व्यवहारमयूख (नीलकण्ठ भट्ट - पश्चिमी भारत की हिन्दू न्याय-संहिता एवं व्यवहार कोष)

§ IV. 1 3-4 ] DETERMINATION OF HERITAGE 79
M. p 32 l. 25-p 33 l 20 ]
"It cannot be said that this (text) conveys that the cause of the pro-
duction of ownership is the death of the grandfather and not the birth of the
son,¹ since (if that view were accepted) there would arise the unacceptable
result that a grandson not born at the death (of the grandfather) would
have no ownership (in what was his grandfather's property) Really speak-
ing, the word pitāmaha (in Yājñavalkya's text 'bhūryā pitāmahopāttā) is
not intended (to be taken literally), because otherwise it would follow that
there is absence of equal ownership (in father and son) in what is ac-
quired by the great-grand-father or the like, and because it (the word pitā-
maha) is an attribute of the anuvādya² (the subject) As to the text
of Devala.³
When the father is dead, the sons should divide their father's wealth, for
as long as the father who is free from any defect (bodily or mental)
lives, there is absence of ownership in them
The first half (of this verse) only enjoins the time of partition, as the
potential termination is found (in the word vibhajeyuh), while the latter
half only commends the time (of partition laid down) and indicates that the
sons are dependent, but is not to be construed as laying down absence of
ownership (in them during the father's lifetime⁴). This (interpretation)
explains the text of Śaṅkha also viz. 'while the father is alive, the sons
should not divide the riktha and also whatever might have been acquired by
them after (they were born), sons are not entitled (to separate in the father's
lifetime), as they are not independent (of him) in matters of wealth and the
1 This is directed against those who, like Jīmūtavāhana, hold that ownership even
in ancestral property arises not by birth but on the death of the previous owner. Vide notes
to V. M. p 121.
2 The word anuvādya means 'subject', about which something is to be enjoined and
is contra-distinguished from vidheya (predicate or what is to be enjoined) In the text of
Yājñavalkya what is to be enjoined is equal ownership of father and son The subject (anu-
vādya) of which this is enjoined is bhū (land). Pitāmahopāttā is only an attribute of the
subject bhū and forms no part of what is enjoined with reference to bhū Hence it is not to
be taken literally, but only illustratively So nothing turns on the mention of pitāmaha
(which stands for 'ancestor') and that passage says nothing about the death of the pitāmaha.
Vide notes pp 121--122 to V. M for further explanation and the two other ways in which
Yājñavalkya's verse is explained in the Dāyabhāga.
3. This text of Devala is a sheet anchor of the Dāyabhāga theory.
4. The potential is used in laying down vidhis. In the word vibhajeyuh (should
divide) we have the potential termination and so that portion enjoins a rule. What follows
gives the reason and so is a mere arthavāda and not to be taken literally. Vide Jaimini
I. 2 26--30 (hetuvan--nigadādhikaraṇa) Arthavāda only expatiates upon or recommends
a vidhi Nīlakaṇṭha draws a distinction between svatva (ownership) and svātantrya (abso-
lute power of disposal). A woman owns her strīdhana, she has no svātantrya over it (exce-
pting saudāyika) during her husband's life-time.

• P. 90 (text).