द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

THE ANTI-CLIMAX 91
and get him sentenced to a long term of imprisonment. But
the point they had to consider was what the effect of such an
action would be on the masses who idolised the Mahatma.
Lord Reading, it was reported, was genuinely afraid that in
spite of all the non-violence which the Dictator preached,
his arrest would be followed by widespread disorder, rioting
and bloodshed. And coming after Lord Chelmsford, under
whose regime the Amritsar massacres had taken place, he had
no desire to repeat the terrible events of 1919. He was
therefore anxiously and nervously looking for an opportunity
to strike at the Mahatma—when the latter himself took a
step which had a depressing effect all over the country and
produced a revolt within the Congress itself. That was
the proper psychological moment for Lord Reading to act
—if only the Secretary of State for India, Mr. Montagu,
would not stand in his way. Fortunately for the Government
of India, early in March, owing to differences with the
Cabinet in England, Mr. Montagu was forced to resign. The
last obstacle was therefore removed and on March 10th, 1922,
Mahatma Gandhi was made a prisoner.
The trial of Mahatma Gandhi was an historic event. In
describing the trial proceedings, Deshbandhu C. R. Das in
his presidential speech at the Gaya Congress in December
1922, drew an analogy with the trial of Christ before Pontius
Pilate. A similar comparison was also drawn by the well-
known Y.M.C.A. leader, the late Mr. K. T. Paul.¹ In the
trial, the Mahatma who described himself as a farmer and a
weaver, made a lengthy statement describing how 'from a
staunch loyalist and co-operator I have become an uncom-
promising disaffectionist and non-co-operator.' And he
ended his statement with these words: 'The only course open
to you, the Judge and the Assessors, is either to resign your
posts and thus dissociate yourselves from evil if you feel
that the law you are called upon to administer is an evil and
that in reality I am innocent, or to inflict on me the severest
penalty if you believe that the system and the law you are
assisting to administer are good for the people of this country
and that my activity is therefore injurious to the public weal.'
¹ The British Connection with India by K. T. Paul, London, 1927, p. 50.

92 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
The English Judge, Mr. Broomfield, sentenced him to six
years' imprisonment.
The resignation of Mr. Montagu was an indication of the
growing power of the Conservatives in the Coalition Cabinet
of Mr. Lloyd George, the Premier. Under pressure from the
Tory members, Mr. Lloyd George delivered in August his
famous 'steel-frame' speech in which he described the Civil
Service as the steel-frame of the Indian administration
which must remain British, no matter what other changes
may overtake India. This speech caused widespread resent-
ment in India, because people were looking forward to the
day when the power and the emoluments of the Civil Service
would be curtailed and the people given thereby a due place
in the administration of their country. About this time,
Lord Winterton, the new Under-Secretary of State for India,
visited India. One of the purposes of his visit was to herald
a new policy with regard to the Indian Princes and Ruling
Chiefs. The year before, when the Prince of Wales visited
India, he had noticed a great difference between his reception
in British India and in the Indian States. In British India, his
visit had been boycotted by the public, whereas in the States
he had no such unpleasant experience. Since that moment,
the British Government were led to adopt a new attitude
towards the Princes—an attitude of greater friendship and
cordiality. The Princes, on their part, utilised the occasion
for persuading the Government of India to introduce
legislation with a view to suppressing hostile agitation and
propaganda conducted against the Princes from British India.
Accordingly in September 1922, a Bill was introduced in the
Assembly called the Indian States (Protection against Dis-
affection) Bill. The Bill was thrown out by the Assembly
but the Viceroy 'certified' it as urgent and necessary and it
became law. It is noteworthy in this connection that the
new Under-Secretary of State for India, Lord Winterton, in
his conferences with the Viceroy and the Governors of
Bombay, Madras and Bengal, advocated this new attitude
towards the Princes and after his visit, representatives of the
Government of India began to sing praises of the Princes
whenever a suitable opportunity presented itself.

THE ANTI-CLIMAX 93
In October there was a General Election in England. The
Coalition Government broke up and the Conservatives came
into power with Mr. Bonar Law at their head and with
Viscount Peel and Lord Winterton as Secretary and Under-
Secretary of State for India respectively. The next month,
Sir Basil Blackett was sent out to India as the Finance
Member to the Government of India. The current of
reaction began to grow stronger and stronger in India. The
Indian Liberal leaders, who under the influence of Mr.
Montagu had been led to work the Constitution and to accept
office as Ministers, found their position increasingly difficult.
Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru had already resigned from the
Viceroy's Executive Council in April, following the resignation
of Mr. Montagu in March. And in March 1923, when the
situation became unbearable for him, Mr. Chintamani, the
Minister of Education in the United Provinces, resigned.
During the whole of 1922 the only decent acts which the
Government did was to concede the demands of the people
in Midnapore district in Bengal and of the Akali Sikhs in
Punjab. In Midnapore, the new Village Self-Government
Act, as a protest against which the no-tax campaign had been
started, was withdrawn, and in Punjab a new law was passed
under which all the Sikh shrines were taken out of the control
of the Mohants and handed over to popular committees.
We must now interrupt our narrative and enquire as to what
the leaders had been doing in the meantime. In the first
week of December 1921, Lala Lajpat Rai and most of his
principal colleagues had been rounded up by the police at a
meeting of the Punjab Congress Committee. A few days
later, Deshbandhu Das and most of his colleagues, including
the Secretary of the Bengal Congress Committee, Mr. B. N.
Sasmal and myself had been placed under arrest. Following
this, Pandit Motilal Nehru and most of the important Con-
gressmen in the United Provinces had been clapped into
prison. According to the rules of non-co-operation, no Con-
gressman could put up a defence before a British Court of
Law. Consequently, everywhere the prosecution had an easy
task. Most of the trials would not last more than a few
minutes and the same magistrate would dispose of hundreds

94 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
of cases in one afternoon. In the case of Deshbandhu Das,
however, the trial dragged on for two months and since Mr.
Sasmal and I had been made his co-accused in the same case,
we had to suffer the agony of a uselessly long trial. It was
freely talked about at the time that in view of the prestige and
influence commanded by the Deshbandhu, the magistrate
was unwilling to convict him without some show of legality.
Time was therefore given again and again to the prosecution
to collect evidence to prepare their case against him. The
prosecution case rested on certain notices, alleged to have
been signed by him, which were in violation of the Govern-
ment proclamation, banning as illegal all volunteer organi-
sations. Those who worked in the office of the Bengal Con-
gress Committee knew as a matter of fact, that these notices
had not been signed by him. Nevertheless, the official expert
in handwriting gave evidence on oath that the signatures were
genuinely of the Deshbandhu and on the strength of this
so-called expert evidence, he was convicted and sentenced to
six months' imprisonment. These as well as other illegalities
relating to his arrest were pointed out in a statement made
by him before the court towards the end of his trial, in the
course of which he sought to prove that the Government
never hesitate to break the law when it suits their own
purpose. Before sentence was passed, a message was sent on
behalf of the prosecution saying that if he accepted the
Bardoli resolution, regarding the suspension of civil dis-
obedience, the Government would set him free at once, but
he refused to entertain any such proposal.
Soon after our conviction we were transferred to another
prison in Calcutta, the Alipore Central Jail, where we had an
opportunity of meeting representatives from all the districts
in Bengal. Except among the orthodox followers of the
Mahatma who were in a minority, the general feeling was one
of resentment at the Bardoli decision. This feeling was
directed more against the Mahatma, since he was the Dictator
of the All-India Congress Committee and the Bardoli resolu-
tion had been passed at his instance. Accepting the Bardoli
retreat as an accomplished fact, the Deshbandu tried to devise
means for rousing public enthusiasm once again by a change

THE ANTI-CLIMAX 95
in tactics. He thus conceived of his plan of non-co-operation
within the legislatures. According to this plan, Congressmen,
instead of boycotting the elections, would stand as candidates
at the polls and after capturing the elected seats, would carry
on a policy of uniform, continuous and consistent opposition
to the Government. The boycott of the legislatures, as
conceived by the Calcutta Congress in 1920, had proved to
be a failure. While the nationalists had kept away from the
legislatures, undesirables had captured those bodies. These
people, instead of assisting the popular movement in the
country, had lent their support to the Government. Through
their help the Government was able to demonstrate to the
world that in their policy of repression, they had the support
of the elected members of the legislatures. According to the
Deshbandhu, in a revolutionary fight, the points of vantage
should not be left in the hands of the enemy. Therefore all
elected seats in the legislatures, as also in all public bodies
(namely municipalities, district boards, etc.), should be cap-
tured by Congressmen. Where there was room for doing
any solid constructive work, they could do so. But failing
that, they could at least keep up a systematic opposition to
the members and agents of the Government, and thereby
prevent them from doing mischief. Further, the election
campaign would give the Congress an occasion and an
opportunity for doing its own propaganda simultaneously all
over the country. The adoption of this new policy did not
imply that they were to abandon any of the other activities
of the Congress, but simply meant an extension of those
activities to include capture of the elected seats in the legis-
latures and all public bodies.
Discussions regarding this new plan were carried on
vigorously from day to day in the Alipore Central Jail. It
soon appeared that in all these discussions the main contention
of the opponents was that the Government of India Act,
1919, hardly left any room for useful opposition within the
legislatures. Owing to the presence of Britishers and of other
members nominated by the Government, it was difficult, if
not impossible, for the elected members to secure a majority
either in the Indian Legislative Assembly (the Central Legis-

96 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
lature) or in the Provincial Legislatures. Further, the
Viceroy, in the case of the former and the Governors, in the
case of the latter, had powers of veto and certification, whereby
they could always override the decision of the legislatures.
The reply to this was that even if the elected members did
not have a majority, they could still keep up a continuous
opposition against the Government and thereby strengthen
the agitation outside the legislatures. Secondly, it would be
possible for the elected members to secure a majority in at
least some of the legislatures and if the Viceroy or the Governor
set aside the decision of any legislature, the Government
would stand condemned before the bar of public opinion,
both inside India and outside. Lastly, under the existing
constitution, a vote against the Ministers or their departments
could not be overridden by the Governor of any province,
and if the provincial legislature voted down the salaries of
Ministers, they would automatically be thrown out of office
and the working of the diarchical constitution would have to
be suspended. As these discussions went on for some weeks,
two parties crystallised among the political prisoners in the
Alipore Jail and they proved to be the nuclei of the future
'Swaraj' and 'No-Change' parties. In May 1922, the annual
conference of Congressmen in Bengal, called the 'Provincial
Conference,' was held in Chittagong. Mrs. C. R. Das was
elected President of the Conference because of the gallant part
she had played in last year's movement. In her presidential
speech, she stated that the Congress might have to consider
a change in tactics and suggested, among other things, that
the policy of non-co-operation within the legislatures was
worth considering. It was not difficult to guess who had
inspired her speech and taking it as a feeler sent out by her
husband, a storm of controversy was at once let loose all over
the country. It was clear therefrom that the orthodox fol-
lowers of the Mahatma would not think of any deviation
from the plan that he had laid down before his arrest and
that a stiff fight would take place before the new plan could
be adopted by the Congress. This prospect, far from dis-
couraging us, helped to whip up our enthusiasm. The Desh-
bandhu had frequent discussions with his supporters in

THE ANTI-CLIMAX 97
prison and he chalked out his future line of action in great
detail. Among the measures that he contemplated was the
starting of daily papers in English and in the vernacular—
and out of this speculation came the birth of his paper
Forward, which was started in 1923 and soon attained dis-
tinction as one of the leading nationalist papers of India.
During 1922 conflicts between political prisoners and the
prison authorities took place in many prisons in India.
Matters came to a head in two prisons in Bengal—at Barisal
and Faridpur. Political prisoners in these prisons demanded
decent treatment at the hands of the authorities and refused
to submit to the humiliating treatment generally meted out
to prisoners in Indian Jails. The authorities were stubborn
and resorted to flogging, but even that could not break the
backbone of the political prisoners. Meanwhile, intense public
indignation was roused by the news of the flogging. Even
the tame Bengal Legislative Council was stirred to action and
within the Government itself, differences of opinion broke
out. The Member in charge of Jails, Sir Abdur Rahim, dis-
approved flogging of political prisoners, but he could not
carry the Government with him. As a protest he resigned
the portfolio of Prisons which was taken up by the then
Home Member of the Bengal Government, Sir Hugh
Stephenson.
After the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi in March, the Congress
Working Committee was at a loss to decide what to do.
Thereupon, a committee was appointed, called the 'Civil
Disobedience Enquiry Committee,' for the purpose of touring
the country and reporting on the possibility of starting civil
disobedience again. The general feeling among the members
of this committee was that it was not possible to start civil
disobedience so soon. But the point that it was difficult to
settle was what the Congress should do in the meantime.
Should the Congress be content with carrying on its peaceful
constructive work or should it adopt the new plan suggested
by the Deshbandhu? The committee made an extensive tour
of the country and submitted a report after some months.
The members of the Committee were equally divided in their
conclusions. Hakim Ajmal Khan (Delhi), Pandit Motilal
G

98 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
Nehru (Allahabad) and Mr. Vithalbhai J. Patel (Bombay)
were in favour of adopting the Deshbandhu's plan of entering
the legislatures and Dr. M. A. Ansari¹ (Delhi), Mr. K. R.
Iyengar (Madras) and Mr. C. Rajagopalachari (Madras) were
against it. As the report was published shortly before the Gaya
session of the Congress to be presided over by Deshbandhu
Das, his hands were strengthened by the report.
Towards the end of September 1922, there were unexpected
floods in the northern districts of Bengal. Though floods and
famines are of frequent occurrence in the India of to-day, the
floods of 1922 were of an unprecedented magnitude. Four
large districts of Bengal were affected, crops were destroyed,
houses washed away and cattle killed. As a result of the floods,
there were several cases of death also. The whole countryside
was one vast expanse of water. The Congress organisations
throughout the province promptly responded to the appeal
for relief and I was among the first batch to arrive at the flooded
area for the purpose of organising relief. Thanks to the efforts
of Sir P. C. Roy, the famous chemist and the President of
the Relief Committee and to the generosity of the public, a
fund of more than 400,000 rupees was raised, besides large
contributions in cloth, foodstuffs and fodder (for the cattle).
On this occasion the Government of Bengal contributed a
sum of 20,000 rupees and in justifying the niggardliness of
the Government, the Maharaja of Burdwan, a member of the
Governor's Executive Council, stated that the Government
was not a charitable institution. The relief operations con-
ducted by the public, without any aid from the Government
were so successful that they added greatly to the prestige of
the Congress, whose members were largely responsible for
them. In fact we had the good fortune to be complimented on
our work by the Governor of Bengal, Lord Lytton, personally
when he inspected the flooded areas. Since then, the Congress
has always taken a leading part in organising relief operations
on the occasion of floods and famines.
Between August and December two other noteworthy events
took place. The first was the meeting of the All-India Trade)
¹ In the light of this fact it is surprising that Dr. Ansari should be one
of the sponsors of the Council-entry proposal in 1934.

THE ANTI-CLIMAX 99
Union Congress at Lahore, which was presided over by
Deshbandhu Das. In his presidential speech he made a
striking declaration to the effect that the Swaraj he was striving
to win was not for a section of the people—but for the masses
who comprised 98 per cent. of the population. Before and
after this meeting, he always took a keen interest in the trade
union movement and was for some time the President of the
Labour Association of the Tata Iron and Steel Company at
Jamshedpur. The other event was the meeting of the Young
Men's Conference in Calcutta which was the precursor of the
youth movement in the province. This Conference revealed
the desire on the part of the youth to have a movement and
an organisation of their own, quite apart from the Indian
National Congress.
Towards the end of November, a meeting of the All-India
Congress Committee was held in Calcutta at which there
was a trial of strength between the supporters of Deshbandhu
and of the Mahatma. This was a prelude to the annual
session of the Congress. In the last week of December in an
atmosphere tense with excitement the plenary session of the
Indian National Congress assembled at Gaya. According to
preliminary forecasts, Mr. Das's plan was likely to be defeated.
But no one could tell at the time how the voting would go.
It was clear, however, that Mr. Das would have influential
support from all the provinces, especially from Bengal, the
United Provinces, Punjab, Central Provinces and Maharashtra
(part of Bombay Presidency). After stormy debates in the
Subjects Committee, the matter came up for voting before
the open session of the Congress. Mr. Srinivasa Iengar, a
prominent leader from Madras, who was the leader of the
Madras Bar and had resigned the post of Advocate-General
of Madras, moved an amendment to the effect that represen-
tatives of the Congress should contest the elections but
should not participate in the work inside the legislatures. On
this amendment the principal voting took place and resulted
in a big majority for the supporters of the Mahatma. Great
was their enthusiasm and the hero of the day was the Madras
leader, Mr. Rajagopalachari, who stood up before the
Congress as the apostle of Gandhiism.

100 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
The position of Mr. Das became rather anomalous. He
was the President of the Congress, but the plan he advocated
had been rejected. To settle his future course of action, he
summoned a meeting of his supporters. It was decided that
he should resign the presidentship of the Congress and
organise his party under the name of the 'Swaraj Party.' The
next day when the All-India Congress Committee met for the
purpose of laying down the programme of work for the next
year, that is 1923, Pandit Motilal Nehru stood up to make
an announcement about the formation of the Swaraj-Party.
The announcement came as an unexpected blow and cast
a shadow on the jubilant faces of the Mahatma's supporters.
Most of the outstanding intellectuals were on the side of the
Deshbandhu and there was no doubt that without them, the
Congress would lose much of its strength and importance.
The announcement first made by Pandit Motilal Nehru
was confirmed when Mr. Das in winding up the deliberations,
submitted his resignation of the office of president, since he
desired to work in opposition to the official resolutions, with
the object of persuading the country to accept his plan of
work.
The supporters of Gandhiji left Gaya satisfied at their
victory but not happy, because of the split that had taken
place. The Swarajists parted with a sense of defeat, but with
the determination to fight and win.

CHAPTER IV
THE SWARAJIST REVOLT (1923)
THE Swarajist leaders returned from Gaya to their own
provinces with a stiff programme of work before them.
The general understanding was that Deshbandhu Das should
conduct the propaganda in Bengal, Central Provinces and
South India; Pandit Motilal Nehru in Upper India and Mr.
Vithalbhai Patel in Bombay Presidency. The Nationalist Press
as a whole was anti-Swarajist. Therefore the Swarajists had
to depend mainly on lecturing as a means of propaganda.
In Calcutta we published a daily paper of four pages, called
Banglar Katha, to supplement our propaganda and I had to
become editor overnight under the orders of the leader. In
Madras, Mr. A. Rangaswami Iyenger, afterwards editor of
Hindu, was very helpful. His paper, Swadesamitram, a Tamil
daily, became an exponent of the Swarajist policy and he also
started an English weekly under the same name, to help our
propaganda. In Poona the extremely influential Marathi
paper, Kesari, became a champion of our cause. After Loka-
manya Tilak’s death, Mr. Kelkar had been the editor of
Kesari and as he became a staunch supporter of the Swaraj
party, the resources of his paper Kesari were placed at the
disposal of the party.
When the Deshbandhu returned to Bengal after the Gaya
Congress, he found his position considerably weakened.
The Congress machinery had passed into the hands of our
political opponents, who now came to be known as “No-
Changers,” because they were against any change in the
existing plan and programme of the Congress. When we
first took stock of our following, we found that we were in a
minority. It was difficult for us at first to raise funds because
we had rebelled against the official programme of the Con-
gress. Nevertheless, we were a disciplined and determined
band of workers and with unbounded enthusiasm, we

102 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
addressed ourselves to our task. One of the tactics we fol-
lowed at the time, consisted in summoning frequent meetings
of Congress organisations throughout the country and
asking for a reversal of the resolutions passed at the Gaya
Congress. At first our party used to be defeated at such
meetings but we gradually made headway and when our
party was able to secure a majority in one place, the news
would encourage our fellow-workers in other places.
After preliminary propaganda had been done all over
India, the first Swarajist Conference was held in March at
Allahabad at the house of Pandit Motilal Nehru. The
constitution and plan of campaign of the Swaraj Party was
drawn up at the Conference. When the constitution was
being discussed, a controversy arose with regard to the
ultimate aim of the Swaraj Party. Was Dominion Status to
be the goal of the Party or Complete Independence? On this
point the constitution of the Congress was not clear. It
merely stated that Swaraj was our goal but did not define
what was meant by Swaraj. As the Swaraj Party was more
practical, it wanted to define clearly what Swaraj meant, but
a complete agreement was not possible on the question,
because there were two groups among the Swarajists. It was
therefore decided, as a compromise, to declare in the con-
stitution that the 'immediate' objective of the Party was the
attainment of Dominion Status. Thus was the conflict
between the young and the old settled for the time being.
The Swarajist Conference over, Mr. Das set out on a long
tour in South India. It was a tremendously uphill work.
The Madras Presidency was at the time one of the strong-
holds of Gandhiism and Mr. Das deliberately undertook to
storm that citadel first. In spite of the grilling heat of a
South Indian summer he had a very successful tour. His
success there had repercussions in other parts of the country.
On his return to Calcutta he undertook the direction of the
propaganda in Bengal with very good results. About this
time the party decided to requisition frequent meetings of the
All-India Congress Committee. At each successive meeting
it was found that the votes of the Swarajists were increasing.
By the middle of the year 1923, such progress was made

THE SWARAJIST REVOLT 103
that the Working Committee (the Cabinet of the Congress)
composed entirely of 'no-changers,' could no longer command
a majority in the All-India Congress Committee and had
therefore to resign. But though the 'no-changers' were not
strong enough to hold office, neither was the Swaraj Party.
So a third party, which in the absence of a better name may
be called the 'Centre Party,' came into office. This party did
not accept the Swarajist plan but they were not die-hard
Gandhiists either. They advocated some sort of under-
standing between the two rival groups in the Congress. About
the same time the 'no-changers' were also defeated in Bengal
and in the Bengal Congress Committee, a Centre Party,
which was under the influence of the Swarajists, came into
office. Under this arrangement, Moulana Akram Khan
became the President of the Bengal Congress Committee.
But the former Secretary, Dr. P. C. Ghosh, refused to hand
over office. Therefore, two rival Congress Committees began
to function simultaneously, each claiming to be the represen-
tative body. Some months elapsed before the constitutional
question was settled by the Working Committee, when a
decision was given in favour of the Committee of which
Moulana Akram Khan was the president.
In most provinces, especially in Bengal, feelings between
the two parties were exceedingly bitter, though their aim
was a common one, namely to win Swaraj for India. The
prevailing bitterness made responsible Congressmen think
seriously as to how they could bring about some sort of
compromise between the warring groups. Then came the
suggestion to hold a special session of the Congress in Delhi
in September, 1923. This decision was a blow for the sup-
porters of Gandhiji, because the Swarajists were sure to press
their plan at the Delhi Congress once again and with better
chances of winning than they had at Gaya. Moulana Abul
Kalam Azad, one of the most intelligent and distinguished
Mohammedan leaders, was elected President of the Delhi
Congress and in his presidential speech he advocated the
Swarajist policy of contesting the elections and carrying on
the fight within the legislatures.
Shortly before the Delhi Congress, Moulana Mohammed

104 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
Ali, the younger and more influential of the Ali brothers and
Dr. Kitchlew, the well-known Punjab leader, were released
from prison. Their arrival was welcomed by the 'No-Change'
Party whose policy and action they supported. Nevertheless,
the Swarajists had made so much progress that nothing could
hamper them any more. Deshbandhu Das attended the
Congress at the head of a large contingent of delegates and the
Bengal votes served to turn the scales. As soon as it was
clear that the Swarajists would win the day, the 'No-Change'
Party agreed to a compromise. Moreover, Moulana Moham-
med Ali claimed to have received some secret message (which
he called 'wireless message') from the Mahatma, asking him
to bring about a compromise between the rival Congress
groups. Therefore, without much wrangling, a compromise
resolution was passed at the special Congress in Delhi in
September, 1923, to the effect that Congressmen were per-
mitted to take part in the forthcoming elections and carry
on a uniform, continuous and consistent opposition against
the Government within the legislatures, but the Congress
as an organisation would have no responsibility in the
matter.
The Swarajists left Delhi overjoyed. After nine months
of hard and untiring work in the teeth of opposition and in
the face of considerable unpopularity, they had won the day.
But they could not rest on their oars. They had barely two
months' time to prepare for the forthcoming elections. And
they had a tough fight in front of them.
Luck, however, favours the brave. So it did the Swarajists.
In spite of gloomy forecasts they had remarkable success.
In the Central Provinces, the election returns were excellent
and it was clear that by their obstructive tactics the Swarajists
would be able to paralyse the work of the Local Legislative
Council. The election returns for Bengal were also encourag-
ing and for the Indian Legislative Assembly a strong con-
tingent of Swarajists was returned. By mutual agreement it
was arranged that Pandit Motilal Nehru would lead the
Swaraj Party in the Assembly, while the Deshbandhu would
lead the Party in the Bengal Legislative Council, where he
was hopeful of bringing about a constitutional deadlock.

THE SWARAJIST REVOLT 105
The success of the Swarajists in capturing the elected
seats in the central and provincial legislatures was followed
by similar success in other directions. The elections to the
local bodies (municipalities and district boards) in the United
Provinces were held in 1923 and under the direction of Pandit
Motilal Nehru the Swaraj Party in that province had con-
siderable success and as a result, many of the municipalities
and district boards came under Swarajist control. In the
field of journalism, too, the Swarajists made much progress.
In Calcutta, the Deshbandhu launched his daily paper
Forward in October, soon after his victory at Delhi. As some
of the organisers of the paper were suddenly put into prison
without trial, I was entrusted with the organisation of the
paper. Though the launching of the paper entailed very hard
work on our part, success followed rapidly and in its career,
the paper was able to keep pace with the growing popularity
and strength of the Party. Within a short time Forward
came to hold a leading position among the nationalist
journals in the country. Its articles were forceful, its news
service varied and up-to-date and the paper developed a
special skill in the art of discovering and exposing official
secrets.
During 1923 the movement was on the whole of a con-
stitutional nature with the exception of a civil-disobedience
(or Satyagraha) campaign in Nagpur. The authorities in
Nagpur prohibited the carrying of national flags along certain
streets in Nagpur. As a protest against this order, processions
were sent into the prohibited area with flags, etc. The cam-
paign went on for some months and a large number of people
were sent to prison. The issue soon became an All-India
one, because the order in question was regarded as an insult
to the National Flag and people began to pour in from all
parts of the country in order to defy the order and court
imprisonment. Ultimately, better counsels prevailed in
Government House and a compromise was arrived at, whereby
the demand of the people in this connection was substantially
conceded. It should be observed in this connection that the
above campaign—generally known as the Nagpur Flag
Satyagraha Campaign—was run by the orthodox Gandhiists

106 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
who were anxious to demonstrate that the Gandhi method
had not become sterile and was still capable of stirring up
the country.
While the Swarajists represented the main body of rebels
against orthodox Gandhiism in 1923, the same year saw the
birth of another revolt against Gandhiism which was to
acquire greater importance in the years to come. Being dis-
satisfied with the Gandhian ideology, a small group in
Bombay under the leadership of Mr. Dange,¹ took to study-
ing Socialist literature. They had a club of their own and
published a weekly journal for preaching Socialism. Among the
Congress leaders the only patron they had at the time was the
late Mr. Vithalbhai Patel. They soon took up labour organi-
sation in Bombay and before many years elapsed, they
became the first group of Communists in India. Following
Bombay, a similar group was started some time later in
Bengal under the name of the "Workers and Peasants'
Party"—but it was never able to acquire as much importance
or make as much headway, as the Bombay Group. The
reason is not far to seek. Bengal, of which Calcutta is both
the heart and the brain, has for a very long time been one
of the strongholds of the nationalist movement. There the
movement is based on an influential and patriotic petit-bour-
geois class. Moreover, Bengal does not possess an indigenous
and influential capitalist class, as does Bombay. Consequently,
class-differentiation has never appeared in Bengal in that
sharp and acute form in which it has appeared in Bombay.
The petit-bourgeois element is not so strong or influential
in Bombay as it is in Bengal and the national movement
there is of more recent growth than in Bengal. In these
circumstances it is not to be wondered at that the intellectual
revolt against Gandhiism in Bombay should take a Socialist
or Communist turn. In Bengal, on the other hand, the
revolt against Gandhiism took a revolutionary more than a
Communist turn. This phenomenon we shall consider in a
later chapter on 'the Bengal Situation.'
¹ Mr. Dange was convicted in 1925 in connection with the Cawnpore
Bolshevik Conspiracy Case and again in connection with the Meerut
Communist Conspiracy Case in 1933, after a trial lasting nearly four years.

THE SWARAJIST REVOLT 107
We have already seen in the previous chapter that when
in March, 1922, Mr. Montagu resigned from the Cabinet, the
forces of reaction got the upper hand both in England and in
India. The Coalition Cabinet of Mr. Lloyd George soon came
to an end and a General Election took place in October 1922,
which brought the Conservatives into power. In November
1922, Sir Basil Blackett was appointed Finance Member to
the Government of India. One of his first deeds was to
double the Salt Tax in February, 1923, when he produced his
first budget. Now the Salt Tax is traditionally unpopular
in India—partly because the people are prevented by law
from making salt out of the soil or the water given them by
nature and partly because the Salt Tax hits the poor hardest.
The doubling of the Salt Tax therefore, was the worst move
which the Government could have taken. The Indian
Legislative Assembly promptly threw out this provision of
the Finance Member but the Viceroy, Lord Reading, as
promptly restored it by virtue of his power of certification.
In June, the Government gave further offence by appointing
a Commission—called the Lee Commission—to inquire into
the status, position and grievances of the All-India services
which are manned mainly by Britishers. Everyone felt at the
time that the only result of the appointment of this com-
mission would be to enhance the pay and emoluments of
Britishers in India.¹ Thus, while the Government showed
a readiness to incur more expenditure in order to please
Britishers—they showed reluctance in curtailing unnecessary
expenditure, though the Inchcape Committee had made
several useful recommendations in this behalf.² In addition
to this measure, the Government of India took another step
which was severely criticised at the time and which roused
resentment in certain parts of the country. This was the
deposition of the Maharaja of Nabha from his throne (or
Guddee). Though the Government made certain allegations
¹ This apprehension was fully justified when the Lee Commission sub-
mitted its report and the Government of India gave effect to the recom-
mendations in a lavish manner.
² A Retrenchment Committee presided over by Lord Inchcape had been
appointed by the Government for suggesting possible lines of economy.
This Committee submitted its report in March, 1923.

108 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
against the Maharaja as a justification for their action—the
popular feeling in the country was that the Maharaja was
neither better nor worse than the general run of Maharajas
in India and that he was deposed solely because of his avowedly
nationalistic views. Since the Maharaja was a Sikh and he
was reported to have cherished sympathy for the Akali
movement, his deposition roused a great deal of indignation
among the Sikh community.
While the forces of reaction were gaining in strength
in official circles and the Swarajists were preparing their great
onslaught on the bureaucratic citadel, the Indian Legislative
Assembly, even without the nationalists, was neither tame nor
inactive. During the year, resolutions demanding a speedy
constitutional advance were passed twice. Moreover, towards
the end of its term, the Assembly passed a Reciprocity Bill
which was introduced by Dr. (now Sir) H. S. Gour. This
Bill was aimed at the Dominions and Colonies of the British
Empire where Indians were not given equal rights and it
provided for retaliation against all those countries, which
placed disabilities on Indians, inflicting on their nationals in
India the same disabilities which Indians had to suffer there.
This Bill was the result of the injustice meted out to Indians
in the Crown Colony of Kenya in Africa. In Kenya where
the Indian settlers outnumbered the white settlers by three
to one, the latter wanted to usurp all political power and
exclude the former altogether. In the Kenya legislature they
had a law passed giving the vote to all white settlers above
twenty-one. They refused at first to extend the vote to
Indian settlers, but ultimately offered them a separate
electorate with a more limited franchise. This offer was
declined by the Indians because it would put the stamp of
second-class citizenship on them. The Kenya Indians appealed
to India for help and in April 1923 the Rt. Hon. V. S. Sastri¹
led a deputation to England to plead their cause before the
authorities at Whitehall. A fairly satisfactory agreement was
drawn up between the India Office and the Colonial Office
. ¹ Mr. V. S. Sastri who became the head of the Servants of India Society
after Mr. Gokhale's death had been made a Privy Councillor, while Mr.
Montagu was Secretary of State for India.

THE SWARAJIST REVOLT 109
—called the Wood-Winterton¹ Agreement but the Tory
Cabinet did not give effect to it. Mr. Sastri therefore had to
return disappointed. After his return to India, the Recipro-
city Bill was introduced in the Assembly by Dr. H. S. Gour.
The above picture of India in 1923 would not be complete
without reference to some of the communal dissensions
which appeared in 1923 and which were to assume a more
ugly shape in the years to come. Punjab was the scene of
most of the troubles in 1923. Early in the year there was a
Hindu-Moslem riot at Multan and this was followed by a
similar riot in Amritsar, near the scene of the Jallianwalla
Bagh massacre in 1919. About this time, Mr. (now Sir)
Mian Fazli Hussain became a minister in the Punjab and his
extreme partiality for Moslems in the matter of appointments
to public services caused considerable heart-burning among
Sikhs and Hindus. Later in the year, a movement was started
among Indian Moslems in opposition to the Indian National
Congress—called 'Tanzeem' and 'Tabligh'—which aimed at
organising the Moslems as a strong and virile community.
This movement gained adherents for some time but before
long it fell into disfavour and was replaced by communal or
sectarian organisations of a different kind. While the
above movement was going on among the Moslems, the
Hindus were not altogether idle. Their communal organi-
sation—called the Hindu Mahasabha—sought to strengthen
itself by deciding at its annual meeting in August to admit the
depressed classes to all the rights and privileges enjoyed
by high-caste Hindus. Corresponding to the 'Tanzeem' and
'Tabligh' movement among the Moslems, a 'Sangathan' move-
ment was started among the Hindus. Further, in order to
reclaim those Hindus who for some reason had left the Hindu
fold in the past, the 'Suddhi' (or Purification) movement was
started. By performing the Suddhi ceremony, it was made
possible for a non-Hindu to become a Hindu. The apostle
of this movement was Swami Shraddhananda,² a highly-
¹ The Hon. Edward Wood, better known as Lord Irwin and now as Lord
Halifax was the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies—while Lord
Winterton was the Under-Secretary of State for India.
² Swami Shraddhananda was subsequently murdered by a Moslem
fanatic probably out of his resentment at the Suddhi movement.

110 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
respected leader of the Hindu Mahasabha, through whose
influence thousands of non-Hindus, including Moslems and
Christians, were converted to Hinduism. About this time,
the Swami was endeavouring to reconvert the Malkana
Rajputs who had originally been Hindus but had subsequently
embraced the Islamic faith and this attempt caused annoyance
to many of the Moslem leaders.
While the communal storm was brewing in India, the Ali
brothers remained true to their nationalist creed. Moulana
Mohammed Ali, the younger brother, was elected to preside
over the annual session of the Congress at Coconada in
Madras Presidency. There was no heated controversy as at
Gaya and the deliberations took place in an atmosphere of
extreme cordiality. There was, however, a breeze over the
Hindu-Moslem question which fortunately did not develop
into a storm. Deshbandhu Das had drawn up a Hindu-
Moslem Pact for settlement of the communal question in
Bengal and he desired the Congress to put the seal of approval
on it. The Coconada Congress, however, did not do so and
the Pact was rejected on the alleged ground that it showed
partiality for the Moslems and violated the principles of
Nationalism. Another Pact which had been drawn up by
Lala Lajpat Rai and Dr. M. A. Ansari for the settlement of
the communal question was referred by the Coconada Con-
gress to the All-India Congress Committee for consideration.
These pacts indicated that the better minds among the Con-
gress leaders had begun to realise the possibility of a communal
rift and the necessity for making some sort of settlement
before the breach widened. But sufficiently speedy or suffi-
ciently drastic action was not taken, with the result that the
differences did become more acute and grave and the country
had to face a communal storm as soon as the political tension
created by the Swaraj Party subsided after the death of
Deshbandhu Das in June, 1925.
From the Nationalist point of view, the year 1923 had begun
badly but it ended well. In January, there was division and
depression. In December, there was hope and confidence.
Despite signs of communal disturbance here and there, the
political barometer had once again begun to rise. In England