द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

82 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
Mustafa Kemal Pasha and this was followed by a treaty
between Persia and Soviet Russia. In Egypt, the Nationalist
Wafd Party of Syed Zaghlul Pasha was strong and active.
Thus it was apparent that the entire Moslem world was
combining against Great Britain and this had an inevitable
reaction on the Moslems of India. In these circumstances it
was no surprise that the Government of Lord Reading should
be anxious for a settlement with the Congress. A peace-
maker was found in Pandit Madan Mohon Malaviya, the
veteran nationalist leader, who for reasons of his own, had
kept away from the 1921 movement. He came to interview
Deshbandhu Das in the Presidency Jail with a message from
the Viceroy. The offer that he brought was that if the Congress
agreed to call off the civil disobedience movement imme-
diately, so that the Prince's visit would not be boycotted by
the public, the Government would simultaneously withdraw
the notification declaring Congress volunteers illegal and
release all those who had been incarcerated thereunder. They
would further summon a Round Table Conference of the
representatives of the Government and the Congress to settle
the future constitution of India.
The leader had a long discussion with Moulana Abul Kalam
Azad, the outstanding Moslem leader of Calcutta and with
Pandit Malaviya. Some other points had to be decided,
including the question of the release of the Ali brothers and
their associates, who had been sentenced to two years' hard
labour at Karachi in September. On this point the official
reply was that since they had not been sentenced in connection
with the civil disobedience movement, the Congress should
not press for their release as a part of the terms of settlement.
But the Viceroy was prepared to give an assurance that they
would actually be released in due course. When Deshbandhu
Das broached the subject to us and asked for our opinion,
the younger section, including myself, vehemently opposed
the idea of an armistice on those terms. Thereupon he
entered into an elaborate discussion with us and advanced
the following arguments in support of his contention that a
compromise should be made at once. Rightly or wrongly, he
said, the Mahatma had promised Swaraj within one year.