काव्यप्रकाश (आचार्य मम्मट - सम्पूर्ण १० उल्लास सटीक)

14 KĀVYAPRAKĀŚA
द्वितीयो गुणः। शुक्लादिना हि लब्धसत्ताक वस्तु विशिष्यते।
साध्यः पूर्वापरीभूतावयवः क्रियारूपः।
डित्थादिशब्दानामन्त्यबुद्धिनिर्ग्राह्यं संहृतक्रमं स्वरूपं वक्त्रा
यदृच्छया डित्थादिष्वर्थेषूपाधित्वेन संनिवेश्यत इति सोयं
संज्ञारूपो यदृच्छात्मक इति।
imposition upon it of some distinguishing feature ; of
these latter two, the former i. e. (e) is the Community,—as
has been declared in Vākyapadīya, 'By itself the ox is
neither an ox nor a non-ox, it is only by reason of its being
related to the community ox that it is called an "ox"
[which means that the community is the very essence of
the thing denoted];'—the latter [i. e. (f)] is the quality,
because when the thing has obtained its essence (become an
entity), it is the quality of whiteness and so forth, that serves
to distinguish it ;—(d) that which has got to be accom-
plished is the action, consisting of a series of steps appearing
one after the other ;—lastly, when the speaker, of his own
accord, fastens upon a particular object the distinguishing
characteristic in the shape of any such haphazard group
of letters as 'Dittha', 'Davittha' and so forth, solely
as a collocation of letter-sounds ending with the last
syllable, and not as occurring in any distinct order of
sequence, this group of letters is what forms the name of
the object concerned, and is what is classed as a proper
noun (b). This is what the author of the Mahābhāṣya
(on Pāṇini-sūtra, 'ṛḷk') has declared in the following
words—'The denotation of words is fourfold, as signi-
fied in the expression, "the ox which is white and named
Ḍittha is walking."'
As regards the Atomic Dimension and such other
Eternal Qualities (as, e.g. the Infinite Dimension, Sound

CHAPTER II 15
"गौःशुक्लश्चलो डित्थ इत्यादौ चतुष्टयी शब्दानां प्रवृत्तिः"
इति महाभाष्यकारः। परमाण्वादीना तु गुणमध्यपाठात् पारि-
भाषिकं गुणत्वम्। गुणक्रियायदृच्छाना वस्तुत एकरूपाणामप्या-
श्रयभेदाद् भेद इव लक्ष्यते। यथैकस्य मुखस्य खड्गमुकुरतैलाद्या-
लम्बनभेदात्।
and so forth) which, being eternal qualities, are coeval
with the substances to which they belong, of which latter,
on that account, they are the very 'essence', and as such
included under the category of 'community',—these
have even so been classed under the category of 'quality'
(and not under 'community'), only in view of the fact
that they have been classed (by the Vaiśeṣikas) under
'qualities'; but in reality they can be called 'quality'
only in a figurative or indirect sense.
As for qualities, actions and proper names, even
though each of them is, in reality one only (there being
only one whiteness, only one act of walking and only one
proper name 'Dittha', each of these being comprehen-
sive respectively of all individual shades of whiteness, of
all kinds of walking and of all instances of the utterance
of the particular name by several persons), yet it appears
as if there were some diversity in them, the reason whereof
lies in the fact of their subsisting in diverse individuals;
just as, for instance, though the face reflected is one only,
yet when it is reflected in diverse reflecting substances,
—such as the polished sword, the mirror, the oil and so
forth,—it has the appearance of being diverse.
[Hence as the diversity, in the case of quality, action and name is
only apparent, not real, the denotation of these does not involve either
'vagueness' or 'wrongness' which has been found in the case of the
denotation of individuals.]

16 KĀVYAPRAKĀŚA
हिमपयःशङ्खाद्याश्रयेषु परमार्थतो भिन्नेषु शुक्लादिषु यद्वशेन
शुक्ल. शुक्ल इत्याद्यभिन्नाभिधानप्रत्ययोत्पत्तिस्तत् शुक्लत्वादि
सामान्यम् । गुडतण्डुलादिपाकादिष्वेवमेव पाकत्वादि । बाल-
वृद्धशुकाद्युदीरितेषु डित्थादिशब्देषु च प्रतिक्षणं भिद्यमानेषु
डित्थाद्यर्थेषु वा डित्थत्वाद्यस्तीति सर्वेषां शब्दानां जातिरेव
'प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तमित्यन्ये । तद्वान् अपोहो वा शब्दार्थ. कैश्चिदुक्त
इति ग्रन्थगौरवभयात् प्रकृतानुपयोगाच्च न दर्शितम् ॥७॥
Some people (1. e. the Mīmāṁsakas) have argued as
follows :—"(a) Even though the quality of whiteness
subsisting in such varied substances as the snow, the
milk, the conch and other things is in reality diverse, yet
there is something in them by virtue of which all of them
are spoken of and comprehended under the single common
name 'whiteness' ; and this something is what has been
called the 'community of whiteness',—(b) similarly, in
the cooking of such diverse things as molasses, rice and so
forth, there is the 'community of cooking';—(c) as also
in the name 'Ḍittha' as pronounced by such diverse
individuals as the boy, the grown up man, the parrot and
so forth ; or as applied to such and such objects named
'Ḍittha' as are undergoing transformation at every mo-
ment, there is the 'community of the name Ḍittha';—and
from all this it is clear that the denotation of the word
consists (in all cases) in the community only (and not in
quality, action and name also.)"—7
There is another view held by others (i.e. the Naiyāyikas)
viz., that what is denoted by the word is the Individual as
belonging to the Community.
Yet others (Bauddhas) have held the view that what is

CHAPTER II 17
स मुख्योऽर्थस्तत्र मुख्यो व्यापारोऽस्याभिधोच्यते ॥ ८ ॥
स इति साक्षात्संकेतितः । अस्येति शब्दस्य ॥ ८ ॥
मुख्यार्थबाधे तद्योगे रूढितोऽथ प्रयोजनात् ।
अन्योऽर्थो लक्ष्यते यत्सा लक्षणारोपिता क्रिया ॥ ९ ॥
‘कर्मणि कुशलः’ इत्यादौ दर्भग्रहणाद्ययोगात् ‘गङ्गायां
घोषः’ इत्यादौ च गङ्गादीनां घोषाद्याधारत्वासंभवात् मुख्यार्थस्य
बाधे विवेचकत्वादौ सामीप्ये च संबन्धे रूढितः प्रसिद्धेः तथा
denoted by the word is the ‘Apoha’, i.e., ‘the negation
of the contrary’.
[e. g., what the word ‘ox’ denotes is ‘the negation of the ‘non-ox’,
this view being in accordance with the Bauddha theory that there
is absolutely no positive entity in the world.]
All these various views are not set forth here, as it
would unduly prolong our work, and it would not serve
any useful purpose in regard to the real subject-matter
of the treatise.
That is the primary meaning; and this is the primary
function of it (the word), called ‘denotation’.—(8)
‘That’—i.e., the directly conventional;—‘of it’, of
the word. 8.
When the primary meaning is precluded (by incompati-
bility), another meaning, in affinity therewith, comes to be
implied,—either on the basis of usage or for a special
purpose,—this process of imposed implication is called ‘Indica-
tion’, Lakṣaṇā.—(9)
(a) In the expression ‘karmaṇi kuśalaḥ’, (used in
the sense of ‘expert in his work’) the primary meaning
of the word ‘kuśalaḥ’ is ‘grass-chopper’, and this
idea of ‘grass-chopping’ is not compatible with the
sense of the sentence;—similarly in the expression
2

18 KĀVYAPRAKĀŚA
गङ्गातटे घोष इत्यादेः प्रयोगात् येषां न तथा प्रतिपत्तिः तेषां
पावनत्वादीना धर्माणां तथाप्रतिपादनात्मनः प्रयोजनाच्च मुख्येन
अमुख्योऽर्थो लक्ष्यते यत् स आरोपितः शब्दव्यापारः सान्तरार्थ-
निष्ठो लक्षणा ॥ ९॥
‘ gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ ’ (used in the sense of ‘ the ranch in the
Gaṅgā ’) the primary meaning of the term ‘ Gaṅgā ’ is
the river itself, and this is incompatible as the location for
the ranch ;—hence in both these cases ‘ the primary mean-
ing is barred ’; and ‘ another ’ secondary meaning comes
to be implied by the primary meaning in each of these
two cases,—(a) the term ‘ kuśala ’, implying the sense of
the ‘ expert ’, which is ‘ in affinity with ’ the primary sense
of ‘ grass-chopping,’ in this that just as the ‘ expert in
business is possessed of discrimination so is the grass-
chopper also (who cuts what he needs and rejects what he
does not need),—and (b) the term ‘ Gaṅgā ’ implying
the sense of ‘ the bank,’ which is ‘ in affinity with ’ the
primary sense of the ‘ river ’ in this that it is situated in
close proximity ,—and while in (a), the case of the term
‘ kuśala ’, the said implication is based upon ‘ usage ’
(by which the term is generally used in the sense of ‘expert’),
while in (b), in that of the term ‘ Gaṅgā,’ the said impli-
cation proceeds on the basis of the ‘ purpose ’ of pointing
out those properties of ‘ sanctity ’ and the rest which could
not be expressed by the use of such expressions as ‘ gaṅgā-
tate ghoṣaḥ ’ (‘ the ranch on the bank of the Gaṅgā ’); this
function of indirect implication is ‘ imposed ’ upon the
word, in the sense that it is not direct (from the word to
the meaning), but indirect, through certain intervening
factors (in the shape of the ‘ incompatibility of the primary
meaning ’ and the rest mentioned in the text). 9.

CHAPTER II 19
स्वसिद्धये पराक्षेपः परार्थं स्वसमर्पणम् ।
उपादानं लक्षणं चेत्युक्ता शुद्धैव सा द्विधा ॥ १० ॥
‘कुन्ताः प्रविशन्ति’ ‘यष्टयः प्रविशन्ति’ इत्यादौ कुन्तादि-
भिरात्मनः प्रवेशसिद्धयर्थं स्वसंयोगिनः पुरुषा आक्षिप्यन्ते ।
तत उपादानेनेयं लक्षणा ।
“गौरनुबन्ध्यः” इत्यादौ श्रुतिचोदितमनुबन्धनं कथं मे
स्यादिति जात्या व्यक्तिराक्षिप्यते न तु शब्देनोच्यते “विशेष्यं
‘Pure’ Indication is of two kinds—(a) the ‘Inclusive’, in
which there is implication of the other (the secondary) meaning
for the purpose of completing (the logical connection of)
the primary meaning itself, and (b) the ‘Indicative’ in which
the primary meaning surrenders itself for the sake of the other
(the secondary meaning)—(10).
(a) An example of the ‘Inclusive’ Indication we
have in the expression ‘kuntāḥ praviśanti’ (‘the lances
enter’), where the ‘primary meaning,’ the ‘lances,’ im-
plies the men holding the lances, for the purpose of establishing
the logical connection of the lances themselves with the
act of ‘entering’ (which could not be done by the lances,
except through the men holding them).
Some people have cited as an example of ‘Inclusive’
Indication, the expression ‘gauranubandhyaḥ (‘the ox is to
be sacrificed’), where, they explain, the primary meaning
of the term ‘ox’—which is the ‘community’ ox—implies
an individual ox, for the purpose of establishing its connec-
tion with the act of ‘being sacrificed’ enjoined by the said
Vedic expression; and they go on, this individual ox could
not be regarded as directly denoted by the word itself,
because of the principle ‘the denotation of a word, having
its force spent up in the qualifying adjunct (which, in this

20 KĀVYAPRAKĀŚA
नाभिधा गच्छेत् क्षीणशक्तिर्विशेषणे" इति न्यायादित्युपादान-
लक्षणा तु नोदाहर्तव्या । न ह्यत्र प्रयोजनमस्ति न वा रूढि-
रियम् । व्यक्त्यविनाभावित्वात्तु जात्या व्यक्तिराक्षिप्यते ।
यथा क्रियतामित्यत्र कर्ता । कुर्वित्यत्र कर्म । प्रविश पिण्डी-
मित्यादौ गृहं भक्षयेत्यादि च ।
case, is the community), is unable to proceed to the qualified
(which is the Individual).'
This however is not a right example of 'inclusive'
indication ; because in this case, there is neither any
'purpose' (served by the indirect implication, which
could not be got by direct denotation), nor any 'usage'
(and these alone have been declared to be the basis for
indirect implication). What really happens in the case
cited is that the individual is implied by the community
by reason of their invariable concomitance ; just as there
is in the case of the imperative passive form 'kriyatām',
where the agent is implied by reason of his being invariably
concomitant with an action,—or in that of the imperative
word 'kuru', the object is implied by reason of its being
inseparable from every transitive verb,—or in the case of
the word 'praviśa,' 'enter,' which implies the 'house'
to be entered, as what is entered is inseparable from the
act of entering,—or in the case of the word 'piṇḍīm'
'cake' (in the accusative), some such verb as 'eat'
is implied, as without some such transitive verb, there
could be no object.
The expression 'fat Devadatta eats not during the
day' as implying his nocturnal feeding has been regarded
by some people as an example of 'Indication'; but in
this case the nocturnal feeding is not 'indicated' by the words

CHAPTER II 21
‘पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते’ इत्यत्र च रात्रिभोजनं न
लक्ष्यते श्रुतार्थापत्तेरर्थापत्तेर्वा तस्य विषयत्वात् ।
‘गङ्गायां घोषः’ इत्यत्र तटस्य घोषाधिकरणत्वसिद्धये
गङ्गाशब्दः स्वार्थमर्पयति इत्येवमादौ लक्षणैनैषा लक्षणा ।
उभयरूपा चेयं शुद्धा । उपचारेणामिश्रितत्वात् ।
at all ; it is simply cognised either through ‘Verbal Pre-
sumption’ (of the expression ‘he eats at night’ as held
by the Bhāṭṭa), or through pure presumption (of the fact
of the nocturnal feeding, as held by the Prābhākara).
(b) An example of the ‘Indicative’ Indication we have
in the expression ‘gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ’ (‘the ranch in the
Gaṅgā’); here, for the purpose of obtaining for the Bank
(which is the secondary meaning indicated by the term
‘Gaṅgāyām’) the character of being the location of the
ranch, the term ‘Gaṅgāyām’ ‘surrenders its primary mean-
ing’ (i. e. the river); and in this case the process of Indi-
cation is called ‘Indicative.’
Both of these kinds here exemplified (a and b) belong
to the category of ‘pure’ Indication,—so called because
they do not involve or require any auxiliary agency (in the
shape of some sort of similitude between the Primary and
Secondary meanings).
It is not true (as some people have asserted) that in
cases of ‘pure’ Indication—like those just cited—there
is a clear ‘difference’ manifested between the indicated
(secondary) and the indicative (primary) meanings,—this
‘difference’ being technically called ‘tāṭasthya’ ‘aloofness’
—[while in cases of Indication other than the ‘pure,’ there
is ‘non-difference’ manifested between the two mean-
ings.]—This, we say, is not true ; because as a matter of

22 KĀVYAPRAKĀŚA
अनयोर्लक्ष्यस्य लक्षकस्य च न भेदरूपं तटस्थ्यम् ।
तटादीनां गङ्गादिशब्दैः प्रतिपादने तत्वप्रतिपत्तौ हि प्रतिपिपाद-
यिषितप्रयोजनसंप्रत्ययः । गङ्गासंबन्धमात्रप्रतीतौ तु गङ्गातटे
घोष इति मुख्यशब्दाभिधानाल्लक्षणायाः को भेदः ॥१०॥
सारोपान्या तु यत्रोक्तौ विषयी विषयस्तथा ।
आरोप्यमाणः आरोपविषयश्च यत्रानपह्रुतभेदौ सामाना-
धिकरण्येन निर्दिश्येते सा लक्षणा सारोपा ॥
fact, in a case where the Bank is spoken of by means of
the word 'Gaṅgā,' it is done clearly for the purpose of
expressing some definite notion (such as that of 'sanctity'
in the present case); and this purpose can be accomplished
only when the two (the indicated 'bank' and the indica-
tive 'river') are comprehended as absolutely identical
i. e., the sanctity of the 'bank' is recognised only when the
'bank' is identified with the 'river' whose sanctity is
already well-known. If this were not so, and if all that
was intended to be expressed was some sort of connection
with the 'river,' then as this could be done equally well
by the ordinary expression 'gaṅgātaṭe ghoṣaḥ' ('the ranch
on the banks of the river Gaṅgā'),—what difference would
there be between the expression of that idea by this direct
assertion and the indirect 'indication' of the same (by
the indirect expression 'gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ') ? 10.
There is however another (kind of Indication) called the
'Super-imponent', wherein the 'imposed' as well as 'that
imposed upon' are both distinctly expressed.
That Indication is called 'Super-imponent' in which
what is 'imposed' and what is 'imposed upon' are both
mentioned as correlated and as clearly distinct from
one another.

CHAPTER II 23
विषय्यन्तःकृतेऽन्यस्मिन् सा स्यात्साध्यवसानिका ॥ ११ ॥
विषयिणारोप्यमाणेनान्तःकृते निगीर्णे अन्यस्मिन्नारोपविषये
सति साध्यवसाना स्यात् ॥ ११ ॥
भेदाविमौ च सादृश्यात्सम्बन्धान्तरतस्तथा ।
गौणौ शुद्धौ च विज्ञेयौ
इमावारोपाध्यवसानरूपौ सादृश्यहेतू भेदौ ‘गौर्वाहीकः’
इत्यत्र ‘गौरयम्’ इत्यत्र च ।
अत्र हि स्वार्थसहचारिणो गुणा जाड्यमान्द्यादयो लक्ष्य-
माणा अपि गोशब्दस्य परार्थाभिधाने प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तत्वमुपयान्ति
That same (Indication) would be called ‘Introsusceptive’
when what is ‘imposed’ swallows the other (that is ‘imposed
upon’).—(11)
Where the ‘viṣayin’, what is ‘imposed’ ‘swallows’—
i. e., takes within itself—‘the other’—i. e., that which
is ‘imposed upon’,—it is a case of ‘Introsusceptive’
Indication. 11.
These two kinds of Indication (a) when based upon
similitude, are known as ‘qualitative’; and (b) as ‘pure’ when
they are based upon other kinds of relationship.
(A) As examples respectively of the ‘Superimponent’
and ‘Introsusceptive’ Indication, based upon similitude
(and hence ‘qualitative’), we have the two expressions
(a) ‘gaurvāhīkaḥ’ ) (‘the ploughman is an ox’), and (b)
‘gaurayam’ (‘he is the ox itself’).
[In (a) the character of the ‘ox’ is what is ‘imposed’, and the
‘ploughman’ is the one ‘imposed upon’, and both these being mentioned
as distinct from one another, it is a case of ‘superimponent’ Indication;
while in (b) the character imposed, i. e. the ‘ox’, ‘swallows’ up the
man upon whom it is imposed, the man loses his distinct individuality
and becomes merged, as it were, in the ‘ox’, hence this becomes
a case of the ‘introsusceptive’ Indication.]

24 KĀVYAPRAKĀŚA
इति केचित् । स्वार्थसहचारिगुणाभेदेन पदार्थगता गुणा एव
लक्ष्यन्ते न परार्थोऽभिधीयते इत्यन्ये । साधारणगुणाश्रयत्वेन
परार्थ एव लक्ष्यते इत्यपरे ।
उक्तं चान्यत्र “अभिधेयाविनाभूतप्रतीतिर्लक्षणोच्यते ।
लक्ष्यमाणगुणैर्योगाद्वृत्तेरिष्टा तु गौणता” इति ।
अविनाभावोत्र संबन्धमात्रं न तु नान्तरीयकत्वम् । तत्त्वे हि
‘मञ्चाः क्रोशन्ति’ इत्यादौ न लक्षणा स्यात् । अविनाभावे
चाक्षेपेणैव सिद्धेर्लक्षणाया नोपयोग इत्युक्तम् ।
The exact process of Indication in these cases is thus
explained by some people :—When the ‘ploughman’ is
spoken of as the ‘ox’, this latter word indicates the qualities
of stupidity, dullness and the like which belong to the
animal denoted by that word, and through these qualities
(thus indirectly indicated) the word ‘ox’ comes to denote
the man (and it is thus that the co-ordination between the
man and the ox is secured).—According to others, how-
ever, what happens is, not that the word ‘ox’ directly ex-
presses the man (through its qualities of stupidity and dull-
ness), but that it indirectly indicates similar qualities in the
man.—But according to others again (men of our way of
thinking), the word ‘ox’ indicates the man himself, as
being the substratum of those same qualities that belong
to the ox also.
This has been declared elsewhere also (in the
Ślokavārttika)—‘Indication is the name given to the
cognition of what is invariably concomitant with what is
directly expressed by the word ; and this process is called
‘qualitative’ on account of the indication being based
upon the presence of certain qualities.’

CHAPTER II 25
‘आयुर्घृतम्’ ‘आयुरेवेदम्’ इत्यादौ च सादृश्यादन्यत्
कार्यकारणभावादि संबन्धान्तरम् । एवमादौ च कार्यकारण-
भावादिलक्षणपूर्वे आरोपाध्यवसाने ।
अत्र गौणभेदयोर्भेदोपि ताद्रूप्यप्रतीति. सर्वथैवाभेदावगमश्च
प्रयोजनम् । शुद्धभेदयोस्त्वन्यवैलक्षण्येनाव्यभिचारेण च कार्य-
कारित्वादि ।
In this passage what is meant by ‘invariable con-
comitance’ is only relationship, and not actual (inseparable)
concomitance, for if the latter were meant, there could
be no indication in the case of such expressions as ‘mañchāḥ
krośanti’ (‘the platforms are shouting’).
[As there is no inseparable concomitance between the platform
and the men on the platform.]
In fact it has been rightly observed that in cases where
there is actual invariable concomitance (between the indicated
and the indicator), one naturally implies the other, and
there is no need for the indicative process at all.
(b) Examples of the ‘superimponent’ and ‘intro-
susuceptive’ Indication, based upon factors other than
‘similitude,’ (and hence ‘pure’) we have in the two ex-
pressions ‘Āyurghṛtam’ (‘clarified butter is longevity’)
and ‘Āyurevedam’ (‘It is longevity itself’) ; —where the
factor upon which the indication is based is some such
relationship as that between cause and effect, and the like
and in all such cases the two kinds of Indication—‘superim-
ponent’ and ‘introsusceptive’—are such as are actually
preceded (and brought about) by the said relationships
of ‘cause and effect’ and the like.

26 KĀVYAPRAKĀŚA
क्वचित् तादर्थ्यादुपचारः । यथा इन्द्रार्था स्थूणा इन्द्रः ।
क्वचित् स्वस्वामिभावात् । यथा राजकीयः पुरुषो राजा । क्वचित्
अवयवावयविभावात् । यथा अग्रहस्त इत्यत्राग्रमात्रेवयवे हस्तः ।
क्वचित् तात्कर्म्यात् । यथा अतक्षा तक्षा ॥
Now here, in the case of the two kinds of 'qualita-
tive' Indication, the purpose served [(a) in the case of
the 'superimponent' variety, e. g., 'the ploughman is an
ox'] is the bringing about of the cognition of similarity
between the two things recognised as different from one
another,—and [(b) in the case of the 'introsusceptive'
variety, e. g., 'he is verily an ox'] it is the bringing about
of the notion of absolute identity between the two things.
In the case of the two kinds of 'pure' Indication [e g.,
(I) 'Butter is longevity' and (b) 'It is longevity itself'],
on the other hand, the purpose served is the bringing about
of the notion that the thing spoken of is one that accom-
plishes a certain object in a way better than anything else
[in the case of (a)] or infallibly [in the case of (b)] .
In some cases the Indication is based upon the rela-
tion of 'subserviency;' e.g., the pillar that subserves the
purpose of (the worship of) Indra is called 'indra';—
sometimes it is based upon the relationship of 'master
and servant'; e. g. when the king's servant is spoken as
the 'king';—in some cases it is based upon the relation-
ship of 'whole and part'; e. g. in the expression 'agra-
hastaḥ' ('foremost hand') as applied to any and every
foremost limb, this latter is indicated by the word 'hand';—
in other cases again it is based upon the relationship of
'doing the same work'; e. g., when one who is not a
carpenter is spoken of as 'carpenter' (on account of his
doing the carpenter's work).

CHAPTER II 27
लक्षणा तेन षड्विधा ॥ १२ ॥
आद्यभेदाभ्या सह ॥ १२ ॥
सा च
व्यङ्ग्येन रहिता रूढौ सहिता तु प्रयोजने ।
प्रयोजनं हि व्यञ्जनव्यापारगम्यमेव ॥
तच्च गूढमगूढं वा
तच्चेति व्यङ्ग्यम् । गूढं यथा
मुखं विकसितस्मितं वशितवक्रिम प्रेक्षितं
समुच्छलितविभ्रमा गतिरपास्तसंस्था मतिः ।
Thus Indication is of six kinds.—(12).
That is, (the four kinds mentioned in 11 and 12)
along with the first two kinds (described in 10) 12.
This (Indication)—
When based upon usage, is without any ‘suggested’ meaning;
but when it is based upon some purpose, it is accompanied by
a ‘suggested’ meaning.
In fact the recognition of the purpose (in the case of
Indication) is obtained only through the process of
‘suggestion’.
And it may be either abstruse or explicit.
‘It’—the suggested meaning.
It is ‘abstruse’ in the following passage—
‘Oh ! The first tide of youth is exuberant in the
body of the moon-faced one : her face is blooming with
smiles, her glances have acquired the graceful arch, her
gait evinces a rising gracefulness, her thoughts have re-
linquished steadiness, the bosom shows the budding
breasts, and her thighs are plump and efficient.’
[Here we have the primary meaning of the following words barred
by incompatibility with the context—(a) the word ‘is exuberant’
(as applied to tide of youth, which is inanimate),—(b) ‘blooming’
(applied to smile, though it is really applicable to flowers),—(c) ‘acqui-

28 KĀVYAPRAKĀŚA
उरो मुकुलितस्तनं जघनमंसबन्धोधुरं
बतेन्दुवदनात नौ तरुणिमोद्गमो मोदते ॥ ९ ॥
अगूढं यथा
श्रीपरिचयाज्जडा अपि भवन्त्यभिज्ञा विदग्धचरितानाम् ।
उपदिशति कामिनीनां यौवनमद एव ललितानि ॥ १० ॥
अत्रोपदिशतीति ॥
ling' (as applied to the glances, which are inanimate),—(d) 'rising'
(as applied to gracefulness, which is not a material substance and hence
cannot do any rising),—e) 'relinquishing steadiness' (as applied to
thoughts which are not sentient),—(f) 'budding' (as applied to breasts,
though really applicable to flowers,)—and (g) 'efficient' (as applied
to the thighs which are inanimate), and hence they are taken as indicating
the (figurative) meaning in which the words are understood in the
passage, e g (a) 'exuberance' indicates excellence and what is suggested
is 'desirability',—(b) 'blooming' indicates unrestrained manifestation,
and what is suggested is 'sweet odour' and so forth,—(c) 'acquiring'
indicates mastery and it suggests the 'appearance of the loved person',—
(d) 'rising' indicates profuseness, which suggests 'heart-ravishing cha-
racter';—e) 'relinquishing steadiness' indicates impatience, which
suggests 'the increasing influence of love',—(f) 'budding' indicates
unflabbiness, which suggests 'fitness for embrace',—(g) 'efficiency'
indicates capacity for spirited intercourse, which suggests 'loveliness.'—
And all this, not capable of being comprehended by ordinary men, is
very 'abstruse'।
As an example of the 'explicit' suggested meaning,
we have the following—
'Coming into contact with prosperity' even dull
persons become conversant with the functions of the
clever : the intoxication of youth itself teaches the graces
to lovely women.'
Here the work 'teaches' (having its direct meaning
barred, in relation to the 'intoxication of youth,' which
is inanimate), indicates 'manifestation', which suggests
'spontaneous attainment of the graces'; and this sug-
gestion is quite explicit).

CHAPTER II 29
तदेषा कथिता त्रिधा ॥ १३ ॥
अव्यङ्ग्या गूढव्यङ्ग्या अगूढव्यङ्ग्या च ॥ १३ ॥
तद्भूलाक्षणिकः
शब्द इति संबध्यते । तद्भूस्तदाश्रयः ॥
तत्र व्यापारो व्यञ्जनात्मकः ।
In this way Indication has been declared to be of three
kinds.—(13).
That is, (1) that in which there is no suggested meaning,
(2) that in which the suggested meaning is abstruse,
and (3) that in which the suggested meaning is explicit.
That which contains the said (indication) is the 'Indicative'—
'Word', 'śabdah', has to be construed here (from
Text 6).
'Tadbhūh'—That which contains, is the substratum
of, the Indication.
[Having described the 'expressive word' (in the Text 7) and the
'indicative word' (in the foregoing Text), the author now turns to
the description of the 'suggestive word' As in the other two cases,
however, so here also, before describing the 'suggestive word,' it is
necessary to explain the process of 'suggestion.' This suggestion is
of two kinds—'Verbal', based upon the word, and 'Ideal', based
upon the meaning, as the present context is dealing with words, the
author takes up Verbal suggestion here, the other kind being dealt
with in Chapter III. The Verbal suggestion also is of two kinds,
that based upon the directly expressed meaning of the word,
'denotative', and that based upon the indicated meaning of the word,
'indicative'. And as he has been just dealing with Indication, he
takes up the 'Indicative' suggestion first ]—13
Of the Indicative Word, that function (which brings about
the cognition of the 'purpose' of the indication) is of the nature
of 'Suggestion'.
"Why so?"

30 KĀVYAPRAKĀŚA
कुत इत्याह
यस्य ऽप्रतीतिमाधातुं लक्षणा समुपास्यते ॥ १४ ॥
फले शब्दैकगम्येऽत्र व्यञ्जनान्नापरा क्रिया ।
प्रयोजनप्रतिपिपादयिषया यत्र लक्षणया शब्दप्रयोगस्तत्र
नान्यतस्तत्प्रतीतिरपि तु तस्मादेव शब्दात् । न चात्र व्यञ्जना-
दृतेऽन्यो व्यापारः ॥
तथाहि
नाभिधा समयाभावात्
[Answer.]
In regard to that intended idea for bringing about the
cognition whereof one has recourse to Indication, (14) and which is
cognisable through the word only,—the function (of the word)
can be none other than 'Suggestion.'
A word is used indicatively only when it is intend-
ed to convey the notion of the 'purpose' (which
could not be cognised through the direct denotation of
the word);—and yet the said notion is obtained from that
same word, and not from anything else ; and in this func-
tion the word is none other than Suggestion ;—because
(a) it cannot be direct denotation, as there is no usage to
that effect ;—
In the case of the expression 'the ranch in the
Gaṅgā', the 'sancity' and such other qualities are re-
cognised as belonging to the bank ; and yet there is no
usage of the word 'Gaṅgā in that sense :—
(b) nor can it be Indication because the necessary conditions
are wanting.—(15).

CHAPTER, II 31
गङ्गायां घोष इत्यादौ ये पावनत्वादयो धर्मास्तटादौ प्रतीयन्ते
न तत्र गङ्गादिशब्दाः संकेतिताः ॥
हेत्वभावान्न लक्षणा ॥ १५ ॥
मुख्यार्थबाधादित्रयं हेतुः ॥ १५ ॥
तथा च
लक्ष्यं न मुख्यं नाप्यत्र बाधो योगः फलेन नो ।
न प्रयोजनमेतस्मिन् न च शब्दः स्खलद्गतिः ॥ १६ ॥
That is the three conditions described above—the
primary meaning being barred and so forth (see Text
9). For instance—
What is 'indictated' is not the primary meaning ; nor is
that meaning incompatible ; nor has it any connection with the
intended idea ; nor again is there any purpose served by it (i. e.,
by making the intended idea an object of further Indication) ,
nor lastly is the word itself wanting in the requisite force. (16).
In the expression 'the ranch in the Gaṅgā', the
word 'Gaṅgā' is taken as indicating the 'bank', because
its primary meaning of 'river' is found incompa-
tible;—if, in the same manner, the sense of the 'bank'
also were incompatible, then alone could it be taken as
indicating the intended idea (of 'sanctity' and so forth) ;—
as a matter of fact however, in the first place, the bank
does not form the primary meaning of the word 'Gaṅgā',
nor is it incompatible, [so that the first condition of Indi-
cation is not fulfilled],—secondly there is no affinity
between the 'bank' as indicated by the word 'Gaṅgā'
with 'sanctity' and the other qualities that would be
indicated (by the bank) [so that the second condition of
Indication is not fulfilled];—thirdly, there is no further
purpose served by making the intended idea of 'sanctity'
and the rest the object of a further indication ;—nor lastly,
is the word 'Gaṅgā' incapable (without the intervention

32 KĀVYAPRAKĀŚA
यथा गङ्गाशब्द स्रोतसि सबाध इति तटं लक्षयति तद्वत्
यदि तटेऽपि सबाध स्यात् तत प्रयोजनं लक्षयेत । न च तटं
मुख्योर्थ. । नाप्यत्र बाधः । न च गङ्गाशब्दार्थस्य तटस्य पावन-
त्वादैर्लक्षणीये संबन्ध.। नापि प्रयोजने लक्ष्ये किचित् प्रयोजनम् ।
नापि गङ्गाशब्दस्तटमिव प्रयोजनं प्रतिपादयितुमसमर्थः ॥१६॥
एवमप्यनवस्था स्याद् या मूलक्षयकारिणी ।
of the indicative process) of bringing about the notion
of ‘sanctity’ and the rest, as it is of denoting the bank.
[The word ‘Gaṅgā’ is incapable of denoting the bank, hence for
the purpose of bringing about the notion of the bank, it has to seek
the help of Indication, but as regards ‘sanctity’ and the rest, the idea
of these can be brought about by the word ‘Gaṅgā’ itself, through
‘suggestion’]—16
Further, in this manner, there would be an infinite regress,
which would strike at the very root (of the intended com-
prehension).
If the purpose for which the original Indication has
been adopted were itself the object of a further Indica-
tion,—then for the second Indication there would be
another purpose; and in connection with the Indication
of this latter, there would be yet another purpose; and
so on and on, there would be an infinite regress, and the
result of this would be that the desired comprehension
would not be got at.
An objection is raised:—‘‘What the word ‘Gaṅgā’
indicates may be the bank as possessed of the qualities of
sanctity and the rest; and the purpose served by this indi-
cation is the bringing about of a notion that could not be
got at by the expression ‘the ranch on the bank of the
Gaṅgā’; and thus as Indication itself would provide the
comprehension of the bank along with the qualities, where
would be the need for having any ‘suggestion’ at all?’’

CHAPTER II 33
एवमपि प्रयोजनं चेल्लक्ष्यते तत् प्रयोजनान्तरेणेति तदपि
प्रयोजनान्तरेणेति प्रकृताप्रतीतिकृत् अनवस्था भवेत् ॥
ननु पावनत्वादिधर्मयुक्तमेव तटं लक्ष्यते । 'गङ्गायास्तटे
घोषः' इत्यतोधिकस्यार्थस्य प्रतीतिश्च प्रयोजनमिति विशिष्टे
लक्षणा तत्किं व्यञ्जनयेत्याह--
प्रयोजनेन सहितं लक्षणीयं न युज्यते ॥ १७ ॥
कुत इत्याह--
ज्ञानस्य विषयो ह्यन्यः फलमन्यदुदाहृतम् ।
प्रत्यक्षादेर्नीलादिर्विषयः फलं तु प्रकटता संवित्तिर्वा ॥
[The answer to this is given by the following Text.]
It is not right to make the 'indicated' meaning include the
intended idea (for the sake of which Indication is admitted.—(17)
"Why not?"
Because the object of a cognition is one thing, and its
resultant is said to be another.
For instance, the 'object' of the perceptional cognition
is the blue thing, while the 'resultant' of that cognition
is the 'apprehendedness' of that thing (as held by the
Mīmāṁsaka), or the 'representative cognition' ('I perceive
the blue thing,'—this is according to the Naiyāyika).
[Similarly the object of the cognition obtained by Indication is the
'bank', and the idea of 'sanctity' and the rest is only its resultant,
which, therefore, being different from the 'object', cannot be
coupled with the former.—There is no doubt that such is the mean-
ing of the text, and the commentators have had recourse to a subtle
and laboured explanation only on account of their being unable to re-
concile the clear meaning of the text with their own conceptions ] 17
Thus Indication cannot apply to the thing along with its
qualities.
This has been already explained.
3