वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

[SŪ. 2. 2. 8.
ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 335
SŪTRA 8
“AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF BEING PREPON-
DERANT.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
As it is impossible for the guṇas, which are in a state of equi-
librium at the time of dissolution, to enter in a relation of mutual
subordination and preponderance, so the inference (i e. the infer-
rible pradhāna) is not the cause of the world.
Vedānta-kaustubha
For this reason also the inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna)
is not the cause of the world Why? “On account of the impossi-
bility of being preponderant.” Thus, is pradhāna,—consisting of the
three guṇas in a state of equilibrium, not regulated by an intelligent
principle and established by inference as admitted by you,—trans-
formed into the form of the world by means of entering into a state of
mutual subordination and preponderance (of the guṇas), or inde-
pendently of any such state? If the first, then the preponderance of
one among (these three guṇas) sattva, rajas and tamas, which are
in a state of equilibrium prior to creation and are mutually inde-
pendent, being impossible, it is not possible for pradhāna to be the
cause of the world. If the second, then pradhāna, consisting of the
three guṇas in a state of equilibrium and immutable, is not trans-
formed into the form of the world all the more,—there being no state
of inequality consisting in a mutual subordination and preponder-
ance (of the guṇas).
It cannot be said also that at the time of creation there is a lapse
from the state of equilibrium and the guṇas entering into a state of
mutual subordination and preponderance, thereby the world arises,—
for this leads to the horns of a dilemma. Thus, is it admitted by you
that the lapse from the state of equilibrium, at that time, is sponta-
neous; or that it is due to the Omniscient Being? The first alter-
native is not valid because of the impossibility of a spontaneous lapse
without a cause, and also because of the following inference:
Whatever has a cause has lapse,
like seeds and the rest.
Whatever has no cause has no lapse,
like the soul.

336 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 9.
ADH. 1.]
The second alternative, too, is not valid, because that is not
admitted and because that will be falling in with the view of your
opponents
—————
SŪTRA 9
“AND IF THERE BE AN INFERENCE IN ANOTHER WAY, (PRADHĀNA
CANNOT STILL BE THE CAUSE) ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF
THE POWER OF BEING A KNOWER.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
“And if there be an inference” with regard to pradhāna “in
another way”, still then “on account of the absence of the power of
being a knower” on the part of pradhāna, the world is not due to it.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Just as there may be the origin of effects, preceded by (pradhāna’s)
entering into a state of mutual subordination and preponderance
in a way other than the stated, so if an inference be made with regard
to pradhāna, still then “on account of the absence of the power of
being a knower”, i.e on account of pradhāna being devoid of the power
of being a knower, the objections, viz. impossibility of arrangement
and the rest, mentioned above, must remain in force. Hence the
inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna) is not the cause of the world.
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
Interpretation same, but they read sūtras 5–9 in a different order.
Thus:—
Nimbārka, etc. Rāmānuja, etc.
“Anyatra-bhāvāc ca . .” (Sū. 5). “Anyatra-bhāvāc ca . .”
(Sū. 4).
“Abhyupagame . .” (Sū. 6). “Puruṣāśmavat . .” (Sū. 5)
“Puruṣāśmavat . .” (Sū. 7). “Aṅgitva . .” (Sū. 6).
“Aṅgitva . .” (Sū. 8). “Anyathānumitau . .” (Sū. 7)
“Anyathānumitau . .” (Sū. 9). “Abhyupagame . .” (Sū. 8).

[sū. 2. 2. 10.
ADH. 1 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 337
SŪTRA 10
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF CONTRADICTION, (THE SĀṂKHYA DOCTRINE
IS) INCONSISTENT."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The view of Kapila is "inconsistent", because of the opposition
between its prior and subsequent (statements)
Vedānta-kaustubha
The view of Kapila is "inconsistent" in every way. Why?
Because of its opposition to the Vedānta,—that is, the Vedāntas,
independent of all proofs, authoritative by themselves and eternally
established, establish the omniscient and omnipotent Lord of all as
the cause of the origin and the rest of the world, and the admission
of the doctrine of a non-sentient cause is opposed to this,—because
of that;—because of the rejection of a doctrine based on mere reasoning
in the passage: 'This knowledge is not attainable through reasoning'
(Kaṭha 2.9); and because of the opposition between its prior and
subsequent (statements). Thus, they hold that puruṣa (or the soul)
is all-pervading, devoid of attributes, mere consciousness, isolated
(from prakṛti) by nature, non-attached like a lotus leaf ¹ and inactive
Then again, they maintain also that prakṛti is an agent through its
mere proximity to puruṣa; and that through the super-imposition of
nescience that very same (puruṣa) comes to have the attributes of
'being an agent', 'being an enjoyer' and so on, to be afflicted by the
three kinds of miseries,² and to be subject to transmigratory
existence Again, they teach that the salvation of puruṣa proceeds
from the knowledge of prakṛti and puruṣa Thus, a multitude of
inconsistencies between prior and subsequent (statements) may be
found there.
In the case under discussion, on the other hand, since in accordance
with the Smṛti passages: ' "The evil-doers, the deluded, and the vilest
men do not attain me,—they whose wisdom is destroyed by nescience
and who have resorted to demoniacal nature" ' (Gītā 7 15), 'Know-
ledge is enveloped by non-knowledge; thereby beings are deluded'
¹ I e just as a lotus leaf is not wetted by water, so the soul is not attached
to anything.
² Viz. physical, mental and elemental
22

[sū. 2. 2. 11.
338 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 2.]
(Gītā 5.15.), ‘ ‘ ‘At the end of many births, one who is possessed of
knowledge attains me’ ’ ’ (Gītā 7 19), ‘ ‘ ‘Those who attain me cross
over this māyā’ ’ ’ (Gītā 7 14), ‘ ‘ ‘Many, purified by the penance of
knowledge come to attain my nature’ ’ ’ (Gītā 4.10), the causes of
bondage, as well as of salvation,—liberating the bound soul from its
bondage, unprecedented, and characterized by the attainment of
His nature,—is well-established, there is not even a shadow of any
contradiction among prior and subsequent (statements) Hence
it is established that there is no contradiction of the concordance of
the scriptural texts (with regard to Brahman) by the view of Kapila,
which is opposed to the Veda and is set forward by means of fallacious
reasoning
Here ends the section entitled “The impossibility of arrange-
ment ” (1).
COMPARISON
While Nimbārka adduces two reasons as to why the Sāṁkhya
doctrine is ‘inconsistent’, viz. (1) oppositon to the Vedānta, (2)
internal contradictions,—others adduce only one, viz. Śaṁkara,
Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva adduce the second,¹ Bhāskara
adduces the first.² Hence they do not attach any special meaning
to the particle “ca” in the sūtra
Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled “The great
and the long”. (Sūtras 11–17)
SŪTRA 11
“FOR, JUST AS THE (ORIGIN) OF THE GREAT AND THE LONG FROM
THE SHORT AND THE SPHERICAL (IS UNTENABLE) (SO EVERYTHING
IS UNTENABLE IN THE VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY).”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Since if they bo possessed of parts, then there will result an
infinite regress; and if without parts, then it will be impossible for them
¹ Ś.B. 2 2.10, p 513; Śrī. B 2.2 9, pp. 78 ff., Part 2; ŚK B. 2.2 9, p. 61,
Parts 7 and 8; G B. 2 2.10, p. 96, Chap. 2
² Bh. B., 2.2 10, p. 112.

[sū. 2. 2. 11
ADH. 2.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 339
to be the producer of other evolutes ¹,—there is inconsistency in
the origin of the binary compounds from the atoms, and there is all
the more inconsistency in the origin of ternary compounds from these
(binary compounds) Like this, everything admitted by the main-
tainers of the atomic view is inconsistent.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Apprehending the objection, viz . Let pradhāna, not superin-
tended by an intelligent principle, be not the cause of the world;
but let the groups of atoms, under the control of the wish of the
Supreme Lord, be the cause of the world,—the author is now pointing
out the inconsistencies in the atomic doctrine as well
The procedure of the atomists is the following: A substance
produces another substance, a quality another quality; and the pro-
duction of the effect proceeds from three causes, viz. the inherent,
the non-inherent and efficient ²; just as an effect, viz. a piece of cloth, is
produced by the threads which are the inherent cause, by their mutual
conjunction which is the non-inherent cause, and by the shuttle, the
loom, the weaver and the rest, which are the efficient cause. Like-
wise, there are four kinds of atoms, distinguished as earth-atoms,
water-atoms, fire-atoms and air-atoms; and they are eternal, without
parts, possessed of colour and the rest, and spherical in extension,
and remain without producing effects at the time of dissolution.
At the time of creation, the atoms become the inherent cause for the
production of the effect (viz. the world), their conjunction, the non-
inherent cause, and the unseen principle ³ the efficient cause. Thus,
through the wish of the Lord, first motion arises in the air-atoms, then
a conjunction (between them) and thereby an effect, viz. a binary
compound, arises from two atoms; a ternary compound arises from
three binary compounds; a quaternary compound arises from four
ternary compounds, and so on, and through this process, finally, the
great air arises and remains trembling in space. In the very same
manner, fire arises from the fire-atoms and remains shining in the
form of earthly fire and so on. In the very same manner, the great
¹ C.S.S. ed. reads “parimāṇa” instead of “pariṇāma”, p. 31.
² Samavāyin, asamavāyin, nimitta.
³ I.e. the merit or demerit attaching to a man's conduct in one state of
existence and the corresponding reward or punishment with which he is visited
in another.

[SŪ. 2 2 11.
340 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 2 ]
ocean arises from the water-atoms and remains flowing. In the very
same manner, the great earth arises from the earth-atoms and remains
immobile in the form of clay, stones and the rest. Again, the qualities
of the effects arise from the qualities of the cause. Just as the qualities
of a piece of cloth arise from the qualities of the thread,—a red cloth
being found to arise from red threads,—so the qualities of whiteness
and the like, inhering in the binary compounds and the rest, arise
from the qualities of whiteness, etc. inhering in the atoms. But
the combination of two simple atoms, producing a binary compound,
produces different measures, viz. minuteness and shortness, in the
binary compound, but do not produce sphericity, the measure of the
simple atoms themselves,—because, then, there will result an intense
fineness (on the part of the binary compound which it has not).
Similarly, at the time of dissolution, too, through the wish of the
Lord, there is motion in the atoms, thereby the dissolution of their
conjunction, thereby the dissolution of the binary compounds and so
on, and in this manner, finally, there is the dissolution of the earth
and the rest.
This view is being refuted here. The particle "or" in the aphorism
is meant for implying the aggregate (of defects in the atomic doctrine)
left unsaid. The word 'inconsistent' is to be supplied from above.
The phrase: "from the short and the spherical" is to be applied by
dividing it in a compatible manner. This being so, like the doctrine
of the origin of a short binary compound from two simple spherical
atoms, and like the doctrine of the origin of the great and long ternary
compounds from the short (binary compounds), everything else too,
maintained by them (viz. the atomists), is inconsistent—this is the
construction of the words of the aphorism.
The sense is this: The origin of binary compounds from atoms
is impossible. That being impossible, the origin of the ternary com-
pounds from the binary compounds is all the more impossible. In
exactly the same manner, whatever is maintained by the atomists
is simply inconsistent. Thus, it is observed that the parts, viz. the
threads and the rest, produce a whole, viz. a piece of cloth, only by
being conjoined (with one another) by means of their six sides which
are their own parts. An atom, too, is established to have six parts
through its connection with the six quarters. As has been said:
'An atom has six parts because of its simultaneous connection with the
six (quarters)'. Hence, even the atoms must be productive of effects

[SŪ. 2. 2. 12.
ADH. 2 ] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 341
as possessed of parts indeed. If they be so, then they themselves
will become effects like the binary compounds because of possessing
parts. And the parts of the atoms too,—conjoined (with one another)
by means of their six sides which are their own parts, and establishing
that the atoms have parts,—must have parts; that parts, again,
further parts and so on, and thus there must be an infinite regress.
If the atoms be admitted to be without parts, then if there be the
conjunction of even a hundred atoms which fill no space, there will
not be any extension different from that of a single atom, and hence
there will never be (different kinds of extensions like) minuteness,
shortness and the rest. Thus, the origin of the binary compounds
is impossible, in their absence, the origin of the ternary compounds
is impossible; and hence the origin of the world must be impossible.
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and Bhāskara
Interpretation different. They take this sūtra as constituting
an adhikarana by itself, concerned with refuting the Vaiśeṣika objec-
tion, viz. that the qualities of the cause must inhere in the effect.
Hence if the intelligent Brahman be the cause of the world, then
the quality of intelligence must be found in the world. But since this
is not the case, He is not its cause.¹ The answer is: Or just as (there
is the origin of) big and long (ternary compounds) from minute and
short (binary compounds) so there is the origin of the non-intelligent
world from the intelligent Brahman.²
SŪTRA 12
“EVEN IN BOTH WAYS THERE IS NO ACTION (ON THE PART OF THE
ATOMS), HENCE THERE IS THE ABSENCE OF THAT (VIZ. CREATION).”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Because it is impossible for the unseen principle to inhere in the
atoms, as well as because it is impossible for it, connected with the
¹ Note that an exactly similar objection has been put forward and refuted
under Br. Sū. 2.1. 4–11. Hence there is no sense in repeating it here. As such
Nimbārka’s way of interpreting seems preferable.
² Ś. B. 2.2.11, pp. 518-19; Bh. B. 2.2.11, pp. 113-14.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 12.
342 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 2.]
soul, to be the instigator of the motion of the atoms,—thus “even in
both ways” the first motion of the atoms is not possible. “Hence
there is the absence” of the creation of the world through the successive
order of binary compounds and the rest, due to conjunction, which
again is due to the motion of the atoms.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The author is elucidating the statement (made in the last aphorism),
viz. Like the (origin of) the great and the long, everything else, too,
maintained by them, is inconsistent.
“Even in both ways”, no motion is possible in the atoms at the
time of creation. “Hence”, i.e for this reason, viz on account of
the impossibility of motion, “there is the absence of that”, i.e. of the
origin and the rest of the world through the successive order of binary
compounds, ternary compounds and so on, due to the conjunction
of atoms. The phrase: “in both ways” means: Does the first motion
(of the atoms) arise by itself, or through the atoms ? The first alter-
native is not tenable, being impossible. Never does motion, arising
by itself, proceed to bring water in a pitcher. It cannot be said
also that it arises through a cause, because at that time (i.e. at the
time of creation) there exist no human effort, vibration, impact and
the rest (which might have been such a cause). The second alter-
native, too, is not tenable, because then the atoms must become
sentient, it being impossible for non-sentient atoms to be the instigator
of motion. In the building of a palace and the like, the stones and the
rest do not themselves act in conjunction with other works (connected
with the building).
Or ¹, (if it be said that) the motion which arises in the atoms at
that time is caused by the unseen principle, (we reply): There is
negation of motion “in either way”. Thus, does the unseen principle
which causes the motion of the atoms inhere in the atoms, or in the
individual soul? The first alternative is not tenable, because the
unseen principle, being originated by the good and evil deeds of the
individual souls, cannot reside in something non-sentient; because
being non-sentient, it is not possible for the unforeseen principle to
be the cause of motion; because the performance of good and evil
¹ An alternative explanation of the word “Ubhayathā”

[SŪ 2. 2. 13
ADH 2.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 343
deeds being impossible on the part of atoms, the unseen principle
must be necessarily admitted to be natural (to them), and in that case
there will result the origin of motion at all times The second alter-
native, too, is not tenable, because it is all the more impossible for
the unseen principle, inhering in the individual soul, to urge the
motion of the non-sentient (atoms) Thus, there is no motion "even
in both ways".
"Or ¹ else no motion is possible, whether it be due to the individual
soul, or due to the Lord. Thus, does the individual soul give rise to
the first motion through its own destiny (adṛṣṭa), or through its proxi-
mity, or through its attribute of consciousness ? Not the first, because
of the above-mentioned fault Not through its proximity also,
because the proximity of the individual soul to the atoms being eternal,
the consequence will be that it will ever give rise to the world. Nor
even through consciousness, because of the absence of consciousness
then And motion does not proceed from the Lord as well Is the
Lord, according to your view, designated in the Veda or established
by inference and the rest? If it be said: Designated in the Veda,
then have faith in the procedure mentioned by Scripture thus. 'Every-
thing has that for its soul' (Chānd 6.8 7, etc.), 'He became existence
and that' (Tait. 2 6), and being overwhelmed with the sentiment
of love for Him, be free from affliction,—what is the use of your
doctrine of atoms ? If it be said: Established through inference and
the rest,—(we reply :) that it (viz inference) is not even established
has been proved above.²
SŪTRA 13
"(THE VAIŚEṢIKA DOCTRINE IS UNTENABLE) ALSO ON ACCOUNT
OF THE ADMISSION OF THE RELATION OF INHERENCE, ON ACCOUNT
OF AN INFINITE REGRESS (ARISING THEREFROM) BECAUSE OF
SAMENESS."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"On account also of the admission of the relation of inherence,"
the doctrine of atoms is not possible, since just as a binary compound
is connected with its own cause by the relation of inherence, being
¹ A third alternative explanation of the word "Ubhayathā".
² Vide V.K 1.1.3.

344 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2 2. 13
ADH. 2 ]
absolutely different therefrom, so the relation of inherence itself, too,
is to be connected with the two related objects by another relation
of inherence, its absolute difference (from the two related objects)
being the same, that, too, by another relation, and so on—thus there
will be an infinite regress
Vedānta-kaustubha
The phrase: 'on account of the absence of that' is to be supplied
For this reason also, the origin and the rest of the world in the
successive order of the creation of binary compounds and the rest,
due to the conjunction of the atoms is not possible Why? "On
account of the admission of the relation of inherence." Among
separable objects, there is a relation of conjunction,¹ as between a
rope and a pot. Among inseparable objects, on the other hand,
there is a relation of inherence,² just as a piece of cloth exists in
the threads by the relation of inherence, a pot in the two pot-sherds,
cowness in a cow and whiteness and the rest in a piece of cloth. The
relation between objects which are causes and effects is just this
relation of inherence, and this relation is proclaimed to be one, eternal,
and all-pervading like the ether,—on account of the admission of such
a relation of inherence—this is the sense
If it be asked. What objection is there if such a relation of in-
herence be admitted?—(the author) replies: "On account of an
infinite regress because of sameness". That is, just as a binary
compound, absolutely different from its inherent cause (viz. the
two simple atoms), necessarily awaits a relation of inherence (for
being connected with them), so the relation of inherence itself, being
absolutely different from the two related objects, is to be connected
with them by meaus of another relation of inherence,—"because of
the sameness" of absolute difference (i.e because there is absolute
difference equally in both the cases, also because what is itself unrelated
is never observed to be a relation)—that, too, by another relation of
inherence, and that, too, and so on; thus "on account of infinite
regress", the atomic theory defeats itself
¹ Saṁyoga.
² Samavāya.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 14-15.
ADH. 2.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 345
SŪTRA 14
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE EXISTENCE (OF) ETERNAL (ACTIVITY
AND INACTIVITY) ALONE."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If the atoms be active by nature, there being the existence of
(eternal) activity, there will result eternal creation; otherwise there
will result eternal dissolution, and hence there is the absence of that
(viz. creation).
Vedānta-kaustubha
For this, too, the atomic theory is untenable. Why? If the
atoms be admitted to be active by nature, then there being eternal
activity alone, there cannot be dissolution. If, they be admitted
to be inactive by nature, there being eternal inactivity alone, the
absence of creation will necessarily result—this is the sense.
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva
This is sūtra 13 in the commentaries of the first two Interpre-
tation different, viz. "(If the samavāya be admitted to be eternal,
the terms related by it, viz ternary compounds, etc , i.e. the world
too must be) eternal indeed, on account of the existence (i.e. eternity
of the samavāya)".¹
SŪTRA 15
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF (THE ATOMS) HAVING COLOUR AND SO ON,
THE REVERSE (VIEW WOULD FOLLOW), BECAUSE OF OBSERVA-
TION."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
And on account of the atoms having colour and the rest in accord-
ance with the respective effects, there must be non-eternity, which is
the "reverse" of eternity, (on their part), since pots and the rest,
possessed of colour and so on, are observed to be non-eternal. Other-
wise, the effects must be devoid of colour, etc.
¹ Śrī. B. 2.2.13, p. 86, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.2 13, p 75, Parts 7 and 8; G.B.
2.2.14, p. 107, Chap 2

[SŪ. 2. 2. 16.
346 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 2 ]
Vedānta-kaustubha
Since the effects are possessed of colour, etc., the atoms, too, are
admitted to be possessed of colour and so on ¹ Thus, since the four
kinds of atoms are possessed of colour and so on, i e possessed of
colour, taste, smell and touch,—non-eternity, the “reverse” of eternity,
results, as pots and the rest, possessed of colour and so on, are found
to be non-eternal. If they be not admitted to be possessed of colour
and the like, then the fact that the effects are possessed of colour and
so on will come to be contradicted, and the initial proposition ‘Pos-
sessed of parts and eternal’ too will come to be contradicted. For
this reason too, there is the absence of that (viz. creation),—this is
the meaning of the particle “and”. The sense is that an unseen
object cannot be determined in accordance with what is seen Hence
the cause of the world is to be understood in accordance with Scrip-
ture.
SŪTRA 16
“AND ON ACCOUNT OF FAULT IN BOTH WAYS ”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If the atoms be possessed of more numerous qualities,² then the
earth, water, fire and air will become similar. If they be possessed
of less numerous qualities,³ then, too, all the different kinds of atoms
being connected with one quality each, the earth and the rest too,
having qualities corresponding to their causes, must be connected
with one quality each,—this “on account of fault in both ways”,
there is indeed the absence of that (viz. creation).
Vedānta-kaustubha
For this reason also, the procedure admitted by the atomists
is not possible. Why? Because whether the atoms be admitted to
be possessed of more numerous qualities, or to be possessed of less
numerous qualities, “in both ways”, too, there is fault. Since the
1 An effect can have no qualities which the cause has not.
2 I.e. every kind of atoms are possessed of the five qualities of colour and
the rest.
3 I.e. each be possessed of its peculiar qualities

[sū. 2. 2. 16.
ADH. 2 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 347
qualities of the effect are due to the qualities of the cause, all the
qualities of the cause, such as colour, taste and the rest, must attach
to all the effects As a result, there must be smell and taste in fire;
colour, taste and smell in air; and the grossness on the part of the atoms,
since the earth, which has the most numerous qualities, is observed
to be gross. If they be possessed of less numerous qualities, then
all must have one quality each. If this be so, then there must be
touch in fire, colour and touch in water; colour, touch and taste in
earth, because, those particular qualities are absent from those
particular atoms. Otherwise, there will result everything every-
where.
If it be argued : that the earth is observed to be possessed of
colour, taste, smell and touch; water to be endowed with the attributes
of colour, taste and touch; the fire to be possessed of colour and touch;
and the air is to be possessed of touch. Corresponding to these qua-
lities, some atoms are supposed to be possessed of more numerous
qualities, others less numerous Hence the above objection cannot
be raised,—
(We reply :) No; for in that case, too, those that have more
numerous qualities will be deprived of their atomicity.¹ In the case
in hand, on the other hand, there is no fault whatsoever, since the
world has the omniscient and omnipotent Lord of all as its material
cause.
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva
This is sūtra 15 in the commentaries of the first two.
Interpretation different—viz. an elucidation of the previous
sūtra, viz. “Because there is fault in both ways”, i.e. either if the
atoms be possessed of colour, etc , or if they be not. On the first,
they cannot be eternal; on the second, their effects cannot be pos-
sessed of colour and the rest.²
¹ Since increase in qualities cannot take place unless there is a simultaneous
increase in size.
² Śrī. B. 2 2.15, pp. 86-87, Part 2, ŚK. B. 2 2.15, p. 77, Parts 7 and 8;
G.B. 2.2.16, p. 107, Chap. 2

[sū. 2. 2. 17-18.
348 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 3.]
SŪTRA 17
"AND BECAUSE OF NON-ACCEPTANCE, (THERE MUST BE AN)
ABSOLUTE DISREGARD (FOR THE ATOMIC THEORY)."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Because of the rejection of atomism by the wise, "an absolute
disregard" for it is to be shown by those who are desirous of salvation.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Certain portions,—such as the doctrine of a pre-existent cause and
the rest,—of the doctrine of the causality of pradhāna, though rejected
on the ground of its opposition to Scripture and reasoning, has been
accepted by those who are versed in the Veda. But "because of the
non-acceptance", i.e. rejection, by the wise, in toto, of the doctrine
of the causality of the atoms, imagined by the Vaiśeṣikas; because of
its opposition to reasoning; and because of its opposition to the Veda,
"there is an absolute disregard",—i.e. the doctrine of the causality
of atoms is to be disregarded by those who wish for the highest.
Hence it is established that there is no contradiction of the
doctrine of the causality of Brahman by the doctrine of the causality
of atoms which is to be rejected from a distance
Here ends the section entitled "The great and the long" (2).
Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled "The
aggregate". (Sūtras 18-27)
SŪTRA 18
"EVEN IF THE AGGREGATE HAVING TWO CAUSES (BE ADMITTED),
(THERE IS) THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF THAT (VIZ. OF THE
AGGREGATES)."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The author is refuting the view of Sugata.¹
Even if the aggregates of the element and the elemental, the
mind and the mental be admitted, still then, on account of the non-
¹ I.e. of the Buddhists.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 18.
ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 349
sentience of the objects aggregated, as well as on account of non-
admission of another cause of the aggregation, the aggregates are not
possible
Vedānta-kaustubha
Kapila, the maintainer of the doctrine of pre-existing effects,
holds that pradhāna, not having Brahman for its soul, is the cause
of the world He has been refuted by reason of maintaining what is
opposed to the doctrine of the causality of Brahman and the Vedic
doctrine Kaṇāda, inferior even to him in intelligence and the
maintainer of the doctrine of non-existing effects, holds the cause of
the world to be of various kinds ¹, and hence he has been refuted by
reason of maintaining what is opposed to the ‘great’.² Now, the
doctrine of the Buddhists, inferior to that even, is being refuted, on
account of its similarity to that.³
The doctrine taught by the Buddha being interpreted differently,
four views were propounded by his four classes of disciples. These
followers are called, (1) Vaibhāṣika, (2) Sautrāntika, (3) Yogācāra,
and (4) Mādhyamika. Among these, the first two maintain the
reality of external objects Among them, again, the first maintains
that external objects are directly perceivable. According to him,
external objects, like pots and the rest, are knowable by the evidence
of direct perception. The other maintains that external objects are
inferrible through cognitions. According to him, external objects like
pots and rest, which are not directly perceived, are inferred through
cognitions, produced in the forms of pots and so on and directly
perceived. The third maintains the reality of cognitions alone without
any substratum. He holds that external objects are like dreams.
All of them maintain that the objects admitted by them are momen-
tary. The view of the fourth is that everything is void. He holds
that the continuous stream of cognitions, freed from object and
subject-forms, persists from moment to moment of the basis of past
impressions, like a lamp in a place sheltered from wind. But when
past impressions are destroyed, it attains a complete extinction like
the lamp itself, this attainment of non-existence is salvation. The
others, on the other hand, hold that there is no interruption in the
¹ Viz. the four kinds of atoms. ² Vide Br Sū 2.2 17.
³ The Buddhists too admit the aggregation of atoms like the Vaiśeṣikas.

[sū. 2. 2. 18.
350 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 3.]
continuous stream of cognitions Among them, the views of the
Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika will be refuted later But in this
section, the views of the realists, viz the Vaibhāṣikas and the
Sautrāntikas, are being refuted together
Thus, they speak of five groups,¹ viz colour, cognition, feeling,
name and impression.² Among these, the colour-group consists in the
four elements, like the earth and the rest, and the elemental in the
form of the body, sense-organs, and sense-objects. Among these, the
earth-atoms, possessed of colour, taste, smell and touch, and hard by
nature, are aggregated into the form of the earth, the water-atoms,
possessed of colour, taste and smell, and viscid by nature, are
aggregated into the form of water; the fire-atoms, possessed of colour
and touch, and hot by nature, are aggregated into the form of fire,
likewise the air-atoms, possessed of touch and mobile by nature, are
aggregated into the form of air; and the four elements, like the earth
and the rest, are aggregated into the form of body, sense-organs and
sense-objects In this way, these four kinds of momentary atoms are
held to be the cause of the aggregation of the elements and the
elemental The colour-group, consisting of the elements and the
elemental and due to the atoms, is the external aggregate. The
cognition-group consists in a stream of cognitions like the cognition
of a pot, cognition of a piece of cloth, and so on, based on the internal
cognition of the 'I', and subsisting uninterruptedly. This alone is
the agent, the enjoyer and the soul, and from it alone all ordinary
practical transactions proceed The feeling-group consists in pleasur-
able or painful experiences. The name-group consists in the cognition
of secondary marks, e.g. (in the cognition.) 'a cow possessed of
auspiciousness', the cow is distinguished by the secondary mark of
auspiciousness. The impression-group consists in the mental qualities
of attachment, aversion, delusion, pride, malice, fear, grief, depression
and so on. These last four kinds of groups are said to be the mind
and the mental. Among these, the cognition-group is said to be the
mind or the soul, others mental; and thus they are internally aggregated
in such a way as to be the substratum of ordinary practical transactions
This is the internal aggregate, due to the four groups, beginning
with the cognition-group. The soul and the ether, other than the
1 Skandha.
2 Rūpa, vyñāna, vedanā, samjñā and samskāra.

[SŪ. 2. 2 19
ADH 3.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 351
two aggregates, are non-existent by nature. These two aggregates
make the course of mundane existence possible, and practical life
being thus made possible, there is no need, it is thought, of an eternal
soul
(Correct conclusion.) With regard to it we reply: Even if there be
the admission, in the above way, of aggregates, i.e. of groups having
two causes, still then "there is the non-establishment of that",—i e
establishment "of that", viz. of that which has two causes, too, is
indeed impossible. The sense is : because the spontaneous aggregation
of non-sentient objects, mutually independent, is not possible, and
also because of their momentariness, the aggregate of the elements
and the elemental, as well as the aggregate of the mind and the mental,
are not possible. Further, because of the non-admission of a
permanent enjoyer, of a sentient controller—one who brings about the
aggregation, of an omniscient and universal Lord, as well as because
of the consequence of the world becoming super-sensible by reason of
the super-sensibleness of the atoms themselves, the course of mundane
existence must disappear The sense is that this view is faulty,
since it rejects Brahman, taught by the beginningless Veda; since it
admits the aggregates of atoms, unseen and unheard, and since a
cause for the aggregation is impossible
SŪTRA 19
"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (ON ACCOUNT OF THE MUTUAL CAUSALITY
(OF NESCIENCE AND THE REST), (THE AGGREGATION) IS POSSIBLE,
(WE REPLY:) NO, BECAUSE OF (THEIR) NOT BEING THE CAUSE OF
AGGREGATION."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
It cannot also be that no account of the mutual causality of
nescience, past impressions, cognition, name and form, six supports ¹
and the rest, the aggregation and the rest, are possible,—for they, too,
are not the causes of aggregation.
¹ Avidyā, saṃskāra, vijñāna, nāma-rūpa, ṣaḍāyatana, etc. For explanation,
see below V.K.

352 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū 2. 2 19
ADH. 3.]
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be objected In spite of the non-admission of a sentient and
omniscient being as bringing about the aggregation, no harm is done,
since our view admits the mutual causality of nescience and the rest
That which goes towards the effect as its cause is 'pratyaya', i e the
cause; the state of that, no account of that,¹ all aggregation and the
rest become possible. Thus, nescience and the rest, functioning
from all eternity, are admitted to be the causes of the continuous
stream of cognitions. Among these, the word 'nescience' is denotative
of error, such as, taking the non-permanent as permanent, taking
what is not the way (to salvation) as the way and so on Through it
past impressions, consisting in attachment and so on to sense-objects
like colour and the like, arises. It is through this that activity springs
forth when occasion arises. Activity consists in good and bad deeds,
in accordance with the declaration by the Buddha 'There is action,
there is result'. Through this alone cognition arises. Thence the
four (elements like) the earth and the rest, the cause of the aggregate,
viz the body, arise, and that very thing is said to be name because
of being the substratum of name From them arises the body, from
it the six supports, viz. the five organs of knowledge and the mind,
from them touch; from it feeling, viz pleasure, pain and the rest;
from it nescience and the rest once more. Thus, the objects revolving
unceasingly like water-wheels, aggregation is possible therefrom.
Hence, everything in our doctrine is indeed consistent,—
(We reply.) "no". Why? "Because of (their) not being the
cause of aggregation," i e. because nescience and the rest are not the
causes of aggregation; for it can by no means be said that nescience,
consisting in the error of taking a person at a distance to be a post, is
the cause of the aggregation of the already existing person. Likewise,
attachment and the rest too, caused by it (viz. nescience), are not the
cause of aggregation.
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and Baladeva
Reading different, viz. "Itaretara-pratyayatvād iti cen notpatti
mātra-nimittatvāt". Interpretation different accordingly: viz. "If
it be said that because of the mutual causality (of nescience and the
1 This explains the compound "pratyayatvāt".

[sū. 2. 2. 20.
ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 353
rest), (aggregation is possible), (we reply:) no, because of (their) being
the causes of the origin only (of the immediately subsequent effects,
and not of aggregation)”.¹
Bhāskara
Reading slightly different, viz.: “Itaretara-pratyaya-manyat-
vāt . . . .” ²
—————
SŪTRA 20
“AND BECAUSE OF THE CESSATION OF THE PRIOR ON THE
PRODUCTION OF THE SUBSEQUENT.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
For this reason, too, this doctrine is not reasonable,—since “on
the production of the subsequent”, there results the destruction of the
prior, it being momentary.
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be argued that as the prior is the cause of the production of
the later, so our doctrine is consistent,—(we reply:) no “Because
of the cessation of the prior on the production of the subsequent.”
In ordinary life, causality is observed to belong only to an existent
lump of clay, the prior, at the time of the production of a pot, the
subsequent. But on your view, on account of the momentariness of
all existing objects, the prior moment is destroyed and cannot, there-
fore, be the cause of the subsequent moment. Here a momentary
existence is said to be ‘moment’. Now, to begin with, does the prior
moment of the pot ³ give rise to the subsequent effect which exists
at the same time, or as itself unoriginated, or as itself destroyed ?
The first alternative is not tenable, because that (viz the effect) also
(will give rise to) another effect existing at the same time, that,
too, to another and so on, and thus everything will last only for a
moment simultaneously; and because the conventional distinction
between the prior and the subsequent will come to an end. The

¹ S.B. 2.2.19, p. 537; G.B. 2.2.19, pp. 113-114, Chap. 2
² Bh. B. 2.2.19, p. 117.
³ I.e. the prior momentary existence pot.
23

[SŪ 2. 2. 21.
354 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 3.]
second alternative, too, is not tenable, that being impossible More-
over, to say that (the cause) is unoriginated is to imply nothing but
its non-existence, and if it (viz non-existence) be a cause, then by
reason of the absence of obstructions, there may be the origin of
everything everywhere. The third alternative, too, is not tenable
because the prior being destroyed, there will be again the origin of
everything everywhere. It cannot be said that the prior momentary
existence persists up to the origin of the subsequent momentary
existence, for then, its momentariness will come to be abandoned.
SŪTRA 21
"(IF IT BE ADMITTED THAT THE EFFECT ORIGINATES) WHEN (THE
CAUSE IS) NOT EXISTENT, (THEN THERE IS) THE CONTRADICTION OF
THE INITIAL PROPOSITION, OTHERWISE THERE IS SIMULTANEOUS-
NESS."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
On the admission of the origin of the effect when the cause is non-
existent, there must result the "contradiction of the initial proposi-
tion", viz. that there is the origin of cognitions from four causes, viz.
sense-organs, light, direction of the mind and sense-objects. On the
admission of the origin of the effect when the cause is existent, there
must be the origin of another momentary existence when the prior
momentary existence is still present, and thus there must be
"simultaneousness" according to your view, the maintainers of the
doctrine of momentariness!
Vedānta-kaustubha
The author condemns the causeless origin of effects.
If it be argued that let there be the production of the subsequent
(effect) without a cause, and this being so, the above objection cannot
be raised—then we reply: If it be admitted that there is the origin of
the effect even when the cause is non-existent, then there must be the
"contradiction of the initial proposition". Thus, there must be the
"contradiction", i.e abandonment, of your initial proposition that
in the production of cognitions, there are four causes, the main
cause, viz. the sense-organs like the eyes and the rest, the auxiliary
cause, viz. light; the immediate cause, viz. the direction of the mind;