वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)
Vedanta Parijata Saurabha of Nimbarkacharya with Commentary
भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य (टीकाकार: श्रीश्रीनिवासचार्य - वेदान्तकौस्तुभ सहित) द्वारा
DevanagariHindipublished906 पृष्ठ
पृष्ठ 709, कुल 906 में से
संदर्भ में पढ़ेंपृष्ठ 709[SŪ. 3 3. 49.
[SŪ. 3 3. 49.
688 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH 20 ]
"Even on account of the resemblance," in point of being mental,
of the fires piled up by the mind and the rest to the mental cup,—
mentioned in the text: "With this (earth) as the jug, with the sea
as the juice, I take the cup, offered to Prajāpati, for you",—they are
not to be taken as the subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in
action. Why? Because we find from Scripture and the rest ¹ that
they are subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in meditation.
The sense is that a minor resemblance does not invalidate a major
difference.
With regard to this, (the author) states a parallel instance:
'As in the case of death". Just as, though fire and the person within
the sun resemble each other in point of being denoted by the same
word 'death' in the texts "He, verily, is death who is the person
within this orb" (Śat. Br. 10.5.2, 3), "The fire, verily, is death" (Bṛh
3 2.10), they are still different from each other; or just as, in accordance
with the text: "This world, O Gautama, is the fire" (Chānd 5.4 1),
the world does not (actually) become the fire,—so though the fires
piled up by the mind and so on and the mental cup resemble each
other in point of being mental, they still remain mutually different.
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
Interpretation different. The prima facie objectors say that
since the power of the actual fire is transferred to the mental fires
(Śat. Br. 10 5.3, 11), the latter must be actual brick-built fires like
the former. The answer is: "Not even on account of resemblance
(i.e. transference) (an identity) between them results), for (it is)
found (that there is transference even when there is no identity),
as in the case of death, for (there is) no attaining the world (of death
by the person in the sun)". That is, the mere transference of the
property of one thing to another is by no means an indication of an
actual identity between them, for it is found that sometimes such a
transference is based on a single point of similarity. E.g. the person
within the orb of the sun is said to be death (Śat. Br. 10.5.2, 3), but
there is only one point of resemblance between them, viz. destructive
¹ See above V.K. 3 3.47.