पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

KUNJPURA 61
kshetra. Abdali took three days to cross the river with all his army, cannon,
elephants and other camp equipage. The place where he crossed was a little
out of the way where there was no proper ghat for landing. The army had
to cross the various streams and shallows over a distance of half a mile. Some-
times the horses would swim, at others they would wade through sands in knee-
deep water. On the other side was the silt deposited by monsoon floods.
Horses and men found themselves bogged in the soft mud. It was difficult, al-
most impossible, to take a step without sinking still deeper. This difficulty they
overcame by cutting down the various water plants and rushes growing on the
river-bank, and spreading them deep over the passage all along the route.
When these had sunk into the mud, a thatchy road was naturally built over
it by the trampling of thousands of horses and men. Had there been a daring and
resourceful guard of a few thousand troops with a few guns of precision, a
crossing would never have been possible. After safely reaching the other
bank, Ahmad Shah at once sent a small party to drive away all the Maratha
pickets on the western bank, and seize any boats they could find bound fast
at the ghats. They seem to have succeeded in collecting some, which were
used in ferrying the baggage on the second day. Ahmad Shah himself crossed
after half the army was on the other side. There were a few casualties, no
doubt, in the tumult and hurry of crossing. But at last the whole army was
safe on the other bank and began their march to Sonepat, which they reached
on the 27th October.
Next day they moved to Gannaur where Ahmad Shah halted for three²⁴
days. Baji Hari's attempt to scout must have happened during this interval.
The number of casualties in this attempt is not correctly reported anywhere,
though Kashiraj gives the figure at two thousand, and the place where they
crossed swords as near the serai of Samalkha. Bhau fell back as a result of it
and encamped at Panipat. Ahmad Shah advanced to Samalkha on 31st
October, and to Pasina the next day. A distance of some three miles was left
between the advanced posts of the two armies. The two armies came face to
face at last after four months of eying each other on the opposite banks of the
swollen Jamuna. It was seven months since Bhau had started to meet Abdali,
and here he was at last.
But for a final decision by arms, two and a half months had still to
pass. From the first of November 1760 to 14th January, 1761 the two sides
in the struggle for power put their faith in strategy and manœuvring, living in
entrenched camps.
²⁴ RAJ. 1.261.

60 PANIPAT 1761
grain is selling at seven or eight seers a rupee High class people like us had
to sell our gold and silver trinkets and live from the proceeds The climate of
Delhi has been found unsuitable to the Deccani oxen of the artillery depart
ment, and they are dying in hundreds " To escape from this dilemma, the
Maratha army had moved to Kunjpura to feed themselves and their horses, with
the consequence noted above
When Bhau moved toward the north, Abdali also sent a party to ac
cost him from the other side of the river, that party could not do anything
to save their brethren on the other side and had to see with open eyes the fall
of Kunjpura They returned to Abdali who was chafing at the result He
at once issued orders to his army and his allies to be ready for the march From
Shahdhada he moved to Luni, thence he came to Baghpat, twenty miles north
of Delhi in search of a ford for crossing But he searched in vain He chided
his Indian allies for not knowing the fords, but they pleaded their inability to
find any After two days' vain search, Ahmad Shah who was a devout Mus
lim fasted in his agony and beseeched God to point out a ford and tried all
the superstitious and religious methods of search After getting an inspiration
from that source he made his horsemen plunge into an unusual and less fre
quented part of the river and tried to cross He succeeded in the trial, though
a number of horsemen were carried away by the current before the exact
line of crossing could be fixed by driving wooden stakes in the river on the
two sides of the shallow passage and thus clearly lining the way The place
where he actually crossed is not given in histories, though all say that it was
near Baghpat A pontoon bridge used to be constructed at Baghpat in the
fair season in those days as at present, but in the rainy season the place was
not suitable for crossing as the river has a somewhat sharp fall here and con
sequently the stream turns into a torrent Where the river divides itself into
several streams and spreads over a wider area, it becomes easily fordable Such
a place Ahmad Shah seems to have found five miles to the north of old Bagh
pat near the village of Gauripur This place is mentioned in the Bhau's ballad
we have copied down from the bard of Siwa ²³ Because Ahmad Shah crossed
at this place, he could come straight to Sonepat through Kheora and could
elude the Maratha pickets placed at well known crossings such as Baghpat
Ahmad Shah could dare attempt this because he was experienced in
crossing the rivers and knew all the intricacies connected with such crossings
The Marathas seem to have never taken to such daring Big rivers seem to
have blocked their way throughout their military career They could never cross
the Ganges without the help of local allies A Najib ud daulah could always
laugh at Dattaji and keep him waiting at the ford Ahmad Shah, because he
could take such a risk with confidence, was able to entrap the Maratha
army under Sadashivrao Bhau Bhau, on the other hand, could never perform
such a feat, and hence had perforce to entrench himself at Panipat
Ahmad Shah must have begun his crossing on the 24th October, as
Bhau had received the news the next day at his first halt on the way to Kuru-

²³ BDCRI 4.3 stanza 33

CHAPTER V
PANIPAT
To JUDGE from the letters which were sent out in the first fortnight¹
from the Maratha camp at Panipat and even for a month after, the Maratha
army and its commander² seem to be quite confident of victory This seems
strange when we remember the hardships which the Maratha army had to
bear since it started for the north, seven months earlier Not that they had no
proper understanding of the strength of Abdali's army, but the spectacular vic
tory at Kunjpura and freedom from want of grain and fodder which followed
seem to have worked out a change in the despondent mood on the Maratha
side They had seen with their eyes the strength and use of Ibrahim Khan's
splendid corps which, as Kashīrāj says, 'in the twinkle of an eye smashed the
defences of Kunjpura fort and entered it in no time" Intimate friends of
Bhau like Nana Purandare and Krishna Joshi Sangmeshvarkar, are not only
confident but over-jubilant with expectancy of (what they judged as) Abdali's
sure defeat It is true that full stomachs are prone to create enthusiasm and
confidence, still it is strange to think that these intimates of Bhau who should
have known better, were writing in the vein they have done Even Bhau is
found writing in the same tone for a month more Only during the last fort-
night the crisis seems to have developed though even then Janakoji Shinde³
—writing no doubt to the revenue collector—does not betray any sign of hope
lessness when giving out the news at Panipat This is in sharp contrast with
the writing of Kashiraj and the whole tone of it The Marathi chronicles,
though they do not enumerate the events in a similar tone, are found criticizing
Bhau for his attitude during the entire struggle It is difficult to believe that
all the writers on the Maratha side were ignorant, not to understand the real
situation and the strategy of such a consumate general as Abdali, and still that
is the impression created while reading Kashiraj and even historians like Sır
Jadunath Now we know by complete analysis of the whole material that,
because the chroniclers wrote after the event, and because they wanted to shift
and fix the responsibility of the disaster on those who had not survived it, they
have assumed a sliding attitude so as dramatically to break on the rock of
final disaster But we think this methodology wrong in history, and for that
reason have not accepted chronicles as history where psychology plays a part
In the first fortnight, before Abdali could build up his line of com
munication to bring in the supplies from the Doab and beyond, his army was
definitely in a weak position, and comparatively the Maratha army was in a
better position Why Bhau did not try to decide the conflict by a bold attack
at that favourable juncture, we cannot say He seems to have put his faith
in quite a different strategy—that of tiring out Abdali and his allies and mak-
ing them fall on his well fortified, almost impregnable lines In this strategy
1 SPD 21 197, 27, Raj 1.261, 62, 64, 65, Purandare 391
2 SPD 2.134
3 Shinde 1.222.
[ 62 ]

TO FACE PAGE 62

PĀNĪPAT VICINITY
AT PRESENT
SCALE
FURLONGS 8 4 0 1 2 3 4 MILES

मानचित्र पर प्रमुख अंकित विवरण / Prominent Text on Map:

• मुख्य स्थल / Major Town: PĀNĪPAT (पानीपत)
• नदियाँ एवं नहरें / Rivers & Canals:
  • JUMNA RIVER (यमुना नदी)
  • W. J. CANAL / WESTERN JUMNA CANAL (पश्चिमी यमुना नहर)
• दिशानिर्देश / Direction: North Indicator (उत्तर दिशा सूचक चिन्ह)
• अक्षांश एवं देशांतर / Coordinates:
  • 29° 25' N — 29° 20' N
  • 76° 55' E — 77° 10' E

CHAPTER V
PANIPAT
To judge from the letters which were sent out in the first fortnight¹
from the Maratha camp at Panipat and even for a month after, the Maratha
army and its commander² seem to be quite confident of victory This seems
strange when we remember the hardships which the Maratha army had to
bear since it started for the north, seven months earlier Not that they had no
proper understanding of the strength of Abdali's army, but the spectacular vic-
tory at Kunjpura and freedom from want of grain and fodder which followed
seem to have worked out a change in the despondent mood on the Maratha
side They had seen with their eyes the strength and use of Ibrahim Khan's
splendid corps which, as Kashiraj says, 'in the twinkle of an eye smashed the
defences of Kunjpura fort and entered it in no time" Intimate friends of
Bhau, like Nana Purandare and Krishna Joshi Sangmeshvarkar, are not only
confident but over-jubilant with expectancy of (what they judged as) Abdali's
sure defeat It is true that full stomachs are prone to create enthusiasm and
confidence, still it is strange to think that these intimates of Bhau who should
have known better, were writing in the vein they have done Even Bhau is
found writing in the same tone for a month more. Only during the last fort-
night the crisis seems to have developed though even then Janakoji Shinde³
--writing no doubt to the revenue collector--does not betray any sign of hope-
lessness when giving out the news at Panipat This is in sharp contrast with
the writing of Kashiraj and the whole tone of it The Marathi chronicles,
though they do not enumerate the events in a similar tone, are found criticizing
Bhau for his attitude during the entire struggle It is difficult to believe that
all the writers on the Maratha side were ignorant, not to understand the real
situation and the strategy of such a consumate general as Abdali, and still that
is the impression created while reading Kashiraj and even historians like Sir
Jadunath Now we know by complete analysis of the whole material that,
because the chroniclers wrote after the event, and because they wanted to shift
and fix the responsibility of the disaster on those who had not survived it, they
have assumed a sliding attitude so as dramatically to break on the rock of
final disaster But we think this methodology wrong in history, and for that
reason have not accepted chronicles as history where psychology plays a part
In the first fortnight, before Abdali could build up his line of com-
munication to bring in the supplies from the Doab and beyond, his army was
definitely in a weak position, and comparatively the Maratha army was in a
better position Why Bhau did not try to decide the conflict by a bold attack
at that favourable juncture, we cannot say He seems to have put his faith
in quite a different strategy--that of tiring out Abdali and his allies and mak-
ing them fall on his well-fortified, almost impregnable lines In this strategy
¹ SPD 21 197, 27, Raj 1.261, 62, 64, 65, Purandare 391
² SPD 2 134
³ Shinde 1.222
[62]

TO FACE PAGE 62
PĀNĪPAT VICINITY
AT PRESENT
SCALE
FURLONGS 8 4 0 1 2 3 4 MILES
PĀNĪPAT
KALKA RAILWAY
TO DELHI
WESTERN JUMNA CANAL
JUMNA RIVER

PANIPAT 63
Bhau was depending upon the activities of Govindpant Bundele and Naro
Shankar. Had they succeeded in cutting off Abdali’s supplies and making him
move from his camp, Abdali would have had only two alternatives before him,
either to run away to his home without offering a battle, or attacking the Mara-
thas in their strong positions. We do not think that it would have been dif-
ficult for him and his allies to disperse to their homes, as suggested by Krishna
Joshi in his letter,⁴ though ostensibly his road to Afghanistan was blocked by
the Maratha camp at the very onset. But Govindpant was scarcely a fit man
to carry out the orders of Bhau, because primarily he was not a soldier but a
civilian. The military circumstances in the regions surrounding his area have
also to be taken into account. Not only were the Rajput zamindars, with their
strong fortalices, disaffected towards the rule of the Marathas internally, but
externally also the Ruhela chiefs and Shuja’s nominee, Veni Bahadur, were
vigilant and bent on taking advantage of the difficulties of the Marathas
Shuja had taken only a small part of his army to the battlefield, leaving the
main portion under Veni Bahadur⁵ to defend his dominions in his absence.
Shuja himself had only willynilly gone to Abdali under strong pressure for
avoiding the invasion of his own territories by Abdali and his Ruhela allies,
and never took any important part in the whole campaign or in the final bat-
tle. By his behaviour he was insuring his safety between two powerful rivals.
When Bhau blames Govindpant for not devastating Shuja’s dominions so as to
exert a pressure on him to return to his dominions for defence, he seems to be
unaware of the fact that there was sufficient army on the spot to defend it.
Govindpant’s leaving his dominions meant exposing them to an invasion by
Veni Bahadur, as was found to his cost by Gopalrao Govind Barve⁶ in his
attempt.⁷ But sometimes it is necessary to take the risk of completely exposing
one’s dominions in order to gain a necessary military advantage. Only a man
like Frederick the Great of Prussia or a Madhavrao Peshwa could dare it and
reap the harvest. It was too much to expect such an action from Govindpant,
and when he tried to perform it for escaping the charge of disobedience, he
had to pay for the attempt with his life and complete defeat.
This exposition should convince the reader that Bhau’s strategy was
based on precarious means, and he was misguided in depending on a man of
Govindpant’s calibre. There were other means of gaining his end, but Bhau
never seems to have tried these. In the last resort, why Bhau should have
waited up to the breaking point of the 14th of January, completely passes our
understanding. Bhau knew of Govindpant’s death on 23rd December, and
we can find no excuse for Bhau to defer the attack for three weeks, thus weak-
ening still further the Maratha side during this long interval by starvation,
exposure and disease. The only suggestion that might explain Bhau’s delay is
the idea of his waiting for the coming of Nanasaheb from the Deccan so as to
catch Abdali between two grind-stones. This suggestion finds no conclusive
evidence in documents. The Peshwa seems to have been informed by his son,
⁴ Raj. 1.265.
⁵ A. L. Shrivastava, op cit., pp. 94, 111.
⁶ Ibid. 111.
⁷ See the section on The Trans-Ganges raids further on.

94 PANIPAT: 1761
Vishwasrao, and some other men about the gravity of the Maratha situation
at Panipat, and if the Peshwa had correctly judged the situation, he should
certainly have gone immediately to succour his cousin. From the correspondence
it seems that the Peshwa had not received any communication from Bhau for
more than a month, which means that Abdali was successfully intercepting all
couriers. On the other hand, when the Peshwa's suspicions about the real
state of the army in the north had reached their climax and silent dread had
taken their place, he is found writing to Bhau in an almost repentent tone for
not having done his duty, or, as previously promised, succoured Bhau. From
this letter, the Peshwa seems to have promised to send a contingent from the
Deccan so as to reach Panipat in February 1761.* If Bhau was hoping to
carry on till this promised contingent reached its destination, by being able
somehow to get supplies, then a different turn would have been given to the
whole narration of the campaign. Apart from the truth of such a promise, it
looks impossible from the military point of view that the promised help could
have reached Bhau in time. If Bhau had been able to get supplies ad infinitum,
there was no particular point why he should be wanting support from the
south. If supplies were not forthcoming, the coming of the support would not
have helped the matters in any way, at least not in time. Only such an il-
lustrious captain of cavalry as Bajirao could possibly have reached Panipat in
time to be of any help. But there was no such man available at Poona, at
least not of such great calibre, to lead this express expedition. All these con-
siderations, which historians can discuss at leisure now, should have been bet-
ter understood by Bhau. He should have made up his mind, at least after
Govindpant's death, to offer battle—whatever the result—then and there,
without waiting till the last day, as he actually did. This waiting seems to

64 PANIPAT 1761
Vishwasrao, and some other men about the gravity of the Maratha situation
at Panipat, and if the Peshwa had correctly judged the situation, he should
certainly have gone immediately to succour his cousin. From the correspondence
it seems that the Peshwa had not received any communication from Bhau for
more than a month, which means that Abdali was successfully intercepting all
couriers On the other hand, when the Peshwa's suspicions about the real
state of the army in the north had reached their climax and silent dread had
taken their place, he is found writing to Bhau in an almost repentent tone for
not having done his duty, or, as previously promised, succoured Bhau From
this letter, the Peshwa seems to have promised to send a contingent from the
Deccan so as to reach Panipat in February 1761 ⁸ If Bhau was hoping to
carry on till this promised contingent reached its destination, by being able
somehow to get supplies, then a different turn would have been given to the
whole narration of the campaign Apart from the truth of such a promise, it
looks impossible from the military point of view that the promised help could
have reached Bhau in time If Bhau had been able to get supplies ad infinitum,
there was no particular point why he should be wanting support from the
south If supplies were not forthcoming, the coming of the support would not
have helped the matters in any way, at least not in time Only such an il
lustrious captain of cavalry as Bajirao could possibly have reached Panipat in
time to be of any help But there was no such man available at Poona, at
least not of such great calibre, to lead this express expedition All these con
siderations, which historians can discuss at leisure now, should have been bet-
ter understood by Bhau He should have made up his mind, at least after
Govindpant s death, to offer battle—whatever the result—then and there,
without waiting till the last day, as he actually did This waiting seems to
have considerably changed the prospect of giving the slip to the enemy, for-
tune favouring, and marching past Abdali to Delhi, after losing only a part
of the army instead of the whole For, on the 30th of December, 1760, Abdali
changed his camp for the last time, and leaving his river side position, took
post directly across the imperial road to Delhi so as completely to block the
Maratha movement to the south
We shall now proceed to describe the strategical position in the area
surrounding Panipat This city is situated on the slopes of a small hillock,
less than a hundred feet in height above the surrounding plain. In ancient
times, the river Jamuna is reputed to have passed along the eastern edge of the *
hill, but now it is some eight miles away to the east The river changes its course
now and then, and we cannot be very sure what its actual course was in 1760
From our observations, it seems to have been a mile to the west of its present
course in some places The river does not flow in one stream always, but now
and then divides into a number of channels when it comes into a comparatively
plain country Nowhere is the edge along the bank more than thirty feet high
In most places it is less than twenty, and the average is somewhere near ten.
There are large areas along the banks on both sides where there is scarcely any
edge visible, the flood-water spreading far and wide into the interior where it
⁸ Purandare 1.395, Bhau Kaifiyat p. 20.

TO FACE PAGE 65
POSITIONS OF THE RIVAL CAMPS
FROM 3RD TO 30TH NOVEMBER 1760
SCALE
FURLONGS 8 6 4 2 0 1 2 3 4 5 MILES
N
KOH-I-MAULANA
W. JUMNA CANAL
SH. BEG
UGRA KHERI
SH. SHARAFUDDIN
SIKANDARPUR
SIKANDARPUR
KHURD
SH. FAKHRUDDIN
BABARPUR
MACHHROULI
RAJAHERI
NANHERA
JUMNA RIVER
SANOLI KALAN
SHAH KUTUB
PANIPAT
V. THAL
SH. GTY.
B. DILIR KHAN
SH. FAZLULLAH
J. ABDUL AZIZ
D. ALI KHAN
SIKANDARPUR
DILIRPUR
SANOLI KHURD
SH. HUSAIN
D. ALI KHAN
D. ALI KHAN
MARATHA CAMP
GAURI SHANKAR
NALA AM
SIWAH
SIWAH KHURD
KABIR
RESHAPUR
SONDHAPUR
CHHAJJPUR KALAN
JALALPUR
RASLAPUR
OLD JUMNA BED
KHERI NANGAL
PATTAN
M. ALIPUR
JALALPUR
RAMPUR
JAUHPUR
ABDALI CAMP
DIWANA
PASINA KALAN
PASINA KHURD
GAURA KALAN
GAURA KHURD
M. B. BARTANKE, D. G. S.

creates a marsh and a bog To the south-east of Panipat such a condition
prevails near the village of Goyenla At such places, ferrying by boats is neither
possible nor necessary during the fair season, and people ford the river through
knee-deep to chest deep water Where the edges are sharp and the river basin
narrow—though nowhere would it be less than half a mile in breadth—the
waters generally collect in one deep stream wh ch has then to be crossed by
boat. This situation must ever be borne in mind when visualising Abdali's
movements and changing camps The Maratha army had chosen for its camp
the site to the north west and south west of Panipat The imperial road passed
directly through the town of Panipat, and the Maratha army had completely
taken possession of it on the northern side Though there is no mention of the
canal in any original letter on Panipat, we believe that the famous Alı Mardan
Khan Canal was still⁹ flowing along or at a short distance to the west of the
Maratha camp, thus at once supplying a part of the camp with water, and
also acting as a fosse to the Maratha camp on that side The Maratha camp
seems to have spread over a long distance to the north of Panipat, if we are
to believe in the traditional description supplied by the ballad singer o Siwa
It provides the information that the 700 elephants of Bhau were kept at
Gharonda, which is ten miles to the north of Panipat. Incidentally, it means
that there was a sufficient water supply for these elephants in the vicinity, sug
gesting that the place must be along a tank or canal ¹⁰ We have come to this
conclusion from the fact that there was no complaint about the dearth of
water, though there was a dearth of everything else Abdalı first came dı
rectly opposite to Panipat with a view to meeting the Marathas and deciding
the contest at one stroke But the Marathas, entrenching themselves strongly
foiled Abdalı s plan of taking a quick decision by direct attack From their
secure base they were able to defy hım in his camp and even to assume an of
fensive Bhau marched out of his moat a little under the cover of his strongly
placed guns, built temporary stands for his movable guns and from them
opened fire on Abdalı s camp ¹¹ The shots reaching Abdalı s tents and killing
his men and anımals, obliged hım to vacate it and pitch again at a distance
of some five miles to the south east along the river bank near the villages of
Behrampur, Bapaulı, Mırzapur and Goyen'a ¹² In making this retrograde
movement, Abdali seems to have cared for the supply of water which was per
haps completely stopped by the Marathas using up the canal water higher up
above Panipat, as well as for the easy communication with the Doab by merely
fording the river, so as to need no boats to fetch his supplies The Marathas
had hit upon a well protected site, no doubt, with the canal marshes on the
west side, the Panipat hill on the east side and a deep broad, dry moat on the
front and facing side But once entrenched, they had no space to move one
way or the other, while Abdalı remained free to change his camp as it suited
hım At first his line had spread along the Dahad, Siwa, Risalu villages, but
in a few days he receded and settled down along the Dimana village This first
9 See Appendix. "Was the Imperial Canal Flowing, etc" at the end of this chapter
10 BDCRI 41 3
11 SPD 2.131
12 Raj 3.224 Bhau Kaifiyat p 14, SPD 2.131, BDCRI 4.1 2-81
P F.-9

66 PANIPAT: 1761
camp he changed between the 26th and the 30th of November as a result of
Bhau's cannonading as stated above, when he retreated to the riverside, the
centre of the battlefield between the two armies lying along the village of
Chhajpur. The reputed wooden war-pillar¹³ erected by the Marathas and
found described in the Bakhar was somewhere on the plain of Chhajpur, and
here the fight on the 7th of December took place, resulting in the death of
Balvantrao Mehendale. For a month Abdali remained in the second camp
till he moved to Pasina on 30th December, and his line spread across the im-
perial road to Dimana. The main site of the final battle was between Risalu
and Nimbdi This last move on the part of Abdali obliged Bhau to change
his final plan of battle to suit the new disposition by Abdali.
During the first month, or almost for five weeks, the Maratha army was
on the aggressive. Every day they came out with their field guns, supported by
some sardar's contingent, to the front and tried to cut off anyone from the
Afghan side who had come out of his camp for skirmishing, or was loitering
on the plain. The Pendharis on the Maratha side wandered round Abdali's
camp and carried away horses, camels and even elephants which had been let
loose for grazing outside. Still nobody from Abdali's side would come out and
try to protect their animals and men The discipline in Abdali's camp was of
the strictest type and he had issued orders to his army not to stir out of the
camp and offer battle themselves. This seems to be due to the superiority of
the long-range fire on the Maratha side. The big guns placed advantageously
on the mud ramparts surrounding the Maratha camp were able to mow down
anyone coming within their range for some two miles. The Marathas cap-
tured more than a thousand horses, four hundred camels and four elephants
during the first three weeks.¹⁴ The guns on the Afghan side were also not less
effective though somewhat shorter in range, and their shots also could reach
and kill men in the Maratha trenches. Krishna Joshi met his death from one
such shot while he was sitting in his kitchen behind the trenches.¹⁵ But Abdali
had probably taken the decision of not attacking in order to economise his
powder and shot, which he thought could be used more effectively in an open
battle. On the 22nd November there was a lunar eclipse and the Maratha
camp was rather inactive on account of this. No one had possibly come out
of the camp that day as usual. Abdali's Wazir Shah Wali Khan had come
out to watch the Marathas that day. Seeing no danger nearby, he ventured
to go very near the Maratha lines in the course of his patrol. As he was wait-
ing near a well, the Maratha troops on the opposite side saw him and came
out suddenly to take advantage of his unprotected state. A desperate battle
ensued and the Wazir had great difficulty in holding his ground. But the
Afghans in the rear were also watchful and ran to his rescue. Shinde's men
drove them all back to their lines and inflicted considerable loss on them The
Wazir lost four hundred of his troops and double that number were wounded.¹⁶
The loss on the Maratha side was forty dead and one hundred and fifty.
——————————————
13 Bhau Kaifiyat, p. 15; BDCRI 4.179 verse 36
14 SPD 21.197.
15 Ibid.
16 JADUNATH.SARKAR, op. cit., 2.302; Aitihasika Patra Vyavahar p. 97.

PANIPAT 67
wounded.¹⁷ The Marathas were able to capture more than a hundred horses
and but for the nightfall the result would have been still more decisive, as men
from that part of the Abdali camp which was attacked by the Marathas had
begun to run away from their posts. There was again a similar skirmish after
a few days, with no decisive result. The tone of the rank and file in the
Maratha army, as well as of the commander-in-chief himself, is found to be all
optimistic for over a month, and there is no ground for taking Kashiraj as a
correct reporter for this period. Not only are Kashiraj's forebodings incor-
rect, but the tone also of his narrative is vitiated by his personal predilections.
As Abdali had to retreat from his first position to the riverside, it is
proved thereby that the Marathas were in the ascendant till then. Kashiraj
describes with awe all the actions of Abdali. He praises his arrangement to
guard his camp and to watch the other side day and night. As no such vivid
description is forthcoming from the Maratha side, a wrong impression is
created in the mind of the reader, and he thinks that there was no such system
followed by the Marathas. This is absolutely wrong. Just as parties of thou-
sands were appointed to guard the camp on the Afghan side, similarly the
Marathas were also mounting guard and patrolling around their camp at
night. Kashiraj says that the Afghan monarch was in the habit of going
round not only his own camp and that of his allies, but he also took a round
about the entire Maratha camp from a distance, and every day returned by
noon after having ridden fifty kos in person with a small escort. This seems
a gross exaggeration of Kashiraj. We do not think that the Maratha watch-
men and patrols were so slack as not to see even once the Afghan monarch go-
ing round their camp during a period of more than two months, and one can
guess that it was impossible for the daily rounds of Ahmad Shah to go un-
seen, at whatever distance he might be encircling the Maratha camp. We
also think that it was geographically not possible. The canal on the west side
of the Maratha camp was a great impediment to such a movement, and on
the east side also the land was not very favourable for such an excursion. The
river on the north-east side coming very near and the bogs and the zils, which
exist to this day, do not make such a supposition look feasible. Only during
the last fortnight, when the Maratha army had become quite despondent and
taken to heart the lesson of cold massacre, the Afghan monarch might have
indulged in his rounds, though at great risk even then to himself. Kashiraj was
perhaps remembering this last period when he wrote nineteen years after, and
made it applicable to the whole period of two and a half months.
A fortnight after the Wazir's discomfiture, a major engagement took
place between the two armies. As we have noted above, Abdali had moved
to the riverside by then. As the Afghan camp had now gone far beyond
the range of Maratha fire and in a somewhat difficult terrain, and as the
Afghans would not come out of their own accord to offer a battle, it became
a teasing problem for the Marathas to pass the days in futile inactivity. The
Marathas, therefore, hit upon a plan to call them out. At some distance from
17 Bhau Kaifiyat, p. 24

68 PANIPAT. 1761
the Maratha camp, and to the south east of it, they began to clear the jungle
so as to make easy approach possible $^{18}$ They cut down the thick bushes of
short palasa (dhak) trees and prepared a somewhat level battle field and
planted a pillar there The site of this new battle field seems to have been,
from the description in the ballad,$^{19}$ at Chhajpur, beyond which a big nullah
separated it from the Afghan camp They began to drag out their movable
cannon to this place and, standing behind them, to challenge the other side
to come out and dare battle Cut to the quick by these challenges, the Ruhelas
one day came out and began an engagement by firing from a distance The
Marathas advanced a little but by this time it was about sunset Seeing that the
Marathas would take some time to reach back to their camp, Najib's
brother came out to deliver a flank attack as the Maratha army turned
its face in the direction of their camp At this unexpected attack the Marathas
had to leave their guns and run pell mell, which again drew the Ruhelas far-
ther on, close on their heels They almost reached the edge of the Maratha
camp when soldiers from the camp came out, finding their comrades in danger
The Ruhela cavalry fled away, taking advantage of the pitch darkness of that
new moon night, but their infantry was closed in from all sides They fought
with their usual bravery and created havoc in the Maratha camp by their
marksmanship They were well nigh defeated, with great slaughter of fifteen
hundred Ruhelas, and pursued upto a distance But in the midst of this vic-
tory, Balvantrao Mehendale received a bullet shot and came down from his
horse Seeing that he was a sardar of some consequence, the Afghans tried to
cut off his head so as to carry it as a trophy back to their camp, but some
Maratha horsemen, noticing it, turned back to snatch it away just when it
was being cut Khanderao Naik Nimbalkar was responsible for dragging back
the corpse of Balvantrao Mehendale by the feet in the thick of that fight, though
himself wounded Both parties then returned to their camps Though the
Marathas were victorious, the death of Balvantrao had taken away the zest out
of it from them There was a great wailing in the Maratha camp on that night
of the 7th December, 1760 Balvantrao's wife, Lakshmibai, was one of the
few women who had accompanied their husbands to that famous battlefield
Her son, Krishnarao, alias Appa Balvant of later fame, a boy of fourteen or
so, was also with them in the camp, still she at once took the decision of of-
fering herself as a Sati on her husband's funeral pyre No dissuasion by Bhau
himself or by the mother of Nana Fadnis, who was Balvantrao's sister, was able
to change her decision She courageously made over her son to Bhau's care
and faced immolation, making that incident the most dramatic in the whole
Panipat campaign
The seventh of December is taken as a turning point in the Panipat
campaign No doubt it deprived Bhau of a most intimate lieutenant. The
biased Maratha Bakhars and, following them, some Persian chronicles, have
shown Balvantrao as the villain of the piece The Kaifiyat merely depicts the
difference of opinion between Bhau's advisers from the south, and the north
$^{18}$ Ibid. 14-5
$^{19}$ BDCRI 4.179

TO FACE PAGE 68
POSITIONS OF THE RIVAL CAMPS
FROM 1ST DEC. TO 30TH DEC 1760.
SCALE
0 1 2 3 4 5 MILES
GOHANA
JIND
ROAD
SHAH NAHAR (W. JUMNA CANAL)
PANIPAT
KALA AM
RAJA KHERI
BABAIL
HABLA
JUMNA RIVER
UGRA KHERI
CHANDPUR KHURD
CHANDPUR KALAN
JALALPUR
BARALIPUR
BATTLE FIELD
OLD JUMNA BED
SEHLA (VAJIRPUR)
D. G. SANTURNE D. 1945

70 PANIPAT 1761
over a month ²⁵ That most of the letters sent were intercepted by Abdali is
clear from Nana Fadnis' letter²⁶ to Ramchandrapant Natu at Delhi, which
shows that this work of stopping the Maratha correspondence had begun from
the third week of November, though occasionally a messenger was lucky enough
to elude Abdali's patrols This should also have something to do with the
Maratha distress, as the possibility of the outsiders knowing the real condition
of the Maratha camp was lessened But there is no mention of any distress
in the Maratha camp in the above mentioned letter of 12th December, from
which it would not be wrong to conclude that Abdali had not upto that point
succeeded in completely cutting off the Maratha supply from the north On
that side the Sikhs and the Jats were quite well disposed towards the Marathas
Alasingh Jat, the founder of the Patiala State, living at that time at Manuk,
seems to have been actually helping²⁷ the Marathas as he was grateful for
being relieved from the exactions of the Afghan soldiers of fortune like the
chief of Kunjpura and the infamous Mian Qutb Shah The Sikhs were di-
rectly interested in the result of the contest and even after the disaster were the
chief beneficiaries of it Sir Jadunath's harping on the disaffected Jat villagers
seems a figment of the brain There is no ground for such a supposition, though
the Marathas suffered before, during and after the war by the vindictiveness
of the Muslim population, who were equally numerous in those regions and
incomparably more powerful than the submerged Jats and Gujars Bhau is
still a hero in their ballad²⁸ and fire side stories, for whom they have the liveli-
est admiration
Within a fortnight of Balvantrao's death, Govindpant Bundele also met
the same fate Throughout the Panipat campaign, nay, even before starting
for it, Bhau had demanded money of Govindpant ²⁹ The latter sent two lakhs
in the first instance and now at the beginning of December he came to Delhi
with four lakhs and twenty thousand This was all he could possibly bring,
though it was not even a fourth of what Bhau demanded from the beginning.
Handing over the treasure to Naro Shankar, Govindpant sallied forth
with his contingent and crossed over into the Doab He began to cut off
Abdali's supplies coming from the trans Ganges districts and passing through
the Meerut district to Abdali Bhau had intimated to Govindpant that there
were none now to oppose him in the Doab as the Ruhelas had been tied up
to the camp of Abdali So, leisurely and unguardedly, he continued his march,
chastising the refractory local zamindars on the way He seemed to have been
collecting grain also for carrying it to Bhau's camp across an upper ghat on
the Jamuna, to Panipat
But news of Govindpant's depredations soon reached Abdali's camp
The Ruhelas became apprehensive of the safety of their homes The regu-
larity of the food convoy reaching Abdali s camp through these regions had
²⁵ RAJ 3.210
²⁶ Satara 2 300 Letter dated 12th December 1760
²⁷ SPD 27.262, Purandare 1 416
²⁸ BDCRI 1
²⁹ SPD 40 129

PANIPAT 71
been taken away. Abdali, therefore, despatched a select force of some five
thousand horsemen under impetuous Atai Khan, the Durrani Wazir's nephew,
who had recently come from Afghanistan. A few thousand Ruhelas also joined
him to show him the way and properly guide him in their home lands. Cross-
ing the Jamuna at Baghpat and covering some fifty miles in a day and night,
they suddenly alighted upon Govindpant as he was somewhere between Ghazi-
ud-din-nagar (now Ghaziabad) and Meerut. It seems that one Jeta Gujar,
a robber-chieftain in that area, had promised a ransom to Govindpant, and
Govindpant was stopping to recover it. Jeta communicated the news to Abdali
and he sent this force. It is also said that the Ruhelas had assumed different
colours, seeing which Govindpant thought the army from a distance was that of
Naro Shankar.30 While Govindpant was preparing to take a bath and to dine
in the afternoon after a day's hard work, he was overtaken by Atai Khan's
cavalry. He suddenly snatched a horse and began to run with his army. In
the hurry of flight twice he came down from his horse, as he was not properly
seated on a saddle, but reseated again by others. But when he fell for the third
time, none returned to save him, even his son who was accompanying the army
having fled away to a distance. Govindpant's head was cut off and his whole
camp looted. The Maratha loss was some four hundred.31 The rest of the
Maratha army with Govindpant's son Balaji after first having fled to the south,
afterwards returned to Delhi. Atai Khan returned with the loot which con-
tained a good quantity of grain, and Najib presented Govindpant's head to
Ahmad Shah. He sent it to Bhau, announcing his triumph in the undertaking.
The news had already reached Bhau by 23rd December,32 though the head
reached Bhau's hands two or three days later, from which it appears that the
attack on Govindpant must have taken place on 20th December or so, and not
on the 17th as assumed by Sir Jadunath.33 Govindpant had atoned for all his
past sins of commission and omission with his life, and, therefore, the gravamen
of accusations against him is taken away. He might be called slovenly and
not up to the mark in military matters; but none can say that he was disloyal.
After Govindpant's death, when the plan of cutting off Abdali's sup-
plies and directing these to the Maratha camp had failed, the real difficulties
of the Maratha camp began. The Maratha camp was short of not only food
and fodder, but also of coined money necessary to make cash payments for any
supplies brought to the camp from the Panjab. Bhau found it difficult to fetch
money from Delhi where it had been deposited by Govindpant. The first batch
of soldiers from Payagude's troops under the leadership of Krishnarao Ballal,
carrying with them one lakh, ten thousand, started on 22nd December and seems
to have reached the Maratha camp in safety.34 But the second batch under
Parashar Dadaji carrying one and a half lakhs with them, which started on
2nd January, 1761, was cut off by Abdali, as Abdali had shifted his camp
for the last time on 30th December, and was now lying astride the imperial road

30 Bhau Bakhar 129
31 RAJ 1376.
32 Ibid. 1.272.
33 Fall 2.311.
34 RAJ. 1.281.

72 PANIPAT: 1761

from Delhi to Panipat.³⁵ The news of this shifting had not reached Delhi,
and so the Maratha troops were passing along the road in the dead of night
as usual. There were with him three hundred soldiers each carrying five hun-
dred rupees. In the severe cold of January, with their bodies benumbed by
night exposure, they unsuspectingly entered the Afghan camp five miles to the
south of Panipat, thinking it to be the Maratha camp. They alighted from
their horses and tried to warm themselves by the burning fire sides. Some took
out their pipes and began to smoke. As they had entered from the back of the
Afghan camp without fear, none at first seems to have recognised or obstructed
them, the Afghans taking them probably as a batch of their allies. But when the
Marathas began to converse, the Afghans got the clue and raised a hue and
cry. Only one escaped from the tussle and returned back to Delhi.³⁶ The rest
were deprived of their cash and horses and put to the sword according to
Kashiraj,³⁷ while the Bhau Bakhar and the Ka fiyāt say that they reached the
Maratha camp safely after the mishap.³⁸

As more than five lakhs of people were living in that small area from
Panipat to Samalkha for more than two months (in the two camps together),
all the wood and fodder in the vicinity had disappeared and the whole area
had become one vast barren plain. Some ten villages had left their sites and
gone to live elsewhere. The citizens of Panipat had to remain confined in the
small walled area, with no space left for movement. Their farms and gar-
dens had disappeared from the scene. Naturally they had become hostile to
the Marathas and being Muslims for the most part, seem to have acted
treacherously from behind in giving news to Abdali and carrying on nefarious
activities in collusion with the Afghans of Kunjpura and the surrounding area.
The civil behaviour of the Marathas with such people has cost the Marathas
very dearly in history.

In their two and a half months' beleaguerment at Panipat, the Mara-
thas must have spent practically every pie they possessed for buying the vic-
tuals at ten fold prices. The system adopted for fetching grain from a distance
was to send an escort of some thousands to accompany the caravan from
Karnal to Panipat, and while returning to see them back with their pack-
bullocks to Karnal again. But after a time this source also dried up, either
because there was no grain to sell, or more probably because the Afghans had
recovered their posts like Kunjpura and Karnal in the north. Abdali was fur-
nished, some time in the second week of December, with fresh troops from
Afghanistan to the extent of eight thousand. Atai Khan was their leader.
Before joining Abdali, he seems to have followed not the direct route to Pani-
pat, but the safer route across the Jamuna by the Budhia or the Andhera
Ghat north and south of Kunjpura. Before entering the Doab, he could not
but have driven out the small Maratha out posts at Karnal and Kunjpura with
the help of his splendid troops. Diler Khan, the only son of Nejabat Khan, left

³⁵ Shinde 1.229
³⁶ Raj. 1.231. 333
³⁷ Battle of Panipat 19^6 p. 21
³⁸ Bhau Bakhar p 132. Kaifyat p. 21

TO FACE PAGE 72
POSITIONS OF THE RIVAL CAMPS
FROM 31ST DEC 1760 TO 14TH JAN 1761
SCALE
N
SHAH NAHAR OR JUMNA CANAL
PANIPAT
JUMNA RIVER
GOELA KALĀN
GOELA KHURD
M. G. BARTAKKE

PANIPAT 73
free, now recovered Kunjpura with Atai Khan's help and made it impossible
for the caravans to move on that side Added to this, fire started, either pur-
posely or by random cannon shot, and destroyed the big haystacks heaped in
the Maratha camp 39 This misfortune turned the situation from bad to worse
and finally into utter helplessness As a result of this mishap, twenty thousand
followers issued from the Maratha camp one night to gather firewood and
fodder in the neighbouring woods, but they were overtaken, surrounded and
massacred piece-meal by a body of five thousand horse under Shah Pasand
Khan who was patrolling that area After this slaughter, terror struck the
Maratha camp and nobody seems to have ventured out
In the terrible cold of December and January, the Marathas, with
their scanty clothing meant only for the cold in the Deccan, suffered terribly
in addition to the want of sufficient quantities of good food and firewood As
if this was not enough, it rained heavily that winter, generating biting winds
in their wake 40 Thousands of bullocks, horses, mules and even men died of
this calamity The unburied animals and corpses on the intervening battle
field putrified the air 41 The crowded camp where within a small area men
had to perform all their physical duties made it terribly dirty and full of
noxious air Nana Fadnis vividly describes these conditions in his auto-
biography
Such was the condition of the Maratha camp and the state of the men
and animals who were to offer battle to the strong, stalwart, efficient and un-
perturbed Afghans who were well supplied with necessities and fully inured
to these climes and circumstances
As we have said above, we are completely in the dark as to Bhau's aim
in not sallying out for battle three weeks earlier when he received the news of
Govindpant's death Such a step would have appreciably reduced the suf
ferings which the Maratha camp had to endure in the last period The men
and animals would have been found in better condition for a march or a
fight, before their reduction by starvation and misery for three weeks more
Even their morale would have been found better and still Bhau would not take
such a step A casual remark in the Bakhar (p 136) also supports the view
that "had the Marathas started the next day after the heavy massacre of the
Ruhelas in the intervening daily fights, the Afghans had no strength then to
overpower the Marathas" "But," so remarks the chronicler, "the fate had
ordained otherwise and so the Marathas remained inactive, carrying on the
waiting game!" We do not know whether this was a case of fortune first
taking away the wit and then striking hard afterwards
Our wonder increases still more when we find the chronicles reporting
the discussion in the Maratha camp previous to the battle While Bhau,
judging that the army could not pull on even for a day more, wanted to offer
battle the next day, Malharrao and Janakoji were proposing to postpone the
39 RAJ 6 406
40 Sardesai Commemoration Volume p 259
41 BDCRI 4 181