वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

22 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 2.
ADH. 2.]
his own stage of life, who is truthful and so on, whose mind has become
purified by the performance of duties in a disinterested spirit and who
has come into contact with a knower of truth, should then commence
an enquiry into Brahman, for then he is convinced that the fruits of
works undertaken with selfish ends in view are but transitory, while
Brahman alone is the cause of eternal happiness.¹
Thus, the five pre-requisites to the enquiry into Brahman are:—
(1) Study of the Veda (2) Proper performance of the duties incum-
bent on one's own stage of life. (3) Purification of the mind by such
performance of works in a disinterested spirit. (4) Association with
the good and the holy (5) The consequent acquirement of the faculty
of discriminating between the permanent and the non-permanent,
disgust for non-permanent worldly objects and desire to know the
permanent in details
All the commentators agree in holding that the word "ataḥ"
means 'because the fruits of Karmas are transitory, while the know-
ledge of Brahman alone leads to eternal bliss'.
Adhikarana 2: The section entitled 'The Origin'.
(Sūtra 2)
SŪTRA 2
"(BRAHMAN IS THAT) FROM WHOM (ARISE) THE ORIGIN AND THE
REST OF THIS (WORLD)."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Now, with regard to the characteristics of Brahman, the author
states the correct conclusion:
That very Lord—the substratum of infinite attributes like
omniscience, etc. and the ruler of Brahmā, Śiva time and the rest,—
from whom arise the origination, subsistence and dissolution "of this",
i.e. of the universe,—endowed with manifold combinations, the
abode of innumerable peculiarities of names and forms and the like;
and the form of which is inconceivable,—is Brahman, the object of
the above statement (viz. Sū. 1.1.1)—this is the meaning of the
characterizing text.
¹ Op. cit., pp. 19-20, chap. 1.

[sū. 1. 1. 2.
ADH. 2 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 23
Vedānta-kaustubha
Brahman, called Lord Kṛṣṇa, great in qualities, powers and nature,
has been established in the previous section. Now, with reference to
the enquiry: What are His characteristics?—the same Being (viz.
Brahman) is being demonstrated, as having the qualities of 'being
the agent of the origin and the rest of the world', 'being omniscient',
'being true' and so on.
Here the words "of this" denote the effect, viz. the world; and
the words "from whom" denote the cause. The word 'Brahman'
is to be supplied here from the previous aphorism. And, there being
an universal correlation between the terms 'yat' and 'tat', the term
'tat' too must be supplied here.¹
(Next the compound "janmādi" is explained—) 'That of
which "origin" is the beginning'—is "janmādi", i.e. creation, sub-
sistence, dissolution and salvation. This is a Bahuvrīhi compound
of the tad-guṇa-saṃjñāna type.²
That "from whom",—i.e. the Lord, the Highest Person, the
Lord of all, omniscient, omnipotent, the supreme cause and the ruler
of all,—arise the origination, subsistence, dissolution, and salvation
"of this", i.e. of the world, which is manifested by names and forms
connected with enjoyers (viz. the souls) divided variously; which is the
constant abode of the enjoying of place, time and fruits; and the
composition of which is beyond the grasp of reasoning—is Brahman.
He alone is to be enquired into by those who desire for salvation,—
this is the construction of the words in the aphorism.
¹ Thus the construction of the sūtra is:—'Janmādy asya yataḥ Brahmaṇaḥ
tataḥ'.
² There are two kinds of Bahuvrīhi, viz. tad-guṇa-saṃjñāna and atad-guṇa-
saṃjñāna. In the former case, the compounds, the noun (viśeṣya) has direct
connection with and implies the words compounded (viśeṣaṇas), e.g. when it is said
'Bring the man with long ears' (Lamba-karṇaṃ ānaya), the bringing of the man
implies the bringing of his attribute, viz the ears, as well and the man (viśeṣya)
and his ears (viśeṣaṇas) are directly connected. In the latter case, there is no
such direct connection between the compound and the words compounded, e g
when it is said 'Bring the man who has seen the sea' (Dṛṣṭa-sāgaraṃ ānaya),
the bringing of the man does not imply the bringing of his attribute, viz the sea,
and there is no direct connection between the two.
Now, 'Janmādi' is a Bahuvrīhi of the first kind and hence it includes in
its meaning 'janma' too.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 2.
24 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 2.]
There are scriptural texts to this effect,—beginning:—'Bhrgu,
the son of Varuna approached his father, (with the request) "Sir,
teach me Brahman"' (Tait. 3 1), and continuing:—' "From, whom,
verily, all these beings arise, by whom they, so born, live and to whom
they go forth and enter,—enquire into that, that is Brahman" '
(Tait 3.1), 'Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite' (Tait. 2.1)
and so on. (The meaning of the first of the above two texts is:—)
'From whom', i.e from Lord Purusottama, 'all these beings', i.e all
objects from the mahat down to a tuft of grass, 'arise',—hereby the
origination (of the world from the Lord) is indicated. 'By whom, they,
so born, live',—hereby the subsistence (of the world in Brahman) is
indicated. 'They enter',—hereby the dissolution (of the world into
the Lord) is shown. 'To whom they go forth',—meaning—'whom
they attain after the destruction of all karmas',—hereby salvation
(of the souls) is indicated. Here 'origination' means the expansion
of the manifold consciousness of the sentient being, due to its connec-
tion with a body and the rest; and 'dissolution' means its entrance
into the Cause (viz Brahman), resulting from the contraction of its
consciousness. This will be made clear under the explanations of the
two aphorisms, viz. 'Dependent on the movable and the immovable'
(Br. Sū. 2.3.16) and so on. The distinction (between the sentient
and the non-sentient) is that the non-sentient is more primary, having
a different form at the beginning of creation ¹
The meaning of the second text, on the other hand, is that
Brahman possesses the attributes of truth, knowledge and infinitude.
Here, the word 'truth' distinguishes the Lord from what is not true,
the word 'knowledge' from the group of the non-sentient, and the
word 'infinite' from the group of the sentient
And, thus it is established that the characteristic mark of Brahman
is that He, being the one non-distinct material and efficient cause of
the universe, is possessed of truth and the rest He is the material
cause ² in the sense of being the manifestor, in a gross form, of His own
¹ That is, the non-sentient is more primary than the sentient in the sense
that it is prior to the sentient in point of time. Right in the beginning of
creation, the individual soul does not exist, in the sense that there is nobody
with which it may be connected, but pradhāna does, though not in the form
of particular non-sentient substances like stones and houses, etc., and the
body comes to be evolved later on. Cf Sāṁkhya theory of evolution.
² Upādānatva.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 2.
ADH 2.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 25
natural powers, denoted by the terms ‘higher’, ‘lower’ and so on,
and reduced to a subtle state, as well as of the effects, existent and
inherent in them respectively. He is the efficient cause ¹ in the sense
of bringing about a union of the sentient beings,—whose attribute of
knowledge is in a state of absolute contraction being under the in-
fluence of the past impressions of their own karmas which are begin-
ningless, and is, thereby, unfit for bringing about the recollection
(in their minds) of the retributive experiences (to be undergone in the
present birth),—with their respective karmas, and the respective
instruments for experiencing them, through manifesting (in them)
knowledge, enabling them to experience the fruits of karmas ²
There is a Smṛti passage too, conformable to the text dealing
with the topic in hand, (i e. the above Taittirīya text, 3.1) in the
Mokṣa-dharma ³ It begins. ‘The Scripture which was mentioned
by Bhṛgu to Bhāradvāja, who asked’ (Mahā. 12.6769b ⁴), and con-
tinues. ‘“He, verily, is the Lord Viṣṇu, celebrated to be infinite,
abiding as the inner Soul of all beings, and difficult to be known by
those who have not obtained the self, who is the creator of the principle
of egoity for the production of all beings, from whom arose the universe,
about whom I have been asked by you here”’ (Mahā 12.6784b–
6786a ⁵).
¹ Nimittatva.
² The Lord is the material cause of the universe in the sense that creation
means the manifestation of His subtle powers of the sentient and the non-
sentient into gross effects That is, during dissolution, the entire universe of
the sentient and the non-sentient merges in the Lord and exists in Him in a
subtle state as His natural powers. Then, in the beginning of a new creation,
the Lord manifests these powers of the sentient and the non-sentient (cit-
śakti and acit-śakti), developing them into grosser effects and producing, thereby,
the universe of names and forms.
And the Lord is the efficient cause of the universe in the sense that He
unites individual souls with their respective karmas, the results of these karmas,
and the instruments for experiencing them—that is, the Lord is the efficient
cause in the sense that He regulates the destinies of individual souls in
accordance with strict justice. During dissolution, the beginningless im-
pressions of past karmas get dimmed and confused; and at the time of a new
creation, the Lord revives these impressions in particular individuals, thereby
making each individual undergo the fruits of his past works Vide V.R M., p. 63.
³ ‘Mokṣa-dharma’ is the name of a section of the twelfth book of the
Mahā-bhārata, from adhyāya 174 to the end.
⁴ P. 604, line 7, vol. 3. ⁵ Op. cit., lines 22–24.

26 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 2.
ADH. 2.]
If it be objected:—'In the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, a multitude of
causes is spoken of in the passage: 'Time, nature, destiny, accident,
elements and the Person should be known as the Cause' (Śvet. 1.2),
so what authority is there for separating specifically Vāsudeva, the
Highest Person alone as the cause of the world?—(then we reply:)
Listen. A multitude of scriptural and Smṛti passages is our authority
for specifying the cause of the world. Compare the following:—
'He, the One, who governs all these causes, connected with time and
soul' (Śvet. 1.3), 'He who is a knower, the Time of time, possessed
of attributes, omniscient' (Śvet. 6.2), 'Of whom there is neither
a creator, nor a lord' (Śvet. 6.9), 'Verily, Nārāyaṇa was One'
(Mahā. Up. 1.2), 'Then there was Viṣṇu, Hari alone, without parts',
'From Nārāyaṇa is born Brahmā, from Nārāyaṇa is born Rudra'
(Nār. 1), 'From the forehead of this being, wrapt up within himself
in meditation, was born the Person, with three-eyes, trident in hand'
(Mahā. Up. 1.7), 'Kṛṣṇa, the One, the ruler, moving everywhere,
is an object of worship, He who, though one, yet appears as many'.
'"Ka' is the name of Brahman, I am the 'Īśa', i.e. the Lord, of all
beings. We two have sprung up from your body, hence you have
the name 'Keśava'", 'I, Brahmā, the primary Lord of people, am
born from Him, and you have sprung up from me', 'Kṛṣṇa alone is
the source of the worlds, and of their dissolution too', 'Being created
by Kṛṣṇa the universe consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient
has originated'. 'In the Veda, and in Rāmāyaṇa, verily, in the
Bhārata and in the Pañca-rātra, Hari is celebrated everywhere, in
the beginning, in the end, and in the middle' (Hari V. 16232 ¹).
'"I am the origin of the entire world, dissolution similarly"' (Gītā
7.6), '"There is nothing else higher than me, O Dhanañjaya"' (Gītā
7.7), '"I am the source of everything, everything originates from me"'
(Gītā 10.8) and so on. The terms 'Hiraṇyagarbha' and the rest,
which we find sometimes in certain texts concerning the origin and so
on of the world, should be known to be referring to Brahman. Hence
it is established that Lord Kṛṣṇa, the Soul of all, the Lord of all, the
one topic of all the Vedas, is the cause of the world.
Here ends the section entitled 'The Origin' (2).
1 P. 1002, vol 4.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 3.
ADH. 3] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 27
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara
Reading and interpretation same. Of course, consistently with
his doctrine, Śaṃkara must hold that here the term 'Brahman'
denotes 'Īśvara' or the lower Brahman.
Adhikaraṇa 3. The section entitled 'That
which has Scripture for its source'. (Sūtra
3)
SŪTRA 3
“BECAUSE (BRAHMAN HAS) SCRIPTURE FOR HIS SOURCE.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
With reference to the enquiry: What is the proof of His existence?
The author states the correct conclusion:—
Of Whom “Scripture” alone is “the source”, i.e. the cause of
knowing,¹—that very reality, characterized as having the stated marks,
is denoted by the term ‘Brahman’.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Thus, it has been pointed out by the aphorism concerning enquiry²
that Brahman is the object to be enquired into, and it has been
pointed out by the aphorism concerning characteristic mark³ that
the characteristic mark of Brahman is to be the cause of the origin
and the rest of the world and possess truth, etc. Now, with reference
to the enquiry: What is the proof with regard to Him—the proof is
being stated.
On the doubt, viz. whether Brahman, having the stated marks,
is to be arrived at through inference, or has the Veda alone for His
proof,—the prima facie view being that He is to be arrived at through
inference, since we know from the scriptural text: ‘From whom
speech turns back’ (Tait. 2.4, 2 9) that Brahman cannot be known
through speech (i.e. texts),—
¹ This explains the compound ‘śāstra-yoni’.
² Viz. Br. Sū. 1.1.1. ³ Viz. Br. Sū. 1.1.2.

28 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 1. 1. 3.
ADH. 3.]
(We reply) Brahman cannot be arrived at through inference,
but has the Veda for His proof. Why? "Because (Brahman has)
Scripture for His source". That means "Scripture", i.e. the Veda,
is the "source", i.e. the cause, the informant, the proof, with regard
to whom,—that object is "Śāstra-yoni"; and "Śāstra-yonitva" is
the state of being "Śāstra-yoni"—on account of that, i e. on account
of having Scripture for His proof 1 The correct conclusion is that
Brahman has the Veda alone for His proof.
If it be said. For the sake of simplicity, it is well-said that Brahman
has Scripture for His source, and thus to say that Brahman has
Scripture for His source, i e. has the Veda for its proof, serves our
purpose, (i e. is not in conflict with our view),—(we reply.) No,
Brahman cannot be arrived at through inference, because the phrase :
"Because (He has) Scripture for (His) source" indicates a reason
which excludes any other proof except Scripture.
If it be said: How is it known that He cannot be arrived at through
inference?—(we reply) There has been some room for the suspicion
that Brahman can be arrived at through inference, since the middle
term (or the reason), viz. 'the state of being an effect' 2, stated above,
proves the world to be due to a creator.3 With a view to removing
it, that significant word 4 is used here (in this sūtra), in accordance
with the following scriptural texts.—Viz. : 'The word which all the
Vedas declare' (Kaṭha 2 15), 'That with regard to which all the
Vedas become one' (Tait. Ār. 3 11 1 5), '"I ask you about Brahman,
set forth in the Upaniṣads"' (Bṛh. 3 9.26 6), 'He who does not know
the Veda, does not know Him, the great' (Tait Br. 3.12.9 7 7) and
so on, and the following Smṛti passages: '"By all the Vedas, I alone
am to be known"' (Gītā 15 15), '"In the Veda, in the Rāmāyaṇa,
1 This explains the compound 'śāstra-yonitvāt'.
2 Kāryyatva.
3 That is, it has been laid down in Sūtra 1.1 2 that the world is an effect.
This suggests the inference :—Whatever is an effect has a creator.
The world is an effect.
∴ the world has a creator (viz. Brahman).
This suggestion is negatived by Sūtra 1.1.3, which explicitly says that the
Brahman has Scripture alone for His proof, and never inference.
4 Viz. 'śāstra-yoni'
5 P. 19. Reading 'yatrarkam'.
6 Correct reading : 'pṛcchāmi'.
7 P. 202, vol. 3.

[sū. 1. 1. 3.
ADH 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 29
verily, in the Bhārata and in the Pañca-rātra, Hari is celebrated
everywhere, in the beginning, in the end and in the middle' " (Hariv
16232 ¹), 'We bow down to that wherein lies the eternal basis of all
speech' and so on.
If it be said. On the ground of the inference: 'All objects having
parts, like the earth and the rest, have a cause, because they are
effects, like pots and the rest', Brahman is established to be the cause
of the world, since none else can be such a cause, and this being so,
why trouble about the Veda?-(we reply·) no, because, the very fact
that the elements like the ether and the rest have an origin being not
known by anyone without the Veda, that they are effects is not estab-
lished, and hence the reason ² is itself unestablished.³
It cannot be said also that the origin of the elements is to be known
through the Veda, and the fact that they are effects being proved
through this, the reason ⁴ is not unestablished—, for, in that case too,
Brahman, the cause of the world being known through the Veda
alone, the inference becomes futile, and you virtually come to our
side. Thus, even in the case of well-known effects like a house or a
shoot, Brahman cannot be inferred from the reason 'producibleness',
it being possible to suppose the earth, the seed, water, men and so on
to be their causes, and unreasonable to imagine an unseen cause
(viz. Brahman).
This should be understood here: wherever something is found to
be an effect, there it is possible also to arrive, by means of inference, at
an individual soul, corresponding to effect, as the agent. But that
the entire universe is an effect is not known without the help of the
Veda. Hence, the creator of the world, too, can be known through
the Veda alone, and never through a thousand inferences. Further,
Brahman cannot be known through the evidence of perception, since
the ordinary sense-organs are incapable of grasping Him, as declared
―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――
¹ P. 1002.
² Viz Kāryyatva or state of being an effect
³ That is, it has been argued .—
Whatever is an effect has a cause.
The world is an effect.
∴ the world has a cause
Now, we cannot know that the world is an effect, unless we have recourse
to Scripture, and hence Scripture is needed even here too.
⁴ Viz. Kāryyatva or producibleness.

30 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 3.
ADH. 3.]
by the scriptural texts: 'Not the sense-organs, nor inference,' ' "This
knowledge is not attainable through inference, dearest!¹ It leads to
proper knowledge only being told by another" ' (Kaṭha 2 9). That
is, 'Dearest!' 'this knowledge' concerning Brahman, is not to be
overthrown by reason, or, is not capable of being attained thereby.
'Told' by 'another', i.e by an omniscient teacher who is versed in the
Veda, it leads to right knowledge, as declared by the aphorism 'On
account of reasoning having no ground' (Br Sū. 2 1.11); by the
Manu Smṛti: 'One should not apply reasoning to those conceptions
which are verily inconceivable'; and by the Mahā-bhārata: 'One
should not arrive at those conceptions which are verily inconceivable
through reasoning. There can be no ascertainment of any deep
meaning through reasoning which is without a basis'. Moreover,
who but a mad man should say that Brahman, the cause of the world,
who is not known entirely and in every way even by omniscient
mantras and sages, who is difficult to be understood and who is
possessed of infinite inconceivable qualities and powers, can be known
through inference.
It is not to be apprehended: what then will become of such
texts as: 'From whom speech turns back' (Tait. 2.4; 2.9) and so
on?—for the meaning of these is that Brahman is not limited as
being so much. This the author will state under the aphorism:
'For the so-muchness of the topic mentioned' and so on (Br. Sū.
3.2.22).
(An alternative explanation of the sūtra:) If the compound
"Śāstra-yoni" be disjoined as: 'The source of Scripture', then, too,
the very same meaning is arrived at.¹ The resulting meaning is that
Brahman can be known through the Vedas alone,—breathed forth
by Him, the omniscient, and (as such) standing in an intimate and
internal relation with Him,—and not through any external inference
and the rest, imagined by others. In that case, (i.e. on the second
interpretation), the topic of this aphorism will be the scriptural text,
viz. 'Breathed forth by this Great Being is the Ṛg-veda, the Yajur-
veda and the Sāma-veda' (Bṛh. 2.4.10; Maitrī. 6 32). And, on this
interpretation, the eternity of the Vedas are not negatived, for what
we admit is the issuing forth only (and not new creation) of what is
eternally established, in accordance with the following scriptural
¹ Cf. Ś B. 1.1.3.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 4.
ADH 4 ] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 31
and Smṛti passages, viz : 'By means of speech, which is devoid of
form and eternal' (Ṛg. V 8.75.6 ¹, Tait Sam. 2 6 11 2 ²), 'Speech,
without beginning and end, eternal, consisting of the Veda and celestial,
was created by the Self-born in the beginning, whence proceeded all
activities' (Mahā. 12 8534 ³). Hereby, the eternal and non-derived
form of Brahman is indicated, since the Veda, which is prior to all
derivative creation, was breathed forth by Him ⁴ This we shall
explain later on.⁵ Hence, it is established that Brahman has the
Veda as His sole proof.
Here ends the section entitled 'That which has Scripture for its
source' (3)
Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled 'Concord-
ance'. (Sūtra 4)
SŪTRA 4
"BUT THAT (VIZ. THAT BRAHMAN HAS SCRIPTURE AS HIS SOLE
PROOF) FOLLOWS FROM THE CONCORDANCE (OF ALL SCRIPTURAL
TEXTS WITH REGARD TO BRAHMAN)"
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If an objection be raised, viz.: In as much as the entire Veda is
concerned with action (i.e. injunctions and prohibitions), the Vedānta-
texts too, which are concerned with a different topic, are solely
concerned with injunctions by way of establishing the excellence of
the agent, who is a part of sacrifices,—just as the artha-vāda texts ⁶
are indirectly unanimous with the injunctive-texts, by way of estab-
lishing their excellence. Hence, how can Brahman have Scripture
as His sole proof ? ⁷—the correct conclusion is as follows:
¹ P 162. ² P. 241, vol 1.
³ P. 666, line 22, vol. 3
⁴ That is, if Brahman were to breathe forth the Vedas, He must have a
body (nose, etc.), but this body is not evidently composed of matter, but is
non-material, since when He breathes forth the Vedas, there is no matter.
⁵ See V.K 1.3 28–30.
⁶ An artha-vāda is the explanation of the meaning of a precept, or eulogism.
⁷ The sense of the objection is: All Vedas set forth injunctions or prohibitions
with regard to action But besides the texts which directly or explicitly set
forth the above, there are in the Vedas some texts which are merely indicative,

[sū. 1. 1. 4
32 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 4.]
‘That’, ie Brahman alone, the object of enquiry and the
cause of the universe, has Scripture for His proof, and not action and
the rest, since the entire Veda is in concordance in proving Him
alone. (The word) “samanvayāt ” is to be explained thus. “Sama-
nvaya” means concordance in respect of the primary import,—on
account of that—“samanvayāt” Or else, because there is concord-
ance among the Vedas in point of proving Him alone,—so much in
brief
It cannot be said that such a concordance exists with regard to
actions, since actions fulfil their purpose by simply giving rise to a
desire for knowledge ¹ To say that Brahman is a subsidiary factor
of sacrifices is a mere childish prattle, since He is an independent
Being as the regulator of all works, their agents and so on, and their
instruments, and is the giver of fruits. On the contrary, works
themselves are in concordance (with regard to Brahman) as assisting
indirectly the rise of knowledge—which is a means to attaining Him,—
by way of generating a desire for knowledge ² This is ascertained from
the text concerning the desire for knowledge.³
If it be objected: It being established in Scripture that Brahman
is not an object of the proof, viz. Word, just as He is not an object of
the proofs, viz. perception and the rest,—Brahman has not Scripture
as His sole proof,—we reply: Brahman, the object of enquiry, has
Scripture alone as His proof and not anything else, on account of the
concordance of all the scriptural texts, directly or indirectly, with
regard to Him alone. Among these, there is a direct concordance
among the texts concerning His characteristic marks, proof and the

and not injunctive. And, these latter kind of texts are to be explained, not
literally, but as eulogising the direct injunctive texts and thereby indirectly
forming a part of injunctions, etc., otherwise the integrity of the Vedas cannot
be maintained. Hence, the Vedānta-texts too must be taken as not establishing
Brahman, but as simply extolling the sacrificer by identifying him with the
Supreme Soul and so on, and as such really concerned with sacrificial acts.
¹ That is, the proper function of karmas is simply to purify the mind, and
thereby create a desire for knowledge. Karma, thus, is a means and not an end,
the way to truth and not truth itself Hence the Vedānta-texts, dealing as they
do, with the Supreme Truth, cannot be concerned with mere karmas. Vide
V.P.S. 3.4.26.
² I e. knowledge is not an aṅga of karma, on the contrary, karma is an
aṅga of knowledge. Vide V.P.S. 3.4.8.
³ Viz Bṛh. 4.4.22.

[sū. 1. 1. 4.
ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 33
rest, since they are (directly) concerned with Him; and there is an
indirect concordance among the texts concerning the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā,¹
the Pañcāgni-vidyā,² the Madhu-vidyā ³ and so on, as well as among
those which are symbolic in nature.⁴ Or rather, there is a direct
concordance alone among all the texts whatsoever, though leading to
different procedures,⁵ since the topics of all these different texts being
equally Brahman in essence, they are all to be understood in their
primary and literal sense.⁶ It is not to be feared that in that case,
the texts which are concerned with the denial of the object (viz.
Brahman) will be precluded,⁷ since they too, as being concerned with
denying any limit with regard to Brahman's nature, attributes and the
rest, refer to the very same topic (viz Brahman).⁸
Moreover, we ask your Worship: Do you or do you not mean that
Brahman is the object of the statement: 'Brahman is not an object
of knowledge'? If the first, then Brahman is proved to be describable
and hence the proposition that He is not describable is set aside. If
the second, then Brahman is describable all the more. Hence, the
object of enquiry is Lord Vāsudeva alone, omniscient, possessed of all
inconceivable powers, the cause of the origin and the rest of the
universe, known through the evidence of the Veda alone, different
and non-different from all and the soul of all. All Scriptures are in
concordance with regard to Him alone—this is the settled conclusion of
the followers of the Upaniṣads (viz. the Vedāntins).
1 Vide Bṛh. 5.6.1, Chānd 3.14.1–4.
2 Vide Chānd. 5.5.4–10. Also V.K. 3.1 1.
3 Vide Bṛh. 2.5.1–19 (whole section), Chānd. 3.1–11.
4 Vide e g Brh. 5 7–9, etc.; Chānd 3 18–21, 7.1–12, etc.
5 The sense is that the various kinds of texts may impel a man to different
procedures. Some may lead a man to meditate on Brahman directly as the self,
others to meditate on Him as the sun and so on.
6 That is, even the texts concerning the various meditations and symbols,
are to be understood as directly referring to Brahman, i.e. to be interpreted
literally, and not as referring to Brahman indirectly, i.e. to be interpreted
figuratively, as suggested before. This modifies the statement made immediately
before that some texts are direct and primary, some indirect and secondary, and
takes all to be equally direct and primary.
7 Viz. 'Neti, neti' (Bṛh. 2.3.6) and so on.
8 That is, the view that all texts are concerned with Brahman directly in
no way precludes the negative texts, since these negative texts also are concerned
with Brahman equally.

34 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 1. 1. 4.
ADH. 4.]
Vedānta-kaustubha
Thus, it has been said that Lord Krsna, the substratum of great
qualities and powers and the non-distinct material and efficient cause
of the world, has the Veda alone for His proof. Now, with a view to
confirming it, the author, by showing the concordance of the entire
Veda with regard to that very Brahman, refutes the following objection,
viz.; The entire Veda has been associated with action by Jaimini who
holds: 'Since Scripture is concerned with action, there is purport-
lessness of what does not refer to it (viz. action)' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.2.1 ¹).
Hence, what is not concerned with action being laid down as purport-
less, the Vedānta-texts, too, all refer to action (otherwise they will all
become purportless). Consequently, how can Brahman have the Veda
as His sole proof?
The term "but" disposes of the (above) prima facie view. "That",
i e. Brahman alone, the object of enquiry and the cause of the world,
has Scripture for His sole proof. Why? "On account of concord-
ance", i.e. because there is concordance among all the Vedas with
regard to Him alone. (The word "samanvayāt" is to be explained
as follows:) "Samanvaya" means 'Concordance in point of entirety
of statement',—on account of that,—"samanvayāt", i.e. the entire
Veda is in concordance with regard to denoting Brahman entirely or
Lord Krsna, the object to be enquired into by one who desires salvation,
the one identical material and efficient cause of the world, having
Scripture as His source (i.e. proof), the controller of matter, soul, time
and works, having His footstool honoured by the crowns (i.e. the bowed
heads) of Brahmā, Rudra, Indra and the rest, having His greatness
untouched by any odour of fault, the abode of infinite qualties like
omniscience and the rest and to be approached by the freed. The
following groups of texts are in concordance with regard to Him
alone:—'From whom verily all these beings arise' (Tait. 3.1), 'From
bliss alone, verily, do these beings arise' (Tait. 3.6), 'From Him
arise the vital-breath, the mind, and all the sense-organs' (Muṇḍ.
2.1.3), '"The existent alone, my child, was this in the beginning,
One only, without a second"' (Chānd. 6.2.1). "He thought: May I
be many, may I procreate"' (Chānd. 6.2.3), 'From Nārāyaṇa arises
the vital-breath, . . . from Nārāyaṇa arises Brahmā, from

¹ P. 36, vol 1.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 4.
ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 35
Nārāyaṇa arises Rudra’ (Nār. 1), ‘There was verily, Nārāyaṇa
alone, neither Brahmā nor Īśāna (Mahā. Up. 1.2), ‘Brahman, verily,
was this in the beginning, one only’ (Bṛh. 1.4.10.11). ‘Brahman,
verily, was this in the beginning; he knew that self alone thus: “I am
Brahman”’, ‘From Him arose all this’, ‘The self, verily, was this
in the beginning, one only’ (Ait. 1.1.1), ‘From this self, verily, the
ether originated’ (Tait. 2 1), ‘The word which all the Vedas record’
(Kaṭha 2.15), ‘That, in regard to which all the Vedas are unanimous’
(Tait. Ār. 3.11.1 ¹), ‘Entered within, the ruler of man’ (Tait. Ār.
3.11.1.2 ²), ‘To whom all the gods bow down’, ‘Brahman is truth,
knowledge and infinite’ (Tait. 2 1), ‘Knowing the bliss of Brahman’
(Tait. 2 9), ‘Brahman is knowledge and bliss’ (Bṛh. 3 9 28), ‘All
this, verily, is Brahman’ (Chānd. 3.14.1), ‘The self that is free from
sins, without decay, without death, without grief, without hunger,
without thirst’ (Chānd. 8.7 1.3), ‘Who is omniscient, all-knowing’
(Muṇḍ. 1.1.9; 2.2.7), ‘The knower of Brahman attains the highest’
(Tait. 2.1), ‘Brahman, verily, is all this’ (Bṛh. 2.5.1–14, 14 times)
and so on.
(Prima facie view.)
An objection may be raised here:—The entire Veda is but a collec-
tion of five kinds of texts, called, injunction, prohibition, explanation
or eulogy, sacred formulæ and name.³ Of these, ‘One, who desires
heaven should perform the Jyotiṣṭoma ⁴ sacrifice’ and so on, are
injunctive texts. ‘A Brāhmaṇa should not be killed’ and so on, are
prohibitive texts. ‘The wind, verily, is the quickest deity’ (Tait.
Saṁ. 2.1.1 ⁵), and so on are explanations or eulogisms. ‘Oblation to
you’ (Tait. Saṁ. 1.1.1 ⁶), ‘O, heavens, having the fire as your head’
(Ṛg. V. 8.44.16a; ⁷ Śat. Br. 2.3.4.11a ⁸), and so on are sacred formulæ.
‘Jyotiṣṭoma’,⁹ ‘Aśva-medha’ ¹⁰ and the rest are names,—thus we
distinguish them. Thus, in the beginning, in the aphorism: ‘Then,
¹ P. 19. Reading: ‘Yatrārkaḥ’.
² P. 181.
³ Vidhi, niṣedha, artha-vāda, mantra, nāmadheya.
⁴ Name of a Soma-sacrifice, consisting divisions, Agniṣṭoma and the rest.
M.W., p. 427.
⁵ P. 125, lines 1-2, vol 1. ⁶ P. 1, line 1, vol. 1.
⁷ P. 132, line 7. ⁸ P. 163, line 16.
⁹ See footnote 4, above. ¹⁰ The horse-sacrifice.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 4.
36 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 4.]
therefore, an enquiry into religious duties' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.1.1 ¹), it is
said that the Veda has meaning as possessing the fruit to be attained
through the injunctions regarding conceptions which are instrumental
to the Vedic studies. In the second aphorism which is concerned
with mark, viz. 'A religious duty has injunction for its mark' (Pū.
Mī. Sū. 1.1 2 ²), it is established, on the ground of the vyāpti: 'What-
ever has the Veda for its proof, refers to action', that in the sphere
of religious duties, injunction is the authority ³ Here a doubt arises
as to whether the artha-vāda-texts like 'The wind is the swiftest
deity' (Tait. Sam. 2 1.1 ⁴) are authoritative in the sphere of religious
duties, or not With regard to it, the prima facie view is as follows:
We have a text: 'Since Scripture is concerned with action, there is
purportlessness of what does not refer to it (viz. action)' (Pū. Mī. Sū.
1.2.1 ⁵). (It means.)—'Scripture, i e. the Veda, is 'kriyārtha', i.e.
has 'action' alone as its 'purport', or subject-matter or topic,—for
this reason, the artha-vāda-texts are not authoritative. What then
are they?—anticipating this question, the text goes on to say that
'there is purportlessness of what does not refer to it', i e. let there be
simply 'purportlessness' or 'meaninglessness' of that which has not
'action' for its 'purport', viz. of artha-vāda and the rest, and in the
very same manner, of the Vedānta-texts as well. Even those (Ve-
dānta-) texts which comprise injunctions regarding study: viz. 'One's
own text should be studied', cannot be reasonably said to be autho-
ritative, since they are (really) concerned with Brahman, leading to
no fruit.⁶ (Here ends the prima facie view within the original prima
facie view.) With regard to this, we state the correct conclusion:
'Because of their unanimity with the injunctions, let (them be
authoritative) through having the glorification of injunctions as their

¹ P. 1, vol. 1.
² P. 3, vol. 1.
³ That is, the inference is as follows:—
Whatever has the Veda for its proof, refers to action.
A religious duty has the Veda for its proof.
∴ a religious duty refers to action, i.e. is concerned with injunctions and
prohibitions.
⁴ P. 125, lines 1-2, vol. 1. ⁵ P. 39, vol. 1.
⁶ That is, there are some Vedānta-texts, which do refer to action, i.e. to
injunction, yet they are not to be taken as authoritative, since they really refer
to Brahman who is outside the sphere of actions and fruits.

[sū. 1. 1. 4.
ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 37
purport’ (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.2 7¹). That is, since the artha-vādas are
unanimous with the injunctive texts, let them be authoritative
‘through having glorification as their purport’, i.e. by way of glorifying
the matters to be enjoined. Similarly, in order to prevent the absolute
purportlessness of the Vedānta-texts which are wanting in injunction
and prohibition and teach an accomplished object (viz. Brahman), it
is reasonable to take them too as indirectly connected with action,—
which is something to be accomplished,—as included under the
very mantras and artha-vādas, since they (viz. the Vedānta-texts)
admit injunctions regarding the study of the Veda. But if they be
taken to be independent (of action) they would lead to no fruit, and
hence they must be understood to have fulfilled their purpose through
establishing the agent, who is a part of a sacrifice (and not to be
independent of action). Among these, the texts concerning the
‘that’ (viz. Brahman) and ‘thou’ (viz. the individual soul)² glorify
the deity and the agent of the sacrificial act, and the knowledge
concerning it (viz. the ‘that’) called the ‘higher knowledge’,³ glorify
the fruit. (Thus, we conclude :) The Vedānta-texts are not concerned
with Brahman, but are like the artha-vāda-texts, since they are con-
cerned with proclaiming the excellence of the agent, who is a subordi-
nate factor in a sacrifice. (Here ends the original prima facie view.⁴)
(Author’s conclusion.)
To this we reply:⁵ No, because this is a mere imagination, in-
vented by you; and because (on the contrary), works, being generative
of knowledge which is a means to salvation, indirectly refer to Brahman
alone, as declared by the scriptural text:—‘The Brāhmaṇas desire
to know this self through the study of the Veda, through sacrifice,
through penance, through fasting’ (Bṛh. 4.4.22). Here, if in the
statement ‘They desire to know through sacrifice’, there be a direct
connection of the instrument, viz. ‘sacrifice’, with the meaning of the
root,⁶ as in the sentence ‘He desires to go by the horse’, then the
sacrificial act should be known to be serving the purpose of knowledge
(i.e. helping the rise of knowledge), and thereby referring to Brahman.

¹ P. 42, vol. 1.
² Cf the famous text ‘Thou art that’ (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc)
³ Vide e.g. Mund 1.1 4-5.
⁴ It began on p. 35.
⁵ The correct conclusion begins here ⁶ Viz. ‘vid’=to know.

[sū. 1. 1. 4.
38 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 4.]
If, on the other hand, owing to the primacy of the desiderative suffix,¹
there be a connection with the meaning of the suffix, it should be known
to be serving the purpose of desire, (i.e. helping the rise of a desire
for knowledge), to be a subordinate factor of knowledge through
that desire and to be referring to Brahman thereby. And, the fact
that action is a part of knowledge will be stated under the aphorism
'And, there is dependence on all, on account of the text concerning
sacrifice, as in the case of a horse' (Br. Sū. 3.4.26).
It cannot be said, also, that the reality to be known from the
Vedānta (viz. Brahman) is a subordinate factor of sacrifices,—since
He is self-dependent as the controller of all works, their agents and
their instruments. Nor can it be said that the Vedānta-texts are
subsidiary parts of injunctions like the artha-vādas, since the former
have been referred to in a different context and are not in proximity to
injunctions. Nor can it be said that the Vedānta-texts lead to no fruit,
teaching, as they do, something which is neither an injunction nor a
prohibition,—since the knowledge of Brahman, who is to be known
from the Vedānta, leads to a supremely excellent fruit, viz. salvation.
If it be said: As we read in texts like 'Undecaying, verily, is the
good deed of one who performs the Cātur-māsya ² sacrifice' (Āp.
Ś.Ś. 8.1.1.1 ³) that works too have the same fruit like it (viz. knowledge),
so there is nothing objectionable (in taking the scriptural texts) to be
referring to works,—
(We reply :) No, because the scriptural text: 'Just, as here, the
world gained through work perishes, so exactly does hereafter the
world gained through merit perish' (Chānd. 8.1.6 ⁴) is of a greater
force; is in conformity with the inference, viz. 'The world gained
through mere work is non-permanent, because it is gained through
work alone, as in the case of tilling and the rest'; and is confirmed by
another scriptural text as well, viz. 'Frail, indeed, are these boats
of sacrifices' (Muṇḍ. 1.2.7); because the text: 'Undecaying, verily'
(Āp. Ś.Ś. 8.1.1) and so on is a weaker one, and because it is improper
to (take the scriptural texts) to be referring to works, which form
the object of such texts wanting in force. On the other hand, the

¹ Viz. 'san', implying 'desire'.
² See footnote 2, p. 5 ³ P. 1, vol. 1.
⁴ Correct quotation: 'Karma-cita' and not 'karma-jita', which is translated
here. Vide Chānd. 8 1.6, p. 415.

[Sū. 1. 1. 4.
ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 39
texts: ‘Those who know this, become immortal’ (Bṛh. 4.4 14; Kaṭha
6.2.9; Śvet. 3.1.10 13, 4.17.20), ‘The knower of Brahman attains the
highest’ (Tait 2.1), are not contradicted by any scriptural text, and
cannot be set aside by a thousand inferences. Further, the text:
‘Undecaying, indeed’ and so on (Āp. Ś.Ś. 8.1.1) is not really set
aside, since it refers to the relative (permanence of works) ¹, and since
the holy Bhāgavata-smṛti (i.e. the Bhāgavad-gītā), which is a version
of the Veda, is the authority in both the cases (viz. regarding the non-
permanence of karma, and the permanence of Brahman) thus:—
‘“The worlds, beginning from the world of Brahman, come and go,
O Arjuna! But, on attaining me, O Son of Kuntī! there is no re-birth”’
(Gītā 8.16).
If it be objected: It may be that the Upaniṣadic portion is somehow
or other concerned with Brahman, since we see it to be so. But the
prior portion (viz. the Karma-kāṇḍa) is known from the texts: ‘He
performs the Agnihotra ² as long as he lives’, ‘One who desires
heaven should perform the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice’ (Āp. Ś.Ś. 10.2.1)
and so on, to fulfil its purpose by enjoining obligatory and optional
works and the rest; and hence how can they be concerned with
Brahman?—
(We reply:) Not so. The entire Veda is concerned only with
Brahman, and although some part of it is found to refer to action
somehow, its complete concordance is found in Brahman alone.
Among these the Upaniṣadic portion refers directly to Brahman,
directly concerned, as it is, with demonstrating His nature, attributes
and the rest. Among these, again, the statements of difference refer
to Brahman by way of being concerned with the nature of the sentient,
the non-sentient and Brahman; the statements of non-difference, by
being concerned with proving that everything has Brahman for its
essence; the statements of creation and the rest, by being concerned
with proving attributes like creatorship and the rest; the statements
that Brahman is non-qualified, by being concerned with the denial
of the qualities due to māyā; the statements that Brahman is qualified,
by being concerned with proving the natural qualities of the Lord;
¹ That is, this text simply shows that the deeds of one who performs the
Cātur-māsya sacrifice are relatively more permanent than the deeds of one who
does not, and not that they are absolutely permanent.
² Sacrificing to Agni. Cf. Athar. V. 6.97.1, p. 130.

[SŪ. 1. 1. 4.
40 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 4.]
and the statements like: 'That which is not manifested through
speech' (Kena 1.4), by being concerned with proving that Brahman
is not limited by so-muchness.
The texts, concerned with the daily and occasional duties,¹ too,
refer to Brahman alone, by way of effecting the purification of the
nature of the person entitled (to the study of Brahman) and being
thereby co-operative towards the rise of knowledge and so on concern-
ing Brahman, while (the texts) concerned with the optional duties,²
by way of being an atomic bit of the bliss of Brahman, since the text:
'Other beings subsist on a portion only of His bliss alone' (Bṛh
4.3.32) declares even worldly pleasure to be an atomic portion of the
bliss of Brahman. Moreover, the optional duties are in concordance
(with regard to Brahman), since they are concerned with the knowledge
of Brahman by way of giving rise to a pure body, like that of a god
and the rest, entitled to salvation. Moreover, just as in accordance
with the maxim of 'connection and disconnection',³ curd, used in
connection with daily duties (nitya),—as laid down in the passage:
'He performs a sacrifice with curd',—brings about the attainment
of objects of sense,—as laid down in the passage: 'One who desires
for objects of sense should perform a sacrifice with curd' (Tait. Br
2.1 5.6⁴),—so the sacrificial acts, though bringing about heaven and
the rest, should yet be known to be serving the purpose (i.e. helping
the rise) of knowledge.⁵ And (finally) texts like 'Golden right from
the tip of His nails' (Chānd. 1 6.6⁶) refer to Brahman as being
concerned with His divine body.
Or else, since the entire mass of objects has Brahman for its
essence, the mass of texts, denoting them, directly refer to Him.⁷
¹ The daily or nitya karmas are ablution, prayer and so on, to be performed
every day, while the occasional or naimittika karmas are the ceremony in honour
of the dead and so on, to be performed on special occasions. Both of these kinds
are obligatory.
² The optional or kāmya karmas are sacrifices and the rest, undertaken with
special objects in view, viz. heaven and the rest.
³ A term applied to express the disconnection of what is optional from what
is a necessary constituent of anything. Vide Pū. Mi. Sū. 4.3.5, and Śabara's
commentary, pp. 493 and ff., vol. 1.
⁴ P. 180, line 3, vol. 2. ⁵ Vide V.K. 3.4.26.
⁶ Correct quotation ‘Apraṇakhāt sarva eva suvarṇaḥ’. Vide Chānd.
1 6.6, p. 43.
⁷ That is, instead of the laborious explanation given above, it is simpler to
accept this alternative explanation.

[sū. 1. 1. 5.
ADH. 5 ] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 41
Hence it is established that the entire Veda is in concordance
with regard to Brahman alone or Lord Kṛṣṇa the Highest Person,
omniscient, possessing infinite natural and inconceivable powers,
the cause of the world, and different and non-different from the sentient
and the non-sentient, as declared by the Lord Himself in the passage :
‘“By all the Vedas, I alone am to be known”’ (Gītā 15 15).
The four aphorisms constituting the basis of Scripture are hereby
explained. This treatise (viz. the Vedānta) is but an expounding of
these.
Here ends the section entitled ‘Concordance’ (4).
Here ends the explanation of the four aphorisms in the first
quarter of the first chapter in the commentary Vedānta-kaustubha,
composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, the incarnation of the
Pāñcajanya and dwelling under the lotus-feet of the reverend Lord
Nimbāditya, the founder of the sect of the reverend Sanatkumāra.
Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled ‘He sees’.
(Sūtras 5–12)
SŪTRA 5
“BECAUSE (THE CREATOR OF THE WORLD) SEES, (PRADHĀNA IS)
NOT (THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD) (SINCE) IT IS NON-SCRIPTURAL.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
But pradhāna, admitted by the Sāṁkhyas, is “non-scriptural”,
i.e. is devoid of scriptural evidence. Hence it is “not” the cause of
the world, as in Scripture seeing, which is a characteristic of a sentient
being, is predicated of the cause of the world.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Thus, it has been pointed out that Brahman, great in attributes,
powers and nature, omniscient, and the one object of all the Vedas,
is the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. Now, the Sāṁ-
khyas,—who hold that Brahman is not the cause of the world, since
He is of a dissimilar form; while the non-sentient pradhāna, consisting
of the three guṇas, is the cause of the world, since it is of a form