व्यवहारमयूख (नीलकण्ठ भट्ट - पश्चिमी भारत की हिन्दू न्याय-संहिता एवं व्यवहार कोष)
Vyavahara Mayukha of Nilakantha Bhatta
नीलकण्ठ भट्ट (सम्पादक: पी. वी. काणे) द्वारा
पृष्ठ 152, कुल 332 में से
संदर्भ में पढ़ेंstated and (therefore) in the passages prescribing that (the adoption of a
son) such as 'one about to take a son in adoption' &c (Vasiṣṭha Dh. S.
15. 6), the son is stated to be the bhāvya¹ by the word 'putram' being
used in the accusative case. And it is not possible (in the case of adoption)
to cause a son to be in the same sense in which a male child is born.
Therefore by the word 'putra' (in Vasiṣṭha's text and similar ones
on adoption) all the purposes served by a son are to be figuratively under-
stood and the adṛṣṭa (the unseen result) that urges one to perform that
(act of adoption) must be accepted as the bhāvya (in the passages laying
down adoption). Therefore (on the adoption taking place) those actions*
which spring from such special relationship as that of father and son take
place in the adopter's family (so far as the adopted boy is concerned).
Therefore is it that Manu (9. 142) says ²
- Bhāvya literally means 'what is to be made to exist or what is to be caused to be.'
As we say 'yāgena svargaṁ bhāvayet' (one should cause svarga to be by means of sacrifice),
where the goal to be accomplished (svargaṁ) is put in the objective case, so in Vasiṣṭha's
text putram is in the objective case and is the bhāvya of the rite of adoption. But the
boy to be adopted already exists, he is not to be brought into existence literally. Hence
the word 'putram' is to be taken in a figurative sense as indicating all the purposes served
by a son (i. e. paying off a debt, freedom from put hell &c.). When we cannot take the
expressed or literal sense (śakya or vācya sense), lakṣya sense is to be taken. Therefore
what is meant is 'by the ceremony of adopting a son one should accomplish the adṛṣṭa (the
unseen results) to be secured by means of a son'. The promise of heaven in the Vedic texts
prompts a man to perform a sacrifice and so the latter is said to be the prayojaka (what in-
cites or prompts to an act). Similarly the adṛṣṭa brought about by the adoption of a son
is the bhāvya and the prayojaka of the ceremony of adoption. Vide notes to V. M.
pp. 188-189. - Manu IX 142 and Nīlakaṇṭha's explanations of piṇḍa and svadhā are quoted in
Lallubhai v. Mankuvarbai I. L. R. 2 Bom 388 at p. 121 and at pp. 125-126 it is proved by
quotations from the Saṁskāramayūkha that Nīlakaṇṭha accepted Vijñāneśvara's explanation
of the word sapiṇḍa. In Sri Rajah Venkata Narasimha v. Sri Rajah Rangayya 29 Mad.
437 at p. 449 the words of the Mayūkha from 'therefore is it that Manu says' up to 'co-
extensive with the two' are quoted and it is said 'we do not think that there is any thing
in these passages which necessarily carries with it the idea that the adopted son is divested
of property which is his own absolutely at the time of adoption'. In Dattatreya v. Govind
40 Bom. 429 (where a person in whom property had become vested as the sole surviving
male in the family was given in adoption into another family) it was held, dissenting from
29 Mad. 437, that a person on adoption lost all rights to the property of his natural family
that had already become vested in him before adoption. At p 433 the verse of Manu is
translated and it is said (at p. 434) 'there is no room for the distinction that the prohibition
against taking is confind to the inheritance after the adoption and does not extend to what
is already inherited before adoption. The words are wide enough to include the estate
vested in him at the time of his adoption, provided it is the estate of his natural father.' It
is submitted with great respect that this Bombay decision is wrong and is opposed to two
Mīmāṁsā rules of interpretation, viz. about vākyabheda and about bhūta (already existing
things or facts) and bhavya (future things or state of facts). Vide above p. 112n 1 and p. 121n 1
for the latter maxim and pp. 37, 38 of my 'Brief Sketch of the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā system'
for an exposition of how these faults are committed by the Bombay decision. In 29 Mad.,
- P. 115 (text).
V. M. 16