पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

64 PANIPAT 1761
Vishwasrao, and some other men about the gravity of the Maratha situation
at Panipat, and if the Peshwa had correctly judged the situation, he should
certainly have gone immediately to succour his cousin. From the correspondence
it seems that the Peshwa had not received any communication from Bhau for
more than a month, which means that Abdali was successfully intercepting all
couriers On the other hand, when the Peshwa's suspicions about the real
state of the army in the north had reached their climax and silent dread had
taken their place, he is found writing to Bhau in an almost repentent tone for
not having done his duty, or, as previously promised, succoured Bhau From
this letter, the Peshwa seems to have promised to send a contingent from the
Deccan so as to reach Panipat in February 1761 ⁸ If Bhau was hoping to
carry on till this promised contingent reached its destination, by being able
somehow to get supplies, then a different turn would have been given to the
whole narration of the campaign Apart from the truth of such a promise, it
looks impossible from the military point of view that the promised help could
have reached Bhau in time If Bhau had been able to get supplies ad infinitum,
there was no particular point why he should be wanting support from the
south If supplies were not forthcoming, the coming of the support would not
have helped the matters in any way, at least not in time Only such an il
lustrious captain of cavalry as Bajirao could possibly have reached Panipat in
time to be of any help But there was no such man available at Poona, at
least not of such great calibre, to lead this express expedition All these con
siderations, which historians can discuss at leisure now, should have been bet-
ter understood by Bhau He should have made up his mind, at least after
Govindpant s death, to offer battle—whatever the result—then and there,
without waiting till the last day, as he actually did This waiting seems to
have considerably changed the prospect of giving the slip to the enemy, for-
tune favouring, and marching past Abdali to Delhi, after losing only a part
of the army instead of the whole For, on the 30th of December, 1760, Abdali
changed his camp for the last time, and leaving his river side position, took
post directly across the imperial road to Delhi so as completely to block the
Maratha movement to the south
We shall now proceed to describe the strategical position in the area
surrounding Panipat This city is situated on the slopes of a small hillock,
less than a hundred feet in height above the surrounding plain. In ancient
times, the river Jamuna is reputed to have passed along the eastern edge of the *
hill, but now it is some eight miles away to the east The river changes its course
now and then, and we cannot be very sure what its actual course was in 1760
From our observations, it seems to have been a mile to the west of its present
course in some places The river does not flow in one stream always, but now
and then divides into a number of channels when it comes into a comparatively
plain country Nowhere is the edge along the bank more than thirty feet high
In most places it is less than twenty, and the average is somewhere near ten.
There are large areas along the banks on both sides where there is scarcely any
edge visible, the flood-water spreading far and wide into the interior where it
⁸ Purandare 1.395, Bhau Kaifiyat p. 20.