व्यवहारमयूख (नीलकण्ठ भट्ट - पश्चिमी भारत की हिन्दू न्याय-संहिता एवं व्यवहार कोष)

218 VYAVAHĀRAMAYUKHA [S. V - 4, 16-17 ...]
[M. p. 118 ll. 17-18]
That man is termed rikthagrāhaḥ (in Yāj.) who takes the
wealth of the (deceased) father of a person, either justly because
the son though living is affected by defects such as impotency and the like
or unjustly when there is no defect (in the son). In the same way
yoṣidgrāhaḥ is one who takes the wife of another (after the latter's
death). The condition that no paternal wealth should have gone to
another may occur in two ways, either because there is a non-existence
the counter-entity of which is characterised by the quality of going to
another or because there is non-existence the counter-entity of which is
merely the qualifying adjunct viz. estate.¹ Here the meaning is that he
who takes the estate has first to pay the debts (of the deceased), on failure
of him the taker of the wife (has to pay the debts), on failure of him the
son when the estate has not gone to any other person (because none exists), on
failure of him (the son) the grandson (has to pay) only the principal (and
no interest) on failure of him the great-grandson the wife, the daughter
and the rest who are rikthinaḥ (i.e. if they take the estate) should pay the
debts of the deceased. If* no inheritance² is received then debt is not pay-
able by the great-grandson by the wife and the rest. Heritage when taken,
even though small leads to the liability to pay off debts even though
1 The verse rikthagrāha &c. is a very difficult one and various interpretations
have been proposed. Vide for details notes to V. M. pp. 340-345. The meaning of the
rather obscure clause in the Mayūkha 'the condition... estate' is this: a son may be one
whose paternal wealth has not gone to another person in either of two ways. First, the
father may have left no wealth. In such a case the son inherits no property and so such a
son is 'ananyāśritadravya' (as no property exists); secondly a father may have left
property and also sons, in such a case the wealth that exists will not go to another and
so the son will be ananyāśritadravya. The rule is that he who takes the estate should
pay the debts. If a man died leaving property a congenitally blind son and a
nephew the nephew would have taken the estate. In such a case in spite of
the rule 'putrapautrairṛṇaṁ deyaṁ' the nephew would have to pay the debts
because he takes the estate. If there is no wealth, but a man leaves a widow and
a son the man who takes his widow had to pay debts and not the son who took no
assets. This text does not prescribe re-marriage. Remarriages were prohibited by Manu
(V. 162) but by custom or otherwise they did take place. In that case the man who
took the widow (as a wife or mistress) had to pay the deceased man's debts. This was
apprehended to be the law even in modern times and so sec. 4 of the Bombay Act VII of
1866 (Hindu Heirs' Relief Act) expressly provides no person who has married a Hindu
widow shall merely by reason of such marriage be liable for any of the debts of any prior
deceased husband of such widow. If a man left no wealth and none took his widow,
then his son, though he took no wealth, had to pay his deceased father's debt. This is
expressed by 'putro &c.' It might be contended that 'ananyāśritadravyaḥ' means that
wealth exists but has not gone to another. To that Nīlakaṇṭha replies by saying that
even when merely wealth does not exist the son may yet be called 'ananyāśritadravya'
and that this second meaning of ananyāśritadravyaḥ is intended in the verse of Yāj. and
not the first meaning.

• 2 This sentence and the next are referred to in Lakshman v. Satyabhamabai
  2 Bom. 491 at p. 499. This proposition of the Mayūkha about a small estate making the
  taker liable to pay heavy debts is not supported by the Mit. or any other high authority.
  P. 187 (text)
  l. 7
  v