पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

116 PANIPAT: 1761
behaviour during the ten months of the Panipat campaign, but of the im-
pression he had created during the previous ten years. It was singularly un-
fortunate for the Marathas that such should have been the case at this most
critical juncture. The respect and awe with which Shivaji seems to have been
looked upon by his contemporaries was not felt in the case of Bajirao and Bhau.
Bhau was not strict in his sex-life, as was wrongly assumed by SARDESAI in his
Panipat Campaign.⁵ The Purandare Daftar, Part I, bears ample testimony⁶
to Bhau's extra-marital sex life. Perhaps this fact had affected the contem-
porary opinion about Bhau in an adverse manner to a certain extent. We do
not know whether Kashiraj's statement⁷ that "one of the Bhau's wives escaped"
from Panipat on horseback was made under this misapprehension.
SADASHIVRAO BHAU AS A GENERAL
Sadashivrao Bhau has become the scape-goat of both the sides. He
is criticised not only by the opponents but also by his compatriots. The ma-
jority of the Marathas thought that the strategy he followed at Panipat was
wrong. The Marathas till then had never encamped behind the trenches and
arranged their fight on the basis of infantry tactics. The critics on the opposite
side think that the whole Maratha system was loose, insubordination being in-
grained in the Maratha ranks; there was no proper gradation, no link between
the commander-in-chief and the common soldier. But if we compare Bhau
with another renowned general of his times in Europe, there does not seem to
be any great difference in their ideas about the strategy and tactics of those
days. In the battle of Panipat, Abdali had definitely a superiority in the Ruhela
infantry under such a consummate captain as Najib Khan. His infantry
it was that decided the day by its last tactics. Bhau's infantry under
Ibrahim Khan had been used decisively in the beginning of the battle. But
it was not followed with advantage by the cavalry at the back. Bhau's per-
sonal effort was mainly based on his devoted cavalry, in the use of which he
seems to have followed the innovation attributed to Fredric the Great.
"Fredric had learnt its value, against the musket of those days, by experience;
and he believed that Seydlitz in the open, at the head of 70 squadrons, was
a thing which no infantry could resist."¹ But unfortunately for Bhau he first
came across the Afghan cavalry under Shah Wali Khan and not against the
infantry under Najib Khan, due to his formation of the oblique order in the
march out of Panipat. Had the cavalry divisions kept behind the infantry
of Ibrahim Khan to support it and take advantage of its invincible attack acted
in a valiant and correct manner, there would have been no occasion for Bhau
to deliver his side-attack on the Afghan front. Damaji Gaikwad, Vitthal
Shivdeo and Yashwantrao Pawar had been placed behind Ibrahim Khan to
do their duty. They inadvertantly rushed forward, before the full effect of
Ibrahim Khan's grand effort had reached its culmination and created a wide
5 SARDESAI, Marathi Riyasat, Panipat Prakarana, p. 253
6 Purandare 1.212, 241, 289, 293, 311, 345, 364.
7 KASHIRAJ, p. 50.
1 ACTON p. 293.

THE JUDGMENT 117
gap in the weak infantry under the trans Ganges Ruhelas. Their duty was
silently to wait for some two hours, though keeping themselves ready on horse-
back for any eventuality. Had this order been properly carried out, Bhau and
the magnificent Hujrat cavalry which was behind them would have had no
occasion to offer a front battle to the Durrani Wazir. They would themselves
have followed the rushing cavalry of these three sardars into the gap created
by the Gardi fire. Bhau's generalship failed not because his strategy was in-
correct, but the tactics were not properly understood by his captains and they
seem to have acted as if it was only a cavalry battle. Bhau had till then fol-
lowed "the school which taught that actual fighting must not be resorted to
until the use of brains has been exhausted, that the battle comes in when the
manœuvre has failed, the seizure of the strategic position is the first defence
of the armies, so that a force which is tactically inferior may be strategically
superior."² Now when all these alternatives had been tried and failed, Bhau
was following Fredric in his new doctrine "to act on the principle that noth-
ing can destroy the enemy except a pitched battle, and the destruction of the
enemy, not the weakning of the enemy, is the right object of war,' knowing
that 'even a successful defence weakens the victor." Unfortunately for Bhau
he was possibly the only person in the Maratha camp who had understood
this principle and the overwhelming majority of his lieutenants were trained
in different tactics. They thought Bhau almost a madman to follow this
method, their heart was not in it and they deviated from the order of the bat-
tle at the first shock and followed their own mind in the later half of the day.
Those who were loyal and devoted died with the Commander in Chief, while
the rest fled back from the field as soon as it was possible for them to quit the
field unnoticed by Bhau.
NOT INDIVIDUALS BUT THE SYSTEM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
PANIPAT DISASTER
Pānipat was a national disaster. A national disaster exhibits all the
weak points together with some of the good points of a nation. A national
war fought for the prestige of a nation is like an examination for a student.
Though the examination lasts for less than a week it is supposed to show the
preparation of a year. The physical, the intellectual and the moral capacities
all have their play in an examination. Weakness on any of these sides is
likely to prove fatal. There are good students who fail in the nick of time or
are too weak to complete a paper. There are clever students whose intellect
often fails them at the proper time. There are nervous students who have shown
their capacity throughout the year but still are found leaving the examination
hall all of a sudden. War is a similar test for a state. All the weak points ex-
hibited in the Panipat campaign had not cropped up all of a sudden, but were
inherent in the Maratha system under the best of the Peshwas. These inherent
defects have been very convincingly pointed out by a deep student of Maratha
history, Vasudev Vamanshastri KHARE in his invaluable introduction to the
2 Ibid, p. 293.

118 PANIPAT 1761
book Marathe va Ingraj by N C KELKAR, in 1918 The Marathas in the
18th century had nothing original to contribute for the benefit of the Indian
people They were imitators and not inventors They tried to imitate the
foreign model in war, but never made it their own in all its details The
Maratha Constitution was very loose Their military system was no better
The policy of nurturing strength by consolidation had given place to wayward
wandering on the basis of the line of least resistance The result was as KHARE
has tellingly put it "In peace times the Maratha empire was everywhere, but
during times of turmoil it was nowhere" (Page 15) Sadashivrao Bhau and
the Peshwa were depending upon the sympathy and help of the various states
which had paid them tributes, but not one amongst them actually helped the
Marathas during the critical Panipat campaign, exemplifying the truth of
KHARE'S indictment The Marathas tried to imitate the European war-
machine by engaging Bussy's pupils Ibrahim Khan and Muzaffar Khan, but
the danger to the Maratha State of this procedure has been clearly exhibited
in history Muzaffar Khan was all along a self-willed, arrogant and treacherous
person Once he left the Peshwa's service and joined the Nawab of Savnur
and was, after his defeat there, on the point of joining the Portuguese at Goa
or any one else who would engage him In 1759 he tried to assassinate Sa
dashivrao Bhau for personal or political reasons and was beheaded for the at-
tempt Ibrahim Khan was personally loyal, faithful and expert, but all along
he remained unassimilated in the Maratha mode of warfare The various
Maratha officers never felt any comradeship with him and treated him as a
foreigner Instead of co operating with him and supporting him in his dif-
ficulties, they would sit on the fence and see his effort wasted, all this because
he was paid punctually in cash after the European manner, because Bhau
treated him with special favour and tried to depend upon him to the heart-
burning of others! Because he was treated only as an adjunct to the Maratha
cavalry, his system was never understood, much less made their own, by the
Maratha Shiledars The result was seen in the battle of Panipat where his
superb effort was wasted because the other Maratha sardars never tried to de-
fend the square formation nor would they reap the harvest by taking the
proper advantage of his initial effort The Marathas did not try to assimilate
the foreign system then, nor have they done it subsequently Their political
effort and initiative were then, just as they are even now, individual and not
collective. The end to be secured was personal rise, prosperity and aggrandise
ment The leader is the sole loser in the effort, his followers having no con
cern with it except temporary loss of employment The Europeans have
perfected their system in such a manner that their united effort does not depend
on individual caprice Even amongst them incompetent and selfish individuals
occasionally come to the top, but they have little power to play mischief in
the perfected system With us the reverse is the case Occasionally good peo-
ple come to the top amongst us, but still they have no power to change the
system or rather the absence of system existing amongst us Amongst us the
individual effort of the best of men is only temporarily and partially effectual
for some time and ultimately wasted, the nation never deriving permanent bene-
fits therefrom Viewed in this philosophical light, it seems idle either to boom

THE JUDGMENT 119
up or condemn downright an individual, however great personally The final
result must be attributed to the static system and cannot be attributed to any
one actor in history.
DEATH OF NANASAHEB PESHWA
The Peshwa's death six months after the battle of Panipat, on 23rd
June, 1761, is treated as the last event of the Panipat campaign It is almost
thought as a consequence of it That the unexpected disaster unhinged his
mind by that tremendous shock, by the loss of all that was dear and valuable,
was natural enough, but it is utterly wrong to say that his death was due to
it As a matter of fact there seems to have been some hereditary defect in the
Peshwa family which made its members prone to sudden collapse of health
and wasting diseases The uneven life of camp and war had something to do
with it Nor were they free from vices Peshwa Nanasaheb particularly seems
to have been inordinately fond of the company of women He loved ease and
pleasure Beautiful young girls¹ from northern India were always requisitioned
by him This trait of his life had become known throughout India and even
the distant Kashiraj, living far away in the north at the Lucknow Court, knew
of it and thought it necessary to mention it at the beginning of his account of
the battle of Panipat The Peshwa had started from Poona in November and
had made known his plan of proceeding to the north to set the matters right
at the Delhi court in the company of Nizam Ali, the younger brother of the
Nizam Salabat Jang But his march was delayed on account of the "wait and
see" tactics of the Nizam brothers Though it was a condition of the peace
treaty after the battle of Udgir in the previous year, that the Nizam should
join the Peshwa whenever there was any urgent need² and now definitely such
a need arose due to the beleagurement of Bhau at Panipat, the Nizam brothers
would not move from their cantonments even after the cessation of rains The
need for taking Nizam Ali with him to the north arose in a double sense
Firstly, his Gardi troops with their fine park of artillery would have been in-
valuable in a fight against Abdali and the Ruhelas, next it was dangerous to
keep such a mischievous man behind, with power to do what he liked when
the Peshwa had moved north with all his troops But this was a political ex-
cuse The Peshwa was entangled in other domestic matters also For some
time, it seems, he was not keeping on good terms with his wife and had taken
it into his head to marry a second time, though three sons from the first mar-
riage were available as heirs Match makers had been dispatched far and
wide from the one end of Maharashtra to the other He was prepared to marry
a girl from any of the three³ sub-castes of Maharashtra Brahmins, Karhada,
Deshasthas or Chitpavans, to which last caste he himself belonged The
Peshwa's diary shows expenditure incurred in this search for suitable girls
where half a dozen girls have been noted The Peshwa had become so weak,
irritable and listless that his memory was failing and he could not devote him-
¹ RAJ 1.214, 3 158
² SPD 40 128.
³ SPD 2 133

120 PANIPAT: 1761
self to any business with full attention. This was natural when we take into
account the decline in his health which is noted in many places. In 1755, he
was suffering from toothache⁴ which is a sure sign of declining health. In 1758
Sadashivrao Bhau⁵ notes that the Peshwa's health is not what it should be.
When at the end of 1759, Bhau started for the Udgir campaign, the Peshwa's
health had already become a state problem. He was not in a position to fol-
low the campaign himself⁶ with its daily marches. Bhau's one anxiety through-
out the Panipat campaign was for the Peshwa's health. He writes⁷ from
Delhi on 16th September, 1760, that all problems would be best solved when
the Peshwa's health improved. We are at a loss to know why, when things
had come to such a pass, the Peshwa was thinking of marriage. It could not
have been for mere sex satisfaction, because he had any number of concubines
and dancing girls at his service. Three things are suggested as probable causes
for marriage. (1) The advice of the Hindu Vaidyas who prescribed young
girls as a cure for venereal diseases. A Sanskrit verse states that a tender girl
below sixteen adds to the strength of the husband; a youthful one makes her
husband youthful like herself,—an elderly woman drains away the strength of
her partner; and an old woman leads her partner on his way to death. (Bala
tu balada prokta taruni tarunajate, praudha s'aktihara prokta vrddha mrtyuva-
sam nayet.) It is not unlikely that some such advice might have been of-
fered to the Peshwa, though we do not know whether it falls under the category
of medicine or sexual science (Kamasastra). But we have already suggested
that this remedy could have been followed even by having extra-marital rela-
tions with girls, and so we reject this cause. (2) The second cause which is
more probable comes from astrological advice. It is thought that the stars of
certain girls so ordain that a person marrying them cannot possibly die, as it is
written that these girls have no widowhood ordained for them in their horo-
scopes. Of course there is the possibility of the girl herself dying before her
husband so as to justify the stars. We presume that the inquiry for girls was
possibly based on this point. Though this cause seems more probable, even
this is not completely satisfactory, because had the inquiry been only based on
horoscopes, it would not have been found necessary to bring all these young
girls from distant places, and there was no particular necessity for seeing them
unless men who judge horoscopes from bodily features wished to view and ex-
amine them. We would have believed such to have been the case, but the
Peshwa is found in a somewhat playful mood in marrying, as he not only
marries, but makes two of his bosom associates, Aba Purandare and Vireshwar
Dikshit Manohar,⁸ marry, side by side. (3) The third cause is equally likely,
namely, his quarrel with his first wife, Gopikabai. For one reason or another,
they had not been on good terms for some time. The difference of opinion
had arisen on account of domestic causes as well as state policy. The episode at
Patdur, described in the Bhau Bakhar and Kaifiyat before Sadashivrao's ap-
pointment for the Panipat campaign, illustrates one phase of this difference.
⁴ Purandare 3.206
⁵ Ibid. 3 193.
⁶ SPD 1 10.
⁷ Purandare, 1 389.
⁸ SPD 2.149, pp 162, 171

THE JUDGMENT 121
Nana Phadnis, than whom no veracious and correct writer can be found, writes
definitely about this difference in his autobiography.⁹ The irritability of temper
and in general the loss of balance of mind, which is ascribed to the Peshwa
during his last illness, was not a sudden growth after Panipat, but was a
gradual development. Govindpant Bundele¹⁰ notes this change in the Peshwa's
temper even from the north. It will be seen from this detailed discussion that
the death of the Peshwa had little to do with the shock of Panipat. He would
not have survived it long, even if it had ended in a victory. We have thought
it necessary to enter into this detailed treatment of the problem as all historians
have fallen into the trap by treating it as a result of Panipat
We agree with Sir Jadunath¹¹ in thinking that the Peshwa's marriage at
Hiradpuri had nothing to do with the issue in the north, because we do not
think that the Peshwa was at this time in a fit physical or mental condition to
help Bhau by proceeding post haste to the north. It was a national misfortune
of the Marathas that the supreme head of the state should, in these critical years
not be in a fit condition to direct the affairs of the state with a single minded
devotion to the cause of the nation. A Shivaji or Santaji Ghorpade or Baji
rao would have possibly relieved Bhau by marching to Delhi in the rear of
Abdali in about a month with all the spare troops. Such an exploit was be-
yond the capacity of Balaji Bajirao (alias Nanasaheb), to judge from his
whole life.
HISTORICAL OPINIONS ABOUT THE BATTLE OF PANIPAT
That the disaster of Panipat ultimately led to the destruction of the
Maratha power, was understood by Rajwade more than forty five years ago.¹
Even before him, other historians had also said the same thing. But while the
foreigners were conscious of this result the Marathas were not, which only
means that they had no proper understanding of the situation and were thus
living in a fool's paradise. On the other hand, the English writers after Plassey
seemed to be perfectly conscious of the things shaping in those times. Their
knowledge and their self-consciousness ultimately made them the masters
of India.
A national disaster of the type of Panipat has naturally resulted in cast-
'ing a shadow of gloom over the Maratha nation. But the defeat has been
treated differently by various students of history, who have given quite a dif-
ferent turn to the whole discussion. Evans BELL wrote long ago that 'even the
battle of Panipat was a triumph and a glory for the Marathas. They fought
in the cause of 'India for the Indians,' while the great Muhammedan princes
of Delhi, of Oude and the Deccan, stood as de, intriguing and trimming. And
though the Marathas were defeated, the victorious Afghans retired and never
again interfered in the affairs of India." Prof. RAWLINSON writes,² 'A defeat is
9 Ait Patre Yadi 192, RAJ 6 415
10 RAJ 1.143
11 Fall, 2.364
1 RAJWADE I Introduction, p. 46.
2 KASHIRAJ Introduction, p. xiii.

THE JUDGMENT 125
none can say that they were inferior to any in India of those days With all
their internal quarrels, no other state in India could muster so many troops for
war under a unitary command. No other nation was less bigoted or more
tolerant in religious and social matters, as is proved by their behaviour towards
their Muslim neighbours or their rule over Muslim subjects. There is no in-
stance of their having fabricated a document like Clive, none where they tried
to gain a point by assassination or intimidation. They did not hire mercenaries
for slaughtering their opponent in an unguarded moment. They would not
murder persons by calling them for an interview. They would not kill foreign
emissaries at their Court. No other war-like nation is known to be milder in
their peace-time actions. There are no instances where the Marathas entered
into the slaughter of civilians after a victory, or during conquest to have
created terror. It is nowhere noted that they slaughtered disarmed prisoners,
like the Durranis after Panipat, or uselessly cut off the head of a fallen soldier
as in the case of Dattaji Shinde at Buradi. They did not apply torture to ex-
tract hidden wealth like the Afghans at Delhi in 1757. In fact, one feels many
a time that their comparative mildness their humane behaviour, their civil man-
ners, their unwillingness to gain their ends by back-door machinations or solve
their problems, internal or external, by swift unscrupulous actions such as mur-
dering an opponent, or doing away with their unwanted brethren like the
Mughals, has had the effect of their not succeeding in history. Be that
as it may, none can charge them as being morally condemnable in comparison
with many other military nations in the world. When a responsible historian of
India like Sir Jadunath SARKAR charges the Marathas with being "lesser breeds
beyond the law,"³ one does not know how to characterize such a statement and
what standard of conduct and morality he wants to apply. He seems to belong
to that category of historians-cum moralists "who justify Providence by the
event and hold nothing so deserving as success. To them there can be no vic-
tory in a bad cause, prescription and duration legitimate, and whatever exists
is right and reasonable, and God manifests His will by that which He tolerates.
Men must confirm to the divine decree by living to shape the future after the
ratified image of the past."⁴ These writers should learn to know that there
are many Marathas—perhaps the majority—who think it better to have lost
the Empire than to have followed a line of conduct after the manner of a
Clive or Najib or Abdali.
GENERAL THOUGHTS ON WAR
Mankind since it began to think and take a retrospective view of human
affairs, has been sharply divided on the moral basis of war, and it will prob-
ably remain so divided for all time. Indian civilisation, at least after the
Aryan imposition, has not only sanctioned war but has consecrated a particular
class for that work and given it the second rank in society. This is in sharp
contrast with the neighbouring Chinese civilisation which had relegated the
soldier to the last place in society and only tolerated him as an unavoidable
³ Fall II.291
⁴ Lord Acton, Lectures on Modern History (1907) (Inaugural Lecture) p 25 ,

122 PANIPAT 1761
under some circumstances as honourable as a victory, and never, in all their
annals, did the Maratha armies cover themselves with greater glory than when
the flower of the chivalry of the Deccan perished on the stricken field of Pani-
pat, fighting against the enemies of their creed and country But, after all,
the general who wins a campaign is the one who makes the fewest mistakes
The Bhausaheb did not commit a tithe of the blunders of both Wellington and
Napoleon in the Waterloo campaign He lost not because he was a bad gen-
eral, but because his opponent was a better one
We have shown above that these opinions are correct as far as they
go But that is beside the point The wisdom for the Marathas lay in not
coming to grips with such an awkward enemy as Ahmad Shah Abdali Had
Panipat resulted in a defeat of the Afghans it would not have meant the same
thing to them or to others Nobody was going to invade barren Afghanistan
and try to rule over it Instead of consolidating and making sure of what
they had got, the Marathas had no business to march forward, lengthen their
lines of communication and multiply their responsibilities This wrong policy
had begun already with Bajirao s invasion of Delhi in 1736 Geographic fac-
tors were completely ignored, because they were completely misunderstood by
the Marathas The Marathas boasted all along that the Deccan was as good
as theirs," but had never once understood the implications underlying that state
ment Even in their hey day before Panipat, others had coolly stolen a march
on them The implication of the destruction of the Angre s naval power seems
to have been understood by Alivardi Khan³ in Bengal just before his death,
but not by the Peshwa The short sighted policy pursued by the Peshwa even
after his experience in the Vijayadurg affair resulted in his directly playing into
the hands of his enemy and assured Clive's success in Bengal A similar thing
occurred at Mysore and made the line clear for Haidar Ali It should never
be forgotten that Surat and Janjira never came into the hands of the Peshwa,
much less could he have hoped to touch the European citadels on his coast,
Bombay and Goa While the Marathas were exhilarated by their march be-
yond the Indus, the English were silently entering Surat by the back door of
the sea A big army of the Marathas was encamping outside Surat and their
navy had also entered the Tapti estuary Diplomats were coming and going
and taking sides in the civil struggle at Surat, but still the English could carry
on independent correspondence with the Wazir Ghazi ud-din (a so-called crea-
ture of the Marathas) and get a Firman from the Mughal Emperor (who
thought himself a protege of the Peshwa) appointing them the keepers of the
Surat fort and admirals of the Mughal fleet This neglected Surat episode
throws a flood of light on Marathi politics during its most triumphant days.
Sadashivrao's defects have been well pointed out by the English envoy John

122 PANIPAT 1761
under some circumstances as honourable as a victory, and never, in all their
annals, did the Maratha armies cover themselves with greater glory than when
the flower of the chivalry of the Deccan perished on the stricken field of Pani-
pat, fighting against the enemies of their creed and country But, after all,
the general who wins a campaign is the one who makes the fewest mistakes
The Bhausaheb did not commit a tithe of the blunders of both Wellington and
Napoleon in the Waterloo campaign He lost not because he was a bad gen-
eral, but because his opponent was a better one '
We have shown above that these opinions are correct as far as they
go But that is beside the point The wisdom for the Marathas lay in not
coming to grips with such an awkward enemy as Ahmad Shah Abdali Had
Panipat resulted in a defeat of the Afghans, it would not have meant the same
thing to them or to others Nobody was going to invade barren Afghanistan
and try to rule over it Instead of consolidating and making sure of what
they had got the Marathas had no business to march forward, lengthen their
lines of communication and multiply their responsibilities This wrong policy
had begun already with Bajirao's invasion of Delhi in 1736 Geographic fac-
tors were completely ignored, because they were completely misunderstood by
the Marathas The Marathas boasted all along that "the Deccan was as good
as theirs," but had never once understood the implications underlying that state-
ment Even in their hey day before Panipat, others had coolly stolen a march
on them The implication of the destruction of the Angre's naval power seems
to have been understood by Alivardi Khan³ in Bengal just before his death,
but not by the Peshwa The short sighted policy pursued by the Peshwa even
after his experience in the Vijayadurg affair resulted in his directly playing into
the hands of his enemy and assured Clive's success in Bengal A similar thing
occurred at Mysore and made the line clear for Haidar Ali It should never
be forgotten that Surat and Janjira never came into the hands of the Peshwa,
much less could he have hoped to touch the European citadels on his coast,
Bombay and Goa While the Marathas were exhilarated by their march be-
yond the Indus, the English were silently entering Surat by the back door of
the sea A big army of the Marathas was encamping outside Surat and their
navy had also entered the Tapti estuary Diplomats were coming and going
and taking sides in the civil struggle at Surat, but still the English could carry
on independent correspondence with the Wazir Ghazi ud din (a so called crea-
ture of the Marathas) and get a Firman from the Mughal Emperor (wh
thought himself a protege of the Peshwa) appointing them the keepers of th
Surat fort and admirals of the Mughal fleet This neglected Surat episode
throws a flood of light on Maratha politics during its most triumphant days
Sadashivrao's defects have been well pointed out by the English envoy John
Spencer⁴ four years before Panipat He knew him to be a man with great
capacity for business, but as hasty and avaricious, too The impatience men-
tioned by the English Vakil was born of ignorance The ignorance was due
to the defective educational system or rather absence of a progressive system
marching with the times and adequate for making its votaries able to cope with
³ S C HILL, Bengal in 1756-57 (1905), Vol II, pp 16, 65, &
⁴ C H F

THE JUDGMENT 123
any situation arising around them. Balaji Bajirao's studies in Sanskrit were
advanced to the extent of writing verses in that language, but there is no evi-
dence to prove that the Peshwa had enough geographical information to cope
with that of the contemporary Europeans. RAJWADE'S statement⁵ that the
Peshwas possessed maps of the various provinces in India is not borne out by
any positive proof till after the First Maratha War. What knowledge they pos-
sessed was gained from gossipy news or orally from visitors to their Court, but
it was not sufficient to make these aspiring conquerors of India visualise either
the shape of their country or correctly point to the directions of the various
parts of the continent, nor an understanding of its correct extent. This had
a disastrous effect on the policy of the Marathas. Their avarice made them
grab everything which their hands could reach, but the political repercussions
of that grabbing and the pressure it would exert on their military machine they
were unable to comprehend. The non comprehension of political and military
facts surrounding them is the chief defect which made the Peshwas act as way-
wardly as they did. No other reason can explain their actions otherwise. The
contrast can be best understood by studying the English documents and publi-
cations of those times. All their military campaigns, naval fights, political ag-
grandisements, are found fully reported, discussed threadbare and lines of
policy deduced therefrom for future guidance. Not an iota of knowledge once
gained, not a point of vantage once secured, not an inch of ground once oc-
cupied was wasted or lost by them. The Marathas in their career had to go
through many a campaign, to enter into diplomatic talks, to carry on political
controversies and to devise various ways and means for securing their end, but
scarcely any of these things are found published for public edification, for the
use of the younger students in various walks of life. A nation which carried on
wars in all directions over a wide continent for more than a century, has not
produced a single treatise on warfare. That is the basic defect in the nation.
Its want could not be supplied by any other means. When one finds such a
book published in English in the very year of the Panipat disaster with de-
tailed maps, plans of battles, illustrations of the positions of forts giving a
visual demonstration of their military situation, naval manœuvres with drawings
of the anchored ships, together with their full political and diplomatic back-
ground, one is forced to exclaim that want of such training led to the Panipat
disaster (Vide R. O. Cambridge's War in India, etc., 1761).
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE PANIPAT CAMPAIGN
The Panipat campaign takes away the charge against the Marathas that
they were not the rulers of India, but only robbers in the dominions of other
rulers. This one campaign bears evidence not only to the military organiza-
tion developed under the Peshwas, but also to the fact that they were waging
war not for aggrandisement but for the defence of a principle, India for the
Indians, governed by Indians. The Peshwa had accepted the responsibility of
defending the Mughal Empire from its internal and external foes through his
⁵ RAJWADE, op. cit., p. 99

THE JUDGMENT 123
any situation arising around them. Balaji Bajirao's studies in Sanskrit were
advanced to the extent of writing verses in that language, but there is no evi-
dence to prove that the Peshwa had enough geographical information to cope
with that of the contemporary Europeans. RAJWADE'S statement⁵ that the
Peshwas possessed maps of the various provinces in India is not borne out by
any positive proof till after the First Maratha War. What knowledge they pos-
sessed was gained from gossipy news or orally from visitors to their Court, but
it was not sufficient to make these aspiring conquerors of India visualise either
the shape of their country or correctly point to the directions of the various
parts of the continent, nor an understanding of its correct extent. This had
a disastrous effect on the policy of the Marathas. Their avarice made them
grab everything which their hands could reach, but the political repercussions
of that grabbing and the pressure it would exert on their military machine they
were unable to comprehend. The non-comprehension of political and military
facts surrounding them is the chief defect which made the Peshwas act as way-
wardly as they did. No other reason can explain their actions otherwise. The
contrast can be best understood by studying the English documents and publi-
cations of those times. All their military campaigns, naval fights, political ag-
grandisements, are found fully reported, discussed threadbare and lines of
policy deduced therefrom for future guidance. Not an iota of knowledge once
gained, not a point of vantage once secured, not an inch of ground once oc-
cupied was wasted or lost by them. The Marathas in their career had to go
through many a campaign, to enter into diplomatic talks, to carry on political
controversies and to devise various ways and means for securing their end, but
scarcely any of these things are found published for public edification, for the
use of the younger students in various walks of life. A nation which carried on
wars in all directions over a wide continent for more than a century, has not
produced a single treatise on warfare. That is the basic defect in the nation.
Its want could not be supplied by any other means. When one finds such a
book published in English in the very year of the Panipat disaster with de-
tailed maps, plans of battles, illustrations of the positions of forts, giving a
visual demonstration of their military situation, naval manœuvres with drawings
of the anchored ships, together with their full political and diplomatic back-
ground, one is forced to exclaim that want of such training led to the Panipat
disaster (Vide R. O. Cambridge's War in India, etc., 1761).

THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE PANIPAT CAMPAIGN

The Panipat campaign takes away the charge against the Marathas that
they were not the rulers of India, but only robbers in the dominions of other
rulers. This one campaign bears evidence not only to the military organiza-
tion developed under the Peshwas, but also to the fact that they were waging
war not for aggrandisement but for the defence of a principle, India for the
Indians, governed by Indians. The Peshwa had accepted the responsibility of
defending the Mughal Empire from its internal and external foes through his

⁵ RAJWADE, op. cit., p. 99.

124 PANIPAT 1761
agents in 1752. From that date they had waged war against practically all
the potentates in India, great and small. Jayapa Shinde had waged war unto
death against Bijesingh of Marwar as a Mughal Subahdar of Ajmer and Mal-
harrao Holkar had fought against Madhosingh of Jaipur and Surajmal Jat,
as a Subahdar of Agra, in order to bring these recalcitrant chiefs under the rule
of the Mughal Empire. In the campaign against the Nizam in 1760, Bhau had
actually talked with him on the same basis. Bhau had received the Imperial Fir-
man¹ from Alamgir II through his confidential secretary Kamyar Khan sent in
August 1759 three months before that Emperor's assassination. In it, the Emperor
had besought Bhau's help against his unprincipled and unscrupulous Wazir
Ghazi ud din whose behaviour had become unbearable to the Emperor. The
Emperor had given a carte blanche to Bhau to take over the sole charge of the
Mughal Empire, with power to appoint his own Wazir and Mir Bakshi or
any other official. The Emperor wished Bhau to arrange matters in such a way
as to leave him in the position of the Maratha Chhatrapati at Satara. Those
who are ticklish about the constitutional procedure cannot criticize the Marathas
with high handedness in their dealings with the various Indian chiefs if they bear
in mind this important fact often overlooked by the historians. There was no
need for the Marathas to take upon themselves the onerous burden of running
the Mughal Empire, had they wished only for self aggrandisement. As a
matter of fact, matters became difficult for the Marathas by the acceptance of
this burden, because they had to become enemies of all and sundry by this
procedure. But they wished to preserve the grand fabric of the Mughal Em-
pire in so far as it was possible. They had no wish to sweep away all trace of
old rule and begin their rule anew. They did not wish to create anarchy
throughout the length and breadth of India. But they were counting against
the time. None of the chiefs and potentates who had risen in India during
the 18th century, had a wish to lose what they had grabbed or usurped. The
selfishness and machinations of these rulers foiled the attempts of the Marathas
to run the empire on its Mughal basis. It looks as if it would have been far
better for the Maratha state to have run its own course without getting into
this entanglement with the Mughal Empire. But this is by the way. The
critics of the Marathas cannot charge them with not knowing the constitu-
tional ways or want of principles. They tried to follow the constitutional way,
they fought for a principle. They understood the responsibility devolving on
them by the acceptance of a treaty, which they did not treat as a scrap of
paper, to be torn when it did not suit them. They would not sign away the
rights of the Mughal Empire even when these had been usurped by such a
potentate as Ahmad Shah Abdali. Raghunathrao would not part with Kabul
and Kandahar² in 1758, Bhau would not accept the boundary of Sirhind in
1760. In these instances, the Marathas were fighting for regions and rights
already lost by the Mughal Empire. Can any one say with this history be-
fore him that the Marathas had no idea of a state, that they did not know the
constitutional ways, that they had no respect for treaties or had no regard for
principles? They certainly aspired to be the Regents of the Indian Empire and
¹ BISMQ 11 p. 44.
² Itihasa Sangraha— Ait. Sphuta Lekha, 1.11.

THE JUDGMENT 125
none can say that they were inferior to any in India of those days With all
their internal quarrels, no other state in India could muster so many troops for
war under a unitary command No other nation was less bigoted or more
tolerant in religious and social matters, as is proved by the r behaviour towards
their Muslim neighbours or their rule over Muslim subjects There is no in
stance of their having fabricated a document like Clive, none where they tried
to gain a point by assassination or intimidation They did not hire mercenaries
for slaughtering their opponent in an unguarded moment They would not
murder persons by calling them for an interview They would not kill foreign
emissaries at their Court. No other war like nation is known to be milder in
their peace time actions There are no instances where the Marathas entered
into the slaughter of civilians after a victory, or during conquest to have
created terror It is nowhere noted that they slaughtered disarmed prisoners,
like the Durranis after Panipat, or uselessly cut off the head of a fallen soldier
as in the case of Dattaji Shinde at Buradi They did not apply torture to ex
tract hidden wealth like the Afghans at Delhi in 1757 In fact, one feels many
a time that their comparative mildness, their humane behaviour their civil man
ners, their unwillingness to gain their ends by back door machinations or solve
their problems, internal or external, by swift unscrupulous actions such as mur-
dering an opponent, or doing away with their unwanted brethren like the
Mughals, has had the effect of their not succeeding in history Be that
as it may, none can charge them as being morally condemnable in comparison
with many other military nations in the world When a responsible historian of
India like Sir Jadunath SARKAR charges the Marathas with being 'lesser breeds
beyond the law,' ³ one does not know how to characterize such a statement and
what standard of conduct and morality he wants to apply He seems to belong
to that category of historians-cum moralists "who justify Providence by the
event and hold nothing so deserving as success To them there can be no vic-
tory in a bad cause, prescription and duration legitimate, and whatever exists
is right and reasonable, and God manifests His will by that wh ch He tolerates
Men must confirm to the divine decree by living to shape the future after the
ratified image of the past "⁴ These writers should learn to know that there
are many Marathas—perhaps the majority—who think it better to have lost
the Empire than to have followed a line of conduct after the manner of a
Clive or Najib or Abdali
GENERAL THOUGHTS ON WAR
Mankind since it began to think and take a retrospective view of human
affairs, has been sharply divided on the moral basis of war, and it will prob-
ably remain so divided for all time Indian civilisation, at least after the
Aryan imposition, has not only sanctioned war but has consecrated a particular
class for that work and given it the second rank in society This is in sharp
contrast with the neighbouring Chinese civilisation which had relegated the
soldier to the last place in society and only tolerated him as an unavoidable
³ Fall II.291
⁴ Lord Action, Lectures on Modern History (1907) (Inaugural Lecture) p 25 ,

126 PANIPAT 1761
evil Turks who conquered India and held their sway over it for half a mil
lennium were a moving nation in arms In addition, the Islamic teachings
which they followed had charged them with waging an incessant war upon the
infidels till they were converted to Islam When the Marathas rose upon the
horizon of history they had perforce to take to the military profession for solving
the Indian riddle It was a necessity imposed on them by the Epoch and they
had no choice of refusing it How mild and inoffensive the Marathas otherwise
are has been proved after the extinction of their sovereign power, for by the
end of the 19th century they were relegated to the rank of non martial races in
India in the Indo British political phraseology It means that the Marathas
as a race take to arms only when they are insulted or forced to as the Chinese
monk Yu an Chwang remarked long ago in his itinerary Spilling of blood
never became a pastime with them as with the Afghans On the whole, the
battles fought by the Marathas were the least bloody, the casualties on both
sides being as few as possible Their so called guerilla mode of warfare was
nothing more than seeking to gain their ends by manoeuvring and strategy more
than by actual crossing of swords face to face Having acted throughout their
career in this spirit, they naturally felt intensely such a disaster as Panipat on
account of the heavy massacres following it When estimating the effects of
Panipat on the Marathas, this fact should not be lost sight of
The best of political thinkers have allowed war as a human necessity
in solving uncompromising questions Some go so far as to call it a moral neces
sity Taking the historic view, certainly the recorded history of mankind is
mostly a history of wars waged by the various races of mankind between and
amongst themselves as Sir John FORTESCUE says, but all would not agree with
him in thinking the military force of a nation as a manifestation of its moral
force At the same time it is certain that in history the military force has stood
as the test of material civilisation if not of moral The best soldier has always
manifested the highest human virtues personally, but collectively it is difficult
to characterise war as a school for virtues If sometimes the best qualities of a
nation are called forth and mobilised by war, it is also true and much more
often true that the worst side of human nature is exhibited and given a licence
as a result of war Whether a state lapses into degeneracy as a result of long
peace is also a debatable point, because for counteracting such a possibility some-
one else has to suffer The cruelty and the futility of war for final settlement
of human world problems has become more and more manifest with the
progress of modern civilisation and coming together of mankind Be that as it
may, speaking about Panipat, it is very correct to say that the inferiority of
the Marathas, in the material sense, became very manifest But on the moral
side their record is very clean They had not fought for the three primary
(and also primitive) aims of war as given by HOBBES, viz (1) material gain,
(2) fear, or (3) glory It means they fought for a fourth cause unknown to
that political philosopher, viz principle, the sanctity of the contract they had
entered into with the Delhi Emperor for the guarding of his Empire On the
other hand Ahmad Shah Abdali individually was also fighting for a cause
he thought right, viz the cause of Islam in India He triumphed by his superior
power, won glory, freed himself from the fear of the Marathas once for all,

THE JUDGMENT 127

but did not gain anything, materially speaking, thus proving the futility of
war in the material sense to any party, long before Sir Norman ANGEL wrote
his Great Illusion. Incidentally it also proved the correctness of the Maratha
stand in the political sense. The Marathas lost the Panjab no doubt, but it was
gained not by Abdali a foreigner, but by the Sikhs in the long run. The
treacherous Najib-ud-daulah, the arch-villain of the piece, outwardly succeeded
in warding off the Marathas, but found himself thrown between two mill-
stones—the Sikhs from the north and the Jats from the south—never getting
a moment's rest till his death a decade later. The hated Marathas again ruled
in Delhi and uprooted Najib's family together with his buried bones in the
grave at Najibabad.
The trans-Ganges Ruhelas under Hafiz who had joined Abdali as
Afghans, also experienced the scourge of the Marathas after Najib's death.
Shuja-ud-daulah who had been enticed away into joining the side of Abdali
by cajoling and threatening, not only left the Afghan side just after Panipat,
but became the annihilator of the Ruhelas with the help of Warren Hastings,
thus historically proving that he had acted under "duress" the wrong party.
He himself had escaped falling under the suzerainty of the Marathas, only to
find himself obliged to fall a victim to the utterly foreign English. In fact,
the ultimate result of Panipat was to make the way smooth and clear for the
English, a result which could have been avoided only by a victory for the
Marathas. History thus vindicates the correctness of the Maratha stand and
exposes the basic hollowness of their critics. Further, it also proves the com-
plexity of the Afghan border problem, which has not been satisfactorily solved
by the British even after a rule of 150 years. The irony of history can have no
better illustration than Panipat.

a superior official, but thought him to be an ordinary munshi Kashiraj is
self-contradictory in his account of Bhau's behaviour On the one hand, he
condemns Bhau on his pride and obstinacy, on the other he depicts Bhau as
ready to submit to any conditions mediated through the agency of such persons
as Kashiraj himself Now to judge Bhau from his own letters, one thing is
certain about him and that is that he was never proud, though his tone was
often harsh and his manner peremptory Bhau should be the last person to
assume a cringing role before a man of Kashiraj's position or to be over confi-
dent about him
There seems to be some discrepancy in the account of Kashiraj, as is
acknowledged by Sir Jadunath Sarkar who has carefully studied the original
manuscript. He thinks it due to lapse of memory or loose narrative of events ⁶
We cannot treat it so lightly Kashiraj tells us of Bhau's writing his last chit
just before the battle of Panipat, a thing which no thoughtful person will be
ready to believe A commander in chief intimating in his autograph the last
desperate movement of his army, just before the commencement of the fatal
battle, is a thing which cannot be inserted or allowed in fiction or poetry, much
less can it be believed in a primary source of history Was Bhau such a fool
as to believe and hope that his last note would bear any good and immediate
results, after his experience in diplomacy for six months? Would he not rather
fear the fatal consequence of pre-intimating his movement to such a consummate
general as Ahmad Shah Abdali? It was a matter of astonishment to us when
we tried to study this point deeply and found none of the previous writers
even suspecting the full import of this, to us, a cock and bull story We call it
such because fortunately for the historian there is the clear evidence of a con-
temporary letter directly falsifying Kashiraj's narrative Sir Jadunath in his
new translation of Kashiraj's narrative has given the name of Bhau's valet who
took the last chit to Kashiraj as Balakram, who is styled as Bhau's betel-bearer,
and is taken as the most confidential servant of his master ⁷ Anybody with an
acquaintance with the Maratha names knows that Balakram is not a common
Maratha name On the other hand, a letter from the Purandare Archives pub-
lished by Rajwade in his sixth volume clearly gives the name of Bhau's valet
as Balaram, a common name amongst the Marathas ⁸ Anupgir Gosawi writes
in this post-Panipat letter to Nana Purandare that the Peshwa's valet, Balaram
Vaghoji Naik, and some others also had gone to Shuja-ud-daulah's camp on
some errand on the Sunday prior to the battle of Panipat, fought on Wednesday,
14th January, 1761 This proves that the chit Kashiraj is talking of as hav-
ing been dramatically sent three hours prior to the battle had been actually
sent (if at all) three days previous to it We suggest from this small but vital
point that Kashiraj had not only forgotten the days and their proper order, but
was narrating the whole story with a dramatic touch, as the battle of Panipat
is a good theme for such treatment.
6 Fall 2.369
7 Ibid 2 320
8 Rajwade 6 No 407, p 472.
P. F—9

A CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SOURCES
(PUBLISHED AND UNPUBLISHED)
1 Kashiraj •
Persian account of the battle of Panipat and the events leading to it
(Oxford University Press, 1926) Corrected by the translation of Sir JADUNATH
SARKAR, published in Indian Historical Quarterly, 1934 and 1935
Kashiraj Shivdev was a Deshastha Brahmin (native of the Nizam's
Dominions) at the court of Shuja ud daulah of Oudh, who was present through
out the campaign in the camp of his master His narrative is taken as the
best authority on the battle of Panipat He seems to have been working in
the north for some twenty five years before Panipat since the time of Safdar
Jang He had occasional correspondence with the Peshwas¹ for more than
twenty years His exact status at the court of Shuja-ud daulah is not quite
clear He is called a Vakil or a diplomat, but is scarcely sent anywhere as an
emissary with full powers In his account he is found assuming superior airs,
standing tightly on his dignity But there is no mention of him in the whole
range of Marathi political correspondence,² an omission which seems to us
rather significant His account was written nineteen years after the battle of
Panipat, and from memory It appears to have been purposely written for some
one inquisitive on the point, possibly a British official at the Oudh Court In
1780 when this account was written, the British power in India was already
combating with that of the Maratha power The glory of the Maratha power
was on the wane Kashiraj, though racially a Maratha, had culturally, by this
time, become by his long sojourn in northern India, almost a U P Kayasth
with all that it means When he wrote his account he was almost seventy, an
age when the mental faculties are on the decline He seems to have been, at
first, a disappointed candidate for service under the Peshwa,³ and later on moved
to the north in search of employment, which he secured on account of his profi-
ciency in the Persian language That there was no particular love lost between
him and the Maratha nation or their Empire is evident from the tone of his ac-
count. According to him, Sadashivrao Bhau was defeated on account of his
arrogance and pride⁴ Throughout his narrative, he seems to have been con-
vinced that fate had ordained the miscarriage of the Maratha enterprise⁵
On the other hand, whenever he had occasion to write about Ahmad Shah
Abdali, he is found completely over awed by his superior prowess and his divine
role of punishing the Marathas for their wicked pride, for in the eyes of
Kashiraj, pride is sin This much for the mental make up of the man
Bhau's munshi once wrote a letter to Kashiraj at which Kashiraj was
offended on account of some deficiency in the proper form of address due to
his station It means that the Maratha Court did not think Kashiraj to be
1 SPD 40.25 dated Feb 1741
2 KASHIRAJ 14
3 SPD 30.329
4 KASHIRAJ 52
5 Ibid. 8 IHQ 11.552, 10.266.
[128]

CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 129
a superior official, but thought him to be an ordinary munshi Kashiraj is
self contradictory in his account of Bhau's behaviour On the one hand, he
condemns Bhau on his pride and obstinacy, on the other he depicts Bhau as
ready to submit to any conditions mediated through the agency of such persons
as Kashiraj himself Now to judge Bhau from his own letters, one thing is
certain about him and that is that he was never proud, though his tone was
often harsh and his manner peremptory Bhau should be the last person to
assume a cringing role before a man of Kashiraj's position or to be over confi
dent about him
There seems to be some discrepancy in the account of Kashiraj, as is
acknowledged by Sir Jadunath SARKAR who has carefully studied the original
manuscript. He thinks it due to lapse of memory or loose narrative of events ⁶
We cannot treat it so lightly Kashiraj tells us of Bhau's writing his last chit
just before the battle of Panipat, a thing which no thoughtful person will be
ready to believe A commander in chief intimating in his autograph the last
desperate movement of his army, just before the commencement of the fatal
battle, is a thing which cannot be inserted or allowed in fiction or poetry, much
less can it be believed in a primary source of history Was Bhau such a fool
as to believe and hope that his last note would bear any good and immediate
results, after his experience in diplomacy for six months? Would he not rather
fear the fatal consequence of pre-intimating his movement to such a consummate
general as Ahmad Shah Abdali? It was a matter of astonishment to us when
we tried to study this point deeply and found none of the previous writers
even suspecting the full import of this, to us, a cock and bull story We call it
such because fortunately for the historian there is the clear evidence of a con-
temporary letter directly falsifying Kashiraj's narrative Sir Jadunath in his
new translation of Kashiraj's narrative has given the name of Bhau's valet who
took the last chit to Kashiraj as Balakram, who is styled as Bhau's betel bearer,
and is taken as the most confidential servant of his master ⁷ Anybody with an
acquaintance with the Maratha names knows that Balakram is not a common
Maratha name On the other hand, a letter from the Purandare Archives pub-
lished by RAJWADE in his sixth volume clearly gives the name of Bhau's valet
as Balaram, a common name amongst the Marathas ⁸ Anupgir Gosawi writes
in this post Panipat letter to Nana Purandare that the Peshwa's valet, Balaram
Vaghoji Naik, and some others also had gone to Shuja ud daulah's camp on
some errand on the Sunday prior to the battle of Panipat, fought on Wednesday,
14th January, 1761 This proves that the chit Kashiraj is talking of as hav
ing been dramatically sent three hours prior to the battle had been actually
sent (if at all) three days previous to it We suggest from this small but vital
point that Kashiraj had not only forgotten the days and their proper order, but
was narrating the whole story with a dramatic touch, as the battle of Panipat
is a good theme for such treatment.
6 Fall, 2.369
7 Ibid 2 320
8 RAJWADE 6 No 407, p 472
P. F-9

130 PANIPAT: 1761
Bhau Sahebanchi Bakhar,⁹ on the other hand, gives quite the opposite
story It tells us of Abdali's Vakil coming to Bhau just before the battle and
asking him to postpone the fight for the day in order to give a last chance fot
peace talks Bhau is reported to have unceremoniously driven him back, be-
ginning the fight at once thereafter Sir Jadunath, though he considers the
Marathi Bakhars "as later gossipy fabrications no better than opium-eaters'
tales,"¹⁰ has still to acknowledge that "there are some true traditions (as proved
by authentic records) and some statements .which have every appearance of
being true though unsupported elsewhere" We do not know whether Sir
Jadunath would like to believe in this Bakhar story, which, we think, as most
improbable and written to suit the whole tenor of the author, who was out to
condemn Bhau and make a scapegoat of him
Kashiraj was on the battle field that whole day, no doubt, but that fact
cannot make any person see the whole line of battle with his own eyes, much
less can it give him a correct idea of the order of the battle on the opposite
side Kashiraj, with all his sagacity, was a civil official and not a soldier who
could judge military matters correctly For the most part, he was standing
ready in his own camp throughout the day of the battle He himself confesses
that Shuja's side was the least affected part in the line of battle, because none
came to attack it The whole line of battle is taken by Sir Jadunath to cover
some seven miles So it was physically impossible for Kashiraj to see anything
but a small part of the actual battle, and that, too, from a distance His value
as an eye-witness must, therefore, be discounted to a great extent, and his
version of the battle must be taken as gathered after the event from the gen-
eral reports which came to his ears This work of collecting news from various
sources and afterwards collating and correlating it into the form of a running
narrative could be done by others also, and, therefore, we have no valid ground
to reject the version given in the Marathi Bakhars and letters only because we
are unaware of the status of the narrators We have shown in the detailed de-
scription of the battle the various points wherein Kashiraj is proved to be
wrong
2 Bhau Sahebanchi Bakhar (1922) and 3 Shrimant Bhau Saheb Yanchi
Kaifiyat (1887)
These two are the most important primary sources about the battle of
Panipat in Marathi Their authors are unknown but they were certainly much
nearer to the event than Kashiraj when they wrote, as can be proved from the
language, the tone and the textual criticism of their manuscripts Certain pas-
sages in the narration of the events in the Kaifiyat are found bodily incorporated
in the Bakhar¹¹ which is a bigger narrative of the event From this we can say
that the Kaifiyat, small and to the point, was the earlier narrative of the two,
of which the Bakhar was an amplified edition with enlarged paraphrase. The
Kaifiyat gives the life of Bhau from the point of his start for the Udgir cam-
paign of 1759-60 and closes with the retreat from Panipat. The Bakhar, on
the other hand, narrates the Maratha activities in the north from 1753 on-
9 Bhau Bakhar (1922) p 115
10 Fall 2.367
11 Cf Kaifiyat 21 and Bakhar 141, K 22, B 144, K. 23, B. 143.

CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 131
wards It is ostensibly written to glorify the achievements of the Shindes and
these have no direct connection with the battle of Panipat. The author is
evidently a biased person and on that account tries to supply and explain the
genesis, the events and the activities behind the scenes of actual narration with
all the personal bickerings of the actors in their full gusto The reports of
these bickerings and their actual wording may or may not be true in their full
import, but it is clear that they throw a necessary light on the seamy side of
history We shall have to discount much of this report due to the bias of
the author Another thing which has to be borne in mind is the fact that
these reports must have necessarily come from the persons who ran away from
the field of battle and as such were dubbed as renegades by the people at
large The odium of this obloquy and the guilty conscience of having failed
to be with their leaders in the thick of the fight, made the reports from these
survivors naturally colourful and excusatory Most of these persons had di
rect blame attached to their conduct and in sheer self-justification they gave
such a retrospective turn to their own and Bhaus conduct as to lead to the
disaster which would then appear inevitable If we compare the tone of the
letters¹² which some of these survivors sent previous to the battle with those
they wrote after it, we can understand the difference worked out in the minds
of these writers by the fatal disaster When the authors of the Kaifiyat and
the Bakhar wrote their accounts after a few years, the public in Maharashtra
had come to form some sort of plausible opinion about the great disaster, after
hearing, explaining, accounting and guessing about the various reports brought
from the distant field The boiled essence of all these is found written in the
Bakhar Sadashivrao Bhau was out to give a new turn to the ancient mode
of Maratha warfare which was taken to be of the guerilla type Bhau had
introduced the trained infantry tactics and tried to combine them with the
original mode The good result of this innovation had been reaped in the
Udgir campaign The Udgir victory had naturally increased the prestige of
Ibrahim Khan Gardi and his mode of warfare Throughout the Panipat cam-
paign, Bhau had put his main confidence in these infantry corps and they
also gave a very good account of themselves The idea of entrenching at
Panipat was a result of these tactics It made the Marathas unassailable so
long as they remained within their entrenchments Bhau expected Abdali to
attack them in this strong position, as he was sure of victory in the event of
such an attack But Abdali had understood it equally well He himself never
once tried to attack, and had strictly forbidden any one from his camp to go
out with a view to attacking He played a game of waiting and hoped to get
a victory when the Maratha army would come out due to starvation That is
why Bhau is found raging and almost railing against Govindpant Bundele for
not attacking Abdali from behind and making him compulsorily fall on the
Maratha entrenchments to his sure destruction When, due to the failure of
Govindpant and due to starvation, Bhau himself had to come out, that combi
nation of artillery, infantry and cavalry tactics which it was necessary to keep
12 RAJ Vol. 6 Cf Satvoji Jadhavrao's letters No 404 dated 18-9-1760 and No 409
dated 10-3-1761 also cf Nana Purandare's letters No 391 of 14-11-1760 in Purandare

• Daftar Pt. 1, and No 118 in Pt. III