व्यवहारमयूख (नीलकण्ठ भट्ट - पश्चिमी भारत की हिन्दू न्याय-संहिता एवं व्यवहार कोष)

106 VYAVAHĀRAMAYŪKHA [ S. IV 5, 2
M. p. 50 l. 30-p. 51 l. 3
son should be given in adoption¹ in distress) and therefore if this restrictive
rule be violated then one cannot secure the unseen result which is the urging
motive (prayojaka) of the particular act (viz adoption here).* Some
however hold that the word āpad (distress, in Manu's text) does not
serve the purpose of implying a prohibition (of giving a son in adoption)
when there is no distress but that word only conveys this that distress (āpad)
is an occasion (on which a son may be given in adoption) since the word
āpad cannot be construed as meant to exclude (only) the giving of a son in
the absence of distress (i. e. there is no parisaṁkhyā) as such a con-
struction would be liable to the faults of giving up the plain meaning and
the like². Nor can it be urged (as an objection) that if āpad were only
to be understood as the occasion³ (of giving in adoption) there would follow
the undesirable conclusion that sin would be incurred by not giving a son
(in adoption when another is) in distress for this passage (of Manu)
1 So far Nīlakaṇṭha shows that the Mit. is not right in calling the implied prohibition
(of giving when there is no distress) puruṣārtha and that if Mīmāṁsā is to be strictly
followed it must be regarded as kratvartha so that action opposed to it would make the
adoption itself invalid. Then he puts forward the view of some that there is neither
niyama nor parisaṁkhyā in Manu's verse but that verse is only permissive and puts forth
the occasion when a son may be given. He does not refute this view and it looks probable
that he approved of it.
2. For the terms Niyama and Parisaṁkhyā vide notes to V. M. pp. 163-165. Vidhi pure
and simple lays down what is unknown from any other ordinary source of knowledge, such
as the text 'one who desires heaven should perform jyotiṣṭoma'. A Niyama restricts the
performance of a religious act to one out of two or more alternatives and prohibits the rest
e. g. the text 'one should sacrifice on an even plot of land' is a niyama as it restricts perfor-
mance to even ground and prohibits performance elsewhere. A parisaṁkhyā is a permissive
rule, it allows the doing of a thing, though it does not really enjoin it, and prohibits the
doing of things other than those allowed e. g. the text 'the flesh of the five five-nailed ani-
mals may be eaten' is a parisaṁkhyā since it does not enjoin the eating of flesh, it only per-
mits the flesh of five animals and impliedly prohibits the eating of the flesh of other animals.
A parisaṁkhyā is always liable to three faults. It has to give up the plain sense (in the
above the words read like an injunction that the flesh of five animals must be eaten i. e.
there is śrutahānipīḍā), we have to suppose that the text forbids the flesh of other animals
(which is not expressed in so many words) and this implied prohibition is against what
follows human cravings after flesh (i. e. there is prāptabādhā). The view of some writers
is that Manu's verse does not contain a niyama (as in that case it would be a sin not to give
a son in distress) nor does it contain a parisaṁkhyā which latter should not as far as pos-
sible be resorted to as it is liable to three faults. That verse is simply a definition of
dattaka and nothing more.
3. Certain actions were prescribed as always obligatory and certain others were pre-
scribed for certain occasions (nimitta). If both nitya and naimittika actions were not per-
formed, sin was incurred. If Manu's verse put forward āpad as the occasion of giving in
adoption, then by not giving a son in adoption in āpad sin would be incurred. This objec-
tion is raised against the proposition of some that āpad is only a nimitta (occasion). It is
answered in the words 'this passage &c. i. e. the verse of Manu simply defines dattaka and
contains no command (vidhi).
P. 108 (text).