व्यवहारमयूख (नीलकण्ठ भट्ट - पश्चिमी भारत की हिन्दू न्याय-संहिता एवं व्यवहार कोष)

[S. IV. 1. 12-14 / M. p. 85 l. 33-p. 86 l. 21] DISCOURSE ON OWNERSHIP 83

absence of ownership over one's wife while there is (ownership) in a cow,
there is no ownership over the offspring born of her (the wife); and
(further) in worldly experience being born of what is the subject of ownership
is alone understood to be the cause of ownership (in the things produced).
If it be urged (as an objection) that there is ownership in the wife also
on account of accepting her (at the time of marriage when she is given away$^1$),
(the reply is that) this objection is not proper, since there being ab-
sence of ($^2$the privilege of) accepting a gift for kṣatriyas, there will be
no ownership over their wives and therefore there will be none even in the
children born of them. Therefore (i. e. for this very reason), since it is
only a person of the same caste that can be adopted as son on account of
the text (of Yāj. II. 133) 'this rule propounded by me applies to (the
twelve kinds of) sons that are of the same caste (with their father)',
the acceptance of a son in adoption, so far as the kṣatriyas are
concerned, can only be in a secondary (or figurative) sense$^3$. Nor is it
possible to take acceptance (of a son) in the primary sense even as
regards brāhmaṇas, since in that case (i. e. if acceptance be understood
in the primary sense with brāhmaṇas and in the secondary sense with
kṣatriyas) in the texts enjoining that (i, e. adoption of a son) there
will be conflict inasmuch as (the same word acceptance) will have
been used in two different senses at the same time. Nor can it be said
that the rite of acceptance of a son (in adoption) is permitted only to
brāhmaṇas and not to kṣatriyas and the rest, since from the words of
Śaunaka and others such as 'a daughter's son and a sister's son are given
(in adoption) to a śūdra', it is understood that they (i. e. kṣatriyas and
the rest) are entitled to perform that (the ceremony of adoption). Simi-
larly in the case of the marriage of a brāhmaṇa with the daughter of a
kṣatriya (and the like) in the brāhma form, both the gift and the accep-

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1 In the Gṛhyasūtras marriage is said to be the gift of the bride whose hand the
bridegroom accepts. Vide Āśvalāyana Gṛ. S. I. 6. 1 and I. 7. 3.
2 According to Manu 10. 75 and 77, acceptance of a gift, teaching of the Vedas and
officiating as priests in a sacrifice were the peculiar privileges of brāhmaṇas alone.
3 The texts on adoption speak of the gift of a son e. g. (Manu 9. 168 'whom the
mother or father gives with water &c.). A kṣatriya can adopt only a kṣatriya according to
the text of Yāj. (II. 133). But a kṣatriya cannot accept a gift. Therefore when it is said
that a kṣatriya boy is to be given and accepted by a kṣatriya the word 'acceptance' cannot
apply in the case of kṣatriya in its primary sense, but only in a figurative sense. The texts
that enjoin adoption (like Manu's) are applicable to all castes. Therefore it will have to be
said that the same word for acceptance is used in two senses in the sentence, in the primary
sense when applying to brāhmaṇas and in a figurative sense when applying to kṣatriyas.
But this is not a legitimate method, since the Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra (I. 3. 23, I. 4. 8 and
III. 2. 1) says that in one vidhi text, the same word cannot be used in two senses.
Hence it follows that the word acceptance is used in a figurative sense (in adoption) as
regards brāhmaṇas as well as kṣatriyas. Vide notes to V. M. pp. 129--130. There are three
vṛttis (functions) of a word, abhidhā (primary), lakṣaṇā (secondary sense), vyañjanā
(suggestive sense).