द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

102 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
addressed ourselves to our task. One of the tactics we fol-
lowed at the time, consisted in summoning frequent meetings
of Congress organisations throughout the country and
asking for a reversal of the resolutions passed at the Gaya
Congress. At first our party used to be defeated at such
meetings but we gradually made headway and when our
party was able to secure a majority in one place, the news
would encourage our fellow-workers in other places.
After preliminary propaganda had been done all over
India, the first Swarajist Conference was held in March at
Allahabad at the house of Pandit Motilal Nehru. The
constitution and plan of campaign of the Swaraj Party was
drawn up at the Conference. When the constitution was
being discussed, a controversy arose with regard to the
ultimate aim of the Swaraj Party. Was Dominion Status to
be the goal of the Party or Complete Independence? On this
point the constitution of the Congress was not clear. It
merely stated that Swaraj was our goal but did not define
what was meant by Swaraj. As the Swaraj Party was more
practical, it wanted to define clearly what Swaraj meant, but
a complete agreement was not possible on the question,
because there were two groups among the Swarajists. It was
therefore decided, as a compromise, to declare in the con-
stitution that the 'immediate' objective of the Party was the
attainment of Dominion Status. Thus was the conflict
between the young and the old settled for the time being.
The Swarajist Conference over, Mr. Das set out on a long
tour in South India. It was a tremendously uphill work.
The Madras Presidency was at the time one of the strong-
holds of Gandhiism and Mr. Das deliberately undertook to
storm that citadel first. In spite of the grilling heat of a
South Indian summer he had a very successful tour. His
success there had repercussions in other parts of the country.
On his return to Calcutta he undertook the direction of the
propaganda in Bengal with very good results. About this
time the party decided to requisition frequent meetings of the
All-India Congress Committee. At each successive meeting
it was found that the votes of the Swarajists were increasing.
By the middle of the year 1923, such progress was made

THE SWARAJIST REVOLT 103
that the Working Committee (the Cabinet of the Congress)
composed entirely of 'no-changers,' could no longer command
a majority in the All-India Congress Committee and had
therefore to resign. But though the 'no-changers' were not
strong enough to hold office, neither was the Swaraj Party.
So a third party, which in the absence of a better name may
be called the 'Centre Party,' came into office. This party did
not accept the Swarajist plan but they were not die-hard
Gandhiists either. They advocated some sort of under-
standing between the two rival groups in the Congress. About
the same time the 'no-changers' were also defeated in Bengal
and in the Bengal Congress Committee, a Centre Party,
which was under the influence of the Swarajists, came into
office. Under this arrangement, Moulana Akram Khan
became the President of the Bengal Congress Committee.
But the former Secretary, Dr. P. C. Ghosh, refused to hand
over office. Therefore, two rival Congress Committees began
to function simultaneously, each claiming to be the represen-
tative body. Some months elapsed before the constitutional
question was settled by the Working Committee, when a
decision was given in favour of the Committee of which
Moulana Akram Khan was the president.
In most provinces, especially in Bengal, feelings between
the two parties were exceedingly bitter, though their aim
was a common one, namely to win Swaraj for India. The
prevailing bitterness made responsible Congressmen think
seriously as to how they could bring about some sort of
compromise between the warring groups. Then came the
suggestion to hold a special session of the Congress in Delhi
in September, 1923. This decision was a blow for the sup-
porters of Gandhiji, because the Swarajists were sure to press
their plan at the Delhi Congress once again and with better
chances of winning than they had at Gaya. Moulana Abul
Kalam Azad, one of the most intelligent and distinguished
Mohammedan leaders, was elected President of the Delhi
Congress and in his presidential speech he advocated the
Swarajist policy of contesting the elections and carrying on
the fight within the legislatures.
Shortly before the Delhi Congress, Moulana Mohammed

104 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
Ali, the younger and more influential of the Ali brothers and
Dr. Kitchlew, the well-known Punjab leader, were released
from prison. Their arrival was welcomed by the 'No-Change'
Party whose policy and action they supported. Nevertheless,
the Swarajists had made so much progress that nothing could
hamper them any more. Deshbandhu Das attended the
Congress at the head of a large contingent of delegates and the
Bengal votes served to turn the scales. As soon as it was
clear that the Swarajists would win the day, the 'No-Change'
Party agreed to a compromise. Moreover, Moulana Moham-
med Ali claimed to have received some secret message (which
he called 'wireless message') from the Mahatma, asking him
to bring about a compromise between the rival Congress
groups. Therefore, without much wrangling, a compromise
resolution was passed at the special Congress in Delhi in
September, 1923, to the effect that Congressmen were per-
mitted to take part in the forthcoming elections and carry
on a uniform, continuous and consistent opposition against
the Government within the legislatures, but the Congress
as an organisation would have no responsibility in the
matter.
The Swarajists left Delhi overjoyed. After nine months
of hard and untiring work in the teeth of opposition and in
the face of considerable unpopularity, they had won the day.
But they could not rest on their oars. They had barely two
months' time to prepare for the forthcoming elections. And
they had a tough fight in front of them.
Luck, however, favours the brave. So it did the Swarajists.
In spite of gloomy forecasts they had remarkable success.
In the Central Provinces, the election returns were excellent
and it was clear that by their obstructive tactics the Swarajists
would be able to paralyse the work of the Local Legislative
Council. The election returns for Bengal were also encourag-
ing and for the Indian Legislative Assembly a strong con-
tingent of Swarajists was returned. By mutual agreement it
was arranged that Pandit Motilal Nehru would lead the
Swaraj Party in the Assembly, while the Deshbandhu would
lead the Party in the Bengal Legislative Council, where he
was hopeful of bringing about a constitutional deadlock.

THE SWARAJIST REVOLT 105
The success of the Swarajists in capturing the elected
seats in the central and provincial legislatures was followed
by similar success in other directions. The elections to the
local bodies (municipalities and district boards) in the United
Provinces were held in 1923 and under the direction of Pandit
Motilal Nehru the Swaraj Party in that province had con-
siderable success and as a result, many of the municipalities
and district boards came under Swarajist control. In the
field of journalism, too, the Swarajists made much progress.
In Calcutta, the Deshbandhu launched his daily paper
Forward in October, soon after his victory at Delhi. As some
of the organisers of the paper were suddenly put into prison
without trial, I was entrusted with the organisation of the
paper. Though the launching of the paper entailed very hard
work on our part, success followed rapidly and in its career,
the paper was able to keep pace with the growing popularity
and strength of the Party. Within a short time Forward
came to hold a leading position among the nationalist
journals in the country. Its articles were forceful, its news
service varied and up-to-date and the paper developed a
special skill in the art of discovering and exposing official
secrets.
During 1923 the movement was on the whole of a con-
stitutional nature with the exception of a civil-disobedience
(or Satyagraha) campaign in Nagpur. The authorities in
Nagpur prohibited the carrying of national flags along certain
streets in Nagpur. As a protest against this order, processions
were sent into the prohibited area with flags, etc. The cam-
paign went on for some months and a large number of people
were sent to prison. The issue soon became an All-India
one, because the order in question was regarded as an insult
to the National Flag and people began to pour in from all
parts of the country in order to defy the order and court
imprisonment. Ultimately, better counsels prevailed in
Government House and a compromise was arrived at, whereby
the demand of the people in this connection was substantially
conceded. It should be observed in this connection that the
above campaign—generally known as the Nagpur Flag
Satyagraha Campaign—was run by the orthodox Gandhiists

106 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
who were anxious to demonstrate that the Gandhi method
had not become sterile and was still capable of stirring up
the country.
While the Swarajists represented the main body of rebels
against orthodox Gandhiism in 1923, the same year saw the
birth of another revolt against Gandhiism which was to
acquire greater importance in the years to come. Being dis-
satisfied with the Gandhian ideology, a small group in
Bombay under the leadership of Mr. Dange,¹ took to study-
ing Socialist literature. They had a club of their own and
published a weekly journal for preaching Socialism. Among the
Congress leaders the only patron they had at the time was the
late Mr. Vithalbhai Patel. They soon took up labour organi-
sation in Bombay and before many years elapsed, they
became the first group of Communists in India. Following
Bombay, a similar group was started some time later in
Bengal under the name of the "Workers and Peasants'
Party"—but it was never able to acquire as much importance
or make as much headway, as the Bombay Group. The
reason is not far to seek. Bengal, of which Calcutta is both
the heart and the brain, has for a very long time been one
of the strongholds of the nationalist movement. There the
movement is based on an influential and patriotic petit-bour-
geois class. Moreover, Bengal does not possess an indigenous
and influential capitalist class, as does Bombay. Consequently,
class-differentiation has never appeared in Bengal in that
sharp and acute form in which it has appeared in Bombay.
The petit-bourgeois element is not so strong or influential
in Bombay as it is in Bengal and the national movement
there is of more recent growth than in Bengal. In these
circumstances it is not to be wondered at that the intellectual
revolt against Gandhiism in Bombay should take a Socialist
or Communist turn. In Bengal, on the other hand, the
revolt against Gandhiism took a revolutionary more than a
Communist turn. This phenomenon we shall consider in a
later chapter on 'the Bengal Situation.'
¹ Mr. Dange was convicted in 1925 in connection with the Cawnpore
Bolshevik Conspiracy Case and again in connection with the Meerut
Communist Conspiracy Case in 1933, after a trial lasting nearly four years.

THE SWARAJIST REVOLT 107
We have already seen in the previous chapter that when
in March, 1922, Mr. Montagu resigned from the Cabinet, the
forces of reaction got the upper hand both in England and in
India. The Coalition Cabinet of Mr. Lloyd George soon came
to an end and a General Election took place in October 1922,
which brought the Conservatives into power. In November
1922, Sir Basil Blackett was appointed Finance Member to
the Government of India. One of his first deeds was to
double the Salt Tax in February, 1923, when he produced his
first budget. Now the Salt Tax is traditionally unpopular
in India—partly because the people are prevented by law
from making salt out of the soil or the water given them by
nature and partly because the Salt Tax hits the poor hardest.
The doubling of the Salt Tax therefore, was the worst move
which the Government could have taken. The Indian
Legislative Assembly promptly threw out this provision of
the Finance Member but the Viceroy, Lord Reading, as
promptly restored it by virtue of his power of certification.
In June, the Government gave further offence by appointing
a Commission—called the Lee Commission—to inquire into
the status, position and grievances of the All-India services
which are manned mainly by Britishers. Everyone felt at the
time that the only result of the appointment of this com-
mission would be to enhance the pay and emoluments of
Britishers in India.¹ Thus, while the Government showed
a readiness to incur more expenditure in order to please
Britishers—they showed reluctance in curtailing unnecessary
expenditure, though the Inchcape Committee had made
several useful recommendations in this behalf.² In addition
to this measure, the Government of India took another step
which was severely criticised at the time and which roused
resentment in certain parts of the country. This was the
deposition of the Maharaja of Nabha from his throne (or
Guddee). Though the Government made certain allegations
¹ This apprehension was fully justified when the Lee Commission sub-
mitted its report and the Government of India gave effect to the recom-
mendations in a lavish manner.
² A Retrenchment Committee presided over by Lord Inchcape had been
appointed by the Government for suggesting possible lines of economy.
This Committee submitted its report in March, 1923.

108 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
against the Maharaja as a justification for their action—the
popular feeling in the country was that the Maharaja was
neither better nor worse than the general run of Maharajas
in India and that he was deposed solely because of his avowedly
nationalistic views. Since the Maharaja was a Sikh and he
was reported to have cherished sympathy for the Akali
movement, his deposition roused a great deal of indignation
among the Sikh community.
While the forces of reaction were gaining in strength
in official circles and the Swarajists were preparing their great
onslaught on the bureaucratic citadel, the Indian Legislative
Assembly, even without the nationalists, was neither tame nor
inactive. During the year, resolutions demanding a speedy
constitutional advance were passed twice. Moreover, towards
the end of its term, the Assembly passed a Reciprocity Bill
which was introduced by Dr. (now Sir) H. S. Gour. This
Bill was aimed at the Dominions and Colonies of the British
Empire where Indians were not given equal rights and it
provided for retaliation against all those countries, which
placed disabilities on Indians, inflicting on their nationals in
India the same disabilities which Indians had to suffer there.
This Bill was the result of the injustice meted out to Indians
in the Crown Colony of Kenya in Africa. In Kenya where
the Indian settlers outnumbered the white settlers by three
to one, the latter wanted to usurp all political power and
exclude the former altogether. In the Kenya legislature they
had a law passed giving the vote to all white settlers above
twenty-one. They refused at first to extend the vote to
Indian settlers, but ultimately offered them a separate
electorate with a more limited franchise. This offer was
declined by the Indians because it would put the stamp of
second-class citizenship on them. The Kenya Indians appealed
to India for help and in April 1923 the Rt. Hon. V. S. Sastri¹
led a deputation to England to plead their cause before the
authorities at Whitehall. A fairly satisfactory agreement was
drawn up between the India Office and the Colonial Office
. ¹ Mr. V. S. Sastri who became the head of the Servants of India Society
after Mr. Gokhale's death had been made a Privy Councillor, while Mr.
Montagu was Secretary of State for India.

THE SWARAJIST REVOLT 109
—called the Wood-Winterton¹ Agreement but the Tory
Cabinet did not give effect to it. Mr. Sastri therefore had to
return disappointed. After his return to India, the Recipro-
city Bill was introduced in the Assembly by Dr. H. S. Gour.
The above picture of India in 1923 would not be complete
without reference to some of the communal dissensions
which appeared in 1923 and which were to assume a more
ugly shape in the years to come. Punjab was the scene of
most of the troubles in 1923. Early in the year there was a
Hindu-Moslem riot at Multan and this was followed by a
similar riot in Amritsar, near the scene of the Jallianwalla
Bagh massacre in 1919. About this time, Mr. (now Sir)
Mian Fazli Hussain became a minister in the Punjab and his
extreme partiality for Moslems in the matter of appointments
to public services caused considerable heart-burning among
Sikhs and Hindus. Later in the year, a movement was started
among Indian Moslems in opposition to the Indian National
Congress—called 'Tanzeem' and 'Tabligh'—which aimed at
organising the Moslems as a strong and virile community.
This movement gained adherents for some time but before
long it fell into disfavour and was replaced by communal or
sectarian organisations of a different kind. While the
above movement was going on among the Moslems, the
Hindus were not altogether idle. Their communal organi-
sation—called the Hindu Mahasabha—sought to strengthen
itself by deciding at its annual meeting in August to admit the
depressed classes to all the rights and privileges enjoyed
by high-caste Hindus. Corresponding to the 'Tanzeem' and
'Tabligh' movement among the Moslems, a 'Sangathan' move-
ment was started among the Hindus. Further, in order to
reclaim those Hindus who for some reason had left the Hindu
fold in the past, the 'Suddhi' (or Purification) movement was
started. By performing the Suddhi ceremony, it was made
possible for a non-Hindu to become a Hindu. The apostle
of this movement was Swami Shraddhananda,² a highly-
¹ The Hon. Edward Wood, better known as Lord Irwin and now as Lord
Halifax was the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies—while Lord
Winterton was the Under-Secretary of State for India.
² Swami Shraddhananda was subsequently murdered by a Moslem
fanatic probably out of his resentment at the Suddhi movement.

110 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
respected leader of the Hindu Mahasabha, through whose
influence thousands of non-Hindus, including Moslems and
Christians, were converted to Hinduism. About this time,
the Swami was endeavouring to reconvert the Malkana
Rajputs who had originally been Hindus but had subsequently
embraced the Islamic faith and this attempt caused annoyance
to many of the Moslem leaders.
While the communal storm was brewing in India, the Ali
brothers remained true to their nationalist creed. Moulana
Mohammed Ali, the younger brother, was elected to preside
over the annual session of the Congress at Coconada in
Madras Presidency. There was no heated controversy as at
Gaya and the deliberations took place in an atmosphere of
extreme cordiality. There was, however, a breeze over the
Hindu-Moslem question which fortunately did not develop
into a storm. Deshbandhu Das had drawn up a Hindu-
Moslem Pact for settlement of the communal question in
Bengal and he desired the Congress to put the seal of approval
on it. The Coconada Congress, however, did not do so and
the Pact was rejected on the alleged ground that it showed
partiality for the Moslems and violated the principles of
Nationalism. Another Pact which had been drawn up by
Lala Lajpat Rai and Dr. M. A. Ansari for the settlement of
the communal question was referred by the Coconada Con-
gress to the All-India Congress Committee for consideration.
These pacts indicated that the better minds among the Con-
gress leaders had begun to realise the possibility of a communal
rift and the necessity for making some sort of settlement
before the breach widened. But sufficiently speedy or suffi-
ciently drastic action was not taken, with the result that the
differences did become more acute and grave and the country
had to face a communal storm as soon as the political tension
created by the Swaraj Party subsided after the death of
Deshbandhu Das in June, 1925.
From the Nationalist point of view, the year 1923 had begun
badly but it ended well. In January, there was division and
depression. In December, there was hope and confidence.
Despite signs of communal disturbance here and there, the
political barometer had once again begun to rise. In England

THE SWARAJIST REVOLT III
too, the forces of reaction had received a temporary setback.
In May, 1923, Mr. Baldwin replaced Mr. Bonar Law as
Premier and in November of the same year he appealed to
the country on the issue of Protection versus Free Trade. The
Conservatives were thrown out of office as a consequence
and the beginning of 1924 saw a Labour Government installed
in office for the first time in British History. The Near East
policy of the previous cabinets had failed. Before the end of
1922, Mustapha Kemal Pasha had succeeded in driving the
Greeks out of Anatolia. Before the end of 1923 he succeeded
in driving the Allied troops out of Constantinople. And by
March 1924, he felt sufficiently strong to abolish the Khalifate
altogether and bring into existence a new and powerful
Turkey.

CHAPTER V
DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER (1924-25)
THE year 1924 opened with an outlook hopeful in every
direction, but the Swarajists had no time to rest. The
elections to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, the largest
municipality in India, were to be held in March. Thanks to
the Minister for Local Self-Government, Sir Surendranath
Bannerji, the Calcutta Municipal Act had been amended in
1923. Therein, larger powers had been conferred on the
municipality, the franchise had been considerable enlarged
and the elective element strengthened. Under the con-
stitution, it was possible for the Swaraj Party to capture the
municipal administration if they were successful at the polls.
An intensive campaign was therefore started early in 1924
with the object of capturing the elected seats. So great was
the enthusiasm of the people who attended in their thousands
the meetings addressed by the Swarajist leaders that the
election forecast was a very favourable one. As a matter of
fact the Swaraj Party was returned with a very safe majority,
a large number of the successful Swarajist candidates being
Moslems. This result was all the more creditable because the
elections were held on the basis of separate electorate, whereby
Hindu voters alone could vote for Hindu candidates and Mos-
lem voters for Moslem candidates. At the first meeting of the
newly-elected municipal councillors, Deshbandhu Das was
elected Mayor and Mr. Shaheed Suhrawady, a Moslem
gentleman, Deputy-Mayor. The Corporation soon after
appointed me as the Chief Executive Officer, that is, the head
of the municipal administration.¹ Though my appointment
to this important post at the age of twenty-seven was generally
¹ Under the new constitution of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation
there was a division of function—the Chief Executive Officer being the
head of the administration and the Mayor being the head of the Corporation
as a whole. Under the old constitution both these functions were combined
in the ‘Chairman’.
112

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 113
approved in Swarajist circles, it did not fail to cause a certain
amount of heart-burning in some circles within the Party.
To the Government it gave great annoyance and it was
not without a great deal of hesitation that they decided to
give their approval, as they were required to do under the
Statute.
The election of the Deshbandhu as the first Mayor under
the new constitution symbolised our capture of the Calcutta
Municipality and was attended by popular demonstrations.
Under the new regime, new measures calculated to benefit the
citizens, were set in motion in quick succession. The newly-
elected Swarajist Councillors and Aldermen, including the
Mayor, all came dressed in home-made Khadi. Among the
employees of the Municipality, Khadi became the official
uniform. Many of the streets and parks were renamed after
India’s greatest men. For the first time an Education Depart-
ment was started and a distinguished Indian graduate of
Cambridge¹ was put in charge. Free primary schools for
boys and girls sprang up all over the city. Health-Associations,
financed by the Municipality, were started in every ward of
the city by public-spirited citizens for carrying on health
propaganda among the people. Dispensaries were opened by
the Municipality in the different districts for giving free
medical treatment to the poor. In purchasing stores, pre-
ference was given to Swadeshi (i.e., home-made) goods. In
making new appointments, the claims of Moslems and other
minorities were recognised for the first time. Infant clinics
were established in different parts of the city and to each
clinic was added a milk-kitchen for supplying milk free to the
children of the poor. Last, but not least, the Municipality
arranged to give civic receptions to Nationalist leaders like
Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Motilal Nehru and Mr. V. J. Patel,
when they visited the city and the previous custom of giving
civic receptions to Viceroys, Governors and officials was dis-
continued once for all.
The above measures adopted for promoting the welfare of
‘¹ K. P. Chattopadhyaya who has continued to hold office till the present
day. At present there are about 40,000 boys and girls in the Municipal
Schools.
H

114 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
the citizens brought about a new civic consciousness.¹
People for the first time began to look upon the Municipality
as their own institution and upon Municipal officers and
employees as Public Servants and not bureaucrats. But the
British vested interests in the city felt that they were losing
their importance and that they could no longer dominate the
Municipality. At that time nearly all the departmental heads
were Britishers, but with one or two exceptions, I had no
difficulty whatsoever, in dealing with them. The majority of
them were quite loyal to the new Swarajist administration and
some of them were even enthusiastic in praising it. Though
within a few months the efficiency of the administration was
considerably raised and citizens' complaints were attended to
more promptly than before, the official bloc in the Corporation,
as also the Government, continued their policy of opposition,
with the result that constant friction used to take place. In
the matter of appointments, they were opposed to the Swarajist
policy of doing justice to the minorities. With regard to the
drainage problem of the city, they were also in conflict with
the Swarajists. The scheme sponsored by the Government
for the new drainage works was rejected by the Swarajists as
being unscientific and useless. In this they had the support
of the Drainage Engineer of the Municipality, the late Mr.
O. J. Wilkinson and of the Director of Public Health, Dr.
C. A. Bentley, while the Chief Engineer, Mr. J. R. Coats,
was on the side of the Government. The drainage controversy
between the Municipality and the Government continued for
a long time and it took the Government ten years to give in
to the Municipality on the drainage question.²
The doings of the Swaraj Party in the Calcutta Corporation
would not have embarrassed the Government so much but
for the fact that there was a simultaneous pressure on the latter
from many quarters. In the Indian Legislative Assembly the
Swaraj Party was fairly strong and on behalf of the Party,
notice of a resolution was given demanding the release of
Mahatma Gandhi. Mahatma Gandhi had fallen seriously
¹ To give expression to this new consciousness, a weekly journal, called
the Calcutta Municipal Gazette was started by the Municipality.
² The drainage scheme which has been adopted now was drawn up by the
Indian Chief Engineer, Dr. B. N. Dey, who is still holding that office.

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 115
ill on January 12th and had been operated upon. This
news had caused anxiety and alarm from one end of the
country to the other and there was a very strong public
demand for his release. On the morning of February 5th,
the day on which the above resolution was to be moved,
the Mahatma was quietly released. A few days later, on
February 8th, Pandit Motilal Nehru, the leader of the
Swaraj Party in the Assembly, moved a resolution demand-
ing that a Round Table Conference be convened for drawing
up a Constitution for India, establishing full responsible
Government and that the new Constitution be placed before a
newly-elected Indian Legislature and be submitted before
the British Parliament for being embodied in a statute. Reply-
ing to this resolution on behalf of the Government of India,
Sir Malcolm Hailey, promised an investigation into the
complaints against and criticism of, the Constitution. If
after the investigation it was found that there was possibility
of constitutional advance within the four corners of the Act,
the Government would have no objection in making recom-
mendations to the British Cabinet to that effect. But if on
the other hand, further constitutional advance involved an
amendment of the Government of India Act, 1919, then the
Government could not promise any action at that stage.
This reply was extremely disappointing and as a retort, the
Assembly threw out some of the demands for grants and
refused leave to introduce the entire Finance Bill. The
Finance Bill had therefore to be restored with the help of
the special powers of certification vested in the Viceroy.
The debate over the demand for a Round Table Conference
was followed by the appointment of a Committee with the
following terms of reference—to inquire into the difficulties
arising from or the defects inherent in the working of the
Government of India Act, 1919; to investigate the feasibility
and desirability of securing remedies for such difficulties and
defects, consistent with the structure, policy and purpose of
the Act, either by action taken under the Act and the rules or
by such amendments of the Act as appear necessary to rectify
any administrative imperfections. This Committee was
presided over by the Home Member, Sir Alexander Muddi-

116 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
man and among the members were Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru
(Allahabad), Sir Sivaswami Aiyer (Madras), Mr. M. A.
Jinnah (Bombay) and Dr. Paranjpye (Poona)—all of them
being Liberal (Moderate) politicians—who submitted a
minority report. The Committee as a whole reported that
there were serious defects in the Constitution and in the
manner in which it had been worked. The majority of the
members, consisting mostly of officials, recommended a
number of minor modifications which would help the working
of the Constitution. The minority reported that such modi-
fications would be of little avail and that a satisfactory opera-
tion of the Constitution would be possible only when it was
revised with a view to introducing responsible government
in the provinces and at least a measure of responsibility in
the Central Government. It should be noted in this con-
nection that the Swaraj Party in the Assembly did not
co-operate with the Muddiman Committee in any way and
the report of the Committee was altogether disappointing
from the Swarajist point of view.
While the major issues were being tackled by its members
in the Assembly, the Swaraj Party was following obstructive
tactics in all the provincial legislatures. In the Assembly
there was hardly any room for obstruction or deadlock be-
cause the Viceroy could easily override the legislature by his
special powers of ‘veto’ and ‘certification.’ Moreover, all
the departments of the Central Government were adminis-
tered by members who were under the full control of the
Viceroy and were neither elected members of the Assembly
nor removable by a vote of that body. In the provinces, on
the other hand, the departments called ‘transferred’ depart-
ments were administered by ‘ministers’ who were elected
members of the provincial legislature and were subject to the
vote of that body—while the other departments called
‘reserved’ departments, were administered by members who
were quite independent of the vote of the legislature.¹ The
Swarajist tactics in the provincial legislatures therefore con-
sisted in attacking the ministers and their ‘transferred’
departments. The salaries of the ministers would be either
¹ Because of this dual system, the constitution was called ‘diarchy’.

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 117
rejected altogether, in which case no ministers could be
appointed at all—or votes of no-confidence in the ministers
would be moved repeatedly so that no set of ministers could
continue in office long. At the same time attempts would be
made to throw out the Budget of the transferred departments
which could not be restored by certification. By such tactics,
the Governor of the province would be forced to suspend the
working of the transferred departments, take over the
administration into his own hands and go on ruling as he
would in the pre-reform days. In the Central Provinces
Legislative Council where the Swarajists had an absolute
majority—the entire Budget was thrown out without any
difficulty and no ministers could therefore be appointed.
In Bengal the situation was somewhat similar to that in the
Central Provinces. The salaries of the ministers were rejected
and repeated attempts to restore them proved unavailing. The
ministers had therefore to lay down their office. Thus, in
the Central Provinces and in Bengal, the working of the
constitution was rendered impossible. It is not possible to
describe the enthusiasm of the public when diarchy was
overthrown in these two provinces. It was regarded as a
great triumph for the Swarajists and this victory brought a
sense of elation all over the country. In 1920, the Congress
had tried to paralyse the new constitution, by boycotting the
polls but this attempt had failed, because not a single seat
had remained vacant and undesirable men had flooded the
legislatures. In 1924, on the other hand, the Swarajists, by
carrying the fight inside the legislatures, were able to wreck
the constitution, in at least some of the provinces.
People belonging to the Liberal Party and even 'No-
Changer' Congressmen have not sometimes been able to under-
stand the utility of the Swarajist policy of constitutional
obstruction. They argue that if ministers are allowed to
continue in office they could do more good than if those
departments are taken over by the Governor and his officials.
As against that, the Swarajists argue that three years' exper-
ience (from 1920 to 1923) has shown that there is hardly any
scope for useful work for a minister under the Constitution
of 1919. All the more important departments, like public

118 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
security, justice, prisons, finance, etc., are in the hands of
officials and the budget allotments for these departments are
made first. What is left is handed over to the ministers and
this amount is so inadequate that it barely suffices for their
minimum establishment, rendering it quite impossible to
undertake nation-building work on a decent scale. Moreover,
the principal officials working under the Ministers, including
their secretaries, cannot be subjected to disciplinary action
by them and being quite independent of the legislature in
the matter of their pay and emoluments, they are not respon-
sive to popular sentiment. In these circumstances, the
the unhampered working of the constitution cannot benefit
the country in any way—whereas successful obstruction not
only brings pressure to bear on the Government by putting
obstacles in its path, but also develops a spirit of resistance
in the country as a whole. As a matter of fact, when the
constitution of the Swaraj Party was first drawn up in
March 1923, it was explicitly stated in the preamble that
the object of the Swarajist policy was to create an atmos-
phere of resistance to the bureaucracy, without which the
Government could never be made to respond to popular
demands.
While the Swarajists were enjoying the first flush of
victory, the Labour Secretary of State for India, Lord
Olivier, in a striking speech delivered in the House of Lords,
analysed the causes which led to the birth of Swarajism in
India. Among the causes he mentioned were—firstly, the
resolution passed by the House of Lords supporting General
Dyer, the author of the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre; secondly,
the 'steel-frame speech' of the Premier, Mr. Lloyd George,
in 1922, eulogising the Indian Civil Service; thirdly, the
doubling of the Salt Tax by the Government of India, in
1923, in the teeth of intense popular opposition and despite
the adverse vote of the Indian Legislative Assembly; and
fourthly, the injustice meted out to Indians in the Crown
Colony of Kenya in Africa. This clever and sympathetic
analysis of the causes of the Indian unrest leading to the birth
of the Swaraj Party, showed that for once at least the India
Office in London was able to appreciate public sentiment

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 119
and public opinion in India. It is to be regretted, therefore,
that this understanding was not followed up by appropriate
action.
Not content with his activities in the legislature, the
Municipality and in other directions, the Deshbandhu
launched another important movement at this time—the
Tarakeswar Satyagraha movement. Not far from Calcutta,
at a place called Tarakeswar, there is an old temple of 'Baba
Taraknath' or 'Shiva.' As in the case of other holy shrines,
there was considerable property attached to the temple, which
had been endowed in order to provide for its upkeep. Fol-
lowing the Hindu custom, there was a trustee, called the
Mohunt, in charge of the temple and the attached property.
Though the Mohunts are expected to live a chaste and
abstemious life, there were allegations against the Mohunt of
Tarakeswar with regard to his personal character and to his
administration of the endowed property. As Tarakeswar
happens to be one of the most holy places of pilgrimage in
Bengal and is visited every year by people from all parts of
the province, the allegations made against the Mohunt were
widely known. After the success of the Akali movement in
the Punjab, pressure was brought to bear on the Bengal
Congress Committee for starting a similar movement at
Tarakeswar. Notices were served on the Mohunt calling upon
him to mend his ways but as these attempts were of no avail,
in April 1924, the Deshbandhu launched a movement for
taking peaceful possession of the temple and the attached
property, with a view to placing them under the administra-
tion of a public committee. The Mohunt appealed to the
Government for help and as soon as volunteers began to
move towards the temple and the palace of the Mohunt—the
police appeared on the scene. The usual Satyagraha scenes
were re-enacted at Tarakeswar—peaceful volunteers moving
up from one side and the police attacking them mercilessly on
the other and occasionally making arrests. Owing to the
intervention of the Government, the issue became a political
one. Once again, in order to set an example to the people,
the Deshbandhu sent his son to prison at the head of the
volunteers. Within a short time, the movement became

120 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
extremely popular and there was a warm response from every
corner of the province.¹
In May, 1924, the annual conference of Bengal Congress-
men, called the Provincial Conference, was held at a place
called Sirajganj. Prior to this the Deshbandhu had drawn up
an agreement between Hindus and Moslems, covering
religious as well as political questions, but it had been rejected
by the Coconada Congress in December 1923, on the ground
that it conceded too much to the Moslems. This agreement,
known as the Bengal Pact—was placed before the Sirajganj
Conference for ratification. There was a stormy debate and
the political opponents of the Deshbandhu, joined by some
reactionary Hindus, put up a formidable opposition. Never-
theless, the passionate eloquence of the leader carried the
day and the Bengal Pact was adopted by a large majority.
After this, another resolution was discussed and passed which
was to stir up a hornet's nest in the days to come. This was
the Gopinath Saha resolution. Some months earlier, a young
student, named Gopinath Saha, had attempted to assassinate
the Commissioner of Police of Calcutta, Sir Charles
Tegart. Through mistaken identity, he shot at and killed
another Englishman, Mr. Day. At the trial before the High
Court of Calcutta, Saha made a statement which created a
sensation at the time. He stated in effect that he really had
intended to murder the Police Commissioner and expressed
his sincere sorrow for having killed the wrong person. He
was glad to pay with his life and hoped that every drop of his
blood would sow the seeds of freedom in every Indian home.
Saha was sentenced to death by the High Court and duly
hanged. But, after his death, resolutions were passed in
several meetings in Bengal appreciating his courage and
spirit of sacrifice, while condemning his action. A similar
¹ The Satyagraha Campaign went on for several months. The Mohunt
ultimately was forced to come to a compromise with Deshbandhu C. R.
Das and an agreement was drawn up whereby the temple and the major
portion of the property was to be handed over to a public committee.
This agreement had to be placed before a court of law but at this stage a
third party, under the name of the Brahman Sabha, raised objections. While
the whole matter was under consideration, the Deshbandhu died. After
his unfortunate death, the agreement was set at nought and the result
of the Satyagraha Campaign was nullified,

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER ' 121
resolution was unanimously passed at the Sirajganj Con-
ference and it caused considerable annoyance to the Govern-
ment.
While these stirring events were happening in Bengal,
interesting developments were taking place elsewhere.
Mahatma Gandhi, as we have already seen, was released on
February 5th. He went to a seaside resort near Bombay for
rest and change of climate. After some weeks he was able
to take interest once again in public affairs and gradually to
assume his normal activities. Speculation at once arose as to
what attitude Gandhiji would take up with regard to the
Swaraj Party. On principle he was of course bitterly opposed
to the Swarajist policy of ‘Council-entry,’ nevertheless, he
did not adopt a hostile attitude. It may be that he found the
position of the Swarajists to be too strong in the country to
be able to overthrow them and so he bowed to the inevitable.
Or it may be that he felt that the changed circumstances in
the country warranted a change in tactics. Be that as it may,
he met the Swarajist leaders, Deshbandhu Das and Pandit
Motilal Nehru and arrived at an understanding with them.
This agreement, known as the Gandhi-Das Pact, was to the
effect that the Mahatma was to devote himself to the Khadi
Campaign, while the Swarajists were to be in charge of
the political campaign. In order to carry on his work
without any interference on the part of the Congress or the
Swaraj Party, the Mahatma was empowered to organise
an autonomous body to be called the All-India Spinners’
Association. This body was to have its own funds and its own
Secretariat.
The Swaraj Party, on the other hand, was to carry on its
work as an autonomous body independently of the Congress
and to have its own Secretariat.¹ The alliance thus struck
between the Mahatma and the Swaraj Party soon ripened into
friendship as a result of conciliatory statements made by the
former from time to time. On one occasion, for instance, he
said in his characteristic style, ‘My political conscience is in
the keeping of the Swarajists.’ On another occasion he is
¹ This agreement was ratified at the annual session of the Congress
held at Belgaum in December, over which Mahatma Gandhi presided.