मूलमध्यमककारिका (आचार्य नागार्जुन - चन्द्रकीर्ति प्रणीत प्रसन्नपदा व्याख्या सहित)

320 Madhyamaka-Śāstra
existent nor non-existent in the past time. Besides the other four views concern-
ing the eternality of the world-order in the past time have already been adverted
to above. Candrakīrti has remarked that the four-fold view as elaborated in
connexion with the eternity of the world-order in the past, does not differ
from that of the latter to an extreme point. Yet it has been separately set
down by relying upon their apparently distinctive feature. The view that the
world-order is eternal does not differ from the view I was existent in the past
time to an inordinate degree. Or, the difference between them may be accounted
in the following way. The view the world-order is eternal relates to the past time
in a universal way. But the view I was existent in the past arises exclusively
with respect to the past existence of the self. It is bereft of any element of
universality. This attitude should be adopted with regard to the other view. So
it is evident that these eight views pertain to the past time.
There are also eight views divided under two categories that take the future
time into its consideration. The one category of the four-fold view may be
stated in the following order : (1) Shall I be existent in the future, (2) I shall not
be existent in the future, (3) I shall be both existent and non-existent in the
future, (4) Verily I shall be neither existent nor non-existent in the future. All
these four views relate to the future time. Over and above there is also four-fold view
which concerns itself to the destructibility and non-destructibility of the
world-order and the mode of its expression has been referred to above. The
salient feature of it consists in the fact that it takes course by depending upon the
future time in a general way. But the view I shall be existent in the future time
proceeds on by resting upon the future existence of the self to the exclusion of
any other thing. This is the difference between the categories of four-fold view
that concerns itself with the future time. (PP. 249-50).
P. 277, l. 1, svabhāva, Self-nature, self-being, intrinsic reality, self-hood.
P. 277, l. 1, hetu-pratyaya-sāmagrī, totality of causal conditions, both individually and collectively. (Mookerjee, Vigrahavyāvartanī).
P. 278, l. 7, ṣaṭkoṭiko vādaḥ, six fold dialectic (Mookerjee, Vigrahavyāvartanī)
sixfold disputation, sixfold argumentation.
P. 278, l. 2, vaiṣamīkatvam, disparity, unwarranted differentiation.
P. 278, l. 2, viśeṣahetu, ground of differentiation, ground of discrimination
(Mookerjee, Vigrahavyāvartanī 10).
P. 278, l. 9, pratiṣedha negation, denial.
P. 279, l. 19, Kuśala-dharma : Nāgārjuna, in his auto-commentary on the
Vigrahavyāvartanī, and other sacred texts of Buddhism have enumerated 119
Kuśala-dharmas which induce spiritual elevation. The word Kuśala occurs in
association with the following : Kuśala-puṇya, Kuśala-mūla, Kuśala-pakṣa, Kuśala-karmapatha
and the like.
P. 279, l. 22, dharmāvasthāvid, conversant with the different branches of
the Doctrine.
P. 280, l. 14, nairyāṇika, conducive to deliverance (BHS, 312). Cf. conducive
to the attainment of nirvāṇa cf. nairvāṇika.
P. 280, l. 16, bodhyaṅga, saṃbodhyaṅga, factors of enlightenment. The
Critical Notes 321
Arthaviniścayasūtra, 18, has enumerated seven varities of it, viz. smṛtisambodhy-
aṅga, dharmapravicaya°, gāmbhīrya°, prīti°, prasrabdhi°, samādhi° upekṣā°.
P. 281, l. 4, niḥsvabhāva, bereft of reality.
P. 281, l. 11, grāha, ( = Pāli gāha ) false belief : cf. ātmagrāha ( = Pāli atta-
gāha, clinging to the (false view that there is a) self. BHS., 219. The Laṅkāva-tāra
has observed : Na ca tvādṛśā anye vā budhyante ātmagrāhapatitayā saṃtatyā.
cf. Suzuki's rendering : This is not understood by you and others who cherish the notion of an ego soul and its continuity.
P. 282, l. 2, naiḥsvābhāvya, intrinsic unreality.
P. 283, l. 17, māyāpuruṣa, man created by power of magic.
P. 285, l. 7, Vyavahārasatyam, empirical reality.
P. 293, l. 33, ayoniśo manaskāra, unfounded belief ( Mookerjee, Vigrahavyāvartanī
P. 37 ). ayoniśa, not fundamental or thoroughgoing, superficial ( BHS.,
64 ). The expressions ayoniśo, vikalpena occur in the Laṅkāvatāra, 265.13.
Suzuki has rendered it as wrong discrimination.
P. 279, l. 25, adhimokṣa, see elsewhere.
P. 279, l. 25, adhyāśaya, see elsewhere.
P. 279, l. 25, prativirati, abstention ( BHS. 368 ).¹

1. PP 313–321 of these notes have been added by the General Editor.