वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

|sū. 2. 1. 5.
276 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 3.]
became Knowledge and non-knowledge' (Tait. 2.6), 'On the same
tree, a person, immersed, grieves for his impotence, bewildered'
(Muṇḍ. 3 1 2, Śvet 4 7), 'And the soul, which is without the Lord,
is bound, because of being an enjoyer' (Śvet. 1.8) and so on.
COMPARISON
Baladeva
Interpretation absolutely different He takes this sūtra as
forming one adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with demonstrating the
eternity and infallibility of the Veda. He thus does not take this
sūtra as representing a prima facie view. Thus, this sūtra means,—
according to him,—'(The Veda is) not (unauthoritative like the
Sāṁkhya and the rest), on account of (its) difference (from them),
(i.e. because it is a non-human origin unlike the Sāṁkhya and the
rest), (its) being so (i e its eternity) (is known) from the text '.¹
PRIMA FACIE VIEW (concluded)
SŪTRA 5
"BUT (THERE IS) THE DESIGNATION OF THE PRESIDING (DEITIES)
ON ACCOUNT OF SPECIALITY AND FOLLOWING."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"But" in the texts. 'The earth spoke' (Tait Saṁ 5 5 2, 3²),
'These sense-organs, disputing about self-supremacy, went to Brahma'
(Bṛh. 6 1 7 ³) and so on, there is the designation of their presiding' ⁴
deities, 'on account of the specification', mentioned in the passage.
'"Very well, let me enter into these three divinities"' (Chānd.
6 3.2 ⁵); and 'on account of the following', or entering, mentioned
in the passage: 'Fire, becoming speech, entered the mouth' (Ait.
2.4 ⁶).
Vedānta-kaustubha
To the objection, viz : From the scriptural texts: 'The earth
spoke to him' (Tait. Saṁ 5.5 2, 3), 'The earth spoke' (Śat. Br.

¹ G.B 2.1.4, p 18, Chap. 2.
² P. 76, line 9, vol. 2. ³ Ś, R, B.
⁴ C.S.S. ed. reads 'tat-tat', meaning 'their respective deities', p. 24.
⁵ R, ŚK, B. ⁶ Ś, R, Bh, SK

[sū. 2. 1. 5.
ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 277
6 1 3, 4¹), 'The waters spoke' (Śat. Br. 6 1.3, 2²), 'These sense-
organs, disputing about self-supremacy, went to Brahmā' (Bṛh
6 1 7), 'They said to speech "Do you sing for us"' (Bṛh 1.3.2)
and so on, it is known that of the effects too are sentient; and hence
they have no difference from the material cause—
We reply: The word "but" disposes of the stated objection.
There is no designation of sentience on the part of the effects, and
so they cannot have Brahman for their material cause; but there
is the designation of only the presiding deities of earth and the
rest in the passages, 'The earth spoke to him' (Tait. Sam. 5.5.2, 3)
and so on. Why? "On account of speciality and following", i e.
on account of the specification of the earth and the rest by the word
'deity' in the passage "'Very well, let me enter into these three
deities'" (Chānd. 6.3.2), and on account of the specifications of the
sense-organs by the word 'deity' in the passages 'These deities,
verily, disputing about self-supremacy' (Kauṣ. 2.14), 'These deities,
verily, having known superiority in the vital breath' (Kauṣ 2 14),
as well as 'on account of the following' of fire and the rest as the
presiding deities of speech and the rest, i.e on account of the scrip-
tural mention of following, or entering, in the passage: 'Fire, becoming
speech, entered the mouth,—the sun, becoming sight, the eyes
(Ait. 2 4) Hence the world being different from Brahman, Brahman
is not its material cause.
COMPARISON
Baladeva
Literal interpretation same, but import different, since he takes
this Sūtra as an adhikaraṇa by itself, not laying down a prima facie
view, but the correct conclusion. Thus, the Sūtra means according
to him "(If it be objected: How to reconcile the absurd sayings of
the Vedas, such as 'Fire willed to be many' and so on?). We reply: (In
those passages) there is the designation of the presiding (deities) (of
fire and the rest), on account of speciality and following (i.e. entering
into)".³
¹ P. 505, line 12.
² Op. cit., line 9.
³ G.B. 2.1.5, p. 18, Chap. 2.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 6-7.
278 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH 3 ]
CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sutras 6-7)
SŪTRA 6
“ BUT (IT) IS SEEN.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
With regard to it, we reply: “It is seen” that there is the origin
of hairs on the head and so on from a person from whom they are
different, and of dung-beetles from the cow-dung from which they are
different. Hence it is not to be said that the universe, because of
being different from Brahman, has not Him as its material cause.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The author points out that such a prima facie view is based on a
fallacious reason (viz. ‘on account of difference’).
The word “but” is for disposing of the prima facie view The
statement that this universe has not Brahman as its material cause
on account of being different from Him, is not tenable, since it “is
seen” that there is the origin of nails, body-hairs and the rest from a
person from whom they are different, and that of the dung-beetles
from the cow-dung, from which they are different,—on account of
this,—this is the sense.
COMPARISON
Baladeva
Interpretation same, but he takes this sūtra as forming an
adhikaraṇa by itself.
—————
(CORRECT CONCLUSION (end))
SŪTRA 7
“ IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (IN THAT CASE THE EFFECT MUST BE)
NON-EXISTENT (WE REPLY :) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING A
NEGATION MERELY ”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be objected: If the effect be different from its material cause,
it must be “non-existent” prior to its origination,—(we reply.) No
such objection can be raised, “on account of there being a negation

{SŪ. 2. 1. 7}
ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 279
merely ”, in the previous aphorism, of the rule that there is a similarity
between the material cause and its effect in every respect
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be objected : Having admitted an absolute similarity between
the material cause and its effect in the aphorism : ‘(There is) no
(having Brahman for its cause) on its part, on account of difference ’
(Br. Sū 2.1.4), it has been objected by the opponent that the world
being different from Brahman, He is not its material cause with a
view to disposing of that objection, it has been established in the
aphorism. ‘But (it) is seen’ (Br Sū. 2.1 6) that there can be a cause-
effect relation even between two different objects. With regard to
it, the question is whether prior to creation the universe was non-
different from its cause, or different. What is your opinion ? If you
say, Non-different,—then, just as the origin of a different world is
admitted, like the origin of hairs on the head and body hairs from a
person from whom they are different, so why there may not be the
origin of a similar world, like the origin of a gold-bracelet and the rest
from gold ?
If you say : Different,—then, the world must have a material
cause different from Brahman, and hence pradhāna must be the
cause of the world. If it be said that this cannot be admitted, as
pradhāna has been already refuted,—(we point out) in the texts.
‘Brahman ¹ is one only, without second’ (Chānd. 6.2.1), ‘There
was, verily, Nārāyana, the one’ (Mahā. Up. 1 2), ‘Then there was
Viṣṇu, Hari alone, without parts’,—there is the mention of a single
reality; and hence, it follows that there was the absence of anything
else prior to creation. Therefore, the world must be non-existent
prior to creation.
(Here ends the original prima facie view)
(Author’s conclusion.)
(We reply :) ‘No’. Why ? “On account of there being a
negation merely.” The aphorism ‘But (it) is seen’ (Br. Sū. 2.1.6)
negates merely,—by way of mentioning the difference between the
material cause and its effect,—the rule, admitted by the opponent, viz.
that there is similarity between a material cause and its effect in every

¹ The word ‘Brahman’ is not included in the original text.

280 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 1. 8.
ADH. 3.]
respect; but it never establishes any difference between the two in
every respect Hence, because of having Brahman as its soul, the
universe is existent even during its causal state.
Or an alternative explanation of the phrase "On account of
there being a negation merely". The statement, viz 'The universe
is non-existent' is a negation merely, i e without any meaning, in
accordance with the scriptural text. ' "The existent alone, my dear,
was this in the beginning" ' (Chānd. 6 2.1)
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara
Interpretation different, viz · 'If it be said that (the effect) is
non-existent (prior to its actual creation), (we reply) No, since (it)
is a mere negation (without an object to be negatived)'. That is,
the negation by the opponent, viz. . 'The world is non-existent' has
no object, for it certainly cannot have for its object the existence of
the effect prior to its actual creation, as the effect always exists in its
cause, whether before or after its actual creation 1
PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 8)
SŪTRA 8
“ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING THE CONSEQUENCE OF (BECOMING)
LIKE THAT DURING DISSOLUTION, (THE DOCTRINE OF THE CAUSALITY
OF BRAHMAN) IS INCONSISTENT.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
An objection is raised: As at the time of dissolution, the cause,
like the effect, will become non-sentient, the view that Brahman is
the material cause of the universe is “inconsistent”.
Vedānta-kaustubha
An objection is raised once more.
It is objected. “Inconsistent”, indeed, is the view which admits
Brahman to be the material cause of the world—Brahman who
1 Ś.B. 2.1.7, 'Pratiṣedham hīdam nāsya pratiṣedhasya pratiṣedhyam asti',
p. 453.

[sū. 2. 1. 9.
ADH. 3] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 281
possesses the attributes of sentience, infinity, freedom from sins and
the rest, and is established by the scriptural texts 'Brahman is
truth, intelligence, infinite" (Tait. 2.1), "Free from sins, ageless,
deathless" (Chānd. 8.1.5, 8 7.1, 3; Maitrī. 7.7), "Who is omniscient,
all-knowing" (Muṇḍ. 1 1.9, 2.2.7) and so on. Why? "On account
of there being the consequence of (becoming) like that during dissolu-
tion." That is, because "during dissolution", or during reabsorption,
non-sentience, limitedness, impurity and the rest will occur on the
part of the material cause as well, "like that", i.e as on the part of
the effect The sense is that during dissolution, the world, possessing
non-sentience and the rest, and merged into its material cause in an
order reverse to that of creation, i.e merged into Brahman, possessing
the attribute of sentience and the rest, is sure to defile Him with its
own attributes, as does butter-milk dropped in milk
CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 9-10)
SŪTRA 9
"BUT NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING PARALLEL IN-
STANCES."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The reply is as follows: There is indeed no "consequence of (be-
coming) like that". Just as the evolutes of the earth do not defile
it when dissolved into it, so the universe, the evolute of Brahman,
also does not.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The author refutes the objection.
"But no", i.e. no such consequence follows, and hence our
view does not involve any inconsistency. Why? An effect does
not defile its material cause with its own attributes when dissolved
into it, there being parallel instances to this effect. Just as the evolutes
like bracelets, ear-rings and the rest, when dissolved, do not defile
the lump of gold with their own attributes; and just as the evolutes
of the earth, when dissolved into the earth, do not defile the earth
with their own attributes, so this universe, consisting of the sentient
and the non-sentient, when dissolved into Brahman, does not, indeed,

282 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ 2. 1. 10.
ADH. 3.]
defile Brahman, possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His
powers.
CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)
SŪTRA 10
"AND ON ACOUNT OF OBJECTION TO HIS OWN VIEW."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The Sāṁkhya, maintaining a doctrine opposed to the Veda,
cannot raise any objection, since the stated objections apply to his
own view as well.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The author points out that the Sāṁkhya cannot even object that
there is any inconsistency in our view which is based on the Veda.
There is no inconsistency in our view based as it is on Scripture.
It has been alleged by the Sāṁkhya, unacquainted as he is with the
settled conclusion of the Vedānta, firstly, that a cause-effect relation
between Brahman and the world is inappropriate, as there is a
difference between the cause and the effect in this case, secondly,
that, in our view, the effect becomes non-existent prior to creation,
and thirdly, that Brahman becomes like the world during the time of
dissolution. All these objections are of equal force against the
Sāṁkhya doctrine as well. The sense is. The origin of the effect,—
which possesses colour and the rest and possesses parts,—from pra-
dhāna, which is colourless and devoid of parts, is admitted. Hence,
a cause-effect relation between pradhāna and its effects is inappro-
priate, there being here a difference between the cause and the effect.
There being nothing gross prior to creation, the effect itself becomes
non-existent; and during dissolution, prakṛti, like the world, becomes
gross.
COMPARISON
All others, except Baladeva, read. "sapakṣa-doṣāc ca" ¹
¹ Ś B 2.1.10, p. 357; Śrī. B 2.1.10, p. 13, Part 2; Bh. B. 2.1.10, p. 91;
ŚK. B. 2.1 10, p. 14, Parts 7 and 8.

[sū. 2. 1. 11
ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 283
SŪTRA 11
“IF IT BE SAID THAT ON ACCOUNT ALSO OF REASONING HAVING
NO SOLID GROUND, IT IS TO BE INFERRED OTHERWISE, (WE REPLY )
IN THAT WAY, TOO, THERE WILL BE THE CONSEQUENCE OF NON-
RELEASE ”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
On account also of the instability of reasoning, there is no
inconsistency in the stated conclusion; since, if pradhāna and the rest
be inferred to be the cause of the world by means of a strong reasoning,
then a counter-argument is possible by means of another equally
strong reasoning. As there will be the “consequence of non-release
thus also”, owing to disagreement among the logicians, so, that alone
which is mentioned in the Veda is acceptable—this is established.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The word ‘api’ means ‘and’. There is no inconsistency in the
stated conclusion, which is based on Scripture. There is inconsistency
in the Sāṁkhya conclusion itself which is based on reasoning, since the
stated objections apply thereto, “on account also of reasoning having
no solid ground”, i.e on account of the instability of reasoning. The
sense is that the thing inferred by one expert logician is set aside by
another, proved to be otherwise by another,—on account of the
instability of reasoning in this way. But the thing mentioned in the
Vedānta in the beginning and the end cannot be refuted even by
hundreds of reasonings
If it be objected. Even though reasonings like ‘on account of
difference’ ¹ be refutable, having no solid ground, yet in order that
there may not be any infinite regress, it is perfectly proper to infer,
in that way, a non-sentient material cause of the non-sentient effects,
like the ether and the rest—
(We reply:) “in that way too”, the primacy of reasoning is
upheld, and hence the conclusion stated in the Veda is regarded as but
of a secondary importance. As a consequence, non-release will result
owing to the mutual opposition among Kapila, Kaṇāda and the
rest It cannot be said that if victory be won by one of them at
some time or other, there will be no non-release as a consequence,—
¹ Vide Br. Sū. 2.1 4

284 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [sū. 2. 1. 12.
ADH 4]
it being impossible for one among many persons to be ever-victorious.
If it be said that the Supreme Soul is such, you fall in with our view;
so be happy by giving up reasoning which is opposed to the Veda.
Thus the Lord Vāsudeva, the sole topic of all the Vedas, being
established to be the material cause of the world, no opposition, based
on reasoning which is opposed to the Veda is of any avail—this is
established.
Here ends the section entitled “Difference” (3).
COMPARISON
Śamkara
He reads: “Vimokṣa-prasaṅga” instead of “Anirmokṣa-pra-
saṅga”.¹
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
They break it into two different sūtras—viz. “Tarkāpratiṣṭhānād
api” and “Anyathā . . . prasaṅgaḥ”.²
Adhikaraṇa 4. The section entitled “The Non-
acceptance of the rest”. (Sūtra 12)
SŪTRA 12
“HEREBY THE REMAINING (PERSONS) TOO WHO DO NOT ACCEPT
(THE VEDA) ARE EXPLAINED (I.E. REFUTED).”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
“Hereby”, i.e. by the refutation of the Sāṁkhya view, the
remaining ones, i.e. others who maintain a cause which is opposed to
the Veda, “too”, are refuted.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now, the author is extending the above refutation to the remaining
views.
“Hereby”, i.e. by the above refutation of the doctrine of pra-
dhāna as the cause of the world, “the remaining (persons) who do not
¹ Ś.B. 2.1.11, p. 458.
² Śrī. B., p. 13, Part 2, ŚK B., p. 14; Parts 7 and 8.

[sū. 2 1. 13.
ADH. 5.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 285
accept (the Veda)", too, should be known to be refuted The word
"śiṣṭāḥ" means 'the remaining ones', i.e persons other than Kapila ¹
and Patañjali ². The word "parigrahāḥ" means all who do not accept
the Veda.³
It is thus established that the doctrine of the causality of Brahman
is not contradicted by their views as well.
Here ends the section entitled "The Non-acceptance of
the rest" (4)
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha
According to them the word "śiṣṭāparigrahāḥ" means (the doc-
trines like Atomism and the rest) which are not accepted by the wise ⁴
Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled "Becoming
the enjoyer". (Sūtra 13)
SŪTRA 13
"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF (BRAHMAN) BECOMING
AN ENJOYER, (THERE WILL BE) NON-DISTINCTION, (BETWEEN
BRAHMAN AND THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL), WE REPLY, IT MAY BE
AS IN ORDINARY LIFE."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be objected that if Brahman be the material cause, then
Brahman Himself will become an enjoyer of pleasures and pains in
the form of the individual soul, so that there will be no distinction
¹ The founder of the Sāṃkhya doctrine.
² The founder of the Yoga doctrine.
³ This explains the compound: "śiṣṭāparigrahāḥ".
⁴ Hence they explain the compound as "Śiṣṭaiḥ aparigrahāḥ" and not as
śiṣṭhāś ca aparigrahāś ca", as done by Nimbārka, Śrīnivāsa, Rāmānuja and
Baladeva. Vide ŚB. 2.1.11, p. 461; Bh. B. 2.1.12, p. 92; ŚK. B. 2.1.13, p. 18,
Parts 7 and 8.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 13.
286 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 5.]
between the enjoyer (viz. the individual soul) and the controller (viz.
Brahman) as well-known from the Veda,—
(We reply:) In spite of there being a non-distinction, there is
a distinction as well between the two, as between the sea and the
wave, and between the sun and its ray.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Now, having apprehended an objection once more, the author
is disposing of that here.
If it be objected: If Brahman who is without an equal or a superior
be the material cause of the world, then there must be no distinction
between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed. Why? “On account
of becoming the enjoyer” That is, all effects whatsoever being non-
different from their causes, the enjoyer, i.e. the individual soul, will
become the object enjoyed; and the object enjoyed, i.e. the body,
the sense-organs and the sense-objects, will become the enjoyer; and
hence, the distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed,
well-known in ordinary life and in the Veda, will not be possible on
this doctrine of the causality of Brahman. Moreover, there will not
be any distinction between the enjoyer and the controller, because
the group of enjoyers being non-different from the controller, the
enjoyer will become the controller, and the controller, the Supreme
Soul, will become the enjoyer. In ordinary life, to begin with, the
distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed is well-known,
thus ‘The individual soul is the enjoyer, the body and the rest are the
objects enjoyed’, and in the Veda too, thus: “Eats the sweet berry”
(Muṇḍ. 3.1.1; Śvet. 4.6). Similarly, the distinction between the
enjoyer and the controller, too, is well-known in ordinary life, as is
evident from the conduct of the good who always regard their pleasures
and pains as dependent on the Lord, and in the Veda too; thus: “He
alone makes one do good deeds” (Kauṣ. 3.8), “The soul which is
without the Lord is bound, because of being an enjoyer” (Śvet. 1.8)
and so on. Thus, “on account of becoming an enjoyer, there is non-
distinction”; and hence the doctrine of the causality of Brahman
cannot be accepted,—
The author states the correct conclusion in the words “It may be,
as in ordinary life”. That is, on our view, too, there may, indeed,
be a distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed, as well as
between the enjoyer and the controller, “as in ordinary life”. In

[sū. 2. 1. 13
ADH. 5 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 287
ordinary life, although pots, dishes and the rest, having the lump of
clay as their material cause, bracelets, ear-rings and the rest, having
gold as their material cause; foams, waves and the rest, having the
sea as their material cause; and leaves, fruits and the rest, having the
tree as their material cause, are all non-different from their respective
causes, there is still a mutual distinction amongst the particular
effects themselves In exactly the same manner, there may be
a mutual distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed,
although they are non-different from Brahman, having Brahman
as their material cause Similarly, in spite of their non-distinction,
there may still be a distinction between the enjoyer and the controller ,
just as pots, dishes and the rest, though by nature non-different from
the clay, as having no existence and activity apart from the clay,
are yet by nature different, too, from the clay possessing as they do
their own peculiar attributes which the clay lacks. The same should
be known to be the case with the gold and bracelets and the rest too.
Likewise, there is a natural relation of difference—non-difference
between Brahman and the individual soul. There is, indeed, no
inconsistency here. Hence it is established that the doctrine of the
causality of Brahman is not open to the above objections.¹
Here ends the section entitled “Becoming the enjoyer” (5).
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and Bhāskara
Interpretation different, viz. they interpret the sūtra like Śrīni-
vāsa, although while Śrīnivāsa understands the word “bhoktrā-
patteḥ” to mean ‘because the enjoyer will become the object enjoyed
and vice versa, as well because the enjoyer will become the controller
and vice versa’, they understand it to mean only ‘because the enjoyer
will become the object enjoyed and vice versa’. Each develops his
own peculiar theory in connection.²
¹ Note the different interpretations given by Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa.
² Ś.B. 2.1.13, pp. 461 et seq.; Bh. B. 2.1.13, p. 92.

288 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 1. 14.
ADH. 6.]
Adhikarana 6 The section entitled "The begin-
ing" (Sūtras 14-19)
SŪTRA 14
"(THERE IS) NON-DIFFERENCE (OF THE EFFECT) FROM THAT
(VIZ THE CAUSE), ON ACCOUNT OF (THE TEXTS) BEGINNING WITH
THE WORD 'BEGINNING' AND THE REST."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
There is "non-difference" between the effect and the cause, and
not absolute difference. Why? On account of the texts. '"The
effect having its beginning in speech, is a name, the reality is just the
clay"' (Chānd. 6.1.4 ¹), '"All this has that for its soul. That is
true . . . Thou art that"' (Chānd. 6.8.7, 6.9.4, 6.10.3–
6.16.3 ²), "All this, verily, is Brahman" (Chānd 3.14.1 ³).
Vedānta-kaustubha
In the first chapter, Brahman has been described many times as
different from the sentient and the non-sentient, in order that there
may be a proper discrimination between the peculiar natures of these
three realities respectively.⁴ Here, on the other hand, the non-
difference of the world, the effect, from Brahman, the cause, resulting
from the absence of separate existence, activity and the rest (on the
part of the former), has been established under the aphorism. "If
it be objected that (in that case the effect must be) non-existent,
(we reply:) no, on account of there being a negation merely" (Br
Sū. 2.1 7) and so on. Now, with a view to confirming the stated
conclusion, the author is refuting the view of the Vaiśeṣikas who hold
that the effect is not non-different from the cause, but is something
which originates (i.e. is an absolutely new creation).⁵
The compound ("tad ananyatvam") is to be explained as follows:
There is non-difference between the two, viz. the cause and the effect,
or, there is non-difference of that, viz. the world, the effect, from
¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B. ² Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B. ³ R.
⁴ Vide e.g. V.K. 1.1.1, p. 11; 1.1 18, p. 32; 1.1.22, p. 36; 1.2.3, p. 50, etc.
K S.S.
⁵ This is the doctrine of Asat-kāryya-vāda.

[SŪ. 2. 1. 14.
ADH. 6 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 289
Brahman, the cause; or, there is non-difference of the effect from that,
viz. the cause. That is, the effect, which is of the form of the sentient
and the non-sentient, which is limited, has many names and forms,
and is dependent, is non-different from Brahman, the Supreme
Cause, possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers,
unlimited, denoted by words like 'one', 'without a second' and so
on, capable of abiding voluntarily in the causal state and in the effected
state, and prior to the entire universe. The author states the proof
with regard to it in the words: "on account of (the texts) beginning
with the word 'beginning' and the rest". (The compound "āram-
bhaṇa-śabdādibhyaḥ" is to be explained thus:) The texts of which
the beginning is the word 'beginning', on account of them. That is,
on account of the texts. '"The effect, having its beginning in speech,
is a name, the reality is just the clay"' (Chānd 6.1.4), '"The exis-
tent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one, without a second"'
(Chānd. 6.2.1), '"He thought, 'May I be many', may I procreate"
He created the light' (Chānd. 6.2.3), '"All that has this for its soul.
That is true. That is the soul. Thou art that"' (Chānd. 6.8.7,
etc.), "All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from Him, disappearing
into Him and breathing in Him" (Chānd. 3.14.1), "That was
unmanifest then. It became manifest by name and form" (Bṛh.
1.4.7) and so on. There are many texts of such kinds which establish
the non-difference of the world, the effect, from Brahman, the cause,
but which are not quoted here for avoiding prolixity.
Among these, the meaning of the text beginning with the word
'beginning' (ārambhaṇa) is as follows.
The Chāndogas, having made an initial statement to the effect
that through the knowledge of the material cause there arises the
knowledge of all the effects, in the passage: '"Whereby the unheard
becomes heard, the unthought thought, the unknown known"'
(Chānd. 6.1.3), state a parallel instance to establish it, in the passage:
'"Just as, my dear, through one lump of clay, everything made of
clay may be known,—the effect, having its beginning in speech is a
name, the reality is just the clay"' (Chānd. 6.1.4¹). That is, just
as 'through one lump of clay' being known as clay, 'everything made
of clay', i.e. the group of the evolutes of clay, may be known, since
1 The passage is "Yathā saumya! ekena mṛt-piṇḍena sarvaṁ mṛnmayaṁ
vijñātaṁ syāt, vācārambhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyaṁ mṛttikēty eva satyam".
19

290 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2 1. 14.
ADH. 6.]
they are all made of clay;—for such a group of evolutes 'has its
beginning in speech', i.e. is designated by speech. Speech is of two
kinds: 'effect', i e. meaning, and 'name', i.e word. The function
of speech rests on these two, viz meaning and word, e.g. we say:
'Fetch water by the pot'. Hence, 'the truth' is that the evolute,
characterized by having a broad bottom and resembling the shape of
a belly, having the name 'pot', and conducive to the function of
fetching water and so on, is 'just clay'. That is, the view that the
effect is different from the cause, on account of the difference of
individuality and conception, is incorrect, for it is not possible to
attribute the individuality or the conception of a pot to the wind
and the rest which are different from clay.¹ If the effect is to originate
from the non-existent simply, then that would lead to the origin of
everything everywhere, as well as to the futility of the activity of
the agent. So desist from further arguments
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara
Each commentator develops his peculiar theory in this connection.
Śaṃkara understands the word "Ananyatva" as absolute identity,
interprets the word 'vācārambhaṇa' to mean 'that which begins
from speech only, but does not exist in reality', and thereby develops
his theory of Vivarta at great length ²
Rāmānuja
He understands the word "ananyatva" as non-difference, like
Nimbārka, but connects it with his peculiar doctrine of the soul-body
relation between Brahman and the universe.³ He interprets the
phrase: "vācārambhaṇa" as follows: 'vācā' means: on account of
speech, i.e on account of activity preceded by speech; 'rambhaṇa'
means: what is touched. Hence the text means. On account of
speech, (i.e. for the sake of certain activities, like the fetching of
¹ If the effect were absolutely different from its cause, then any and every-
thing, e.g. wind, might very well have been conceived to be a pot. But this is
never the case, since clay alone, and nothing else, is conceived to be so.
² "Vācaiva kevalaṁ asti . . . . na tu vastu-vṛttena vikāraḥ kaścid asti",
etc. Ś.B. 2.1 14, p. 464.
³ Śrī. B. 2.1.15, pp. 39, 42, Part 2.

[Sū. 2. 1. 15.
ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 291
water and the rest,) there is touched (by the clay) an effect and a
name; i.e. clay is transformed into a particular effect having a special
name, in order that a certain activity may be accomplished.¹
Bhāskara
He, too, understands the word “ananyatva” as non-difference.
He criticizes the Śaṁkarite view at length and insists on the reality
of difference,² and interprets the phrase “vācārambhaṇa” like
Śrīnivāsa.
Śrīkaṇṭha
He, too, understands the word “ananyatva” as non-difference.³
He explains the phrase “vācārambhaṇa” in the next sūtra, and gives
two alternative explanations, viz. “That which is the beginning, i.e.
the cause, of speech, i.e. of speech and practical activity”.⁴ Hence,
the text means that an effect (vikāra) is a name (nāma-dheya) which
is the cause of speech and practical activity, i.e. of such expressions
‘Fetch water in a pot’ and so on. The second explanation is: “That
which has speech for its beginning”.⁵ Hence the text means that an
effect (vikāra) is simply the object of such expressions: ‘This is a pot’,
i.e. a special condition the clay has assumed for practical purposes,
but is not a separate substance from the clay.
SŪTRA 15
“AND BECAUSE OF THE PERCEPTION (OF THE EFFECT) ON THE
EXISTENCE (OF THE CAUSE).”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
There is non-difference between the cause and the effect, because
the effect is perceived, only when the cause is existent.
1 “Ārabhyate ālabhyate spṛśate,” etc. Śrī. B. 2.1.15, p. 40, Part 2.
2 Bh. B. 2 1.14, pp. 93 et seq.
3 ŚK. B. 2.1.15, p. 22, Parts 7 and 8.
4 “Vācāyāḥ abhilāpārtha-kriyā-rūpa-vyavahārasya niṣpādakaṁ bhavati.”
Op. cit. 2.1 16, p. 23, Parts 7 and 8.
5 Vāgārambha-viṣaya-mātram. Op. cit.

292 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 2. 1 16.
ADH. 6.]
Vedānta-kaustubha
For this reason also, says the author, there is non-difference between the effect and the cause
between the effect and the cause
Whence is it known that there is non-difference between the effect
and the cause ? Because the effect is perceived, only when the cause
is existent, in accordance with the scriptural text '"These beings,
my dear, have the existent as their root"' (Chānd. 6.8 4).
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva
They interpret the sūtra in just the opposite way, viz. "And
because of the perception (of the cause) on the existence (of the effect)"
That is, the gold, which is the cause, is perceived when the ear-ring
is present. That is, the gold alone is perceived in the ear-ring, and
not the clay.¹
SŪTRA 16
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE POSTERIOR."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"On account of the existence" of the effect,—belonging to a pos-
terior time,—in the cause, owing to the designation of their co-inherence
in the text: "Brahman, verily, was this in the beginning" (Bṛh.
1 4.10 ²), there is non-difference between the effect and the cause.
Vedānta-kaustubha
For this reason too, there is non-difference between the effect
and the cause.
"On account of the existence" of the effect,—which is "posterior"
and denoted by the term 'this',—in the cause, owing to the designation
of their co-inherence, in the texts '"The existent alone, my dear, was
this in the beginning"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), "Brahman, verily, was this
¹ Śrī B. 2.1.16, p. 46, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2 1 16, p. 22, Parts 7 and 8; G.B
2.1.15, p. 45, Chap. 2.
² Not quoted by others.

[sū. 2. 1. 17.
ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 293
in the beginning” (Bṛh 1 4.10), the non-difference between the effect
and the cause is definitely ascertained
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
This is sūtra 17 in both They read “aparasya” in place of
“avarasya” and take it to mean ‘an effect’.¹
SŪTRA 17
“IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF
WHAT IS NON-EXISTENT, (THE EFFECT IS) NOT (EXISTENT PRIOR
TO CREATION) (WE REPLY:) NO, (SUCH A DESIGNATION IS) ON
ACCOUNT OF A DIFFERENT ATTRIBUTE, THIS IS KNOWN FROM THE
COMPLEMENTARY TEXT, FROM REASONING AND FROM ANOTHER
TEXT”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
“If it be objected that on account of the designation of what is
non-existent” in the passage. “The non-existent, verily, was this in
the beginning” (Chānd. 3.19.1 ²), the effect does not exist prior to
creation,—
(We reply:) “no”. There is such a designation because of the
subtleness (of the world prior to creation). Whence is this known?
“From the complementary passage,” viz. “That was existent”
(Chānd. 3.19.1 ³), “from the reasoning”, viz. if a previously non-
existent effect does indeed arise, why is there no origin of a barley-
sprout from fire? “and from another text”, viz. ‘The existent alone,
my dear, was this in the beginning’ (Chānd 6.2.1 ⁴).
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be objected· The doctrine of pre-existent effect is not a
more reasonable one. Why? On account of the designation of its
¹ Śrī. B. 2.1.17, p.47, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.1.17, p. 28, Parts 7 and 8.
² Ś, R, Bh. Correct quotation: “Asad eva”. Vide Chānd. 3.19.1, p. 175.
³ Ś, Bh.
⁴ Ś, R, Bh, B.

294 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 2 1. 17.
ADH. 6.]
non-existence prior to creation, in the text · "The non-existent,
verily, was this in the beginning" (Chānd. 3.19 1),—
(We reply ·) "no", why ? Because there is "such a designation"
"on account of a different attribute". That is, the attribute of having
name and form unmanifest is different from the attibute of having
name and form manifest, and it is because of this different attribute
that the world is designated thus in the text · "The non-existent,
verily, was this in the beginning" (Chānd 3 19.1), but is never
denoted to be non-existent by nature
If it be asked Whence is this known ? We reply · 'From the
complementary passage.' For the complementary passage · "That
was existent" (Chānd. 3 19 1), refers to the topic of our discussion,
viz. the world, by the term 'that' and from this it is known that the
term 'non-existent' in the beginning denotes the subtle reality with
name and form unmanifest.
The author states another reason for the pre-existence of the
effect, viz "From reasoning" That is, the existence of the effect
is ascertained from reason as well. To the question: What is that
reason whereby the existence of the effect is ascertained ? We reply:
On our view, names and forms, knowable by means of the evidence
of direct perception and the rest, are all real, on account of being
perceived. An agent, viz a potter, makes a pot out of a lump of
clay that is existent Here, like the lump of clay, the existence of the
pot, too, is known from direct perception. Hence, the activity of
the agent, too, is not useless. If it be objected that as the pot already
exists, like the lump of clay, the activity of the agent has no meaning,—
(we reply .) not so, since its purpose is simply manifestation. The pot
which was unmanifest before is made manifest, hence the activity
of the agent is not useless. The names and forms, mentioned in the
Veda, are used just as they were before ¹ It should be known that,
on our view, the conventional usage of names and forms is not un-
precedented. The origin of a non-existent effect, on the other hand,
does not fit in, since the origin of a barley-sprout from fire is never seen.
It cannot be said that although fire has no power of producing such
an effect, it has, nonetheless, the power of producing sparks,—
for, in an effect, produced from gold and the rest of a known weight,
―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――
¹ Vide V.K 1.3 28–30.

[sū. 2. 1. 17.
ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 295
a different weight is never found.¹ Likewise, the sparks of fire,
which are its evolutes and known through the evidence of direct
perception, are perceived by all,—there being no evidence for the
imaginary doctrine of a power producing unprecedented objects.
Hence the doctrine of a non-existent effect ² is unreasonable. The
activity of the agent, too, is meaningless on this view, since the
activities of an agent in connection with the making of a pot,—viz.
digging earth, pounding it, placing it and so on,—all relate to the
material cause. In the absence of the material cause, with regard
to what should the agent act, seeing that the effect, viz the pot and
the rest, are not produced then, and that, in that case, the conse-
quence will be the origin of the pot through mere activity, even in the
absence of the lump of clay? All this should be considered by the
wise.
The manifold controversies with regard to this point are not
mentioned here for fear of unduly tiring those who desire for release.
In the case under discussion, on the other hand, since Brahman
possesses infinite powers, everything is unobjectionable.
The author states once more another reason for the existence
of the effect, thus "And from another text". The other text is the
text aptly teaching the pre-existence of the effect, viz. " 'The existent
alone, my dear, was this in the beginning' " (Chānd. 6.2.1), which is
other than the above quoted text, viz: 'The non-existent, verily,
was the beginning" (Chānd 3.19.1) Because of this too, it is the
(pre-) existent effect alone that originates,—this is the sense
COMPARISON
Śaṁkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva
They break this sūtra into two different sūtras, viz. "Asad-
vyapadeśāt . . vākya-śeṣāt" and "Yukteḥ śabdāntarāc ca".³
Interpretation same.
¹ I e. the weight of the gold ear-ring is the same as that of the gold from
which it is made. This shows that the cause and the effect are non-different.
² Asat-kārya-vāda.
³ Ś.B. 2.1.17 and 18, p. 475; Bh. B. 2.1.17 and 18. 100, 101; G.B. 2.1.17
and 18.