द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

THE STORM BREAKS 77
brothers in September, following the Khilafat Conference
at Karachi. Two other incidents are worth mentioning—the
‘Akali’ movement in the Punjab and the Moplah rebellion in
Malabar in the south. The Akalis were a section among the
Sikhs analogous to the Puritans among the Christians. They
wanted primarily to reform the administration of the Sikh
shrines or Gurudwaras. These shrines were mostly very rich
and were administered by a set of ‘Mohants,’ who though
required to act merely as trustees living an ascetic and abste-
mious life, generally lived a thoroughly disreputable life at the
public expense. The Akalis wanted to dispossess these
Mohants and bring the shrines under the administration of
popular committees. As always happens in an enslaved
country, the Government rallied to the support of the vested
interests—the Mohants. Thus a movement directed against
the Mohants soon developed into a movement against the
Government. The tactics of the Akalis were in keeping with
the Congress policy of non-violent non-co-operation and
consisted in sending ‘Jathas’ or groups of men and women
to take possession of the shrines. They were arrested and
put into prison or mercilessly beaten and forcibly dispersed.
This movement went on for a year till in November 1922 the
Government came to its senses and introduced legislation in
the Punjab Legislative Council to concede what the Akalis
had demanded from the beginning. The Moplahs of Malabar
were a section of the Moslem community. Their rising was
directed against the local Hindus; nevertheless it was also an
attack on the Government and as such, caused them con-
siderable anxiety and embarrassment. It has significance
also because it was the first incident to loosen Hindu-Moslem
unity.
In spite of these isolated phenomena of revolt, till November
1921 there was no sign of a country-wide conflict, far less of
the Swaraj promised ‘within one year.’ Congress circles were
therefore getting uneasy and depressed, when the Govern-
ment came to the rescue. An announcement was made that
the Prince of Wales would visit India and that he would
land in Bombay on November 17th. The motive behind
the visit was, of course, to assuage public feeling and rally

78 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
public support for the Government. The Congress Working
Committee promptly issued instructions for a boycott of the
Prince's visit. It was 'stated that, though the people had
nothing against the Prince personally, since he was coming
to strengthen the bureaucracy which they were engaged in
fighting, they had no option but to boycott his visit. As a
first step towards this boycott, a ‘hartal’ or boycott demonstra-
tion was called for November 17th, when there should be a
complete suspension of business all over the country. On
that day, the boycott demonstration in Bombay was not a
success. There was a clash between supporters of the
Government and those of the Congress which resulted in
prolonged rioting. But in Northern India, especially in
Calcutta, the demonstration was a unique success, due largely
to the wholehearted co-operation of the Khilafat organisa-
tions. So great was the success in Calcutta that the Anglo-
Indian papers, the Statesman and the Englishman, wrote the
next day that Congress volunteers had taken possession of the
city and the Government had abdicated and they demanded
immediate and drastic action against the Congress volunteers.
Within twenty-four hours, the Government of Bengal issued
a notification declaring them to be illegal. This was followed
by similar notifications in other parts of the country.
We had been spoiling for a fight in Calcutta and the official
notification therefore was thrice welcome to us. The general
opinion was in favour of an immediate reply to the official
challenge. But our leader, Deshbandu Das, was cautious.
He wanted time to take stock of his following in the province
and to consult Mahatma Gandhi and the Working Com-
mittee. Secret circulars were sent out at once to different parts
of the province for a report as to the measure of public
support that would be forthcoming if the Congress started
open defiance of the official ban. In less than a week encourag-
ing reports began to pour in from the districts. A meeting
of the Provincial Congress Committee of Bengal was there-
upon summoned behind closed doors towards the end of
November to decide our course of action. This committee
was a body of about 300 members representing the Congress
organisations of Bengal. By that time I had become a member

THE STORM BREAKS 79
of that body and I was able to participate in the deliberations.
It was unanimously decided to start civil disobedience and
in view of the state of emergency, all the powers of the com-
mittee were vested in its President, Deshbandhu Das—and
he was further authorised to nominate his successors. Thus
he was appointed the Congress Dictator for the Province—a
procedure which was to be followed subsequently all over
the country.
Contrary to the advice given by the younger hot-heads of
the party who wanted to commence with a big demonstration,
the leader decided to make a modest beginning. He wanted,
he said, to work up the movement slowly and restrict the
fight to a single clear issue. That issue was—would the
Government take action if batches of five volunteers went out
peacefully to hawk Khadi cloth—not in uniform as we had
suggested, but in mufti? If they did so, then the public
would regard the action of the Government as wholly arbitrary
and unjustified and all sections would then rally to the
support of the Congress. On this issue the fight began and I
was put in charge of the campaign. My work as the Principal
of the National College could not be continued and more so,
because the students and some members of the staff were
anxious to join the campaign. We issued an appeal for
volunteers who would go out to defy the official ban and
accept all the consequences. The response was discouraging.
Apparently the public were still lukewarm and some stimulus
was required to stir them up. The leader suggested that his
son and his wife should go out as volunteers in order to set an
example to others. We opposed the idea and especially on the
ground that no lady should be permitted to go out as long
as there was a single man left. But the leader was adamant in
his decision. So the next day young Das, who was about the
same age as myself—went out at the head of the volunteers
and was at once taken to prison.¹ There was an immediate
change in the atmosphere and more volunteers began to enlist
—but even that was not enough. So the turn came for Mrs.
¹ According to the rules of non-co-operation, a Congressman was required
not to put up a defence when brought up for trial before a British law
court. The prosecution therefore had an easy time and it would not
generally take more than a few minutes to dispose of the cases.

80 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
Das. Accompanied by her sister-in-law, Mrs. Urmila Devi
and another associate, Miss Suniti Devi, she went out at the
head of the volunteers. When the news spread in the city
that Mrs. Das and other ladies had been taken to prison, there
was wild excitement. In utter indignation young and old,
rich and poor began to pour in as volunteers. The authorities
were alarmed and they converted the city into an armed
camp. But our battle was half-won.
Indignation was not confined to the public but spread
within the ranks of the hitherto loyal police. At the police-
station, as Mrs. Das stepped into the prison-van, to be con-
veyed to prison, numbers of police constables came up to
her and vowed that they were going to resign their jobs the
same day. There was consternation in Government circles.
No one knew at the time how far the contagion would spread.
Orders were issued at once by Government that the pay of
police constables would be substantially increased. The same
evening at a dinner party in Government House there was a
sensation. Mr. S. N. Mullick, a leading Liberal politician
(who was afterwards a member of the Council of the Secretary
of State for India)—when he heard of Mrs. Das's arrest—left
Government House immediately as a protest. So tense was
the excitement that before midnight the Government had to
order the release of Mrs. Das and her associates, and the
public were given to understand that the arrests had been
made through a mistake. From the next day thousands of
students and factory-workers began to enlist as volunteers.
Within a few days the two big prisons in the city were filled
with political prisoners. Camp-prisons were then opened but
they too were filled in no time. The Government then
resorted to drastic action. Orders were issued for the arrest
of Deshbandu Das and his close associates, and by the evening
of December 10th we were all in prison.
But these arrests acted as a further stimulus and as more
people were arrested the prison-administration became more
unmanageable. Orders were given for the release of a large
number of political prisoners but no one would leave the
prison, and moreover, it was impossible to identify them.
Sometimes they would be taken to the prison office on the

THE STORM BREAKS 81
pretext of being transferred to some other prison or of being
interviewed by their relatives and there they would be set
free. When this trick was discovered, no prisoner would
leave his cell when called by a prison-official. Prisoners
were thereupon taken forcibly to the prison-gate and set
at liberty. Outside prison, tactics were changed. Arrests
were stopped and orders were given that sticks and batons
should be used freely by the police in dealing with crowds
and demonstrators. In some cases demonstrators were
removed in police-vans to out-of-the-way places thirty
miles from the city and there asked to walk back home. A
liberal use was also made of the hose in order to give the
demonstrators free cold baths in winter.
But it was clear to everybody that these makeshift arrange-
ments and tactics would not do. The situation was going out
of hand from the official point of view. The novelty of the
tactics employed by the Congress had non-plussed the
Government. They could of course have made a reckless and
ruthless use of force on a large scale to put down the movement
as they did subsequently, but they were embarrassed by the
presence of the Prince of Wales in India. The Prince of
Wales was due to arrive in Calcutta—the storm centre of the
1921 movement—on December 24th, and about a week before
that, the Viceroy, Lord Reading, arrived there. The members
of the Calcutta Bar had previously agreed to invite him to a
banquet, as he was ex-Lord Chief Justice of England. But
in view of the arrest of Deshbandhu Das, they cancelled the
engagement. The Government of India thus found themselves
in an exceedingly difficult position as they met with opposition
everywhere. In the first place, though the civil disobedience
movement was strongest in Bengal, it was fairly strong
throughout Upper India and no province was free from it.
In addition to this the Akali Movement in the Punjab, the
no-tax campaign in the Midnapore District in Bengal, and
the Moplah Rebellion in Malabar in South India inten-
sified the crisis. Outside India, the Sinn Fein Movement in
Ireland had been largely successful, a treaty with Great
Britain having been signed on December 6th, 1921. Some
months earlier, Afghanistan had entered into a treaty with
F

82 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
Mustafa Kemal Pasha and this was followed by a treaty
between Persia and Soviet Russia. In Egypt, the Nationalist
Wafd Party of Syed Zaghlul Pasha was strong and active.
Thus it was apparent that the entire Moslem world was
combining against Great Britain and this had an inevitable
reaction on the Moslems of India. In these circumstances it
was no surprise that the Government of Lord Reading should
be anxious for a settlement with the Congress. A peace-
maker was found in Pandit Madan Mohon Malaviya, the
veteran nationalist leader, who for reasons of his own, had
kept away from the 1921 movement. He came to interview
Deshbandhu Das in the Presidency Jail with a message from
the Viceroy. The offer that he brought was that if the Congress
agreed to call off the civil disobedience movement imme-
diately, so that the Prince's visit would not be boycotted by
the public, the Government would simultaneously withdraw
the notification declaring Congress volunteers illegal and
release all those who had been incarcerated thereunder. They
would further summon a Round Table Conference of the
representatives of the Government and the Congress to settle
the future constitution of India.
The leader had a long discussion with Moulana Abul Kalam
Azad, the outstanding Moslem leader of Calcutta and with
Pandit Malaviya. Some other points had to be decided,
including the question of the release of the Ali brothers and
their associates, who had been sentenced to two years' hard
labour at Karachi in September. On this point the official
reply was that since they had not been sentenced in connection
with the civil disobedience movement, the Congress should
not press for their release as a part of the terms of settlement.
But the Viceroy was prepared to give an assurance that they
would actually be released in due course. When Deshbandhu
Das broached the subject to us and asked for our opinion,
the younger section, including myself, vehemently opposed
the idea of an armistice on those terms. Thereupon he
entered into an elaborate discussion with us and advanced
the following arguments in support of his contention that a
compromise should be made at once. Rightly or wrongly, he
said, the Mahatma had promised Swaraj within one year.

THE STORM BREAKS 83
That year was drawing to a close: Barely a fortnight was left
and within this short period something had to be achieved
in order to save the face of the Congress and fulfil the
Mahatma’s promise regarding Swaraj. The offer of the Viceroy
had come to him as a godsend. If a settlement was made
before December 31st and all the political prisoners were
released, it would appear to the popular imagination as a
great triumph for the Congress. The Round Table Con-
ference might, or might not be a success, but if it failed and
the Government refused to concede the popular demands—
the Congress could resume the fight at any time and when
it did so, it would command greater prestige and public
confidence.
The above logic was irrefutable and I felt convinced.
Under the joint signatures of Deshbandhu Das and Moulana
A. K. Azad, a telegram was sent to Mahatma Gandhi recom-
mending for acceptance, the proposed terms of settlement.
A reply came to the effect that he insisted on the release of
the Ali brothers and their associates as a part of the terms of
settlement and also on an announcement regarding the date
and composition of the Round Table Conference. Unfor-
tunately, the Viceroy was not in a mood for any further
parleying and wanted an immediate decision. All that the
Deshbandhu could do in the circumstances was to send for
his friends who were then outside prison and urge upon them
that they should use all possible means to get the Mahatma
to agree. These friends did so and many telegrams passed
between Calcutta and Sabarmati, the usual residence of the
Mahatma near Ahmedabad. Ultimately the Mahatma did
come round, but by then it was too late. The Government of
India, tired of waiting, had changed their mind. The Desh-
bandhu was beside himself with anger and disgust. ‘The
chance of a lifetime, he said, had been lost.
The feeling among the political prisoners, as also among
the Congress rank and file, was that the Mahatma had com-
mitted a serious blunder. Only a minority, who had blind
faith in him, refused to pass any judgment. However, since
the opportunity had been lost, there was no option but to make
the best of a bad situation. The Deshbandhu had been

84 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
elected President of the ensuing session of the Congress which
was to meet at Ahmedabad in the last week of December.
His half-written speech, which was a vindication of the prin-
ciples and methods of the non-co-operation movement, was
sent to the Congress and the presidential chair was filled,
in his absence, by Hakim Ajmal Khan, the outstanding
leader of Delhi. There was great enthusiasm at the Ahmeda-
bad Congress and the main resolution was one which called
upon the whole country to adopt a policy of individual and
mass civil disobedience. Every man and woman was exhorted
to join the National Volunteer Corps, defy the emergency
ordinances and court imprisonment. The Congress further
appointed the Mahatma as the Dictator for the whole country,
following the precedent of the Bengal Congress Committee,
who had appointed the Deshbandhu as the Dictator for the
province.
There was an interesting episode at the Ahmedabad Con-
gress. Moulana Hasrat Mohani, an influential Moslem
leader of the United Provinces, moved a resolution to the
effect that the goal of the Indian National Congress should
be defined in the constitution as the establishment of a
republic (the United States of India). So impassioned was his
eloquence and so responsive was the audience, that one felt
as if the resolution would be carried by a large majority.
But the Mahatma rose to oppose the resolution and with
great sobriety argued against the proposition, with the result
that it was thrown out by the house. The proposition was,
however, to be brought up over and over again at subsequent
Congresses till it was accepted at the Lahore Congress in
1929, the mover on that occasion being none other than the
Mahatma himself.
With the dissolution of the Congress, the year 1921 came to
an end. Nothing of a startling character happened on or
before December 31st. The promised Swaraj did not come.
A few months earlier, at the conference with the ex-revolu-
tionaries of Bengal, the Mahatma had said, that he was so
sure of getting Swaraj before the end of the year that he could
not conceive of himself as living beyond December 31st,
without having won Swaraj. He had further said that pro-

THE STORM BREAKS 85
vincial autonomy and diarchy in the Central Government he
could have for the mere asking, but he wanted full Dominion
status and if he had that, he would be prepared to unfurl the
Union Jack over his Ashrama. As the curtain was rung down
on December 31st, 1921, these words floated like dreams
before my mind's eye.
Before the end of the year, with the exception of Mahatma
Gandhi, all the other important leaders were in prison. As
a matter of fact at the time of the negotiations between the
Deshbandhu and the Viceroy, none of the outstanding intel-
lectual stalwarts was in a position to advise the Mahatma as
to the proper course for him to adopt. If they had done so,
then in all probability, events would have taken a different
course. There can of course be no doubt that within twelve
months the country had made tremendous progress and much
of the credit for that belonged to the Mahatma. But what
has to be regretted is that he did not show sufficient diplomacy
and prudence when the crucial hour arrived. In this con-
nection I am reminded of what the Deshbandhu used fre-
quently to say about the virtues and failings of Mahatma
Gandhi's leadership. According to him, the Mahatma opens
a campaign in a brilliant fashion; he works it up with unerring
skill; he moves from success to success till he reaches the
zenith of his campaign—but after that he loses his nerve and
begins to falter.
Before we close this chapter it would be desirable to take
stock of the year's achievements and failures. The year 1921
undoubtedly gave the country a highly-organised party-
organisation. Before that, the Congress was a constitutional
party and mainly a talking body. The Mahatma not only
gave it a new Constitution and a nation-wide basis—but what
is more important, converted it into a revolutionary organisa-
tion. The tricolour national flag—red,¹ green and white—
was adopted all over the country and assumed great im-
portance. Uniform slogans were repeated everywhere and a
uniform policy and ideology gained currency from one end
of India to the other. The English language lost its importance
and the Congress adopted Hindi (or Hindusthani) as the
¹ The colour red in the national flag has now been altered to saffron.

86 ' THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
lingua franca for the whole country. Spontaneously, Khadi
became the official uniform for all Congressmen. In short,
all the features of a modern political party became visible in
India. The credit for such achievements naturally belongs
to the leader of the movement—Mahatma Gandhi. He has
unfortunately been guilty of many serious blunders—‘Hima-
layan blunders,’ to use his own language. And the fact that
even to-day he is enthroned in the hearts of his countrymen
does not mean that he has been free from errors of judgment
but that his positive achievements have been really so great
that his countrymen are prepared to forgive his mistakes.
It is necessary, in this connection, to refer to some of the
shortcomings inherent in the movement from the very begin-
ning and which were to reveal themselves more and more
with the lapse of time. In the first place, too much power and
responsibility was handed over to one man. The disadvantages
of such a state of things were not so great, while Deshbandhu
C. R. Das, Lala Lajpat Rai and Pandit Motilal Nehru were
alive, since they could control the Mahatma to some extent.
But since their death the entire intellect of the Congress has
been mortgaged to one man and those who dare to think
freely and speak out openly are regarded by the Mahatma and
his disciples as heretics and treated as such. Secondly, the
promise of ‘Swaraj within one year’ was not only unwise but
childish. It made the Congress appear so foolish before all
reasonable men. No doubt the Mahatma’s disciples have tried
subsequently to explain away the point by saying that the
country did not fulfil the conditions and so Swaraj could not
be won within one year. The explanation is as unsatisfactory
as the original promise was unwise—because arguing in the
same way, any leader can say that if you fulfil certain con-
ditions you can be free in one hour. In making political
forecasts, no leader worth the name should impose impossible
conditions. He should estimate what conditions are likely to
be fulfilled and what results are likely to be achieved in a
given set of circumstances. Thirdly, the introduction of the
Khilafat question into Indian politics was unfortunate. As
has already been pointed out, if the Khilafatist Moslems had
not started a separate organisation but had joined the Indian

THE STORM BREAKS 87
National Congress, the consequences would not have been so
undesirable. In that case, when the action of the Turks
themselves made the Khilafat issue a dead one, the Khilafatist
Moslems would have been completely absorbed into the
ranks of the nationalists.
The storm that was brewing in 1920 actually broke in
November 1921. During November and December it raged
with great intensity and when the new year dawned, such
was the prospect that it was impossible to predict how long
it would last. The year 1922 was, however, destined to
provide an anti-climax, as we shall presently see.

CHAPTER III
THE ANTI-CLIMAX (1922)
It is not possible at this distant date to understand how
profoundly the people of India believed in 1921 that Swaraj
would be won before the end of that year. Even the most
sophisticated people shared this optimism. I remember
listening once to the speech of an able Bengali advocate at a
public meeting in 1921, in the course of which he asserted
in all seriousness: 'We are surely going to get Swaraj before
the year is out. If you ask me how we are going to win it,
I cannot answer. But we are going to win it all the same.'
On another occasion in 1921, I was discussing with an
exceptionally able Calcutta politician, some instructions
issued by the Mahatma. He had declared that all funds at
the disposal of the Congress should be spent before the end of
the year and that nothing should be left over for the next.
To a normal rational mind this seemed improper, but defend-
ing the Mahatma, this friend said, 'We have deliberately
chosen not to look beyond December 31st.' All this may
appear now as madness, nevertheless, it gives some idea of
the exuberance of naïve enthusiasm and optimism that had
taken possession of the country that year.
With the dawn of the new year, 1922, a special effort was
made by the Mahatma to whip up public enthusiasm. It was
therefore decided to proceed to the last item in his plan—
namely, the non-payment of taxes. On February 1st, 1922,
he sent an ultimatum to the Viceroy, Lord Reading, saying that
if within seven days the Government did not demonstrate a
change of heart, he would commence general non-payment
of taxes in Bardoli sub-division in Gujerat (northern part of
Bombay Presidency). It was reported that in Bardoli sub-
division there were many people who had worked with
Mahatma Gandhi in the passive-resistance movement in
South Africa and had acquired experience in work of that
88

THE ANTI-CLIMAX 89
kind. The beginning of the no-tax campaign in Bardoli
would be the signal for starting a similar campaign all over
the country. Elaborate arrangements were also made to
start a no-tax campaign¹ in Bengal simultaneously, and the
United Provinces and Andhrà (northern portion of Madras
Presidency) were also well-prepared for a campaign of that
sort. The ultimatum of the Mahatma threw the whole
country into a fever of excitement. With bated breath
everybody began to count the hours as they sped by. Sud-
denly there came a bolt from the blue which left the people
speechless and dumbfounded. That was the incident at
Chauri-Chaura.
On February 4th, at a place called Chauri-Chaura in the
United Provinces, the villagers in a fit of exasperation set fire
to the police-station and killed some policemen. When this
news reached the Mahatma, he was horrified at the turn of
events and immediately summoned a meeting of the Congress
Working Committee at Bardoli. At his instance, the Com-
mittee decided to suspend the civil-disobedience movement
(that is, the defiance of laws and governmental decrees,
including non-payment of taxes) entirely throughout India
for an indefinite period and all Congressmen were enjoined to
confine themselves to peaceful constructive work. The
‘constructive programme’ included hand-spinning and hand-
weaving, removal of untouchability, promotion of inter-
communal unity, suppression of the drug traffic, extension of
‘national’ education, suppression of litigation and establish-
ment of arbitration-boards—without voluntarily violating any
law or governmental ordinance existing at the time.
The Dictator’s decree was obeyed at the time but there was
a regular revolt in the Congress Camp. No one could under-
stand why the Mahatma should have used the isolated incident
at Chauri-Chaura for strangling the movement all over the
country. Popular resentment was all the greater because the
Mahatma had not cared to consult representatives from the
different provinces and because the situation in the country
as a whole was exceedingly favourable for the success of the
¹ Non-payment of the Chowkidari tax, which all villagers then had to
pay for the upkeep of the village police, etc.

90 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
civil-disobedience campaign. To sound the order of retreat
just when public enthusiasm was reaching the boiling-point
was nothing short of a national calamity. The principal
lieutenants of the Mahatma, Deshbandhu Das, Pandit Motilal
Nehru and Lala Lajpat Rai, who were all in prison, shared
the popular resentment. I was with the Deshbandhu at the
time and I could see that he was beside himself with anger
and sorrow at the way Mahatma Gandhi was repeatedly
bungling. He was just beginning to forget the December
blunder when the Bardoli retreat came as a staggering blow.
Lala Lajpat Rai was experiencing the same feelings and it is
reported that in sheer disgust he addressed a seventy-page
letter to the Mahatma from prison.
In semi-official circles another explanation has been given
of the sudden volte-face of the Mahatma. It is alleged that
elaborate arrangements had been made by the Government
in secret to render his no-tax campaign at Bardoli a debacle
and that a large portion of the next instalment of taxes had
been already collected. Official circles, sympathetic to the
Mahatma, conveyed secret information to him regarding the
counter-measures adopted by the Government and warned
him of the possibility of a failure, in case he launched the
campaign. When Mahatma Gandhi was brought face to face
with these facts, he realised the hopelessness of the situation
and thinking that without a successful campaign at Bardoli,
he could not work up the movement in the country, he
decided to use the Chauri-Chaura incident as a pretext for
calling off the civil-disobedience movement. Those who
know the Mahatma more intimately will not, however, accept
this explanation.
While the followers were fretting and fuming against the
Dictator, the astute ex-Lord Chief Justice of England was not
idle. Throughout 1921 he had given the Mahatma a long
rope, but since the Ahmedabad Congress he began to look
for an opportunity for putting a stop to his activities. In his
weekly paper Young India, the Mahatma had written some
articles—the finest he has ever written and which will rank
for all time among his inspired writings—which the Govern-
ment held to be seditious. They could therefore arrest him

THE ANTI-CLIMAX 91
and get him sentenced to a long term of imprisonment. But
the point they had to consider was what the effect of such an
action would be on the masses who idolised the Mahatma.
Lord Reading, it was reported, was genuinely afraid that in
spite of all the non-violence which the Dictator preached,
his arrest would be followed by widespread disorder, rioting
and bloodshed. And coming after Lord Chelmsford, under
whose regime the Amritsar massacres had taken place, he had
no desire to repeat the terrible events of 1919. He was
therefore anxiously and nervously looking for an opportunity
to strike at the Mahatma—when the latter himself took a
step which had a depressing effect all over the country and
produced a revolt within the Congress itself. That was
the proper psychological moment for Lord Reading to act
—if only the Secretary of State for India, Mr. Montagu,
would not stand in his way. Fortunately for the Government
of India, early in March, owing to differences with the
Cabinet in England, Mr. Montagu was forced to resign. The
last obstacle was therefore removed and on March 10th, 1922,
Mahatma Gandhi was made a prisoner.
The trial of Mahatma Gandhi was an historic event. In
describing the trial proceedings, Deshbandhu C. R. Das in
his presidential speech at the Gaya Congress in December
1922, drew an analogy with the trial of Christ before Pontius
Pilate. A similar comparison was also drawn by the well-
known Y.M.C.A. leader, the late Mr. K. T. Paul.¹ In the
trial, the Mahatma who described himself as a farmer and a
weaver, made a lengthy statement describing how 'from a
staunch loyalist and co-operator I have become an uncom-
promising disaffectionist and non-co-operator.' And he
ended his statement with these words: 'The only course open
to you, the Judge and the Assessors, is either to resign your
posts and thus dissociate yourselves from evil if you feel
that the law you are called upon to administer is an evil and
that in reality I am innocent, or to inflict on me the severest
penalty if you believe that the system and the law you are
assisting to administer are good for the people of this country
and that my activity is therefore injurious to the public weal.'
¹ The British Connection with India by K. T. Paul, London, 1927, p. 50.

92 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
The English Judge, Mr. Broomfield, sentenced him to six
years' imprisonment.
The resignation of Mr. Montagu was an indication of the
growing power of the Conservatives in the Coalition Cabinet
of Mr. Lloyd George, the Premier. Under pressure from the
Tory members, Mr. Lloyd George delivered in August his
famous 'steel-frame' speech in which he described the Civil
Service as the steel-frame of the Indian administration
which must remain British, no matter what other changes
may overtake India. This speech caused widespread resent-
ment in India, because people were looking forward to the
day when the power and the emoluments of the Civil Service
would be curtailed and the people given thereby a due place
in the administration of their country. About this time,
Lord Winterton, the new Under-Secretary of State for India,
visited India. One of the purposes of his visit was to herald
a new policy with regard to the Indian Princes and Ruling
Chiefs. The year before, when the Prince of Wales visited
India, he had noticed a great difference between his reception
in British India and in the Indian States. In British India, his
visit had been boycotted by the public, whereas in the States
he had no such unpleasant experience. Since that moment,
the British Government were led to adopt a new attitude
towards the Princes—an attitude of greater friendship and
cordiality. The Princes, on their part, utilised the occasion
for persuading the Government of India to introduce
legislation with a view to suppressing hostile agitation and
propaganda conducted against the Princes from British India.
Accordingly in September 1922, a Bill was introduced in the
Assembly called the Indian States (Protection against Dis-
affection) Bill. The Bill was thrown out by the Assembly
but the Viceroy 'certified' it as urgent and necessary and it
became law. It is noteworthy in this connection that the
new Under-Secretary of State for India, Lord Winterton, in
his conferences with the Viceroy and the Governors of
Bombay, Madras and Bengal, advocated this new attitude
towards the Princes and after his visit, representatives of the
Government of India began to sing praises of the Princes
whenever a suitable opportunity presented itself.

THE ANTI-CLIMAX 93
In October there was a General Election in England. The
Coalition Government broke up and the Conservatives came
into power with Mr. Bonar Law at their head and with
Viscount Peel and Lord Winterton as Secretary and Under-
Secretary of State for India respectively. The next month,
Sir Basil Blackett was sent out to India as the Finance
Member to the Government of India. The current of
reaction began to grow stronger and stronger in India. The
Indian Liberal leaders, who under the influence of Mr.
Montagu had been led to work the Constitution and to accept
office as Ministers, found their position increasingly difficult.
Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru had already resigned from the
Viceroy's Executive Council in April, following the resignation
of Mr. Montagu in March. And in March 1923, when the
situation became unbearable for him, Mr. Chintamani, the
Minister of Education in the United Provinces, resigned.
During the whole of 1922 the only decent acts which the
Government did was to concede the demands of the people
in Midnapore district in Bengal and of the Akali Sikhs in
Punjab. In Midnapore, the new Village Self-Government
Act, as a protest against which the no-tax campaign had been
started, was withdrawn, and in Punjab a new law was passed
under which all the Sikh shrines were taken out of the control
of the Mohants and handed over to popular committees.
We must now interrupt our narrative and enquire as to what
the leaders had been doing in the meantime. In the first
week of December 1921, Lala Lajpat Rai and most of his
principal colleagues had been rounded up by the police at a
meeting of the Punjab Congress Committee. A few days
later, Deshbandhu Das and most of his colleagues, including
the Secretary of the Bengal Congress Committee, Mr. B. N.
Sasmal and myself had been placed under arrest. Following
this, Pandit Motilal Nehru and most of the important Con-
gressmen in the United Provinces had been clapped into
prison. According to the rules of non-co-operation, no Con-
gressman could put up a defence before a British Court of
Law. Consequently, everywhere the prosecution had an easy
task. Most of the trials would not last more than a few
minutes and the same magistrate would dispose of hundreds

94 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
of cases in one afternoon. In the case of Deshbandhu Das,
however, the trial dragged on for two months and since Mr.
Sasmal and I had been made his co-accused in the same case,
we had to suffer the agony of a uselessly long trial. It was
freely talked about at the time that in view of the prestige and
influence commanded by the Deshbandhu, the magistrate
was unwilling to convict him without some show of legality.
Time was therefore given again and again to the prosecution
to collect evidence to prepare their case against him. The
prosecution case rested on certain notices, alleged to have
been signed by him, which were in violation of the Govern-
ment proclamation, banning as illegal all volunteer organi-
sations. Those who worked in the office of the Bengal Con-
gress Committee knew as a matter of fact, that these notices
had not been signed by him. Nevertheless, the official expert
in handwriting gave evidence on oath that the signatures were
genuinely of the Deshbandhu and on the strength of this
so-called expert evidence, he was convicted and sentenced to
six months' imprisonment. These as well as other illegalities
relating to his arrest were pointed out in a statement made
by him before the court towards the end of his trial, in the
course of which he sought to prove that the Government
never hesitate to break the law when it suits their own
purpose. Before sentence was passed, a message was sent on
behalf of the prosecution saying that if he accepted the
Bardoli resolution, regarding the suspension of civil dis-
obedience, the Government would set him free at once, but
he refused to entertain any such proposal.
Soon after our conviction we were transferred to another
prison in Calcutta, the Alipore Central Jail, where we had an
opportunity of meeting representatives from all the districts
in Bengal. Except among the orthodox followers of the
Mahatma who were in a minority, the general feeling was one
of resentment at the Bardoli decision. This feeling was
directed more against the Mahatma, since he was the Dictator
of the All-India Congress Committee and the Bardoli resolu-
tion had been passed at his instance. Accepting the Bardoli
retreat as an accomplished fact, the Deshbandu tried to devise
means for rousing public enthusiasm once again by a change

THE ANTI-CLIMAX 95
in tactics. He thus conceived of his plan of non-co-operation
within the legislatures. According to this plan, Congressmen,
instead of boycotting the elections, would stand as candidates
at the polls and after capturing the elected seats, would carry
on a policy of uniform, continuous and consistent opposition
to the Government. The boycott of the legislatures, as
conceived by the Calcutta Congress in 1920, had proved to
be a failure. While the nationalists had kept away from the
legislatures, undesirables had captured those bodies. These
people, instead of assisting the popular movement in the
country, had lent their support to the Government. Through
their help the Government was able to demonstrate to the
world that in their policy of repression, they had the support
of the elected members of the legislatures. According to the
Deshbandhu, in a revolutionary fight, the points of vantage
should not be left in the hands of the enemy. Therefore all
elected seats in the legislatures, as also in all public bodies
(namely municipalities, district boards, etc.), should be cap-
tured by Congressmen. Where there was room for doing
any solid constructive work, they could do so. But failing
that, they could at least keep up a systematic opposition to
the members and agents of the Government, and thereby
prevent them from doing mischief. Further, the election
campaign would give the Congress an occasion and an
opportunity for doing its own propaganda simultaneously all
over the country. The adoption of this new policy did not
imply that they were to abandon any of the other activities
of the Congress, but simply meant an extension of those
activities to include capture of the elected seats in the legis-
latures and all public bodies.
Discussions regarding this new plan were carried on
vigorously from day to day in the Alipore Central Jail. It
soon appeared that in all these discussions the main contention
of the opponents was that the Government of India Act,
1919, hardly left any room for useful opposition within the
legislatures. Owing to the presence of Britishers and of other
members nominated by the Government, it was difficult, if
not impossible, for the elected members to secure a majority
either in the Indian Legislative Assembly (the Central Legis-

96 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
lature) or in the Provincial Legislatures. Further, the
Viceroy, in the case of the former and the Governors, in the
case of the latter, had powers of veto and certification, whereby
they could always override the decision of the legislatures.
The reply to this was that even if the elected members did
not have a majority, they could still keep up a continuous
opposition against the Government and thereby strengthen
the agitation outside the legislatures. Secondly, it would be
possible for the elected members to secure a majority in at
least some of the legislatures and if the Viceroy or the Governor
set aside the decision of any legislature, the Government
would stand condemned before the bar of public opinion,
both inside India and outside. Lastly, under the existing
constitution, a vote against the Ministers or their departments
could not be overridden by the Governor of any province,
and if the provincial legislature voted down the salaries of
Ministers, they would automatically be thrown out of office
and the working of the diarchical constitution would have to
be suspended. As these discussions went on for some weeks,
two parties crystallised among the political prisoners in the
Alipore Jail and they proved to be the nuclei of the future
'Swaraj' and 'No-Change' parties. In May 1922, the annual
conference of Congressmen in Bengal, called the 'Provincial
Conference,' was held in Chittagong. Mrs. C. R. Das was
elected President of the Conference because of the gallant part
she had played in last year's movement. In her presidential
speech, she stated that the Congress might have to consider
a change in tactics and suggested, among other things, that
the policy of non-co-operation within the legislatures was
worth considering. It was not difficult to guess who had
inspired her speech and taking it as a feeler sent out by her
husband, a storm of controversy was at once let loose all over
the country. It was clear therefrom that the orthodox fol-
lowers of the Mahatma would not think of any deviation
from the plan that he had laid down before his arrest and
that a stiff fight would take place before the new plan could
be adopted by the Congress. This prospect, far from dis-
couraging us, helped to whip up our enthusiasm. The Desh-
bandhu had frequent discussions with his supporters in