मूलमध्यमककारिका (आचार्य नागार्जुन - चन्द्रकीर्ति प्रणीत प्रसन्नपदा व्याख्या सहित)

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expressions refer to four ārya-satyas or four Noble Truths. The Pāli equivalent
to it is ariya-sacca. The authoritaive Buddhist texts have enumerated four
different varieties of it, viz. suffering (duḥkha), cause or origin of suffering
(duḥkhasamudaya), annihilation of suffering (duḥkha-nirodha), way of
annihilation (mārga). The Arthaviniścaya-sūtra, 6, has laid down the four
noble truths in the following order: Tatra katamāni catvāry ārya-satyāni?
tad yathā-duḥkham āryasatyam. Duḥkhasamudayam āryasatyam.
Duḥkhanirodham āryasatyam. Duḥkhanirodhagāminī pratipadā āryasatyam...
etāni khalu bhikṣavaś catvāry āryasatyāni. The Dharmasaṁgraha, 21, also
has enumerated them in the way indicated below: Catvāry ārya-satyāni. Tad
yathā duḥkham samudayaḥ nirodhaḥ, mārgaś ce'ti.
P. 238, l. 10-(punar-) bhava, state of existence, birth.
P. 238, l. 10 - avidyā = ignorance: Candrakīrti has offered the following in-
terpretation of this term: Tatra avidyā ajñānam tamo yathābhūtārthapracchā-
dakam. It is by depending upon ignorance of previous birth that a person
performs meritorious, demeritorious and immobiling deeds which ultimately
leads to rebirth.
P. 238, l. 10-nivṛta, veiled, concealed.
P. 238, l. 11-pudgala:
P. 238, l. 11-abhisaṁskurute, produces (Candrakīrti); cf. abhisaṁskaroti:
This word frequently occurs with karman and citta in the Mahāyāna Buddhist
Texts. So its meaning varies with the variation of the context. When it is
employed with the former it signifies accumulates, performs, accomplishes and the
like. It is often syntactically related with its accusative which is permitted to
play the role of the cognate object. Similarly in the case of its connection with
the latter, it means concentrates: cf. also abhisaṁskāra.
P. 238, l. 13 - ānejya. This word has often times been used with saṁskāra,
Karman, dharma, and citta. It means immovable. Candrakīrti in his Prasanna-
padā (P. 143) has made this relevant observation: Karmāṇi kuśalākuśalāneñ-
jyāni. In the present context he has interpreted the term saṁskāra as synonym of
karman itself. Confer his observation.........abhisaṁskaroti utpādayati.........
punarbhavābhisaṁskārāt saṁskārāḥ......... tāṁstrividhān karmalakṣa-
ṇān saṁskārān.......................taiś ca saṁskārair abhisaṁskṛtaiḥ karmabhiḥ
karmasaṁjñitaiḥ .....................So it turns out that there are three
varieties of karman, viz. meritorious (kuśala), non-meritorious (a-kuśala) and
immovable (āneñjya). His interpretation of the word saṁskāra coincide with
that provided by the Śālistambasūtra (81.5) which runs as follows: abhisaṁs-
kārārthena saṁskārāḥ. The three varieties of Karman alluded to above also
bring about the three distinct states of existence viz. kāmāvacara, rūpāvacara and
arūpāvacara in order of their mention.
P. 238, saṁskāra, predisposition. It is the result of the performance of
meritorious and non-meritorious deeds and also is the latent trace of past
experience. It is the condition of a new state of existence. It is the second link
in the chain of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). It takes its rise by
depending on ignorance (avidyā) and by itself is the cause of consciousness
(vijñāna). Candrakīrti has observed that saṁskāra means karman and as such

Page 317

the former is susceptible of a threefold classification, viz. Kuśala (meritorious),
a-kuśala, (non-meritorious) and immovable (ānejya). It is also liable to be
set forth in the following order: physical (kāyika), vocal (vācika) and mental
(mānasika). The transmigration of a creature is conditioned by these saṁskāras
produced by ignorance. cf. te ca trividhāḥ-kuśalā, akuśalā, ānejyāś ca yadi vā
kāyikā, vācikā, mānasāś ce'ti. tāṁ strividhān karmalakṣaṇān saṁskārān
avidyānivṛtaḥ pudgalaḥ karoti. Taiś ca saṁskārair abhisaṁskṛtaiḥ karmabhiḥ
karmasaṁjñitaiḥ tad dhetukāṁ gatiṁ gacchati (Prasannapadā, P. 238)
vijñāna, consciousness. It is the third link in dependent origination and
comes into being by depending on saṁskāra. It has been stated ad nauesum that
performance and the consequent accumulation of action brings about a state
of existance, thus facilitating the rebirth of a creature in it. There are accredited
varities of it which are liable to be classified under two distinct heads, viz.
blessed state of existence (sugati), and evil state of existence (durgati). The
former includes the state of existence pertaining to gods (deva) and man
(manuṣya). The latter relates to that of hell (nāraka), lower animals (tiryak),
departed spirits (preta) and demons (asura). It is worthy of remark that the
state of existence is conditioned by the nature of saṁskāra, which is either
blessed or evil as adverted to above. And it is into this state of existence that
consciousness which has action or accumulated predisposition of the previous
birth for its cause enters, that is to say, comes into being, as the seed of
transmigration. The cycle of birth and death recurs in an order that has no
beginning and the twelve links of dependent origination extends over the past,
present and future existence. And consequently in the process of rebirth of a
creature, this consciousness enters the womb of the mother. It is immediately
after its entrance, that name (nāma) and form (rūpa) come into existence in the
womb by depending upon it (consciousness). To be more precise, the
consciousness of the foetus is produced by the predisposion of the previous birth.
nāma-rūpa, name and form. It is the fourth link in the chain of dependent
origination. It is immediately after the entrance of consciousness in the foetus,
that name and form come into existence by depending upon it (consciousness).
It is consciousness which brings about the association with them. It stands to
reason that the different embryonic stages of the foetus which receive distinct
name and form presupposes the existence of consciousness. They are immediate
successor of it.
Candrakīrti has furnished the etymological meaning of these two terms. He
has observed: Tatra karmakleśāviddhaṁ ... ... nāmayatīti nāma, saṁjñāvaśena
vā artheṣu nāmayatīti nāma. Catvāro'rūpiṇaḥ skandhā nāme'ti vyapadiśyate.
rūpyata iti rūpam. bādhyata ity arthaḥ. Idaṁ ca rūpaṁ pūrvakam ca nāma,
ubhayam etad abhisaṁkṣipya nāmarūpam iti vyavasthāpyate (Prasannapadā,
P. 238).
P. 238, l. 21, āyatana: The meaning of this word varies with the varia-
tion of the context. It has been used in the sense of object, field, seat and the
like. In the present context it signifies (six) sense-organs. The Arthaviniś-
cayasūtra (P. 313) has observed: Nāmarūpapratyayaṁ ṣaḍ āyatanam iti. Ṣaḍ-
āyatanaṁ katamat? Cakṣurāyatanam, śrotrāyatanam, ghrāṇāyatanam, jihvā-

318 | Madhyamaka-Śāstra
yatanam, kāyāyatanam, manaāyatanam. Idam ucyate ṣaḍ-āyatanam. Ṣaḍāyatana-
pratyayaḥ sparśaḥ iti. Sparśaḥ katamaḥ? Ṣaṭ sparśakāyaḥ: cakṣuḥsamsparśaḥ,
śrotrasamsparśaḥ, ghrāṇasaṃsparśaḥ, jihvāsaṃsparśaḥ, kāyasaṃsparśaḥ, manaḥ-
saṃsparśaḥ. Ayam ucyate sparśaḥ. The Dharmasaṃgraha (24), however, has
enumerated twelve āyatanas, that is to say, the six sense-organs together with
their respective six sense-objects. Cf. Dvādaśāyatanāni, Cakṣuḥśrotraghrāṇajihvā-
kāyamanaāyatanāni rūpagandhaśabdarasasparśadharmāyatanāni ce'ti. Besides
the āyatana has been classified under two heads, viz. (1) Vāhya and
(2) ādhyātmika The Laṅkāvatāra and other authoritative Mahāyāna texts
have frequently mentioned āyatana in association with dhātu and skandha. Cf.
skandhadhātvāyatanānāṁ parikalpitalakṣaṇasvabhāvāvabodhaḥ-Laṅkā, 2.29.
P. 243—upāyāsa, mental affliction or distress: mental irritation, disturbance
(BHS, 146). It is the final step in the twelve-fold causation. The Artha-
viniścayasūtra (5) has laid down the preceeding links of it in the following order:
Jāti-pratyayā jarā-maraṇa—śokaparideva—duḥkha—daurmanasyo'pāyāsāḥ
sambhavanti. The Dharmasaṃgraha (42) also has provided an identical list,
Candrakīrti has offered the following interpretion: duḥkhadaurmanasyabahutva-
saṃbhūtā upāyāsāḥ.
P. 243—duḥkha, daurmanasya—Candrakīrti has clearly stated the differ-
ence between the meanings of these two words. The appearence of pain with
respect to the five sense-organs is called duḥkha. And the coming about of
disagreeable state of mind is known as daurmanasya. cf. Pañcendriyāsātanipāto
duḥkham. Manoniṣṭanipāto daurmanasyam (Prasannapadā, Pp. 243-44).
P. 247—Manasi-kāra,—attention, concentration of mind. In the sacred
texts of the Buddhist, the word manasi which is loc. sing. of the stem manas has
been frequently associated with the different forms of the root √kṛ. cf. manasi-
karoti, manasi-karoti, manasi-kurvanti, manasi-kuru, manaskāra, manasi-karta-
vya, manasi-kṛta, manasi-kurvāṇasya manasi-kariṣyanti. Besides the two words
yoniśaḥ and ayoniśaḥ frequently preceed the two words manasi-kāra and manas-
kāra. Asaṅga in his Yogācārabhūmi (60) has made the pertinent observation:
manaskāraḥ katamaḥ? cetasa ābhogaḥ. Besides he has expounded the signi-
ficance of the two technical terms: yoniśo manaskāraprajñapti (Ybh., 114)
and ayoniśo manaskāraprajñapti (Ybh., 118)
P. 245—anuparigraha, cohesion. cf. Śāl. 77.17 Yaḥ kāyasyā'nuparigraha-
kṛtyaṃ karoty ayam ucyate'bdhātuḥ.
P. 248—paritta, small.
P. 248—sabhāga, similar, same, equal; antonym of visadṛśa.
P. 248—aupapattyaṃśika, pertaining to the portion of origination or
birth. Sometimes the word aṅgika has also been used with aupapatti. cf. Laṅkā
(277. 97) aupapattyaṅgikaṃ cittaṃ vicitraṃ vāsanāsaṃbhavam. The word
aṃśika and antika have also been compounded with māraṇa or maraṇa.
Cāndrakīrti in his Prasannapadā has quoted the Śālistambasūtra with a slight
variation of reading.
P. 248—māranāntika, maranāntika, pertaining to the portion of destruction
(death).
P. 249, l. 1, pūrvānta (= Pāli pubbanta), the past time: cf. pūrvakoṭi,
Critical Notes | 319
(koṭi, limit, end BHS, 352). Candrakīrti in his Prasannapadā, P. 249 has offered
the following interpretation of this word: Tatra vartamānaṃ ātmabhāvam
apekṣya atītā ātmabhāvāḥ pūrvānta ity ucyate. Pūrvo hi janmaparaṃparāṃśaḥ
pūrvāntaḥ. This word is frequently associated with aparānta.
P. 249, l. 1—aparānta, the future time, the farthest limit, the future end of
worldly existence. Candrakīrti in his Prasannapadā, (249) explains it as
follows: Tatra vartamānaṃ ātmabhāvam apekṣya bhāvinaḥ ātmabhāvāḥ aparānta
ity ucyate. Aparo hi janmaparaṃparāṃśo'parāntaḥ.
P. 249, l. 3—ātmabhāva, existence of the self. This word has also been
used in the sense of body.
dṛṣṭi, heretical or erroneous view. This word frequently occurs in the Laṅkāva-
tāra, cf. Laṅkā 3. 1. dṛṣṭivigatam; 25.26 bhavadṛṣṭiḥ; 30.67 svabhāvaḥ kalpana kal-
pyam dṛśyaṃ dṛṣṭidvayaṁ katham? (V, 67); tīrthyadṛṣṭi (Laṅkā. P. 23) antadvaya-
dṛṣṭi 51. 12) P. 23—āya-vyayadṛṣṭābhiniveśena ... ... ... (Laṅkā, 174. 12).
The Dharmasaṃgraha (68) has made the following observation: pañca dṛṣṭa-
yaḥ. Satkāyadṛṣṭiḥ, antagrāhadṛṣṭi, mithyādṛṣṭiḥ, dṛṣṭiparāmarśaḥ, śīlaparāmarśaḥ.
Candrakīrti (P. 235) has observed that there are four views with reference to
nirvāṇa: (1) A Tathāgata is born after death, (2) A Tathāgata is not born after
death, (3) A Tathāgata is both born and is not born after death, (4) A Tathāgata
is neither born nor is not born after death. Besides he has referred to four
views pertaining to the annihilation and the like. (P.235) They may be set forth
in the following order: (1) The world-order is destructible, (2) The world-
order is non-destructible, (3) The world-order is both destructible and non-des-
tructible, (4) Verily the world-order is neither destructible nor non-destructible.
These four views are to be understood with respect to the future time. When an
individual does not perceive the future coming-into-existence of the self or the
world-order, he imagines that the world-order is liable to destruction. And he
pursues this course by relying upon the future time. Analogously when he
perceives the origination of that what was in future, he adopts the course that the
world is non-destructible. When he both perceives and fails to perceive, he
concludes in both ways. And due to the negation of both, he comes to hold that
it is neither destructible nor non-destructible.
Besides there are four views concerning the existence of the world-order in
the past. They may be set down in the order indicated below: (1) The world-
order is eternal, (2) The world-order is non-eternal, (3) The world-order is
both eternal and non-eternal. (4) The world-order is neither eternal nor non-
eternal: These four views relate to the past time. (P. 235). When an
experient perceives the past origination of the self or the world-order, he reaches
the conclusion that it (world-order) is eteranal. But when he cannot perceive
it, he thinks it to be non-etrnal. But when he both perceives and fails to
perceive, he concludes that it is both eternal and non-eternal. But when he
neither perceives nor fails to perceive, he considers it to be neither eternal, nor
non-eternal. These views concern with the past time. (P. 235).
Furthermore, Candrakīrti (P. 249) has set forth eight views pertaining to the
past time. They are susceptible of classification in the following order: (1)
Were I existent in the past time? (2) I was not existent in the past time, (3)
I was both existent and non-existent in the past time, (4) Verily I was neither

320 Madhyamaka-Śāstra
existent nor non-existent in the past time. Besides the other four views concern-
ing the eternality of the world-order in the past time have already been adverted
to above. Candrakīrti has remarked that the four-fold view as elaborated in
connexion with the eternity of the world-order in the past, does not differ
from that of the latter to an extreme point. Yet it has been separately set
down by relying upon their apparently distinctive feature. The view that the
world-order is eternal does not differ from the view I was existent in the past
time to an inordinate degree. Or, the difference between them may be accounted
in the following way. The view the world-order is eternal relates to the past time
in a universal way. But the view I was existent in the past arises exclusively
with respect to the past existence of the self. It is bereft of any element of
universality. This attitude should be adopted with regard to the other view. So
it is evident that these eight views pertain to the past time.
There are also eight views divided under two categories that take the future
time into its consideration. The one category of the four-fold view may be
stated in the following order : (1) Shall I be existent in the future, (2) I shall not
be existent in the future, (3) I shall be both existent and non-existent in the
future, (4) Verily I shall be neither existent nor non-existent in the future. All
these four views relate to the future time. Over and above there is also four-fold view
which concerns itself to the destructibility and non-destructibility of the
world-order and the mode of its expression has been referred to above. The
salient feature of it consists in the fact that it takes course by depending upon the
future time in a general way. But the view I shall be existent in the future time
proceeds on by resting upon the future existence of the self to the exclusion of
any other thing. This is the difference between the categories of four-fold view
that concerns itself with the future time. (PP. 249-50).
P. 277, l. 1, svabhāva, Self-nature, self-being, intrinsic reality, self-hood.
P. 277, l. 1, hetu-pratyaya-sāmagrī, totality of causal conditions, both individually and collectively. (Mookerjee, Vigrahavyāvartanī).
P. 278, l. 7, ṣaṭkoṭiko vādaḥ, six fold dialectic (Mookerjee, Vigrahavyāvartanī)
sixfold disputation, sixfold argumentation.
P. 278, l. 2, vaiṣamīkatvam, disparity, unwarranted differentiation.
P. 278, l. 2, viśeṣahetu, ground of differentiation, ground of discrimination
(Mookerjee, Vigrahavyāvartanī 10).
P. 278, l. 9, pratiṣedha negation, denial.
P. 279, l. 19, Kuśala-dharma : Nāgārjuna, in his auto-commentary on the
Vigrahavyāvartanī, and other sacred texts of Buddhism have enumerated 119
Kuśala-dharmas which induce spiritual elevation. The word Kuśala occurs in
association with the following : Kuśala-puṇya, Kuśala-mūla, Kuśala-pakṣa, Kuśala-karmapatha
and the like.
P. 279, l. 22, dharmāvasthāvid, conversant with the different branches of
the Doctrine.
P. 280, l. 14, nairyāṇika, conducive to deliverance (BHS, 312). Cf. conducive
to the attainment of nirvāṇa cf. nairvāṇika.
P. 280, l. 16, bodhyaṅga, saṃbodhyaṅga, factors of enlightenment. The
Critical Notes 321
Arthaviniścayasūtra, 18, has enumerated seven varities of it, viz. smṛtisambodhy-
aṅga, dharmapravicaya°, gāmbhīrya°, prīti°, prasrabdhi°, samādhi° upekṣā°.
P. 281, l. 4, niḥsvabhāva, bereft of reality.
P. 281, l. 11, grāha, ( = Pāli gāha ) false belief : cf. ātmagrāha ( = Pāli atta-
gāha, clinging to the (false view that there is a) self. BHS., 219. The Laṅkāva-tāra
has observed : Na ca tvādṛśā anye vā budhyante ātmagrāhapatitayā saṃtatyā.
cf. Suzuki's rendering : This is not understood by you and others who cherish the notion of an ego soul and its continuity.
P. 282, l. 2, naiḥsvābhāvya, intrinsic unreality.
P. 283, l. 17, māyāpuruṣa, man created by power of magic.
P. 285, l. 7, Vyavahārasatyam, empirical reality.
P. 293, l. 33, ayoniśo manaskāra, unfounded belief ( Mookerjee, Vigrahavyāvartanī
P. 37 ). ayoniśa, not fundamental or thoroughgoing, superficial ( BHS.,
64 ). The expressions ayoniśo, vikalpena occur in the Laṅkāvatāra, 265.13.
Suzuki has rendered it as wrong discrimination.
P. 279, l. 25, adhimokṣa, see elsewhere.
P. 279, l. 25, adhyāśaya, see elsewhere.
P. 279, l. 25, prativirati, abstention ( BHS. 368 ).¹

1. PP 313–321 of these notes have been added by the General Editor.

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