hence Paśupati who is
present before creation cannot possess a non-eternal body.
² Ś.B. 2.2.39, p. 570. See p. 656 under Śaṁkara.
³ Śrī. B. 2.2.36, p. 113, Part 1; Bh. B. 2.2.35 (written as 2.2.38), pp. 127-128;
Śk. B. 2.2.36, p. 107, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.2.39

[SŪ. 2. 2. 41
ADH. 7.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 381
relation with a body, and no objection can be raised here,—(we
reply:) no. "On account of enjoyment and the rest." The sense is
this: If like the individual soul, the Lord, too, has such a relation with
a body, then all the faults like experiencing pleasure and pain, and
thereby being the agent of good or bad actions and the rest must
pertain to Him also.
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and others
Interpretation different, viz. "If it be argued: As in the case of
sense-organs, (we reply:) no, on account of enjoyment and the rest".
That is, if it be argued that the Lord rules over pradhāna in the same
way as the individual soul rules over its sense-organs,—we point out:
In that case the Lord Himself must undergo pleasure and pain ¹
At the end of this sūtra, Śaṁkara gives an alternative explanation
of this and the immediately preceding sūtras and this explanation
tallies with that of Nimbārka.
SŪTRA 41
"(THERE WILL RESULT ON THIS VIEW) FINITUDE OR NON-
OMNISCIENCE."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If there be a connection between Him and the unseen principle,²
consisting in merit and the rest, then there must be "finitude" and
"non-omniscience" (on His part).
Vedānta-kaustubha
It cannot be said also: What objection can there be if enjoyment
and the rest result on the part of the Lord? What can a snow-flake
do when fallen on the sun?—for it is unreasonable. On account of
performing good and bad deeds, due to nescience and the cause of
transmigratory existence, and of undergoing their consequences,
there must of course result "finitude", i.e. liability to being created,
¹ Ś.B. 2.2.40, p. 570, Śrī. B. 2.2.37, p. 113, Part 2; Bh. B. 2.2.36
(written as 2.2.39), p. 128; Śk. B. 2.2.37, p. 108, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.2.40.
² Adṛṣṭa.

[Sū. 2. 2. 42.
382 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 8.]
as well as "non-omniscience" on the part of the Lord; otherwise the
individual soul, too, must cease to be subject to transmigratory
existence,--so much in brief. Hence, it is established that the
stated conclusion is not contradicted by the doctrine of the Māheśvaras
Here ends the section entitled "Paśupati" (7).
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara and Bhāskara
According to them, the particle "vā" means 'or' and not
'and' as held by Nimbārka. Interpretation different, viz. "(There
must be) either finitude or non-omniscience". That is, the Lord
must either define the measure of the individual souls, pradhāna and
Himself, or not define them. If He does, then they become finite;
if he does not, then the Lord becomes non-omniscient.¹
Adhikaraṇa 8: The section entitled "Impossi-
bility of origin". (Sūtras 42–45)
SŪTRA 42
"ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ORIGIN."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Since the origin of the world from Śakti without Puruṣa is
impossible, the doctrine, too, which maintains it as the cause is not
valid.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now, the author is refuting, incidentally, the erroneous view of
the Śāktas, viz. that Śakti alone is the producer of the world.
The particle 'no' is to be supplied.
Śakti is not the cause of the universe. Why? Because the
origin of the universe from Śakti, without any connection with Puruṣa,
is impossible. The consequence would be that the Śaktis, being
independent of Puruṣa, would come to be perceived everywhere.

¹ Ś.B. 2.2.41, pp. 571 ff.; Bh. B. 2.2.37 (written as 2.2.40), p. 128.

[sū. 2. 2. 43.
ADH. 8 ] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 383
Or else,¹ because the origin of the world is impossible, it being
eternal, Śakti cannot be its cause, there being no proof that the world
is something produced. If it be said that the Veda is the proof—
(we reply:) Let then the cause of the world be Brahman who is
established by the Veda. The doctrine of the causality of Śakti
which is without any basis is to be rejected.
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha
They take this adhikaraṇa as concerned with the refutation of the
Pañca-rātra system. Thus, according to them this sūtra means:
“On account of the impossibility of origin”. That is, the Pañca-rātra
doctrine holds that Saṃkarṣaṇa (the individual soul) springs from
Vāsudeva (the Highest self), Pradyumna (the mind) from Saṃkarṣaṇa
and Aniruddha (the principle of egoity) from Pradyumna, is not
tenable, for the individual soul, which is eternal, cannot spring from
the Highest soul.²
Rāmānuja
Rāmānuja also takes this adhikaraṇa as dealing with the Pañca-
rātra doctrine, but not refuting, but establishing, it. Accordingly,
he takes this and the next sūtra as laying down the prima facie
view, the rest the correct conclusion. Interpretation like Śaṃkara
and the rest.
SŪTRA 43
“AND THE SENSE-ORGAN OF THE CREATION (IS) NOT (POSSIBLE).”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be said, there is a connection (between Śakti and Puruṣa,)—
(we reply.) No “sense-organ” is possible on the part of Puruṣa at
that time.
¹ An alternative explanation of the sūtra.
² Ś.B. 2.2.42, pp. 572 ff.; Bh. B. 2.2.38 (written as 2.2.41), p. 128; ŚK. B.
2.2.39, p. 115, Parts 7 and 8.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 44.
384 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 8.]
Vedānta-kaustubha
(If it be argued:) There is a creator helping Śakti; and the fact
that the world is something produced, too, is inferred on the analogy
of what is directly perceived; hence the above objection cannot be
raised,—then (we reply:) No "sense-organ" is possible on the part
of the creator, since there is no sense-organ prior to creation. In its
absence, it is not possible for Puruṣa to be a helper. Moreover, since
there is no similarity of the ether and the rest with pots and so on,
the fact that the former are something produced (like the latter)
is by no means established. The term "and" (in the sūtra) implies
that if there be Puruṣa as the creator, Śakti is no longer the cause.
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha
Criticism of the Pañca-rātra view continued: "(There can be)
no (origin) of the organ (viz. the mind) from the agent (viz. the
individual soul)" ¹
Rāmānuja
This is sūtra 40 in his commentary. As pointed out above, he
takes this sūtra as laying down a prima facie view against the Pañca-
rātra doctrine. Interpretation like Śaṃkara and others ²
SŪTRA 44
"OR IF THERE BE THE EXISTENCE OF INTELLIGENCE AND SO ON,
THERE IS NO DENIAL OF THAT."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If there be the existence of natural intelligence and so on (on the
part of Śakti), what contradiction can there be in its being the cause
of the world? The doctrine of Śakti is set aside by itself through the
admission of Brahman.
¹ Ś.B. 2.2.43, p. 574; Bh. B. 2.2.39 (written as 2.2.43), p. 129, Śk. B. 2.2.40,
p. 116, Parts 7 and 8.
² Śrī. B. 2.2.40, p. 115, Part 2.

[sū. 2. 2. 44.
ADH. 8.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 385
Vedānta-kaustubha
The term "or" has the meaning 'but'. Śakti is the abode of a
mass of natural attributes like knowledge, strength and the rest,
independent by nature of anything else, and self-relying "If there
be the existence," i.e. admission, "of knowledge and so on", in this
manner, on the other hand, then "there is no denial of that", i.e. its
causality is not denied. In this aphorism: "And endowed with all
(attributes)" (Br. Sū. 2.1 29), there is designated a Deity, knowable
through all the Vedāntas, and it is He that is admitted by you. He is
not the power (Śakti) of any one, He is the Highest Deity, denoted by
the word 'Brahman' and so on. The sense is that the doctrine of
Śakti defeats itself.
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara and Bhāskara
The criticism of the Pañca-rātra doctrine continued: viz "(Even)
if there be the existence of knowledge, there is no setting aside of that
(viz. of the above objection)". That is, even if be said that Saṃkarṣaṇa
and the rest are not the individual soul and so on, but divine beings,
endowed with supreme knowledge and the rest, still then the objection
stated before, viz the impossibility of origination, remains in force.¹
Rāmānuja
This is sūtra 41 in his commentary. According to him this 'sūtra
and the next set forth the correct conclusion against the above prima
facie view, and defend the Pañca-rātra doctrine. Thus, it means:
"If (Saṃkarṣaṇa and the rest be) of the nature of knowledge and so
on (i.e. of the Highest Lord), there is no contradiction of that". That
is, the Pañca-rātra doctrine is not that individual soul arises from the
Lord, the mind from the individual soul, and so on, but simply that the
Highest Lord, viz. Vāsudeva, out of kindness for people, abides in a
four-fold form, so that He may be easily accessible to His devotees.²
Śrīkaṇṭha
This is sūtra 41 in his commentary as well He takes it to be a
prima facie view, viz. "If there be the assumption of intelligence and
1 Ś.B. 2.2.41, pp. 574 ff.; Bh. B. 2.2.40 (written 2 2.44), p. 129.
2 Śrī. B. 2.2.41, pp. 116-117, Part 2.
25

[SŪ. 2. 2. 45.
386 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 8.]
so on (i.e. of the forms of the individual soul and so on), there is no
contradiction of that". That is, the opponents point out that they
do not hold that there is the origin of the individual soul and the rest,
but simply that Samkarsana and the rest assume the forms of the
individual soul, etc., i e. rule them Hence the above objection
cannot be raised.¹
Baladeva
Interpretation different: "If (the body of the Lord be of the)
nature of intelligence and the rest, there is no contradiction of that".
That is, if the prima facie objector points out that although the Lord
cannot have a material body, yet He may have a non-material body
composed of knowledge and so on, then we reply that if the Lord of
the Śāktas be possessed of such a body, then we have no objection to
their view, since it becomes identical with our doctrine of Brahman.
SŪTRA 45
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF CONTRADICTION."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
And on account of being opposed to Scripture and Smṛti, the
doctrine of Śakti is unauthoritative
Here ends the second quarter of the second chapter in the Vedānta-
pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṁsā
texts, and composed by the reverend Nimbārka.
Vedānta-kaustubha
And because of being opposed to the following scriptural and
Smṛti texts: 'Person, verily, is all this' (Śvet. 3.15), 'Supreme is
His power, declared to be of manifold; natural is the operation of
His knowledge and strength' (Śvet. 6 8), '"I am the origin of all,
everything originates from me"' (Gītā 10.8), and so on, the doctrine of
1 Śk. B. 2.2.41, p. 116, Parts 7 and 8.

[sū. 2. 2. 45.
ADH. 8 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 387
the causality of Śakti is not to be accepted by one who is desirous of
salvation. Hence, it is established that the concordance of the
scriptural texts with regard to Brahman, Lord Kṛṣṇa, the lord of all
and the soul of all, is not contradicted by anything whatsoever.
Here ends the section entitled "Impossibility of origin" (8).
Here ends the second quarter of the second chapter in the Vedānta-
kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṁsā, and composed
by the reverend Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the lotus-feet of the holy
Nimbārka, the teacher and founder of the sect of the venerable
Sanatkumāra.
——————
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara
Criticism of the Pañca-rātra doctrine concluded: "(The Pañca-
rātra doctrine is to be rejected), because it is full of (inner) contradic-
tions; and (because it contains passages opposed to the Veda)".¹
Rāmānuja
Right conclusion, in defence of the Pañca-rātra doctrine, ends
here. "(The above objection cannot be raised) on account of the
contradiction (i.e. becasue the Pañca-rātra doctrine itself controverts
that the individual soul has an origin".²
Bhāskara
This sūtra is not found in his commentary
Śrīkaṇṭha
Criticism of the Pañca-rātra doctrine concluded : "(In reply to the
above prima facie view, we point out although the contradiction with
regard to the origin of the individual soul and the rest set aside by
the above view, yet the Pañca-rātra doctrine is not to be accounted)
on account of its opposition (to Scripture).³

¹ Ś.B. 2.2.45, pp. 575-76.
² Śrī. B. 2.2 42, pp 117 ff., Part 2
³ Śk. B 2 2.42, pp. 116–119, Parts 7 and 8.

388 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 2. 2. 45.
ADH. 8 ]
Résumé
The second section of the second chapter contains:—

1. 45 sūtras and 8 adhikaranas, according to Nimbārka;
2. 45 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṁkara;
3. 42 sūtras and 8 adhikaranas, according to Rāmānuja;
4. 40 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
   5 42 sūtras and 8 adhikaranas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha,
   6 45 sūtras and 8 adhikaranas, according to Baladeva.
   Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha read sūtras 1 and 2 in Nimbārka's
   commentary as one sūtra, and omit sūtras 31 and 38 in Nimbārka-
   bhāṣya.

SECOND CHAPTER (Adhyāya)
THIRD QUARTER (Pāda)
Adhikaraṇa 1: The section entitled "The
ether". (Sūtras 1-6)
PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 1)
SŪTRA 1
"THE ETHER (DOES) NOT (ORIGINATE), ON ACCOUNT OF NON-
MENTION IN SCRIPTURE."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
That there is no contradiction in our own view has been proved by
means of the views of the opponents. Now, it is being proved that
there is no mutual non-contradiction among the scriptural texts.
"The ether" does "not" originate. Why? Because in the
Chāndogya its origin is not mentioned.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Thus, having demonstrated that the views of the opponents are
based on a mere semblance of (and not real) reason, now with a view
to generating intense reverence for Brahman, the cause of the world,
on the part of those who are desirous of salvation, (the author) is
demonstrating the origin of the ether and the rest, His effects, as well
as the mutual consistency among the scriptural texts (about them).
On the doubt, viz. whether the ether originates or not, the prima
facie view is as follows: "The ether" does not originate. Why?
"On account of non-mention in Scripture." Thus in the Chāndogya,
the creation of three only—viz. light, water and food, without the
ether and the air, is mentioned in the section concerned about creation
in the passage beginning: 'He created that Light' (Chānd. 6.2.3).

390 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [sū. 2. 3. 2-3.
ADH. 1.]
CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtra 2)
SŪTRA 2
‘BUT (THERE) IS (A TEXT DESIGNATING THE ORIGIN OF THE
ETHER)’
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
In the Taittirīyaka, there “is” a text designating the origin of
the ether, viz ‘From the soul the ether originated’ (Tait. 2.1¹).
Vedānta-kaustubha
To this we reply·
The term “but” implies the acceptance of the correct conclusion.
If it be objected that in the Chāndogya there is no text about the
origin of ether, (we reply.) in the Taittirīya there “is” a text designat-
ing the origin of the ether, viz. “From this soul, verily, the ether
originated (Tait. 2.1)
PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtras 3-4)
SŪTRA 3
“(THE TEXT ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF THE ETHER IS) METAPHORICAL,
ON ACCOUNT OF IMPOSSIBILITY, AND ON ACCOUNT OF SCRIPTURAL
TEXT”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Because the origin of the ether, which is without parts, is
impossible, and also because of the scriptural text· ‘The air and the
atmosphere—this is mortal’ (Bṛh. 2.3.3 ²)—the text: ‘The ether
originated’ (Tait. 2.1) is “metaphorical”.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Thus, intending to remove the apparent contradictions among
those scriptural texts which designate the origin of the ether and those
which do not, His Holiness here raises a doubt based on the view of
those who hold that the ether does not originate
An objection may be raised: The scriptural text designating the
origin of the ether, viz. ‘From this soul, verily, the ether originated’
(Tait. 2.1), can be (only) “metaphorical”, just as in ordinary life,
¹ Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B. ² Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

[sū. 2. 3. 4.
ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 391
the statement 'The ether acts' is metaphorical. The reason for this
is: "on account of impossibility", i e. because the origin of the ether
which without parts is impossible, seeing that the earth and the rest
alone, which are possessed of parts, can originate from the atoms of
the same class The second reason is: "on account of scriptural
text", i.e on account of the scriptural text 'The air and the atmos-
phere—this is immortal' (Bṛh 2 3 3)
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara and Bhāskara
They divide this sūtra into two different sūtras—viz "Gauny
asambhavāt" and "Śabdāc ca".¹
PRIMA FACIE VIEW (concluded)
SŪTRA 4
"AND THERE MAY BE (THE USE) OF THE SAME (TERM 'ORIGINATED'
IN TWO DIFFERENT SENSES), AS IN THE CASE OF THE WORD
'BRAHMAN'"
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
But the same term 'originated' "may be" used in a metaphorical
sense with reference to the ether, and in a literal sense with reference to
the subsequent (elements),² as in the case of "Desire to enquire
after Brahman by austerity, austerity is Brahman" (Tait. 3 2³)
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be objected How can one and the same word 'originated'
be used in a metaphorical sense with reference to the ether, and in a
literal sense with reference to what follows, we reply.
Just as in the text 'Desire to know Brahman by austerity, austerity
is Brahman' (Tait. 3.2), the word 'Brahman' is used in a figurative
sense in reference to austerity, but in a literal sense as the object to be
¹ Ś B., pp. 579-80, Bh B., p 130.
² Viz. the air, fire, water, earth, etc. mentioned in Tait. 2.1 subsequently
to the ether. That is, the expression 'The ether originates' is to be understood
metaphorically, while the expressions 'The air originates' and the rest literally.
³ Ś, Bh, Śk, B.

392 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 5.
ADH. 1 ]
enquired into, so one and the same word 'originated' may be used in
a figurative sense in reference to the ether, and in a literal sense in
reference to what follows.
CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtra 5)
SŪTRA 5
"(THERE IS) NON-ABANDONMENT OF THE INITIAL PROPOSITION, ON
ACCOUNT OF NON-SEPARATION (KNOWN) FROM SCRIPTURAL TEXT ''
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"On account of the non-separation" of the mass of objects,
beginning with the ether, from Brahman, there is no contradiction
of the "initial proposition", viz. that there is the knowledge of all
through the knowledge of one. But if the ether be something non-
originated, then it must be outside the sphere of knowable objects, and
thereby the initial proposition will be set aside. The non-separation
of everything from Brahman is known "from the scriptural text", viz.
'Everything has that for its soul' (Chānd. 6.8.7 ¹), and so on.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The author states the correct conclusion.
The Taittirīya-text, designating the origin of the ether, is literal
and not figurative for the following reason. If the origin of the universe,
beginning with the ether, be admitted, then "on account of the non-
separation" or non-difference of the effect, or of the entire expanse of
the universe beginning with the ether, from the object to be known,
the cause, viz. Brahman,—as of the leaf from the tree,—then alone,
there will be "non-abandonment" or acceptance of the initial pro-
position, viz. that there is the knowledge of all through the knowledge
of one, stated in the passage 'Whereby the unheard becomes heard,
unthought becomes thought' (Chānd 6.1.3), otherwise, the initial
proposition will be abandoned.
The cause of non-separation is. "On account of scriptural text",
i.e on account of the texts: 'The existent alone, my dear, was this in
the beginning, one only, without a second' (Chānd 6 2.1), 'Every-
thing has that for its soul' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc ), and so on.
¹ Ś, Bh, B.

[sū. 2. 3. 6.
ADH 1.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 393
The allegation stated under the aphorism 'Metaphorical, on
account of impossibility and on account of scriptural text' (Br Sū.
2.3 3), viz that the origin of what is without parts being impossible,
the scriptural text designating the origin of the ether is metaphorical,—
is not tenable, since reasoning has no scope with regard to matters
which are beyond the cognizance of the senses and are determined by
Scripture. But how can then the text: 'The air and the atmosphere—
this is immortal' (Brh. 2.3 3) be accountable? In this passage the
permanency of the ether is established on the analogy of the statement
'The gods are immortal', and hence the immortality of the ether fits in.
The allegation made under the aphorism: "And there may be
(the use) of the same (term in two different senses), as in the case of
the word 'Brahman'" (Br. Sū. 2.3.4), too, is not tenable, since the
word 'Brahman' being mentioned twice, the example is not to the
point.¹
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
They break this sūtra into two parts—viz. "Pratijñāhānir . . .'
and "Śabdebhyaḥ". The meaning of the last portion is different, viz
(That the ether has an origin is known) from scriptural text (also).²
CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)
SŪTRA 6
"BUT AS FAR AS THERE IS EFFECT, THERE IS DIVISION, AS IN
ORDINARY LIFE"
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The author concludes: It being established by the texts 'All
this has that for its soul' (Chānd 6.8.7, etc.³) and the rest that the
¹ In Tait. 2.1, the term 'originated' is mentioned only once, while in the
analogical passage quoted, the term 'Brahman' is mentioned twice separately.
Hence, while it may be said that of the two separately mentioned words 'Brahman',
one is literal, the other figurative, it cannot be said that the word 'originated'
which is mentioned only once, is simultaneously literal and figurative.
² Śrī. B. 125, Part 2; Śk B., pp 124-125, Parts 7 and 8.
³ R, Śk, B.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 6.
394 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 1.]
entire expanse of the universe, beginning with the ether, has Brahman
for its soul, it is definitely ascertained that the ether is an effect.
Likewise, it is known that "as far as there is effect" there is origin
indeed.¹ The non-mention of the ether and the mention of light
and the rest as objects to be created in the text: "He created that
light" (Chānd. 6.2.3) fit in, "as in ordinary life". In ordinary life,
when referring to the group of Devadatta's sons the origin of some
of them is mentioned, thereby the origin of all the rest is mentioned.
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz. since in the Chāndogya there is no indication
of the origin of the ether, the scriptural text designating origin is
metaphorical,—(the author) replies:
The term "but" is for disposing of the objection "As far as
there is effect", i.e. the entire expanse of the universe, there is
"division" indeed. The Chāndogya texts, viz. ' "The existent, alone,
my dear, was this in the beginning"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), and ' "Whereby
the unheard becomes heard, the unthought becomes thought, the
unknown known"' (Chānd. 6 1.3) designate (respectively) that
everything, beginning with the ether, and denoted by the term 'this'
consisted of the cause in essence prior to creation, and is knowable
through the knowledge of the cause. Hence, in the Chāndogya the
"division", i.e. the origin, of the entire expanse of the universe,
beginning with the ether, from the cause, is indeed stated.
To the enquiry: Why then the origin of the light and the rest
alone is mentioned, without any mention of the ether and the air?—
we reply. "As in ordinary life". Just as in ordinary life, through
the mention of the origin of some sons of a person, there may be the
mention of the origin of all the rest, so through the statement of the
origin of light and the rest, the origin of the ether and so on, too,
is indeed mentioned. Hence, it is established that the ether has
Brahman for its material cause.
Here ends the section entitled "The ether" (1).
¹ I. e. whatever is an effect has an origin.