वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

310 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 1. 27.
ADH 9.]
Rāmānuja
Interpretation of the word "śabda-mūlatvāt" different,—viz.
(The fact that Brahman is possessed of various powers) is based on
Scripture 1 According to Nimbārka, it means, as we have seen,
"(The fact that Brahman creates the world, yet remains untransformed)
is based on Scripture" 2, while according to Śrīnivāsa '(The fact
that transformation means nothing but projection of powers) is based
on Scripture.
Baladeva
This is sūtra 27 in his commentary, viz. "(But the above objection
does not apply to the case of the Lord, the real creator) on account
of Scripture, because (the knowledge of Brahman) is based on Scrip-
ture".3
—————
CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)
SŪTRA 27
“AND SINCE THESE VARIOUS (MODIFICATIONS) (ARE SEEN) IN THE
SOUL ALSO.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
When various modifications are appropriate on the part of indivi-
dual souls, like gods and the rest, how can they possibly be inappro-
priate on the part of the omnipotent Lord of all, the cause of the
universe?
Vedānta-kaustubha
The author is confirming the stated view on the rule of 'how much
more'!
No wonder that if the creation of the world be due to one who is
possessed of true resolves, of inconceivable and infinite powers, and
is unchangeable by nature, then faults like entire creator being trans-
formed and so on never result,—"since", i e. because "in the soul
too", i.e. in the individual soul which has come to attain lordship,
"this", i.e. without there resulting any faults like entire transforma-
tion, "various" creations are seen in accordance with its own power.
—————
1 Śrī. B. 2.1 29, p. 60, Part 2.
2 This is the interpretation of Saṁkara as well.
3 G.B. 2.1.27, p. 60, Chap. 2.

[sū. 2. 1. 27.
ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 311
The second "and" ("ca") is indicative of 'how much more'? (i e.
obviousness).¹
To begin with, the forms of swans and the rest, assumed by indivi-
dual souls, are well-known in Scripture.²
The following Smṛti passages are indicative of the power of the
king of gods: 'Now he changes into those particular forms repeatedly.
He becomes a bearer of the crest and the thunder-bolt, armed with a
bow, and wearing the ear-rings, then in an instant, he comes to look
like a Caṇḍāla ³ Then, again, my son, he comes to be clad in bark,
with a tuft of hair on the top of his head and matted hair Then he
comes to have a large body, becomes fine, likewise stout or thin.
Again he changes himself as fair, dark, likewise black, ugly or hand-
some, likewise young or old; learned, dull or ignorant, likewise short
or long. Then the performer of a hundred sacrifices becomes a high
caste or a low caste. He assumes the forms of a parrot or a crow,
man or cuckoo, and again assumes the forms of a lion, a tiger or an
elephant', and so on
The Smṛti passages concerned with power of the sun are as
follows: 'The abode of many wonders is the revered Sun, from whom
arise all beings, honoured in the three worlds', and so on. Similarly,
the creative power of other gods may be known from Scripture itself.
The following Smṛti passage is indicative of the power of gods:
'They may make a non-god god, and a god non-god When incensed,
they may create rulers of worlds and other worlds'.
The following Smṛti passage designates the power Cyavana:
'O, the power of the Brahma-sage Cyavana, the great-soul! The
ascetic can create other worlds, simply by wishing, through the power
of austerities'.
The following Smṛti texts refer to the power of Vasiṣṭha's cow,
viz. 'The cow, with her head and neck raised, look terrific, her
eyes reddened with anger, and lowing repeatedly. Her body, blazing
with anger, shone like mid-day sun. The cow created the Palhavas
from her tail in great frequency in the form of the piling up of the
¹ I.e if individual souls are capable of assuming various forms without
themselves undergoing modifications, how much more so this must be the case
with the Lord, the omnipotent Being. Kaimutyaka-nyāya.
² Vide, e.g. Chānd. 4 1.2, where certain divine sages are said to have
assumed the form of swans. For fuller account of this story see V.K. 1.3.34.
³ An outcaste, born from a Śūdra father and a Brāhmaṇa mother.

[sū. 2. 1. 27.
312 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 9.]
charcoal, as it were ¹; the Drāviḍas from her tail; the Śakas from her
urine; the Yavanas from her womb, numerous Śabaras from her
dung; the Cicukas, the Pulindas, the Cīnas, the Hūṇas, the Sakelaras
from her foam as well as the Mlecchas of various kinds' (Mahā. 1.6679b–
6680a, 6682-6683, 6685) and so on.
Similarly, other individual souls, too, possess the power of various
kinds of creations, which are not quoted here for avoiding prolixity,
and also because they are not suitable here. Even in eminent indivi-
dual souls, the power of creating object is insignificant, befitting
their own powers and only given by the Lord. It is not possible
for even the freed soul to be the creator of the entire universe. This
will be made clear in the aphorism. "Devoid of the activity regarding
the universe' (Br Sū. 4.4.17)
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
This is sūtra 28 in their commentaries. Interpretation different:
viz. And thus in the soul (the attributes of the non-sentient are not
found), for there are manifold (powers) (in different objects) That
is, we find that the sentient individual soul, which is different from
non-sentient objects, does not possess their attributes. Similarly,
these non-sentient objects themselves, fire, water and the rest, which
are different from one another, do not share one another's attributes,
but have manifold attributes. In the very same manner Brahman
who is different from both the sentient and the non-sentient does not
possess their attributes, but numerous others not found in them.²
Baladeva
This is sūtra 28 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz.
And thus (there are mysterious powers) in the soul (viz. Brahman),
because various (powers) (belong to the tree of all desires, or to the
philosopher's stone). That is, we believe, on the ground of Scrip-
ture alone, that the tree of all desires and the philosopher's stone
possess mysterious powers, capable of giving rise to elephants, horses
¹ Aṅgār-iva+ṇamul. Here the suffix 'ṇamul' implies comparison in accord-
ance with the rule Pāṇ. 3.4.45. S. K. 3366, p. 714, vol. 2.
² Śrī. B. 2.1.28, pp. 60-61, Part 2, ŚK. B. 2.1.28, p 39, Parts 7 and 8.

[sū. 2. 1. 28.
ADH. 9] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 313
and the rest. So why should we not believe, on the very same ground.
that the Lord is possessed of mysterious powers ? 1
CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)
SŪTRA 28
“ AND BECAUSE THERE IS FAULT IN HIS OWN VIEW.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Let our view stand Since the faults mentioned by you rebound
to your own view, it is proper for you to keep silent.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The particle “and” (“ca”) is meant for disposing of the doctrines
which are opposed to the Vedānta. The Sāṁkhyas and the rest, who
maintain doctrines opposed to the Vedānta, cannot find fault with
our determination of the cause of the world. Why? “Because
there is fault in their own views.” Thus, the Sāṁkhyas admit that
pradhāna, consisting of the three guṇas, and without parts, is trans-
formed into mahat and the rest This being so, the consequence is
that faults like entire pradhāna being transformed and so on must
pertain to their view as well. Since what is without parts cannot be
transformed, pradhāna cannot also be the cause, otherwise there will
result transformation on the part of puruṣa as well.
If it be argued There are parts of pradhāna, viz. sattva, rajas
and tamas, and hence the above fault does not result,—(we reply )
In that case, according to your view, pradhāna must be an effect,
like a piece of cloth, and sattva and the rest, which are its parts, must
be its cause, like threads
If it be argued again: We do not admit that pradhāna has no
form before, but is brought into existence by its parts, sattva and the
rest, as a piece of cloth by the threads. What we hold is that pradhāna,
already existent in its peculiar form, is the aggregate of sattva and the
rest in a state of equilibrium,—(we reply:) This does not stand to
reason. If this be so, then too, it must be admitted, according to
7 G.B 2.1.28, pp. 63-64, Chap. 2.

314 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [sū. 2. 1. 29.
ADH 9.]
your view, that when in a state of equilibrium, sattva and the rest
are pradhāna, and when in a state of non-equilibrium, they give rise
to the world
Moreover, if each of these be possessed of parts, there must
follow infinite regress; but if they be without parts, there must result
the violation of the respective difference between the cause and the
effect, since there will be no distinction between the causal and the
effected states of the aggregate of the sattva and the rest, which are
devoid of parts.
Hereby, the doctrine of Atomism too should be known to be
refuted.
COMPARISON
All others, except Baladeva, read "Sapakṣa-doṣāc ca" 1 Inter-
pretation same
Baladeva
This is sūtra 29 in his commentary. Interpretation different,
viz.: he does not take this sūtra to be referring to the Sāṁkhya view,
but to the view that the individual soul, and not the Lord, is the
creator of the world. Hence the sūtra means, according to him,
"And because there is fault in his own view". That is, the objection
raised by the opponent to our view, viz. if Brahman be the creator,
the question arises whether He creates with His entire energy or a
portion of it only, applies equally to the view that the individual soul
is the creator; and while we can answer this objection, the opponent
cannot. 2
――――――
CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)
SŪTRA 29
"AND THAT (DIVINITY) IS ENDOWED WITH ALL (POWERS), BECAUSE
IT IS SEEN." 3
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
In accordance with the scriptural text: 'Supreme is His power,
declared to be manifold; natural is the operation of His knowledge
1 G.B. 2.1.29. 2 G.B 2 1.28.
3 C.S S. ed. leaves out the "ca", p 29.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 29.
ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 315
and power' (Śvet 6.8 ¹), "that" divinity is "endowed with all
powers", i. e. is able to do everything.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The author is demonstrating the omnipotence of the Highest
Person.
The cause of the world, as admitted by the Sāṁkhyas and others,
viz . pradhāna and the rest, devoid of a multitude of powers, suitable
for the production of the diverse and multiform world, does not stand
to reason But in the case in hand, the Divinity, worshipped by His
own devotees who resort to none else, is "endowed with all", i.e.
endowed with all powers, "and", i e. hence, He alone is capable of
being the cause, and not pradhāna and the rest Why ? "Because
it is seen,—", i.e (because) Scripture ("darśana") demonstrates it
("tad"),² viz. the divinity who is endowed with all powers;—i e.
because of the scriptural texts like 'The own power of the divinity,
hidden by his own qualities' (Śvet 1.3), 'Supreme is His power,
declared to be manifold; natural is the operation of His knowledge
and action' (Śvet 6 8), 'Possessed of true desires, possessed of true
resolves' (Chānd 8.1.5, 8.7 1, 3) and so on; and because of the
Smṛti passage: 'Hundreds of positive powers like creation and the
rest, which are inconceivable to the comprehension of all beings, may
belong to Brahman, O best among the ascetics, as heat to fire'
(V.P. 1.3 2 ³)
COMPARISON
All others read: "Sarvopetā ca tad-darśanāt", omitting "sā".
Śaṁkara and Bhāskara begin a new adhikaraṇa here, (ending with the
next sūtra).
¹ R, Śk, B.
² This explains the compound "tad-darśanāt".
³ P 22.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 30.
316 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 9 ]
CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)
SŪTRA 30
"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (BRAHMAN IS NOT THE CAUSE OF THE
WORLD) BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF SENSE-ORGANS, (WE REPLY,)
THAT HAS BEEN SAID"
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be objected that on account of the denial of His sense-organs
in the text. 'No action or sense-organ of Him exists' (Śvet. 6 8¹),
it is not possible for one who is endowed with all powers to be the
creator of the world—(we reply:) the answer to this has already
been given.²
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be objected: Let Brahman be endowed with all powers;
still, like milk, without implements such as basin, pot and the rest;
like the seed, without implements, such as earth, water, and so on,
and like gods and others without implements befitting particular
places and times, He cannot consistently be the creator of effects,
though possessed of powers, "because of the absence of sense-organs'
on His part, i.e. because He is known to be devoid of sense-organs
from the text. 'No action or sense-organ of Him exists' (Śvet. 6.8)—
(We reply:) The reply to this has been given in the aphorism:
"Because of being based on Scripture" (Br. Sū. 2.1.26). The
meaning of the above scriptural text is as follows: There exist 'no
action',—i.e. that which is to be done for the purpose of obtaining
bliss,—and 'sense-organ' for the production of desired for action,
'of him', i.e. of the Supreme Lord who is one mass of ever-present
bliss, the Lord of all and the Creator of the world.³ There are scrip-
tural texts to this effect, viz: 'The soul, which consists of bliss'
(Tait. 2.5), 'Filled with His own self alone', 'A flavour, verily, is
He' (Tait. 2 7), 'Having all desires, having all odours, having all
tasks' (Chānd 3 14.2, 4), 'Without hands and feet, he is swift and
a seizer; without eyes, he sees; without ears he hears' (Śvet. 3 19)
and so on. The declaration by the Lord Himself, too, is as follows:
¹ R, ŚK, B. ² Vide Br. Sū. 2.1.26.
³ I.e. the Lord, who is ever blissful does not need to act for attaining any
further bliss; and He has not to depend on the sense-organs for His action.

[sū. 2. 1. 31.
ADH. 10] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 317
‘“I have no duties, whatsoever, O Pārtha, in the three world, nor
anything unattained to be attained; yet I abide in action”’ (Gītā
3 22). Hence it is established that the above-mentioned faults
pertain to the opponent's view alone, but not to the conclusion estab-
lished by the Vedānta.
Here ends the section entitled “The consequence of the
entire” (9).
COMPARISON
Baladeva
This is sūtra 31 in his commentary. The interpretation of the
phrase “tad uktam” different, viz.· “that has been answered (by
Scripture itself)”. That is the very same Upanisad (viz. Śvetāśva-
tara) which has been quoted by the opponent in support of his
allegation that the Lord, devoid of sense-organs (viz. Śvet. 6 8),
cannot act, answers to the objection by pointing out that though
devoid of sense-organs, He can yet act (viz. Śvet. 3.19 ¹)
Adhikarana 10: The section entitled “Having
a need”. (Sūtras 31–35)
PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 31)
SŪTRA 31
“(BRAHMAN IS) NOT (THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT
OF (THE ACTIVITY OF AN AGENT) HAVING A NEED.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
It may be objected: The Supreme Being who has all His desires
eternally fulfilled, is not an agent. Why? “On account of the
activity of an agent having a need.”
¹ G B 2.1.31, p. 67, Chap. 2.

318 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 2. 1. 32.
ADH. 10.]
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now, a doubt is raised. Let this be so, yet there being no need
on the part of Brahman,—who has His desires eternally fulfilled by
themselves,—for creating the world, it is not created by Him.
The prima facie view is as follows: Creatorship of the world does
not fit in on the part of Brahman. Why? "On account of the
activity of the agent having a need", and on account of there being
no need on His part for creating the world, as He has His desires
eternally fulfilled.
CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 32–35)
SŪTRA 32
"BUT, AS IN ORDINARY LIFE, (CREATION IS) A MERE SPORT (TO
BRAHMAN)."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
With regard to it, we reply. Such creation and the rest of the
Supreme Being are like the mere sport of kings and so on, well-known
in ordinary life.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The author is stating the correct conclusion.
The particle "but" is for disposing of the prima facie view.
Just as, in ordinary life, the play of a universal monarch, who has
attained lordship, with various kinds of dice, wooden balls and the
rest, is a mere sport, without any desire indeed for fruit,—so this is
a mere sport on the part of Brahman as well, i e. a mere play with
the creation of the universe and so on.
COMPARISON
Baladeva
This is sūtra 33 in his commentary. Interpretation same, but
the phrase: "lokavat" explained a little differently, thus: As in
ordinary life a man, full of cheerfulness or on awakening from a sound
sleep, dances about without any motive or need, but simply from the
fulness of spirit, so is the case here.¹ Here Baladeva criticizes the

¹ G.B. 2.1.33, p. 71, Chap. 2.

[SŪ. 2. 1 33.
ADH. 10.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 319
Viśiṣṭādvaita illustration of a prince engaged in a game of balls (which
is the illustration given us by Nimbārka as well as we have seen)
by pointing out that such a game is not altogether motiveless, since
the prince gets some pleasure from it.¹
CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)
SŪTRA 33
"(THERE ARE) NO INEQUALITY AND CRUELTY (ON THE PART OF
BRAHMAN), BECAUSE OF (HIS) HAVING REGARD (FOR THE WORKS
OF SOULS), FOR SO (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Inequality and cruelty, due to unequal creation, destruction
and the rest, depend on the works of the individual souls themselves,
and so they do not pertain to the creator of the origin and the rest
of the world, as in the case of the cloud. "So" exactly the scriptural
text. "One becomes good by good action, bad by bad action" (Bṛh.
3.2.13 ²) "shows".
Vedānta-kaustubha
It may be objected: If Brahman creates the universe in mere
sport, He must be open to the charges of inequality and cruelty.
He must be open to the charge of "inequality", i.e. of creating an
unequal world, creating as He does different grades of beings like
gods, men, animals and so on And, He must be open to the charge
of "cruelty", i.e. of heartlessness, creating as He does the universe
which is an abode of three kinds of sufferings, making the individual
souls, not attached to matter, enter into connection with it at the time
of dissolution, and thereby causing them sufferings like old age, death,
and the rest.
(We reply.) No There cannot be any inequality and cruelty
on the part of Brahman. Why? "On account of (His) having
regard", i.e. because in producing different beings like gods and the
rest at the beginning of the creation of the universe, Brahman has
regard for, i.e takes into account, their respective works or karmas,
¹ Op. cit., p. 72. ² Ś, R.

320 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 1. 34.
ADH 10.]
just as the cloud in producing different kinds of shoots depends on
their respective seeds.
If it be asked: Whence is this known? The author replies:
"shows", i.e the holy Scripture shows this thus. 'For he alone makes
one, whom he wishes to raise up from these worlds, do good deed;
he alone makes one, whom he wishes to lead down, do bad deed'
(Kaus. 3.8), 'One becomes good by good deeds, bad by bad deeds'
(Brh. 3.2.13), 'The doer of good deeds becomes good, the doer of
bad deeds becomes bad' (Brh. 4 4.5).
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva begin a new adhikarana here.
CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)
SŪTRA 34
"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT THIS IS NOT (POSSIBLE), ON ACCOUNT
OF THE NON-DISTINCTION OF WORKS, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT
OF BEGINNINGLESSNESS, AND (THIS) FITS IN, AND IS OBSERVED
ALSO."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be objected that since the text: '"The existent alone, my
dear, was this in the beginning"' (Chānd. 6.2.1 ¹) declares the
'non-distinction' of works prior to creation, the Supreme Being's
dependence on the works does not fit in,-(we reply:) "no", as works
exist even then, the works done by the individual souls in previous
births being eternal. And a prior creation "fits in", as a sudden
subsequent creation is unreasonable.² And this is "observed also"
in the text: 'The creator fashioned the sun and the moon as he
did before' (Rg. V. 10.190.3 ³) and so on.
1 Ś, R, ŚK, B.
2 I.e. since a subsequent creation cannot arise all on a sudden we have to
admit that it arises from a prior creation.
3 Pp. 413-14.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 34.
ADH. 10.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 321
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be objected: The reason, viz 'on account of dependence',
does not fit in. Why? "On account of the non-distinction of works."
That is, the non-distinction of the entire world prior to creation being
ascertained from the text: '"The existent alone, my dear, was this
in the beginning, one only, without a second"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), the
non-distinction of the works of the individual souls, too, is ascertained.
Hence, prior to creation, there are no works as the cause of the diver-
sities of the objects to be created, on which Brahman might depend,—
(We reply:) "no". Why? "On account of the beginningless"
of all. That is, the works, good and bad, done by the individual
souls in a previous creation, become the cause of the diversities in
a subsequent creation. "And" the continuity of creation "fits in"
in accordance with the maxim of 'the seed and the shoot',1 and in
accordance with the above-mentioned difference between the manifest
and unmanifest effect,2 as well as because a sudden subsequent
creation without a prior creation is inexplicable, this last reason being
indicated by the particle "and" (in the sūtra). This is "observed
also" in Scripture. That is, since the text: 'The creator fashioned
the sun and the moon as he did before' (Ṛg.V. 10.190.3), teaches
the existence of a prior creation, the eternity of the flow of creation
is established. And in the scriptural and Smṛti texts like: 'With
roots above, branches below is this eternal fig-tree' (Kaṭha 6 1),
'With roots above, branches below, the fig-tree is indestructible,
they say' (Gītā 15.1), the reality as well of mundane existence, as
having the Existent as its root, and as having the form of a continuous
stream, is established. Previously, the effect has indeed been deter-
mined to be real 3 In the texts: 'Without beginning and without end'
(Cūl. 5 4), 'A wise man is not born, nor dies' (Kaṭha 2.18 5), 'Know
prakṛti (matter) and puruṣa (soul) to be both beginningless' (Gītā
13.19), the eternity, too, of the sentient and the non-sentient sub-
stances, which are the powers of the Supreme Cause, is established.

1 I.e. just as it is impossible to say whether the seed is earlier or the shoot,
so it is impossible to say whether karmas are the earlier or the saṁsāra. Hence
they are taken to be beginningless.
2 Vide V.K. 2 1 17-18. 3 Vide V.K. 2.1.14 ff.
4 Correct quotation: "Anādavatī" Vide p. 230.
5 Cf. a very similar passage in Gītā 2.20.
21

322 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 1. 35,
ADH. 10.]
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara
He breaks this sūtra into two different sūtras—thus: "Na . . .
. . anāditvāt", and "upapadyate . . . . ca".¹
Bhāskara
He also breaks it into two different sūtras. Further he reads the
first portion differently, thus: "Asmād vibhāgād iti cen nānāditvāt",
(sūtra 35), "upapadyate . . . ca" (sūtra 36).²
Baladeva
He also breaks it into two different sūtras exactly after Śaṃkara.
But he takes the first portion only, viz "Na . . anāditvāt"
as indicated within the previous adhikarana beginning a new
adhikarana with the second portion: "upapadyate . . . . ca",
concerned with showing that the grace of the Lord is not partial
Hence it means, according to him: And (the special grace shown by
the Lord to his devotees) fits in (since it is not arbitrary, but depends
on the devotion of the souls themselves), and it is observed also (in
Scripture).³
CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)
SŪTRA 35
"AND BECAUSE OF THE FITTING IN OF ALL ATTRIBUTES."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"And because of the fitting in of all the attributes" of a cause on
the part of Brahman alone, it is established that our view is free from
all contradictions.
Here ends the first quarter of the second chapter of the Vedānta-
pārijāta-saurabha, composed by the reverend Nimbārka.
¹ Ś.B., pp. 498-499.
² Bh. B., p. 107.
³ G.B. 2.1.36, pp. 76-77, Chap. 2.

[sū. 2. 1. 35.
ADH. 10.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 323
Vedānta-kaustubha
"And on account of the fitting in." That is, all the attributes,
mentioned or not mentioned, befitting the cause of the world and
inappropriate on the part of pradhāna and the rest,—fit in on the part
of Brahman alone. Hence, it is established that the concordance of
Scriptures with regard to Brahman is not contradicted by any means
whatsoever.
Here ends the section entitled "Having a need" (10).
Here ends the first quarter of the second chapter in the holy
Vedānta-kaustubha, commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā,
and composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa.
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and Bhāskara
This is sūtra 37 in both the commentaries. They take this sūtra
to be a new adhikaraṇa by itself.
Baladeva
This is sūtra 37 in his commentary. Interpretation different,
viz. the same theme continued thus: And on account of the fitting
in of all attributes (harmonious in themselves or not) (on the part of
the Lord). That is, the Lord is possessed of paradoxical and myste-
rious powers, and hence it is possible for Him to possess, along with
the attributes of perfect justice and impartiality, the attribute of
showing special favour and partiality for his devotees as well.¹
Résumé
The first section of the second chapter contains—

1. 35 sūtras and 10 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka;
2. 37 sūtras and 13 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṁkara;
3. 36 sūtras and 10 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja;
4. 37 sūtras and 12 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
5. 36 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha;
6. 37 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.
   ¹ G.B. 2.1.37, p. 78, Chap 2.

324 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 2. 1. 35.
ADH. 10.]
Śamkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva divide each of the sūtras 17
and 35 in Nimbārka’s commentary into two separate sūtras; while
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha divide sūtra 11 in Nimbārka’s commentary
into two separate sūtras.

SECOND CHAPTER (Adhyāya)
SECOND QUARTER (Pāda)
Adhikarana 1: The section entitled "the im-
possibility of arrangement". (Sūtras 1–10)
SŪTRA 1
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ARRANGEMENT
ALSO, NOT THE INFERENCE."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Pradhāna, knowable through inference ¹ is not the cause of the
world. Why? "On account also of the impossibility" of a varied
"arrangement" from it, not acquainted with the arrangement of the
objects to be created.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Thus, with a view to inducing those who desire for salvation to
the hearing, thinking and the like of the nature, attributes and the
rest of the Supreme Person, it has been firmly established above by
the reverend author of the aphorisms that Lord Vāsudeva, the Highest
Person, omnipotent, the Lord of all, and the Supreme Person, is the
cause of the origin and the rest of the world; and that the views of the
opponents arise not supported by Scripture has been shown under
the aphorism: "Because (the creator of the world) sees, (pradhāna is)
not (the creator), (it is) non-scriptural" (Br. Sū. 1.1.5). Now, with a
view to establishing the acceptability of the conclusion of the Vedān-
tins, the reverend author of the aphorisms is exposing, in this section,
the fallaciousness of the arguments put forward by the opponents.
It is not to be said that those who desire for release being benefitted
through a mere exposition of the conclusion of the Vedāntins, what
is the use of villifying the views of the opponents? Since just as
when a man, giving up the most beneficial food, is about to take
injurious poison and the like, people try to induce him to food and to
1 See footnote 1, p. 42 of the book.

326 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 1.
ADH. 1.]
dissuade him from poison, etc. by pointing out the unwholesomeness of
the latter, so the villification of the view of the opponents is justifiable
for the purpose of preventing people from accepting the views which
are opposed to the Veda, and for inducing those desiring for emanci-
pation to our own view.
Now, the Sāṃkhyas, discarding the Highest Person, omnipotent
and omniscient, as the cause of the origin and the rest of the world,
hold prakṛti, devoid of any connection with Him, non-sentient and
the equilibrium of the three guṇas, to be the cause of the world. This
has been said in the treatise treating of the sixty (categories) ¹:
"The primary prakṛti (i.e. matter) is not an effect. There are seven,
beginning with mahat, which are (both) causes and effects There are
sixteen which are effects (only). ‘Puruṣa (i e. soul) is neither a cause,
nor an effect’ (Sāṃ. Kā. 3 ²). They state the five reasons for the
existence of prakṛti thus: The cause is pradhāna, ‘(1) on account of
the transformation of the divisions ³; (2) on account of concordance ⁴;
(3) on account of the activity preceding from power ⁵; (4) on account
of the distinction between the cause and the effect ⁶; (5) on account
of the non-distinction of what is possessed of all form’ (Sāṃ. Kā.
15 ⁷). The word ‘Vaiśva-rūpa’ means the same as ‘Viśva-rūpa’ or
what is possessed of all forms, i.e. the universe of varied configurations.
Whatever is limited is due to a common cause, like pots and the rest.

¹ Peculiar to the Sāṃkhyas. ² P. 4.
³ I.e. on account of the limitedness (pariṇāma) of the effects (bheda) like
mahat and the rest. Thus: Whatever is limited has a cause, like the pot.
The effects are limited.
∴ they have a cause, viz. pradhāna.
I.e. all the effects possess the common qualities of pleasure (sattva), pain
(rajas) and delusion (tamas). Hence they must have a common cause which
possesses all these qualities, viz. pradhāna.
⁴ I.e. the cause can give rise to the effect only if it has the requisite power.
Now pradhāna alone has the power to give rise to mahat and the rest.
⁵ The difference of the effect from the cause proves the existence of the
cause Thus, the difference of the pot from a lump of clay, viz. the first can
fetch water, the second not—proves that the pot has clay for its common cause.
Similarly, from the mahat and the rest we argue to pradhāna, different from them
⁶ I.e. the whole universe merges in a common cause during dissolution,
and such a cause is pradhāna. Vide Candrikā-vyākhyā of Sāṃ. Kā., pp. 18-19;
also Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya on same, pp. 13-14.
⁷ P. 18.

[sū. 2. 2. 1.
ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 327
Similarly, a mahat and ahaṁkāra, the five pure essences, the eleven
sense-organs, and the five great elements which are limited are 'divi-
sions'; they are due to one cause which is unlimited in space and time
and the common substratum of three guṇas.¹ Whatever is observed
to be connected with something else, is due to that one cause; as
dishes and the rest, connected with the clay, are due to it. Similarly,
the external and internal divisions, connected with pleasures (sattva),
pain (rajas) and delusion (tamas) should properly be due to a common
cause consisting in pleasure, pain and delusion.² Similarly, just as
there is the origin of pots and the like from the power of the cause,
so the origin of the effects like mahat and the rest, too, must be held
to be due to the power of the cause. This being so, the cause, possessed
of such a power, is pradhāna.³ Moreover, it is observed that there
is a distinction between the effects, like ear-rings and the rest, and
the cause, similar to them, such as gold and the rest, as well as a non-
distinction Similarly, there is both distinction and non-distinction
on the part of the manifold universe. Through these two, a cause,
viz. the unmanifest which is the substratum of all beings and consists
of the three guṇas in a state of equilibrium, is inferred.⁴
On this suggestion, the author replies: "The inference", i.e.
what is inferred, viz. pradhāna, not having Brahman as its common
cause, is not the cause of the world. Why? "On account of the
impossibility of arrangement," i.e. because it is impossible that the
arrangement of the world,—variegated by the aggregate of manifold
objects of enjoyment, conforming to the diverse works of the souls,—
can arise from pradhāna, not having Brahman for its cause, an object
of inference, non-sentient and devoid of any knowledge of the ob-
jects to be created; as we see in ordinary life that the arrangement
of manifold and variegated palaces, chariots, ornaments and the rest
is due to one who is possessed of the knowledge of the objects to be
created.
The particle "and" (in the sūtra) indicates that the reasons,
intended for proving the existence of pradhāna, can very well be set
aside by valid opposite arguments, since the following inference
¹ This explains the first reason.
² This explains the second reason.
³ This explains the third reason.
⁴ This explains the fourth and the fifth reasons.

[sū. 2. 2. 2.
328 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 1.]
establishes the non-validity of the object established (by the Sāṁkhya,
viz. pradhāna):—
Pradhāna as admitted by the Sāṁkhyas and not having Brah-
man for its soul, is non-existent;
because it is not perceived.
Whatever is this (i.e. not perceived) is that (i.e. non-existent);
like the sky-flower
Whatever is not this (i.e. not non-perceived) is not that (i.e.
not non-existent);
like the sun.
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
They take this and the next sūtra as one sūtra.
SŪTRA 2
“AND ON ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITY ”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
And on account of the impossibility of spontaneous activity
(on its part), not the inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna).
Vedānta-kaustubha
The phrase beginning with ‘on account of impossibility’ is to
be supplied here. And because activity,—viz. spontaneous falling
away from the state of the equilibrium of the three guṇas,—is
impossible on the part of pradhāna which is non-sentient and an
object of inference. Thus, pradhāna, knowable through inference,
is not the cause of the world, since it is observed in ordinary life that
non-sentient objects like chariots and the rest, are moved to action
only when superintended by conscious beings.

[sū. 2. 2. 3.
ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 329
SŪTRA 3
"AND IF IT BE ARGUED THAT (PRADHĀNA ACTS SPONTANEOUSLY)
LIKE MILK AND WATER, (WE REPLY.) THERE TOO (LORD IS THE
INCITER)."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be argued that like milk, etc pradhāna acts for the origin
and the rest of the world by itself, (we reply ) that "there too"
the Supreme Being is the inciter is learnt from the scriptural text:
"Who abiding within water" (Bṛh 3.7.4 ¹)
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be argued: How can it be said that on account of the im-
possibility of spontaneous activity on its part the non-sentient pra-
dhāna is not the cause of the world? Just as milk, though non-
sentient, is by itself transformed into the form of sour milk, and flows
spontaneously for the nourishment of the calf, and just as water
discharged from the cloud is transformed into the form of various
saps of the earth, as well as into the forms of ice, bubble and the rest,
and pours down spontaneously for the growth of plants and the rest,
as well as flows on, so exactly pradhāna too, independent of a sen-
tient being, having entered into a state of mutual inequality of the
guṇas, is transformed into many forms,—
We reply: "There too". That is, in the case of milk and the
rest too, no activity is possible independently of a sentient being.
On the contrary, milk and the rest attain the form of sour milk and
so on only when superintended by a sentient being. It is the cow
herself, fond of her calf, that makes the milk flow out of filial affection,
and being liquid the milk oozes out. If it be argued that even when
the calf is dead, the presence of the milk is observed, and hence to say
that it is the cow that makes the milk flow out of filial affection does
not stand to reason,—(we reply.) there is the flow of the milk then by
reason of her remembrance of the calf, or else it is explicable on the
ground of her love for her master.²
―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――
¹ Ś, R, Bh.
² I.e. the cow gives milk even when the calf is dead because she still remem-
bers the calf, or because she loves her master and wants to be of benefit to him.