मूलमध्यमककारिका (आचार्य नागार्जुन - चन्द्रकीर्ति प्रणीत प्रसन्नपदा व्याख्या सहित)

318 | Madhyamaka-Śāstra
yatanam, kāyāyatanam, manaāyatanam. Idam ucyate ṣaḍ-āyatanam. Ṣaḍāyatana-
pratyayaḥ sparśaḥ iti. Sparśaḥ katamaḥ? Ṣaṭ sparśakāyaḥ: cakṣuḥsamsparśaḥ,
śrotrasamsparśaḥ, ghrāṇasaṃsparśaḥ, jihvāsaṃsparśaḥ, kāyasaṃsparśaḥ, manaḥ-
saṃsparśaḥ. Ayam ucyate sparśaḥ. The Dharmasaṃgraha (24), however, has
enumerated twelve āyatanas, that is to say, the six sense-organs together with
their respective six sense-objects. Cf. Dvādaśāyatanāni, Cakṣuḥśrotraghrāṇajihvā-
kāyamanaāyatanāni rūpagandhaśabdarasasparśadharmāyatanāni ce'ti. Besides
the āyatana has been classified under two heads, viz. (1) Vāhya and
(2) ādhyātmika The Laṅkāvatāra and other authoritative Mahāyāna texts
have frequently mentioned āyatana in association with dhātu and skandha. Cf.
skandhadhātvāyatanānāṁ parikalpitalakṣaṇasvabhāvāvabodhaḥ-Laṅkā, 2.29.
P. 243—upāyāsa, mental affliction or distress: mental irritation, disturbance
(BHS, 146). It is the final step in the twelve-fold causation. The Artha-
viniścayasūtra (5) has laid down the preceeding links of it in the following order:
Jāti-pratyayā jarā-maraṇa—śokaparideva—duḥkha—daurmanasyo'pāyāsāḥ
sambhavanti. The Dharmasaṃgraha (42) also has provided an identical list,
Candrakīrti has offered the following interpretion: duḥkhadaurmanasyabahutva-
saṃbhūtā upāyāsāḥ.
P. 243—duḥkha, daurmanasya—Candrakīrti has clearly stated the differ-
ence between the meanings of these two words. The appearence of pain with
respect to the five sense-organs is called duḥkha. And the coming about of
disagreeable state of mind is known as daurmanasya. cf. Pañcendriyāsātanipāto
duḥkham. Manoniṣṭanipāto daurmanasyam (Prasannapadā, Pp. 243-44).
P. 247—Manasi-kāra,—attention, concentration of mind. In the sacred
texts of the Buddhist, the word manasi which is loc. sing. of the stem manas has
been frequently associated with the different forms of the root √kṛ. cf. manasi-
karoti, manasi-karoti, manasi-kurvanti, manasi-kuru, manaskāra, manasi-karta-
vya, manasi-kṛta, manasi-kurvāṇasya manasi-kariṣyanti. Besides the two words
yoniśaḥ and ayoniśaḥ frequently preceed the two words manasi-kāra and manas-
kāra. Asaṅga in his Yogācārabhūmi (60) has made the pertinent observation:
manaskāraḥ katamaḥ? cetasa ābhogaḥ. Besides he has expounded the signi-
ficance of the two technical terms: yoniśo manaskāraprajñapti (Ybh., 114)
and ayoniśo manaskāraprajñapti (Ybh., 118)
P. 245—anuparigraha, cohesion. cf. Śāl. 77.17 Yaḥ kāyasyā'nuparigraha-
kṛtyaṃ karoty ayam ucyate'bdhātuḥ.
P. 248—paritta, small.
P. 248—sabhāga, similar, same, equal; antonym of visadṛśa.
P. 248—aupapattyaṃśika, pertaining to the portion of origination or
birth. Sometimes the word aṅgika has also been used with aupapatti. cf. Laṅkā
(277. 97) aupapattyaṅgikaṃ cittaṃ vicitraṃ vāsanāsaṃbhavam. The word
aṃśika and antika have also been compounded with māraṇa or maraṇa.
Cāndrakīrti in his Prasannapadā has quoted the Śālistambasūtra with a slight
variation of reading.
P. 248—māranāntika, maranāntika, pertaining to the portion of destruction
(death).
P. 249, l. 1, pūrvānta (= Pāli pubbanta), the past time: cf. pūrvakoṭi,
Critical Notes | 319
(koṭi, limit, end BHS, 352). Candrakīrti in his Prasannapadā, P. 249 has offered
the following interpretation of this word: Tatra vartamānaṃ ātmabhāvam
apekṣya atītā ātmabhāvāḥ pūrvānta ity ucyate. Pūrvo hi janmaparaṃparāṃśaḥ
pūrvāntaḥ. This word is frequently associated with aparānta.
P. 249, l. 1—aparānta, the future time, the farthest limit, the future end of
worldly existence. Candrakīrti in his Prasannapadā, (249) explains it as
follows: Tatra vartamānaṃ ātmabhāvam apekṣya bhāvinaḥ ātmabhāvāḥ aparānta
ity ucyate. Aparo hi janmaparaṃparāṃśo'parāntaḥ.
P. 249, l. 3—ātmabhāva, existence of the self. This word has also been
used in the sense of body.
dṛṣṭi, heretical or erroneous view. This word frequently occurs in the Laṅkāva-
tāra, cf. Laṅkā 3. 1. dṛṣṭivigatam; 25.26 bhavadṛṣṭiḥ; 30.67 svabhāvaḥ kalpana kal-
pyam dṛśyaṃ dṛṣṭidvayaṁ katham? (V, 67); tīrthyadṛṣṭi (Laṅkā. P. 23) antadvaya-
dṛṣṭi 51. 12) P. 23—āya-vyayadṛṣṭābhiniveśena ... ... ... (Laṅkā, 174. 12).
The Dharmasaṃgraha (68) has made the following observation: pañca dṛṣṭa-
yaḥ. Satkāyadṛṣṭiḥ, antagrāhadṛṣṭi, mithyādṛṣṭiḥ, dṛṣṭiparāmarśaḥ, śīlaparāmarśaḥ.
Candrakīrti (P. 235) has observed that there are four views with reference to
nirvāṇa: (1) A Tathāgata is born after death, (2) A Tathāgata is not born after
death, (3) A Tathāgata is both born and is not born after death, (4) A Tathāgata
is neither born nor is not born after death. Besides he has referred to four
views pertaining to the annihilation and the like. (P.235) They may be set forth
in the following order: (1) The world-order is destructible, (2) The world-
order is non-destructible, (3) The world-order is both destructible and non-des-
tructible, (4) Verily the world-order is neither destructible nor non-destructible.
These four views are to be understood with respect to the future time. When an
individual does not perceive the future coming-into-existence of the self or the
world-order, he imagines that the world-order is liable to destruction. And he
pursues this course by relying upon the future time. Analogously when he
perceives the origination of that what was in future, he adopts the course that the
world is non-destructible. When he both perceives and fails to perceive, he
concludes in both ways. And due to the negation of both, he comes to hold that
it is neither destructible nor non-destructible.
Besides there are four views concerning the existence of the world-order in
the past. They may be set down in the order indicated below: (1) The world-
order is eternal, (2) The world-order is non-eternal, (3) The world-order is
both eternal and non-eternal. (4) The world-order is neither eternal nor non-
eternal: These four views relate to the past time. (P. 235). When an
experient perceives the past origination of the self or the world-order, he reaches
the conclusion that it (world-order) is eteranal. But when he cannot perceive
it, he thinks it to be non-etrnal. But when he both perceives and fails to
perceive, he concludes that it is both eternal and non-eternal. But when he
neither perceives nor fails to perceive, he considers it to be neither eternal, nor
non-eternal. These views concern with the past time. (P. 235).
Furthermore, Candrakīrti (P. 249) has set forth eight views pertaining to the
past time. They are susceptible of classification in the following order: (1)
Were I existent in the past time? (2) I was not existent in the past time, (3)
I was both existent and non-existent in the past time, (4) Verily I was neither