पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

THE BATTLE 97
amongst the assailants He proceeded still farther when again a party at-
tacked him, drawing him out of the tall grass where he was hiding Here
again some old soldier took pity on the boy and thus he was finally saved
Because it was the eighth day of the bright half of the lunar month, the moon
was shining overhead in the evening till she set after midnight This circum
stance, while it was useful to some in covering their flight, was also responsible
for the long pursuit by the Afghan troops over that plain and the heavy
slaughter of non combatants running on foot for their lives But many more
were killed by the surrounding villagers who had suffered terribly during the
last three months by the constant tramp of soldiers The Karnal Gazetteer has
recorded that the villages of Phurlak (twelve miles to the north), Bala (fifteen
miles to the north west), and Dahar (six miles to the south west of Panipat)
had migrated to other areas forsaking their sites This will give an idea of
the devastation wrought in the surrounding area It is not recorded as to
when the elephant on which Bhau's wife, Parvatibai, Nana Fadnis's mother
and wife were seated, got itself separated from the other troops From the
Maratha chronicles it appears that this elephant was not far behind Bhau's
line of battle Once her elephant touched the elephant on which Vishwasrao's
corpse had been placed covered under some cloth Then only she came to
know of Vishwasrao's death and began to weep and wail If this fact is truly
reported, it means that she was half a mile behind the fighting line The
chronicles report that one captain with 500 shepherds¹¹ had been specially ap
pointed for the protection of Parvatibai The name of this captain is given as
Visaji Krishna Jogdand, a name which is not found mentioned in any original
document He had been ordered to follow the army to Delhi if it success
fully cut its passage through the Afghan lines, but if the battle turned into
a defeat, as soon as Bhau's fall was reported, he should cut off Parvatibai so
as to avoid her falling into the hands of the Afghans But neither this Visaji
nor his shepherds seem to have done anything according to order They ran
away at the first shock and tried to save their lives! Only a personal servant,
Janu Bhintade, never left her for a moment and tactfully brought her back
to Panipat out of the turmoil¹² when only half an hour of the day remained
She got down from her elephant and followed Janu Bhintade for some time
on foot Fortunately they met one Virsingrao Baravkar with his good horse
He took her on his horse and fastening her at his back, carried her out of a
sea of Afghans with rocks of corpse heaps in the middle Being a skilful horse
¹¹ Why the Marathi chronicles have reported the fact of 500 shepherds (Dhanagar
in Marathi) as specially appointed for the protection of Parvatibai is a mystery Many of
the followers of Malharrao Holkar were by caste like him Dhanagars (shepherds) Was
it is to suggest that Malharrao had a hand in the protection of Parvatibai? If so why is the
name of the captain specifically given as Visaji Krishna Jogdand? The mystery of this
reference is rendered still more mysterious by the tale of Parvatibai as we found current in
the region surrounding Panipat. A septuagenarian Gaud Brahmin told us the same fact
of shepherds (Gujars) being specially charged with the protection of Parvatibai We think
that Bhau who was prepared for all eventualities had done some such thing for extricating
his wife out of the turmoil by some safe comparatively unfrequented path only known
to these local Gujars many of whom must have been certainly serving in the Maratha camp
during all these months. It is not unlikely that because some of them acted as guides
through the jungle to the south west of Panipat that Janu Bhintade and other loyal Marathas
were able to cut their way out of the danger zone.
¹² SPD 2 149 (p 171)
P F—7

98 PANIPAT. 1761
man, he carried her safely across When his horse was exhausted by its dou˙
weight he got her down, when another cavalryman, Piraji Raoot, got her
his horse and thus carried her twelve miles farther on When his horse l
came exhausted he also left her behind, but all along Janu Bhintade kept ]
company, walking or riding along by her side No Maratha would refuse he
place on his horse on the road, and thus she was thirty miles to the south
Delhi when she met Malharrao Holkar and Nana Purandare We have relat
this event in detail because it falsifies Malharrao Holkar's plea as put do
in Holkar's Thaili 13 Malharrao Holkar was neither charged by Bhau w
the special defence of Parvatibai nor did he himself of his own accord do an
thing to bring her out of the field Only casually and accidentally th
met to the south of Delhi, a circumstance of wh ch Malharrao took full ˙
vantage in preparing his apology
The description of the actual battle is very scanty in Marathi, th
given in the chronicles being more or less personal and not useful for milita
study The only eye-witness who speaks of the last effort of Bhau is the trut
ful Nana Fadnis who was only nineteen years old at the time His au
biography is a document by itself throwing considerable light on the who
campaign It clearly sets forth his own prejudices but none can say that
is anywhere untruthful From his writing it seems that Bhau was not u
aware of the possibility of defeat, and had, therefore, made provision for t
special protection of the women folk As a last resort, it had been decided
kill them before they should fall into the hands of the Afghans From Na
Fadnis's words, it looks as if Bhau had prepared himself for death But th
was personal As a general he had taken care that none other should ha
any scent of his personal decision except Nana Fadnis and one or two oth
persons like Nana Purandare He had made every provision that was humar
possible for the ensuing battle with minute care for all eventualities, but all i
precautions came to nothing because the plan was not understood, and, if u
derstood, not followed by anyone with zest, except by Ibrahim Khan Gar
who was the author of it It is clear that the last fight was fought between t
Maratha cavalry and the Afghan infantry But the majority of the Marath
generals had, it seems, no faith in Ibrahim's plan and its possible success Th
were expecting defeat rather than victory, and as such were more prepar
for immediate flight, than for a fight to the finish by sticking to their pos
At the same time they knew that precipitous flight at the very beginning w
quite impossible, the other troops being engaged at the front It is curio
to note that of all those who survived the battle, there is an overwhelmi
majority of old men amongst the notables Malharrao Holkar, Vitth
Shivdeo, Satvoji Jadhav, Damaji Gaikawad, Antaji Manakeshwar, Sabaji Shin
Khanaji Jadhav, Janrao Wable and Gangoba Chandrachud were all age

THE BATTLE 99
certain extent, though they were massacred on the way, like Antaji Manakesh-
war and Baji Hari Supekar who were killed¹⁴ by the Baluch Zamindars near
Farukh nagar to the south west of Delhi Not all who ran away survived
rather the majority died as a result of slaughter or by starvation and cold It
is certain that some two lakhs of people died during those two or three weeks,
but more died from hunger and cold than by wounds in the battle We do
not believe that the Maratha camp had five lakhs of people as reported in
BROWNE'S translation of Kashiraj, much less can it be ten lakhs as trans
lated by Sir Jadunath ¹⁵
Another important thing to note in this affair is the absence of any de
tailed account of the campaign or of the final battle from the pen of any of
these renegades Malharrao Holkar's supposed confession is only an example
of specious pleading specially written to order by some clever scribe Other
wise no one else even tries to give the whole account Nana Purandare who
was very intimate with Bhau, and was supposed to belong to his party in
politics, is ominously silent about the battle, though he had occasion to write
of the event From the whole tenor of the various writings about the battle,
it is clear that the survivors had come to an understanding among themselves
to report it in a particular manner Their additional excuse of doing so was
on account of the personal and political necessities of the case The personal
necessity arose out of the respect for the feelings of Parvatibai, Bhau's wife
who survived and returned in the company of the renegades, as well as anxiety
for the health of the Peshwa Though Nana Fadnis, Nana Purandare, Mal
harrao Holkar and others seem to have been convinced very early of Bhau's
death by the letters they receivd from Kashiraj, Anupgir Gosawi, Purushot
tam Hingne, Ganesh Vedanti and others, they were afraid to disclose the fact
for its effects on Parvatibai and Nanasaheb The political necessity was still
greater The Marathas tried as far as possible to minimise the disaster by
starting rumours about the safe running away of Bhau, Janakoji and others,
thus trying to keep an atmosphere of expectancy for the sudden emergence of
Bhau and Janakoji at any time and from anywhere, as long as they could
By this method they did succeed in rallying the survivors and making a bold
stand from the base at Gwalior Its definite political effect is seen in the re
turn of Ahmad Shah Abdali after waiting for two months at Delhi, and still
more by his political arrangement He bestowed the Wazirship of the Mughal
Empire-be it noted-not on his ally Shuja ud daulah but on the regicide
Ghazi ud din Khan, a protege of the Marathas He tried to conciliate the
Peshwa by sending condolence messages couched in an apologetic tone, and
also by opening negotiations for a political settlement ¹⁶ In response the Peshwa
also tried to look at the matter in a political manner without revengeful feel
ings He also sent Mir Anvarulla Khan Trimbakkar to Delhi with dresses of
honour for Abdali and his Wazir Shah Wali Khan ¹⁷ But by the time Anvarulla
Khan had reached Kota, he got the news of Abdali's sudden return to his own

¹⁴ KHARE 1.71
¹⁵ IHQ 10.265
¹⁶ SPD 21.202.
¹⁷ Ibid. 2.168.

100 PANIPAT. 1761
country due to the rebellious attitude of his Durrani troops, and had, there-
fore, to come back with the elephant which was being carried as a present to
Abdali. 18
Estimate of the Loss of Human Lives in the Battle
The last trace of resistance on the battle-field ceased at 4 P. M. on that
day, when two hours of day-light still remained. This fact, together with the
fact of the day being the eighth of the bright moon on which the moon was over-
head in the evening casting no shadow and setting after midnight, gave ample
time and scope for the Afghans to pursue the fugitives and kill as many of
them as possible. It is difficult to estimate the number of Maratha soldiers and
non-combatants slaughtered, but the total was not less than one lakh. Out of
the 60,000 soldiers, possibly half the number died on the battle field fighting
face to face. Some 10,000 more must have died in the pursuit. Of the re-
maining 20,000, 10,000 definitely reached Gwalior in safety after a fortnight.
The rest died on the way fighting with the villagers or on account of heavy
wounds, exhaustion, starvation and disease. Of the survivors, too, half only
had run away with their horses, the rest had slowly trudged back on foot losing
their horses to the robbers on the way. Amongst the soldiers who lost their lives,
Bhau, Vishwasrao, Samsher Bahadur (who had extricated himself out of the
final struggle after receiving heavy wounds and run back upto Deeg in the
Jat's dominion to die there), Yashvantrao Pawar, Janakoji Shinde (who was
slaughtered in captivity), Ibrahim Khan Gardi with his brother-in law and
son, Santaji Wagh, Manaji Paygude, Khanderao Nimbalkar, Sonaji Bhapkar,
Tukoji Shinde, Dadji Darekar and Narayan Bapuji Rethrekar were the most
notable, though practically all the soldiers who died on the battle-field were ex-
perienced men who had fought in more than one battle.
In the camp were probably one lakh and a half of non combatants. Of
these some 6,000 found their way to the non hostile camp of Shuja-ud-daulah
and got a shelter there. They were protected from the fury of the Afghans and
safely sent back to Jatwada after the return of Ahmad Shah to Delhi. Some
22,000 persons were captured as slaves by the Afghans the next day. Of these
a considerable number were women belonging either to the servant or concu-
bine class with perhaps a few hundred of married women, who had accom-
panied their husbands for pilgrimage. These were sold by their Afghan cap-
tors to Indian soldiers. Of the rest, possibly some 50,000 were slaughtered
in cold blood by the Afghans on the day after the battle for religious merit.
According to Kashiraj, every Durrani soldier slaughtered a hundred or two
in this way, which is obviously a gross exaggeration, because if we take even
10,000 Durranis to have done this, it would bring the total slaughter to
10,00,000! Many persons who had foolishly returned to Panipat in the even-
ing of the battle and taken shelter in the walled town, were, the next day,
hunted out and put to the sword by the hostile townsmen themselves. The
Bhau Bakhar reports a curious permission granted by Ahmad Shah to the sons
18 Raj. 6 472

THE BATTLE 101
of Mian Qutb Shah and Abdus Samad Khan who were beheaded by the
Marathas at Kunjpura with ignominy They sought permission to slaughter
captured men to avenge their fathers' deaths Ahmad Shah gave them the
permit to go upto 20 kos and slaughter for four ghatikas only, but not more
Thus permitted, Qutb Shah's son slaughtered 4,000 fugitives near Sonepat
and Samad Khan's son killed 5 000 near Bahadurgad to the west of Delhi
None of those who were captured alive at Panipat on the next day were
slaughtered Their property was looted but they were allowed to get them
selves freed by paying a ransom Shuja ud daulah and his Hindu officers,
like Anupgir Gosawi and Kashiraj, paid the ransom for many and sent them
back with a safe escort Many of the fugitives possibly lost their lives because
they would not part with what they possessed on their body Only those who
like Nana Fadnis threw away all property and assumed the dress of beggars
were able to return unmolested, unless they were caught in the cold massacres
related above
The loss on the Afghan side can be estimated at some 20,000, practically
all dying on the battle field Three fourths of this number were possibly the
Indian Ruhelas, the rest being Afghans and other foreign allies
THE SPOILS OF THE BATTLE
If it is impossible to estimate the total number of men who died at
Panipat, it is still more impossible to estimate the spoils which came into the
hands of the Afghans and the Ruhelas The definite loss on the Maratha side
as stated by Nana Fadnis¹⁹ was 50,000 horses, the number of all the elephants
and camels and bullocks is nowhere definitely stated 300 elephants, 3,000
camels and about a lakh of bullocks would be, we believe, a fair estimate All
the artillery as well as the weapons possessed by the various soldiers and non-
combatants fell into the hands of the victors and brigands The total number
of cannon, great and small, heavy and light, should be some 300, 25,000 match
locks and muskets of the French pattern wielded by the Gardi troops of Ibrahim
Khan must have fallen into the hands of the Ruhelas and the Durranis One
lakh of swords, shields and spears in the possession of both combatants and non
combatants must have been looted by the victors A similar number of javelins,
axes daggers and knives of many varieties also must have been captured from
the camp by the victors A few thousand armours, worn by some of the noted
Marathas and the Gardis of Ibrahim Khan also must have fallen into the hands
of the various captors This is as far as the war material is concerned Of
these, most of the horses and bullocks and elephants were in a half starved con-
dition, unable to walk even a short distance These were sold by the Afghans
to the Indian soldiers at almost nominal prices Many of these must have
perished before reaching the homes of their buyers as no fodder was available
anywhere in the vicinity of Panipat and Delhi Many of the bullocks must
have been slaughtered for food by the victorious Muslims
¹⁹ Purandare 1 417

102 PANIPAT: 1761
How much property fell into the hands of the captors is very difficult
to estimate The personal kit of an average Maratha soldier was very meagre
It would be one big brass lota and a small vessel for drinking water, an iron
pan for baking bread and a brass plate on which to dine A few hundred
big vessels for storing water or cooking rice and vegetables in volume would
naturally be found in this big camp where occasionally even Brahmins must
have been fed on religious occasions, or when on visits to places of pilgrimage
on the way The clothing and bedding of an average Maratha soldier and
camp follower could not have been worth much, except for some big sardars
and officials who were probably well clad, wearing costly apparel The tents,
big and small, screens and other material of an official nature, worth some lakhs,
also came into the possession of the Afghans What the bazar accompanying
the Maratha army possessed on the last day, it is difficult to say But taking
into consideration the famine conditions subsisting in the Maratha camp, there
could not have been much of corn, grain and other articles of food and drink
The only item left worth noting was cash and jewellery A certain amount of
accumulated coin should have been found in the possession of the bazar merchants
and artisans who had received fabulous returns for their goods But most of
the army and camp followers, as well as the state treasury accompanying the
army on the march, had possibly exhausted their treasure in buying things at
fabulous prices, and many had to sell their jewellery and trinkets in order to
subsist, thus leaving comparatively very little in their pockets or on their per-
sons Possibly the accumulated sales money of the merchants had been bor-
rowed by the starving individuals in the camp and also perhaps by the state
If this surmise is true, then even the merchants' money must have disappeared
from the camp in buying victuals and fodder or other necessities Only the
unsold and unsalable articles must have remained in the camp and fallen into
the hands of the Afghan soldiers Some 20,000 slaves, male and female, were
also appropriated by the victors
Taking into consideration what has been said above, we do not think
the estimate of various writers about loot as correct "Every trooper brought
away ten or even twenty camels laden with money" is the description of
Kashiraj We think it a gross exaggeration It is true that the Marathas lost
everything they possessed, but no Maratha soldier would have on his person or
in his pocket precious metal worth more than a hundred rupees on an average
It is doubtful whether even this much had been left with him after ten months
of march through a foreign country, when looting had been forbidden, salaries
and wages not paid for the most part, and all subsisted by selling what they
possessed We know the aftermath of war Ahmad Shah Abdali found it im-
possible to pay the accumulated salaries of his soldiers and hence they mutinied
They were, so reports Nur ud din, completely dissatisfied with what they had
received as spoils, which they considered very meagre after two years of hard
campaigning The conquered territories were bestowed on the Ruhelas The
booty had also to be sold to them at nominal prices on account of the want of
cash with which to buy the necessaries The captured horses were worth only
ten or twenty rupees each¹ As a result, the unruly Durrani troops were on the
point of plundering the camp of Shuja ud daulah who decamped from Delhi

THE BATTLE 193
without even taking leave of the Afghan monarch! It will be seen from these
descriptions that this great victory had not brought much cash into the coffers
of the Afghans, and was thus a financial failure. While the Marathas had lost
their all in the immediate as well as distant sense, there was no commensurate
gain to the victors Verily it was a Pyrrhic victory!
FOOD ARRANGEMENTS DURING THE BATTLE
Sir Jadunath's charge (Fall 2.337) that the Marathas did not carry
"roast meat and dry bread" in their saddle is due to his ignorance of the
Maratha manners. Roasted gram and rice were generally carried by the
Marathas when on travel, together with raw sugar (gur) to be eaten before
drinking water after a long journey. Flour for baking bread was carried on
the person to be used at halt. The Marathas were vegetarians to a great ex-
tent, but they also knew the sustaining power of meat in preference to bread.
At least one reference mentioning its use is available in RAJWADE 10-59, dur-
ing the war between Janoji Bhonsle and Madhavrao Peshwa in 1769. Janoji
for one month was continually on the march every day with Madhavrao close
at his heels During a march of three or four days in succession, he could not
make a halt so as to bake bread. The Bhonsle army subsisted on mutton only
and thus gave the slip to the Peshwa. This clearly proves that occasionally,
when available, the Marathas made use of roast meat to subsist on. Of course,
it is more than we can say whether the Marathas on the field of Panipat were
actually carrying ready-made food on their persons, but our surmise is that
they did.
MARATHA MODE OF WARFARE
That the historic Marathas had perfected an individual mode of
cavalry movement is clear from its adoption by Col. Skinner in his later famous
"Skinner's Horse." General G. C. MUNDY²⁰ who accompanied Lord COMBER-
MERE, the Commander-in-Chief in India in 1830, on his tour through northern
India, writes of it in the following manner:
"The peculiar evolution of the 'Skinner's Horse' and which is most striking to a Eu-
ropean eye is the Maratha charge. In this movement the whole corps advances in line,
two deep, at a canter or trot, which, like John Gilpin's, becomes 'a gallop soon'; and as
they approach their object, the files open out, and every man, uttering a wild, shrill scream,
comes thundering on with his sword waving above his head In spite of the apparent
disjointed irregularity of the charge, and the amazing speed of their approach, at the word
'halt' every horse is brought upon his haunches within ten paces of the reviewing General.
The Maratha charge is certainly well calculated to strike terror into a foe already wavering,
but its real physical effect upon staunch troops must be far inferior to the close combined
charge of our cavalry" (Page 165)
The Marathas were known as superb spearmen and their mode can be
judged from the Skinner's Horse trained in the same tradition
²⁰ MUNDY's Pen and Pencil Sketches in India, 3rd ed. (1858).

THE BATTLE 105
housings, the fringe of which reached nearly to the ground, were of velvet embroidered in
gold and silver . The Mahratta elephants have a style of gait and carriage peculiar to
themselves, and are as superior in appearance to ours, as the English thorough bred racer
is to the earth-stopper's hack. The Company's elephants, probably from having been rode
too young, and oppressed with burthens, shuffle along with short step , their necks bent,
and their heads hanging with the melancholy air of an Oxford street hackney coach horse.
The Mahratta elephant strides majestically along, his head elevated far above his shoulder,
and his tusks standing out horizontally. The chiefs pride themselves greatly on these ani-
mals, and take pleasure in teaching them a variety of tricks." (Pages 213, 4 )
Though these descriptions are dated seventy years after Panipat, they can as well serve
for the visualisation of the Maratha army on that fatal field.

CHAPTER VII
THE JUDGMENT
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PANIPAT DISASTER
THE MARATHA survivors from the Panipat disaster seem to have com
bined in taking advantage of the death of the commander in chief and ascrib-
ing the defeat to his incorrect strategy, wrong tactics and, in general, to his con
ceit, arrogance and blindness to the facts of the situation Our narrative should
have made it clear by now that most of these grounds of condemnation are
flimsy after thoughts As Bhau was not a free man in diplomatic talks, the
responsibility is shifted to the shoulders of the Peshwa Sadashivrao Bhau's
strategy or planning was not incorrect, but its execution devolved upon per-
sons who were not strong enough or wise enough to carry it out Bhau cer-
tainly cannot be pronounced a first rate general in history Three fourths of
his mental mould was civil in composition, and only one fourth can be treated
as military in form Ahmad Shah Abdali, his rival, bore a reverse proportion
in his mental make up The sort of expertness in any matter which comes to
a man by single minded absorption in one kind of work only, is not possible
in a man whose life is divided and shared by various interests Sadashivrao
was, no doubt, trained as any other Maratha sardar of the day for war, but
that does not seem to be his favourite occupation His mind was diplomatic
in formation and his expertness was to be seen in his management of finance
and administration Ahmad Shah had led the life of a slave under such a
military master as Nadir Shah from his childhood, and spent practically every
minute of his life amidst war His expertness was born of this long, all ab-
sorbing experience Such an experience and such period of candidateship
seldom fall to the lot of an average man Certainly none of the Marathas
could boast of such training The historic Marathas were war like no doubt,
but when compared to the Afghans, must be judged more as civil than military
Civil men can also become good soldiers if they are imbued with high ideals
If the cause for which a man fights is after his own heart, he can put all his
faculties into the affair and see to it that it ends in success Unfortunately
such was not the state of the Maratha army at Panipat as a whole Bhau and
others siding with him fought for the name of the Marathas, but there were
many others, perhaps the majority, who thought otherwise. Malharrao Holkar

THE JUDGMENT. 107.
lieved in his professions at all. This was the real tragedy of the Pánipât cam-
paign. Actually, it was Malharrao who, in the company of Raghunathrao,
had gone to the Panjab and stretched the Maratha sphere of influence upto
Attock and even beyond. It was this expansion by driving Abdali's forces out

CHAPTER VII
THE JUDGMENT
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PANIPAT DISASTER
THE MARATHA survivors from the Panipat disaster seem to have com-
bined in taking advantage of the death of the commander in-chief and ascrib-
ing the defeat to his incorrect strategy, wrong tactics and, in general, to his con-
ceit, arrogance and blindness to the facts of the situation. Our narrative should
have made it clear by now that most of these grounds of condemnation are
flimsy after thoughts. As Bhau was not a free man in diplomatic talks, the
responsibility is shifted to the shoulders of the Peshwa. Sadashivrao Bhau's
strategy or planning was not incorrect, but its execution devolved upon per-
sons who were not strong enough or wise enough to carry it out. Bhau cer-
tainly cannot be pronounced a first-rate general in history. Three-fourths of
his mental mould was civil in composition, and only one-fourth can be treated
as military in form. Ahmad Shah Abdali, his rival, bore a reverse proportion
in his mental make up. The sort of expertness in any matter which comes to
a man by single minded absorption in one kind of work only, is not possible
in a man whose life is divided and shared by various interests. Sadashivrao
was, no doubt, trained as any other Maratha sardar of the day for war, but
that does not seem to be his favourite occupation. His mind was diplomatic
in formation and his expertness was to be seen in his management of finance
and administration. Ahmad Shah had led the life of a slave under such a
military master as Nadir Shah from his childhood, and spent practically every
minute of his life amidst war. His expertness was born of this long, all ab-
sorbing experience. Such an experience and such period of candidateship
seldom fall to the lot of an average man. Certainly none of the Marathas
could boast of such training. The historic Marathas were war-like no doubt,
but when compared to the Afghans, must be judged more as civil than military.
Civil men can also become good soldiers if they are imbued with high ideals.
If the cause for which a man fights is after his own heart, he can put all his
faculties into the affair and see to it that it ends in success. Unfortunately
such was not the state of the Maratha army at Panipat as a whole. Bhau and
others siding with him fought for the name of the Marathas, but there were
many others, perhaps the majority, who thought otherwise. Malharrao Holkar
and others, who escaped by running away from the battle field in good time,
held a different opinion. They thought that they were not fighting for a
supreme cause like the defence of one's motherland. It was the life long con-
viction of Malharrao and men of his type that the Marathas outside Maha-
rashtra were fighting for profit and not for a cause. If they succeeded in the
attempt without scratching their skin, so much the better. But if they had to
fall back in face of higher odds, there was no disgrace for the name of the
Marathas in case of a reverse. Sadashivrao Bhau's declared ideal—India
for the Indians, governed by the Indians themselves—was scarcely under-
stood by anyone besides a few near friends, and none in the enemy camp. Le-
[ 106 ]

THE JUDGMENT. 107
lieved in his professions at all. This was the real tragedy of the Panipat cam-
paign. Actually, it was Malharrao who, in the company of Raghunathrao,
had gone to the Panjab and stretched the Maratha sphere of influence upto
Attock and even beyond. It was this expansion by driving Abdali's forces out
of the Panjab that had caused Ahmad Shah Abdali to seek revenge. But Mal-
harrao had stretched the line only when Ahmad Shah, after first looting Delhi
and Mathura, had returned back to Afghanistan. Taking advantage of the
absence of the main forces of the enemy in India, Raghunathrao and Malhar-
rao had proceeded to Lahore. Even in the Panipat campaign, Malharrao's
idea was similar. He had advised Bhau to remain behind the Chambal in the
Maratha dominions and wait till the departure of Abdali. Afterwards he would
have accompanied Sadashivrao Bhau even to the Panjab, had he so desired.
Malharrao and most of the Marathas thought this as the real guerilla mode
coming down from the days of Shivaji. Fighting open, face-to-face, pitched
battles on the result of which the fate of the Marathas would depend, was
against the fixed tenor of their minds. They would never run such risks. On
the other hand, it was the intention first of the Mughals and later on of the
Afghans under Abdali to bring the Marathas to a pitched battle so as to de-
cide the issue in a single fight. As long as the defence of their home-land and
the breaking up of the enemy's power were the primary aims of the Marathas,
their old mode was all right; but now that the Marathas had spread over the
length and breadth of India and aspired to take the reins of Government of
the whole continent in their hands, the original mode was out of place and
time. Sadashivrao Bhau had understood this point, especially after coming
into contact with the French under Bussy in 1751, but Malharrao had not.
Malharrao followed his life's conviction even after Panipat and succeeded
when not confronted by the new type of infantry. He received his coup-de-
grace finally at the hands of the English at Kora on 3rd May, 1765, and fled
back to Kalpi to save his life! Thus it will be seen that a conflict of ideals
and long cherished modes of warfare cut at the root of Panipat.
The late Vishwanath K. Rajwade in his oft-repeated and uncritically
accepted criticism of the Panipat campaign,¹ puts the whole blame for the
failure on two persons in the main, Malharrao Holkar and Govindpant Bun-
dele. We have seen above how a fundamental conflict of ideals and modes
was at the root of the whole difference. Just as Bhau's mind was already
prejudiced against Govindpant long before his starting for the Panipat cam-
paign, similarly Bhau's opinion about Malharrao from the beginning was any-
thing but favourable. Malharrao's way in politics was to keep on speaking
terms with all and not to antagonise anyone completely.² He had kept a simi-
lar attitude towards Najib Khan for the same reasons. Such an attitude was
possible for a secondary potentate like Malharrao, but impossible for men of
Bhau's position who had to take a decisive step one way or the other. In 1750-
51 the Peshwa had suspected Malharrao and even Jayapa Shinde of trying to
free themselves from the Peshwa's service and accepting service under the

¹ Raj. 1 Introduction.
² Purandare, 1.287, 293

CHAPTER VII
THE JUDGMENT
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PANIPAT DISASTER
THE MARATHA survivors from the Panipat disaster seem to have com-
bined in taking advantage of the death of the commander in chief and ascrib-
ing the defeat to his incorrect strategy, wrong tactics and, in general, to his con-
ceit, arrogance and blindness to the facts of the situation. Our narrative should
have made it clear by now that most of these grounds of condemnation are
flimsy after thoughts. As Bhau was not a free man in diplomatic talks, the
responsibility is shifted to the shoulders of the Peshwa. Sadashivrao Bhau s
strategy or planning was not incorrect, but its execution devolved upon per-
sons who were not strong enough or wise enough to carry it out. Bhau cer-
tainly cannot be pronounced a first rate general in history. Three fourths of
his mental mould was civil in composition, and only one fourth can be treated
as military in form. Ahmad Shah Abdali, his rival, bore a reverse proportion
in his mental make up. The sort of expertness in any matter which comes to
a man by single minded absorption in one kind of work only, is not possible
in a man whose life is divided and shared by various interests. Sadashivrao
was no doubt, trained as any other Maratha sardar of the day for war, but
that does not seem to be his favourite occupation. His mind was diplomatic
in formation and his expertness was to be seen in his management of finance
and administration. Ahmad Shah had led the life of a slave under such a
military master as Nadir Shah from his childhood, and spent practically every
minute of his life amidst war. His expertness was born of this long, all ab-
sorbing experience. Such an experience and such period of candidateship
seldom fall to the lot of an average man. Certainly none of the Marathas
could boast of such training. The historic Marathas were war like no doubt,
but when compared to the Afghans, must be judged more as civil than military.
Civil men can also become good soldiers if they are imbued with high ideals.
If the cause for which a man fights is after his own heart, he can put all his
faculties into the affair and see to it that it ends in success. Unfortunately
such was not the state of the Maratha army at Panipat as a whole. Bhau and
others siding with him fought for the name of the Marathas, but there were
many others, perhaps the majority, who thought otherwise. Malharrao Holkar
and others, who escaped by running away from the battle field in good time,
held a different opinion. They thought that they were not fighting for a
supreme cause like the defence of ones motherland. It was the life long con-
viction of Malharrao and men of his type that the Marathas outside Maha-
rashtra were fighting for profit and not for a cause. If they succeeded in the
attempt without scratching their skin, so much the better. But if they had to
fall back in face of higher odds, there was no disgrace for the name of the
Marathas in case of a reverse. Sadashivrao Bhau's declared ideal—India
for the Indians, governed by the Indians themselves—was scarcely under-
stood by anyone besides a few near friends, and none in the enemy camp. Le-
[ 106 ]

lieved in his professions at all This was the real tragedy of the Panipat cam-
paign Actually, it was Malharrao who, in the company of Raghunathrao,
had gone to the Panjab and stretched the Maratha sphere of influence upto
Attock and even beyond It was this expansion by driving Abdali's forces out
of the Panjab that had caused Ahmad Shah Abdali to seek revenge. But Mal
harrao had stretched the line only when Ahmad Shah, after first looting Delhi
and Mathura, had returned back to Afghanistan Taking advantage of the
absence of the main forces of the enemy in India, Raghunathrao and Malhar-
rao had proceeded to Lahore Even in the Panipat campaign, Malharrao's
idea was similar He had advised Bhau to remain behind the Chambal in the
Maratha dominions and wait till the departure of Abdali Afterwards he would
have accompanied Sadashivrao Bhau even to the Panjab, had he so desired
Malharrao and most of the Marathas thought this as the real guerilla mode
coming down from the days of Shivaji Fighting open, face-to-face, pitched
battles on the result of which the fate of the Marathas would depend, was
against the fixed tenor of their minds. They would never run such risks. On
the other hand, it was the intention first of the Mughals and later on of the
Afghans under Abdali to bring the Marathas to a pitched battle so as to de-
cide the issue in a single fight. As long as the defence of their home-land and
the breaking up of the enemy's power were the primary aims of the Marathas,
their old mode was all right, but now that the Marathas had spread over the
length and breadth of India and aspired to take the reins of Government of
the whole continent in their hands, the original mode was out of place and
time Sadashivrao Bhau had understood this point, especially after coming
into contact with the French under Bussy in 1751, but Malharrao had not.
Malharrao followed his life's conviction even after Panipat and succeeded
when not confronted by the new type of infantry He received his coup de-
grace finally at the hands of the English at Kora on 3rd May, 1765, and fled
back to Kalpi to save his life¹ Thus it will be seen that a conflict of ideals
and long cherished modes of warfare cut at the root of Panipat.
The late Vishvanath K RAJWADE in his oft repeated and uncriticaly
accepted criticism of the Panipat campaign,¹ puts the whole blame for the
failure on two persons in the main, Malharrao Holkar and Govindpant Bun-
dele We have seen above how a fundamental conflict of ideals and modes
was at the root of the whole difference Just as Bhau's mind was already
prejudiced against Govindpant long before his starting for the Panipat cam-
paign, similarly Bhau's opinion about Malharrao from the beginning was any-
thing but favourable Malharrao's way in politics was to keep on speaking
terms with all and not to antagonise anyone completely ² He had kept a simi-
lar attitude towards Najib Khan for the same reasons Such an attitude was
possible for a secondary potentate like Malharrao, but impossible for men of
Bhau's position who had to take a decisive step one way or the other In 1750-
51 the Peshwa had suspected Malharrao and even Jayapa Shinde of trying to
free themselves from the Peshwa's service and accepting service under the
¹ RAJ 1 Introduction
² Purandare, 1.287, 293

108 PANIPAT 1761
Wazir Safdar Jang * Malharrao was head strong but he had also the knack
of neatly and vigorously carrying out a piece of work on which he had set
his heart or on which a challenge was offered to him In the dispute for suc-
cession at Jaipur he had taken a different attitude from the Peshwa and Ram-
chandra Bawa, but ultimately he forced his will on the others and executed
the thing in his own manner Similarly, after Ghazi ud din s poisoning in
1752 when the Peshwa went back on his promise to his sardars, Malharrao and
Jayapa were suspected of being in collusion with Tarabai and Mahadoba
Purandare so as to checkmate the Peshwa s plans for the governance of the
Maratha Empire ³ Even that suspicion was ultimately found to be wrong
These examples will show the tenor of Malharrao s previous life, and can ac-
count for the suspicion which fell upon him during the Panipat campaign, of
acting hand in glove with Najib, Shuja and Surajmal In popular mind, this
suspicion proved correct as Malharrao could escape from the disaster un-
scathed with most of his troops but we have no faith in this judgment Sa-
dashivrao Bhau very well knew Malharrao's ways in politics, but had decided
to take a different line in this campaign on his own responsibility Not only
Malharrao but other sardars also were dissatisfied with Bhau on account of his
financial exactions To balance his budget after Raghunathrao's deficit cam-
paign of the Panjab, Bhau had put the burden of the Peshwa's debts on the
shoulders of the various Saranjamdars and Jagirdars Malharrao had to pay
30 lakhs for this debt tax ⁴ but due to the debacle after Dattaji Shinde s death,
Malharrao had not found it possible to pay it in time before the Panipat cam-
paign Holkar's Diwan Gangoba Chandrachud is found putting excuses⁵ for
the non payment of this accepted debt tax Bhau was naturally dissatisfied
with Malharrao and other sardars for their non payment of this tax which
had put a strain on his treasure purse Malharrao was always a man of tight
purse, but there does not seem to be any ground for suspicion that there was any
bickering between Bhau and his sardars on this point during the Panipat cam-
paign Those who think him acting in collusion with Surajmal Jat should
note the fact of his behaviour after the disaster Holkar's Kaifiyat,⁶ ostensibly
written to represent Malharrao's side, positively tells us that he would not put
his faith in Surajmal and remain in his territory to recoup himself When one
Jat zamindar tried to stop him in his flight by catching hold of the reins of his
horse, Malharrao asked his companion, Govindrao Bule, to cut off the Jat's
hand, and drove away precipitately for fear of treachery This anecdote
represents Malharrao s mind He would not put faith even in his friend, for
who could guarantee that the Jat Raja had not changed his mind as a result
of the disaster? Malharrao's whole manner was that of a very suspicious and
overcautious man taking no risks The anecdote is supported by the fact of
his flight through the Jat s territory south of Mathura without sojourning in
it He took a road skirting on the Jat dominion, but not through it, and went
direct to Bhind via Agra, crossing the Chambal and the Kuwari along the river

• Shinde 3.25
  3 Purandare 1.311
  4 Satara, 2.292.
  • 5 S P D 21 184
  6 Kavyetihasa Sangraha No 18, 2nd Ed. 1930 p 23

THE JUDGMENT 109
Jamuna to avoid the oft-trodden and direct road to Gwalior After Panipat
he fought against the rebels in Malwa and Bundelkhand In November 1761,
he decisively defeated Madhosingh of Jaipur, getting a wound himself He
fought in the Rakshasabhuwan campaign and helped in defeating the Nizam in
1763 Returning to the north, he again joined Jawahirmal Jat against—be
it noted—Najib All these incidents make it difficult to believe that Malhar-
rao was treacherous towards Bhau or the Peshwa A man's character ought to
be judged as a whole and not by his suspicious behaviour in one incident only
Govindpant Bundele has been made the chief scape goat for the Panipat
disaster One third of RAJWADE'S renowned introduction to his first volume
of letters is devoted to an analysis of Govindpant's behaviour and his down-
right condemnation, making him solely responsible for the miscarriage of Bhau's
plans RAJWADE'S charges against Govindpant are as follows Firstly, he was
not successful in bringing Shuja ud daulah to the Maratha side Next, he had
not made proper arrangements for Bhau's transport into the Doab Thirdly,
he had not sent the monies called for Fourthly, he would not invade Shuja's
dominions and create a diversion in that direction And last, but not least, he
did not cut off Abdali's supplies coming through the Doab, thus making Bhau's
plan futile We have seen in the course of the campaign how none of these
charges can be substantiated RAJWADE, and following him other critics also,
have wrongly assumed that Govindpant was a military captain On page 19,
RAJWADE puts Govindpant in the list of renowned generals of the time⁷ The
suffix Pant as opposed to Rao appended to the name of Govind is itself a proof
that the man was taken as a civilian and not a soldier He was not a Saran-
jamdar or Jagirdar maintaining troops out of the income of his Jagir He was
an ambitious mamlatdar who on account of a boastful temperament, aspired
to be a captain He had to call in various military captains like Antaji
Manakeshwar, Naro Shankar, Gangadhar Bajirao, Manaji Payagude and
others for helping him in meeting the rebels in his districts Occasionally he
had himself acted as a captain, but that was against insignificant opponents
and in the company of regular troops Even Bhau looked towards him as a
mamlatdar first and a military sardar afterwards In RAJ 1, Letter No 244,
Bhau specifically says, "You are not now only a Mahalkari You have with
you as many troops as with a sardar" This means that Bhau was bolstering
up Govindpant and asking him to take upon himself work which was nor-
mally not his His age (sixty five) and habits of life were against Bhau's ex-
pectation This was not a question of ordinary times but of a fight to the
finish Only exceptionally good captains could have done what Bhau asked
Govindpant to do The argument that as Bhau asked Govindpant repeatedly
to do certain things, it must have been in his power to do it, is faulty The
fact is, geographically, Govindpant was living in a region to the rear of Abdali,
and as such he was the only man who could have done anything in the mat-
ter Bhau could not detach a part of his army and send it to Abdali's rear, as
Abdali was sitting across the path Upto October, Sadashivrao had ordered
Govindpant not to come to the north⁷ but to invade the enemy dominions be-
⁷ RAJ 1.258, 260

112 PANIPAT: 1761
miss an unwanted officer or to replace him by a better one. If Govind-
pant did not prove serviceable enough during the Panipat campaign, the result
must be attributed to the defective system and not to the individual. But
supposing that Govindpant did not send the funds to Bhau even though
he did possess them, his non-compliance had little to do with the military side
in the Panipat affair. Ample funds in the hands of Bhau at Panipat would
not have brought him the necessary supplies which depended solely on the
military strength to fetch them. Even Bhau, writing to his son after Govind-
pant's death, is not found speaking anything against him. The Peshwa heard
the news of Govindpant's death after his crossing the Narmada in January
1761. Writing a letter⁸b of condolence to his son, the Peshwa eulogised his
faithful services unto death, a befitting end to a long life of faithful serv-
ice. The Peshwa wanted to treat the sons of Govindpant as children in
his own family. This shows that the Peshwa had no information or
suspicion of Govindpant's dereliction in the Panipat camgaign. Balkrishna
Dikshit, writing from Benares about Govindpant's end, remarked,⁸c "A great
man has passed away." Thus it would seem that contemporary opinion did
not condemn Govindpant. It was only when survivors from Panipat, who
wished to absolve themselves from all blame, began to put the whole responsi-
bility on those who had died, that Govindpant came in for his share in the
condemnation along with Bhau and Balvantrao. The Bhau Bakhar puts the
whole affair in such a dramatic form as to lead to the inevitable disaster. It has
made Govindpant a friend of Najib Khan⁹ from the beginning of the campaign,
where he is shown as an accessory of Malharrao in shielding Najib against
Dattaji Shinde's wrath! Govindpant is the agent who made Dattaji accept
Najib's treacherous proposal of building a bridge over the Ganges, so as to de-
lay the affair till the arrival of Abdali! Later on, Govindpant is represented
as having refrained from attacking Najib's family and treasure in his trans-
Ganges raid by accepting five lakhs as a bribe. Ultimately Govindpant is killed,
according to the Bakhar, not by Atai Khan, but by Najib's Ruhelas! Now
from what we know of Govindpant's relations with the Shinde family from the
very beginning, it cannot be imagined that he would do anything of the kind,
especially against the Shindes. There is positive proof in his letters to Ramaji
Anant, the Diwan of the Shindes, that Govindpant favoured Jayapa Shinde in
preference and perhaps as against Malharrao Holkar.¹⁰ In Dattaji's cam-
paign against Najib, Govindpant is throughout acting under his orders. He

THE JUDGMENT 111

latdar There is evidence of troubled times and consequent non realisation of
Government dues by him from 1750 onwards In 1755 a similar condition
is found repeated ⁸ From the unpublished Dabholkar papers (Nos 159, 163,
164, 165, 166) it is clear that Sadashivrao Bhau and even Raghunathrao who
was in the north at the time, were very suspicious of all the sardars and the
mamlatdars in the north ⁸ᵃ Gangoba Chandrachud the Holkars Diwan
Ramaji Anant Dabholkar the Shinde's Diwan, and Govindpant were sup-
posed to be acting in collusion, and grabbing Government dues by an under
standing among themselves Bhau seems to have threatened Govindpant with
an investigation into his revenue dealings even then Govindpant had not sub-
mitted accounts for some five years So he was peremptorily called to Poona
and Govindpant was very apprehensive of the result He wrote to Ramajipant
his fear of losing the credit and the fruit of his thirty years' service if the in
vestigation against him went wrong He asked Ramaji to help him in his dif-
ficulties as both were sailing in the same boat¹ His visit to Poona was de
layed for a year more on account of local difficulties After defeating Sayyad
Ali Askar Kubda sent by the Wazir Ghazi ud din to occupy the Mahals granted
to the Marathas at the beginning of 1756, settling the affairs in the north and
making arrangements for his absence, he came to Poona at the end of the
year and remained there for some ten months He seems to have satisfied the
Peshwa and his exacting Diwan, Bhau Bhau sent back with him two au
ditors, Janardan Apaji Erande and Trimbak Krishna Kanitkar, to check his
accounts and, in general, to control Govindpant in his revenue matters They
lived in the north for three years till Panipat, and still they could not succeed
in doing what they had been appointed to do Govindpant became entangled
in other political matters and went with Dattaji Shinde to the north The au
ditors, becoming hopeless, were on the point of returning to Poona at the end
of 1759, but somehow they were prevailed upon to remain in the north on
Govindpant's promise to come and settle the accounts to their satisfaction
The correspondence between Govindpant and the auditors proves that Govind
pant was not efficient in keeping his accounts nor could he be treated as blame-
less or above suspicion Why he was not dismissed for his negligence before
Panipat is again a moot point It may be that while Bhau was charging him
with embezzlement, the Peshwa was perhaps shielding him in the affair Even
after the Panipat disaster, the Peshwa is not found condemning Govindpant
or calling his sons to account for their father's negligence Thus it appears
that there was something wrong in the system of administration devised by the
Peshwa Every Government officer of some standing looked upon himself as
a small chief in those days Sardars like Shinde, Holkar, and Pawar, thought
themselves more as partners in the empire than as servants of the Peshwa
What was allowed by the Peshwa to these higher men out of necessity, was
usurped by lesser men Antaji Manakeshwar, Naro Shankar, Vitthal Shivdeo,
Gopalrao Barve, Govindpant Bundele, and the Hingne brothers tried to pose
as equals in some way with the fortunate sardars Their rivalry had vitiated
the whole atmosphere, and it was difficult for the Peshwa either to dis
⁸ SPD 2 19,30 Raj 3 158, 159 160
⁸ᵃ Shinde 3 310

THE JUDGMENT 111
latdar. There is evidence of troubled times and consequent non-realisation of
Government dues by him from 1750 onwards In 1755 a similar condition
is found repeated ⁸ From the unpublished Dabholkar papers (Nos 159, 163,
164, 165, 166) it is clear that Sadashivrao Bhau and even Raghunathrao who
was in the north at the time, were very suspicious of all the sardars and the
mamlatdars in the north ⁸ᵃ Gangoba Chandrachud the Holkar's Diwan,
Ramaji Anant Dabholkar the Shinde's Diwan, and Govindpant were sup-
posed to be acting in collusion, and grabbing Government dues by an under-
standing among themselves Bhau seems to have threatened Govindpant with
an investigation into his revenue dealings even then Govindpant had not sub
mitted accounts for some five years So he was peremptorily called to Poona
and Govindpant was very apprehensive of the result He wrote to Ramajipant
his fear of losing the credit and the fruit of his thirty years' service if the in
vestigation against him went wrong He asked Ramaji to help him in his dif-
ficulties as both were sailing in the same boat! His visit to Poona was de-
layed for a year more on account of local difficulties After defeating Sayyad
Ali Askar Kubda sent by the Wazir Ghazi ud din to occupy the Mahals granted
to the Marathas at the beginning of 1756, settling the affairs in the north and
making arrangements for his absence, he came to Poona at the end of the
year and remained there for some ten months He seems to have satisfied the
Peshwa and his exacting Diwan, Bhau Bhau sent back with him two au-
ditors, Janardan Apaji Erande and Trimbak Krishna Kanitkar, to check his
accounts and, in general, to control Govindpant in his revenue matters They
lived in the north for three years till Panipat, and still they could not succeed
in doing what they had been appointed to do! Govindpant became entangled
in other political matters and went with Dattaji Shinde to the north The au-
ditors, becoming hopeless, were on the point of returning to Poona at the end
of 1759, but somehow they were prevailed upon to remain in the north on
Govindpant's promise to come and settle the accounts to their satisfaction
The correspondence between Govindpant and the auditors proves that Govind-
pant was not efficient in keeping his accounts nor could he be treated as blame-
less or above suspicion Why he was not dismissed for his negligence before
Panipat is again a moot point It may be that while Bhau was charging him
with embezzlement, the Peshwa was perhaps shielding him in the affair Even
after the Panipat disaster, the Peshwa is not found condemning Govindpant
or calling his sons to account for their father's negligence. Thus it appears
that there was something wrong in the system of administration devised by the
Peshwa Every Government officer of some standing looked upon himself as
a small chief in those days Sardars like Shinde, Holkar, and Pawar, thought
themselves more as partners in the empire than as servants of the Peshwa
What was allowed by the Peshwa to these higher men out of necessity, was
usurped by lesser men Antaji Manakeshwar, Naro Shankar, Vitthal Shivdeo,
Gopalrao Barve, Govindpant Bundele, and the Hingne brothers tried to pose
as equals in some way with the fortunate sardars Their rivalry had vitiated
the whole atmosphere, and it was difficult for the Peshwa either to dis-
⁸ SPD 2.29,30 RAJ 1 158, 159, 160
⁸ᵃ Shinde 3.316.

110 PANIPAT 1761
yond the Ganges The original plan of Bhau when proceeding towards Kunj
pura in October was frustrated by Abdali's daring in crossing the Jamuna at
his back This fact changed the strategy in such a manner that Bhau had to
fall back on Govindpant s support because he found it impossible to return to
Delhi in the face of Abdali Herein Bhau was completely non plussed
Abdalis daring could have been met only by a counter daring on the part of
the Marathas Bhau's original plan was to proceed farther north from Kunj
pura and replenish his army He expected Abdali to follow him towards the
north in a parallel line across the Jamuna through the Doab, as his calcula
tion for the subsidence of the Jamuna waters made him believe When he
heard on his way to Kurukshetra that Abdali had begun crossing above Bagh
pat, he should have proceeded farther north and crossed over into the Doab
by the Budhia Ghat as first intended Instead, he returned by the same path
and found to his dismay that it was impossible to pass by Abdali towards Delhi
or to defeat him by direct attack in an open pitched battle Because he re-
ceived this first check, he had to fall back on Panipat and dig trenches there
so as to follow a different mode of warfare to suit Ibrahim Khan's Gardi
troops Looking historically, it seems that in this Bhau took a wrong decision.
Once taken, the only strategy which remained open was to make Abdali at
tack him in his strong, almost impregnable, entrenched position, but who was
to make Abdali attack? No single valiant captain could have succeeded in the
move So Bhau expected hunger to do the work If somebody in the rear could
cut off Abdali's supplies he would have to move and either attack the Mara
thas as Bhau wanted him to do or return to Afghanistan without offering a
battle Placed in such straits, Bhau was found urging Govindpant to do the
needful Govindpant came into the rear as ordered and tried his luck He
lost his life in the attempt, proving that the work was beyond his strength and
that Abdali was a far more consummate general than Bhau imagined him to be.
This discussion should prove that Govindpant cannot be charged with not obey
ing orders and doing his best We believe that any other captain would have met
the same fate and could not have succeeded in cutting off the supplies, as the
Ruhelas in that region were well organised and vigilant
The charge of not sending the sums called for stands on a different
level There is no evidence available on the point of Govindpant's ability to
pay As a Kamavisdar of thirty years' standing, the public as well as the
Peshwa probably took him to be a rich man Whether he had funds at his
disposal when Bhau called for them is a moot point We suspect that the ideas
about his riches were ill founded Like all other mamlatdars of the time, he
was also very cautious in money matters and would not easily part with money
But there is no external evidence, as in the case of Naro Shankar, for Govind
pant's having spent money lavishly on any work or in any matter There are
no temples or ghats or forts built by him, which would prove his ever having
been an opulent man On the other hand, complaints about non realisation
of Government dues in his rented Mahals is a theme found repeated through
out the period under discussion We do not suggest that Govindpant was above
board in all his money dealings But the Peshwas estimates about his vast
riches seem to be ill founded Nor do we think him to be an efficient mam