द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

THE FIGHT RESUMED 273
among whom were included 5,325 women and many children,
have been arrested, imprisoned and humiliated. This could
not possibly include arrests in the far-off villages in the
interior of the country and, therefore, the Congress
estimates the total arrests to be over 80,000 up to that date.
The jails are overcrowded and ordinary prisoners are being
released before their time to make room for political
prisoners. To this has to be added the number of arrests
made during the last ten days, including those of the
delegates to the Delhi Congress. According to the reports
in the Press, firing has been resorted to in at least 29
cases with considerable loss of life. There have been lathi
charges on unarmed crowds at 325 places. There have been
633 cases of house searches and 102 cases of confiscation
of property. A general policy has been pursued of imposing
extraordinarily heavy fines on persons who have been con-
victed in connection with the movement and property far
in excess of what was necessary for realising the amount of
the fines has been attached and sold. The Press has been
gagged as it has never been gagged before. 163 cases have
been reported where the newspapers and public presses
have been regulated by orders for confiscation, demands
for security and consequent closing down of the presses,
warnings, searches and arrests of editors, printers or
keepers. Numerous public meetings and processions of
non-violent men and women have been dispersed by lathi
charges, and sometimes by firing.' (Indian Recorder,
Calcutta, p. 271.)
In connection with the above report, it may be noted, that
during the period under review, political prisoners in Karachi
Jail and in Haripur Jail in the Frontier Province were subjected
to whipping. In Rajshahi Jail in Bengal, political prisoners
were subjected to numerous humiliating punishments like
bar-fetters, night handcuffs, gunny clothing, etc. In Suri Jail
in Bengal, women prisoners went on hunger-strike as a protest
against ill-treatment.¹
¹ In many other prisons similar incidents took place. In Rajmundhry
Jail, a prisoner belonging to the Lahore Conspiracy Case was flogged.
In Bellary Jail, political prisoners were attacked by warders with sticks
(lathis). In the Deoli Detention Camp for Bengal state-prisoners near
Ajmer, the state-prisoners were assaulted by the guards and seriously
injured. In all such cases the usual charge against the prisoners was one
of insubordination.
S

274 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
On the whole the activities of the Congress in 1932 did
not compare unfavourably with those of 1930. Nevertheless,
every Congressman could feel one difference. In 1930, the
Congress had taken the offensive, while the Government was
on the defensive. In 1932 it was just the reverse. There is no
doubt that in spite of the manifold defects of the Delhi Pact,
die-hards in England and in India took it as a defeat or a
humiliation for the all-powerful British Government. They
were smarting under a sense of defeat and wanted to avenge
themselves. The overwhelming majority gained by the
Conservatives at the General Election in October 1931,
encouraged them greatly. Moreover, the attitude of Mahatma
Gandhi and the statements made by him in England, gave
them the impression that he was unwilling or unprepared to
face a fight again. That the Mahatma was honestly pursuing
a peaceful policy has to be admitted on all hands and his
very unpreparedness can be regarded as a proof of his sincerity
of purpose. In fact, the Mahatma carried his peaceful inten-
tions so far that he neglected to keep his 'powder dry.' He
was in reality dragged into a fight in 1932 because of the
non possumus attitude of the Viceroy on the one hand and the
rising temper of the public on the other. In this connection
it is significant that the aggressive steps taken by the Govern-
ment of India during the absence of the Mahatma, had the
full approval of His Majesty's Government. Apart from the
Government's attitude there were two other factors that
forced the Mahatma to resume the fight, the general temper
of the public and the influence of the Left Wing. As for the
first, in none of the major provinces was the public satisfied
at the attitude of the Government. Those who had given in
to the Mahatma hoping that something tangible would come
out of the Round Table Conference were disillusioned.
Further, the steady propaganda carried on by Left-Wing
Congressmen, youth-leaguers¹ and Left-Wing Labourites,
also had its effect. While in England the Mahatma did feel
now and again that another fight was unavoidable but the pit
¹ On December 22nd, 1931, the Maharashtra Youth Conference met at
Poona with the writer in the chair and passed a resolution calling upon the
Congress Working Committee to resume the civil-disobedience campaign.

THE FIGHT RESUMED 275
of it is that no preparations were made by the Congress for
the coming campaign and no plans were prepared in advance.
The campaign of 1932 was an imitation of that of 1930 and
the Government had prepared effective counter-measures for
dealing with a campaign of that sort. If the Congress wanted
to be successful in 1932 as well—it should have devised new
tactics to take the Government by surprise.
It is not generally understood why the Congress was
unsuccessful in 1932, though the same tactics had been
successful in 1930. The reason is that in 1930 the tactics of
the Congress had taken the Government by surprise. No
doubt, the same tactics had been employed in 1921 and 1922,
but owing to the sudden termination of the campaign in
February 1922, the Congress did not have to disclose all its
secrets. Moreover, eight years had elapsed since that cam-
paign and most of the men who had dealt with that campaign
were no longer in the service of the Government. Conse-
quently, the 1930 campaign was to all intents and purposes a
novel campaign and it took the Government some time to
comprehend it and to develop counter-tactics thereafter to
cope with it. The Delhi Truce gave the Government time to
do this work and on January 1st, 1932, when the Working Com-
mittee resolved to resume the civil-disobedience campaign,
the Government forces were in complete readiness to strike
immediately and ruthlessly. And they were not content with
striking at those who worked in the open, but made a clean
sweep of the brains and financiers of the movement as well.¹
During the first eight months of the year the fight went on
with unabated zeal. The declaration of the Government that
the Congress would soon be down and out was falsified.
The Congress was still alive and kicking, and there was no
sign that it would meet with an early death. In March the
movement was further strengthened because the Jamiat-ul-
ulema, the All-India organisation of the Moslem priests and
divines, under the leadership of Mufti Kifayetullah, declared
¹ Among those imprisoned in this way were Mr. Bhulabhai Desai, former
Advocate-General of Bombay and Mr. Sarat C. Bose, a prominent advocate
of Calcutta and a front-rank Congressman who was then an Alderman of
the Calcutta Municipality. At present (November 1934) the latter is
still in detention.

276 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
for non-co-operation and the leaders of the Jamiat soon found
themselves in prison. This decision of the Jamiat considerably
strengthened the position of the Nationalist Moslems, who
had all along been an integral part of the Congress, and of the
Moslems of the Frontier Province who were going through
the worst form of official repression. Nevertheless, the odds
were against the Congress. In Bombay, which had been the
storm centre in 1930, Hindu-Moslem riots broke out in May
and dragged on for nearly six weeks. Owing to this outbreak,
the Congress campaign in Bombay suffered a terrible set-back
from which it could not recover. In Gujerat, the harassed,
persecuted and impoverished peasantry could no longer
wage the brave fight of which they could boast in 1930. In
the United Provinces, after some months, the no-rent
campaign could not make further headway in the face of
official repression. In Bengal, more serious than the civil-
disobedience movement was the terrorist campaign of the
revolutionaries. But though terrorism was a thorn to the
Government, it brought untold hardship on the people, since
several districts like Chittagong, Midnapore and Dacca were
virtually handed over to martial law and the innocent
villagers were subjected to heavy collective fines for the
misdeeds committed by unknown people. During the year
a liberal use was made of fire-arms for dispersing Congress
demonstrations. Replying to a question in the Indian Legis-
lative Assembly, the Home member to the Government of
India, Mr. (now Sir) H. G. Haig stated that in dispersing
'assemblies, firing was resorted to seventeen times in Bengal,
seven times in the United Provinces, three times in Bihar
and Orissa, once in Madras Presidency, once in the Frontier
Province—while in Bombay Presidency the casualties from
shooting, were thirty-four killed and ninety-one wounded.
In this situation, when the Congress was engaged in a life
and death struggle, an unexpected development took place
which led to a complete side-tracking of the civil-disobedience
movement in the country. That was the fast of Mahatma
Gandhi on September 20th, 1932.
On March 11th, the Mahatma had written to Sir Samuel
Hoare informing him that in keeping with what he had

THE FIGHT RESUMED 277
stated at the Round Table Conference in London on Novem-
ber 13th, 1931, if the depressed classes were torn away from
the main body of Hindus by the grant of a separate electorate,
he would resist it with his life and in pursuance of that
resolve, he would fast unto death. On April 13th, Sir Samuel
Hoare had replied in a non-committal way, saying that the
Government would give the matter their fullest consideration
before coming to a decision. The 'Communal Award'¹ of
the Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, was thereafter
announced on August 17th. It provided for a certain number
of seats for the depressed classes in the Provincial Legislatures
which would be filled up on the basis of a separate electorate.
In addition to this, members of the depressed classes would
be entitled to stand for election from the general con-
stituencies earmarked for Hindus and would be registered in
a common electoral rôle along with other Hindus. The award
further provided that if His Majesty's Government were
satisfied that the communities concerned were mutually agreed
upon a practicable alternative scheme, either in respect of
one or more of the Governor's provinces or in respect of the
whole of British India, before the new Government of India
Bill was passed into law, they would be prepared to recom-
mend to Parliament that the alternative should be substituted
for the provisions now outlined. On August 18th the Mahatma
addressed a letter to the Premier informing him that in
accordance with what he had written to Sir Samuel Hoare
on March 11th, he had resolved to commence fast unto
death at noon on September 20th. 'The fast will cease if
during its progress, the British Government, of its own
motion or under pressure of public opinion, revise their
decision and withdraw their scheme of communal electorates
for the depressed classes whose representatives should be
elected by general electorate under common franchise, no
matter how wide it is.' The Mahatma further asked that the
entire correspondence be given immediate and full publicity.
¹ As the members nominated by the British Government to the Second
Round Table Conference in 1931 could not come to an agreement on the
question of representation, electorate, etc., for the legislatures under the
New Constitution, the British Prime Minister announced the Government's
decision. This decision is known as the Communal Award.

278 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
The Premier replied on September 8th, regretting the decision
of the Mahatma but affirming that the provisions of the award
could not be altered except on the condition stated therein.
The Mahatma received this communication the next day and
immediately replied saying that he felt compelled reluctantly
to adhere to the decision he had already conveyed.
Words cannot describe the anxiety and alarm that passed
from one end of the country to the other when the news about
the impending fast was published on September 13th. Frantic
appeals were made to the Mahatma to desist but the appeals
proved ineffective. Government offered to release him under
certain conditions but he declined conditional release. It
was therefore decided to leave him undisturbed in Poona
Prison, but to remove all restrictions regarding interviews
and correspondence. On an appeal from Pandit M. M.
Malaviya, a conference of Hindu leaders met at Bombay on
September 19th, in order to deliberate how the Mahatma's
life could be saved. After a preliminary discussion there, the
leaders adjourned to Poona in order to be in constant touch
with the Mahatma. After prolonged discussions, an agree-
ment was arrived at between the Hindu leaders on September
24th, which virtually did away with separate electorate for the
depressed classes. This agreement, hereafter known as the
Poona Agreement,¹ was ratified by the Hindu leaders' con-
ference and by the Hindu Mahasabha on September 25th,
and was cabled to the Government of India and to the Prime
Minister. On September 26th, His Majesty's Government
announced that they were prepared to recommend to Parlia-
ment to endorse the Poona Agreement. The whole country
breathed a sigh of relief. Prayers went up to heaven that the
Mahatma's life had been saved.
The Poona Agreement provided for a certain number of
reserved seats for members of the depressed classes in the
Legislatures on the basis of a common electorate for all
classes of Hindus. There was, however, one qualification.
The members of the depressed classes registered in the
general electoral roll in a constituency would form an electoral
college which would elect a panel of four candidates belonging
¹ Also called the Poona Pact.

THE FIGHT RESUMED 279
to the depressed classes for each of such reserved seats by
the method of the single vote. The provision for a primary
election, to be in operation for ten years, was insisted on by
Dr. Ambedkar (who had been nominated by the Government
to the Round Table Conference) though before the Simon
Commission and at the first Round Table Conference, he
had demanded reservation of seats for the depressed classes
on the basis of a common electorate for all Hindus. Mr.
M. C. Rajah, a prominent leader of the depressed classes
had, on the contrary, consistently stood for reservation of
seats for his community on the basis of a common electorate.
Earlier in the year he had entered into a pact with Dr.
Moonje, President of the Hindu Mahasabha, on this basis.
This pact—known popularly as the Rajah-Moonje Pact—was
however opposed by Dr. Ambedkar and his followers and on
that ground it was not accepted by the British Government.
As long as the Mahatma was on fast, rational thinking was
completely suspended and the one thought of his country-
men was how to save his life. Once he was out of danger,
people began to examine the Poona Agreement in the cold
light of reason. Then it was realised that while the Communal
Award had provided 71 seats in the Provincial Legislatures
for the depressed classes, the Poona Agreement had provided
148. These additional seats would be given them at the
expense of the rest of the Hindu community. In provinces
like Bengal, where Hindus had already been unjustly treated
in the award, the Poona Agreement was regarded as a further
injustice by the rest of the Hindu community—particularly
in view of the fact that the depressed classes problem
hardly existed there. Moreover, it was realised that the
Poona Agreement had not done away with separate electorate
altogether. People began to ask seriously if after all it was
worth while for Mahatma Gandhi to have staked his life for
such an issue, especially when the Communal Award was from
start to finish an objectionable document.
But whatever may be the permanent value of the Poona
Agreement, there is no doubt that the fast of Mahatma
Gandhi had a permanent and far-reaching effect in rous-
ing the conscience of the Hindu community. It was a

280 · THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
unique spectacle to see how the heart of the entire nation
throbbed for one man. All sections of the Hindus were
stirred to activity as they had never been before. The most
important result of the 'epic fast' was to give a powerful
impetus to the movement for the eradication of untouch-
ability. During the fast such a colossal amount of sympathy
had been generated not only for the Mahatma personally but
for the cause of the depressed classes as well, that it would
have been a great pity if that sympathy had not been harnessed
into permanent channels of activity through the organisation
of the All-India Anti-Untouchability League.
While the Mahatma's fast had a remarkable effect on his
countrymen, in the international sphere it did not prove to
be an unmixed blessing. It served to advertise to a dis-
proportionate degree the issue of the depressed classes.
Hitherto the world had known only one issue relating to India,
the political issue—India's grievance against England. Now
the leader of the Nationalist movement himself announced
to the world that there was another issue—the internal issue
—of such vital importance to India that he was prepared to
stake his life for it. And British propagandists were not slow
to take advantage of the opportunity. In September 1932,
the whole of Europe was told that the Mahatma was fasting
because he was against granting certain rights to the un-
touchables.¹ Ever since then the European public have been
constantly fed with stories that India is a land full of internal
dissensions where not only Hindus and Moslems, but Hindus
themselves are perpetually fighting with one another and only
the strong hand of Britain is able to maintain peace and order.
The fast had another unfortunate effect which proved to
be more serious. It served to side-track the political move-
ment at a time when all possible attention should have been
devoted to it. If with the termination of the fast the Mahatma
had handed over the anti-untouchability work to friends
outside, the effect of the fast would not have been so harmful.
But when the leader himself began to conduct the anti-
¹ In many countries in Europe the writer has heard this remark made
by people generally interested in Indian affairs. At first he did not realise
the significance of this remark—but later on he found out that in September
1932, this story had been told all over Europe.

THE FIGHT RESUMED 281
untouchability campaign from behind the prison-walls, what
could his followers do? The Mahatma had all along held
that a Satyagraha prisoner should regard himself as 'civilly
dead' and should not bother about the work outside prison.
But on this occasion he did not stick to his usual principle.
To make matters worse, when questions were put to him,
at this time, as to whether political work should be done or
social work, he gave replies that were rather confusing or he
did not reply at all, which led people to think that he preferred
social work to political. This lead of the Mahatma was
naturally followed more by his blind followers and by those
who were tired of repeated suffering and imprisonment and
wanted a convenient excuse for giving up the political fight.
Another theory has been put forward to explain the
Mahatma's conduct. It is advanced that he realised the
ultimate failure of the movement and therefore wanted to
create out of it—another movement which would be of
benefit to his countrymen. This theory cannot be accepted
since in November 1931, in London, the Mahatma had spoken
of his determination to resist with his life, special electorate
for the depressed classes. One feels inclined to think that this
side-tracking of the civil-disobedience movement was the
result of that subjectivism which seizes him at times and
makes him utterly blind to and oblivious of objective realities.
Ever since the Round Table Conference, he had begun to
ponder so deeply over the depressed classes problem that the
other problems receded to the background for the time being.
Whatever the real explanation may be, there is no doubt
that the fast served to side-track the civil-disobedience move-
ment and cause a diversion of men, money and public
enthusiasm to the anti-untouchability (or 'Harijan')¹ campaign
at a time when the position of the Congress, vis-à-vis the
Government, was none too strong. The effect was the same
as it would be if in the middle of a battle, a general gave the
order to his troops to start excavating a canal in order to
supply water to the thirsty people of the countryside.
In response to the appeal made by the Mahatma on
¹ The word 'Harijan' (literally, 'a man of God') was coined by the
Mahatma to denote a member of the depressed classes or untouchables.

282 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
September 26th, temples and public wells throughout India
began to be thrown open to the untouchables. In fact so rapid
was the march of progress, that it looked as if the demon of
untouchability would be laid low in no time. However,
a resistance was met with at Guruvayur in South India
where the Zamorin, the trustee of the temple, refused to throw
it open to the untouchables on the plea of tradition and
legal difficulties. Thereupon, Mr. Kelappan, a well-known
and highly-esteemed Congress worker, commenced a fast as
a protest against the exclusion of untouchables from the temple.
When his condition became critical, the Mahatma was pre-
vailed upon to intervene and save his life. At the request
of the Mahatma, who undertook to continue the fight, Kelap-
pan gave up the fast. About this time it was found that in
many places the authorities or trustees of several temples were
raising legal obstacles in the,way of throwing open the temples
to untouchables. It was therefore considered desirable to
introduce legislation in the Madras Legislative Council and
in the Indian Legislative Assembly to remove such legal
difficulties once for all. The Bill drafted for the Madras
Council was refused sanction by the Viceroy. Permission for
introduction of the Bill drafted for the Indian Legislative
Assembly was granted by the Viceroy on January 23rd, 1933,
but it was made clear that the Government would not commit
itself in any way with regard to the Bill and would afford full
opportunity for public opinion to express itself on the question.
A special request was made to the Government of India for
affording facilities for the speedy passage of the Temple
Entry Bill, but the Viceroy declined to offer any such facilities
and thanks to the dilatory tactics of the Government, the Bill
is still hanging fire. To strengthen the demand for temple
entry for untouchables, a plebiscite of temple-goers was taken
at Guruvayur on December 25th, 1932. Though Guruvayur
is regarded to be a socially backward place, out of 20,163
votes recorded, 77 per cent. were in favour of temple entry,
13 per cent. were against, while 10 per cent. were neutral.
Another beneficial result followed from the appeal of the
Mahatma made on September 26th to settle Hindu-Moslem
differences. A Unity Conference was convened at Allahabad

THE FIGHT RESUMED 283
in which Pandit Malaviya and Moulana Shaukat Ali took a
leading part. The Conference met on November 1st, under
the presidentship of Mr. Vijayaraghav Achariar, ex-President
of the Congress and a large number of representative Hindus
and Moslems attended. The atmosphere was one of perfect
cordiality. A great deal of progress was made in the nego-
tiations for a Hindu-Moslem settlement. But ultimately two
obstacles arose. On one side, the leaders of the communalist
section of the Moslems condemned the unity efforts. On the
other side, the Bengal problem proved insoluble, since the
Europeans would not surrender any seat allowed them
under the Communal Award and the Moslems would not be
content with less than 51 per cent. of the total number of
seats. Though the Conference did not come to a successful
conclusion, it had a moral value and it helped to clear the
atmosphere considerably.
We may now review the actions of the Government during
the year 1932. While taking the severest measures against the
Congress, the Viceroy constantly urged that the Government
would simultaneously push on the work of constitution-
making. About the middle of January, the Consultative
Committee was appointed for keeping the Government in
close touch with all the leaders of the other parties, barring
the Congress, through the Viceroy and especially for con-
sidering the recommendations of the Franchise, Federal
Finance and Indian States Inquiry Committees as a pre-
liminary to their consideration by His Majesty's Government.
Owing to the delay in issuing the Communal Award, the
Consultative Committee was twice postponed on the insistence
of the Moslem members. On June 27th, an announcement
was made by the Government to the effect that they had
decided to provide for Provincial Autonomy and Federation
in a single Bill and that they would abandon the Third
Session of the Round Table Conference. The Indian Liberal
leaders immediately lodged a strong protest against the
abandonment of the Round Table Conference and following
this, Messrs. Sastri, Jayakar, Joshi and Sir Tej Bahadur
Sapru resigned from the Consultative Committee. This
made the Government climb down a bit, and on July 7th,

284 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
Sir Samuel Hoare, in a speech before the Central Asian
Society, explained that the change of procedure did not
imply a change of policy. He further stated that when the
Joint Parliamentary Committee met to consider the Govern-
ment proposals, Indians would be enabled to appear not only
as witnesses but also to participate in the discussions of the
Committee. The explanation of the Secretary of State for
India was not considered adequate by the Liberal leaders who
persisted in their opposition. On September 5th, a fresh
announcement was made by the Viceroy before the Indian
Legislative Assembly to the effect that since the Consultative
Committee would not be able to make the contribution
anticipated from it, it had been decided to hold further
discussions in London. A small body of representatives from
British India and from the Indian States would therefore
meet in London about the middle of November. The work
would be in accordance with a fixed agenda and there would
be no public session. The Liberal leaders now felt satisfied
that their trip to London was restored. The Third Round
Table Conference commenced work on November 17th; and
ended on December 24th, the final session being open to the
public. The Labour Party did not participate in this Con-
ference on the ground that the Government had gone back
on the policy of conciliation. They also wanted that the Indian
members should keep aloof, but that desire was not complied
with. Sir Samuel Hoare summed up the results of the
Conference at the close of the session. The following are
some of the decisions made by the Government to which he
referred:

1. The Moslem community would have a representation
   of 33⅓ per cent. in the Federal legislature so far as
   British India was concerned.
2. It was not possible to give any definite date as to
   when the Federation would be in operation.
3. Sindh and Orissa would be separate provinces.
4. The Defence Budget would be non-votable.
5. For employing Indian troops outside India for
   purposes other than Indian, the decision of the
   Federal Ministry and the Federal Legislature would

THE FIGHT RESUMED 285
be taken, but the Crown would have full authority
when Indian troops were to be employed outside
India in the defence of India.
Finally, in response to an appeal for co-operation made
by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Sir Samuel Hoare said that he
wanted to see no empty chairs at the Round Table Con-
ference of the Joint Select Committee.
During the year the revolutionary movement was strong
in the province of Bengal. Special powers were given to the
Bengal Government by the Viceroy, in. addition to the
Viceregal ordinances. The Viceregal Ordinances, four in
number, designed mainly for coping with the civil-dis-
obedience movement, were issued on January 4th, 1932. On
June 30th, before these Ordinances were due to lapse, a fresh
but comprehensive Ordinance, called the Special Powers
Ordinance 1932, was promulgated by the Government of
India. In addition to this, the Bengal Emergency Powers
Ordinance had been issued in November 1931, for arming the
Bengal Government with powers similar to those enjoyed by
martial law authorities, for the suppression of the terrorist
movement. This Ordinance was renewed on May 29th, 1932.
Further powers were given to the Bengal Government on
July 20th, by the Government of India through the Bengal
Emergency Powers (Second Amendment) Ordinance 1932.
On September 1st, the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment
Act, 1932, was passed by the Bengal Legislative Council
which gave increased powers to the Executive, the most
important provision being that attempt at murder was made
punishable with death sentence. Another Act was passed on
September 6th, called the Bengal Suppression of Terrorist
Outrages Act, 1932, which empowered the executive to seize
buildings, to order citizens on pain of punishment to assist
them in the suppression of terrorism, to impose collective
fines on villagers, etc. The Legislation passed in the Bengal
Legislative Council armed the Government with permanent
powers—so that in future, emergency ordinances would not be
necessary. During the year, terrorist outrages took place
from time to time, the most important of them being the

286 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
murder of Mr. Douglas, the District Magistrate of Midnapore
and Mr. Ellison, Additional Superintendent of Police,
Comilla. On the side of the Government the severest measures
were taken. Troops were quartered in many districts where
trouble had taken place or was apprehended and heavy
collective fines were imposed in Chittagong, Midnapore and
twenty-four Parganas Districts. Moreover, the abandoned
prison for revolutionary prisoners in the Andaman Islands
in the Bay of Bengal was reopened in spite of public protest
and political prisoners were transported there.
During the year, two important Labour Conferences were
held. The first session of the Indian Trades Union Federation
(former Right Wing of the Trade Union Congress) was held
at Madras on July 15th, with Mr. V. V. Giri in the chair.
Among the resolutions passed was one relating to the position
of labour in the future Indian Constitution. The All-India
Trade Union Congress met on September 12th at Madras,
with Mr. J. N. Mitra as President. The Trade Union Con-
gress condemned the Communal Award and the Ottawa Pact
as harmful to the best interests of the workers. It also passed
a resolution saying that in view of the sporadic strikes at
Matunga (near Bombay), Kharagpur (seventy miles from
Calcutta), Lillooah (near Calcutta), Lucknow (in the United
Provinces) and other places, it was clear that the workers in
all the railways were resolved to declare a general strike
and that the responsibility for postponing it indefinitely, lay
upon leaders like Mr. Jamnadas Mehta,`Mr. V. V. Giri and
Mr. S. C. Joshi (Right-Wing leaders), who were guiding the
policy of the Railwaymen's Federation. Attempts were made
during the year to bring about unity between the Trades
Union Federation and the Trade Union Congress, but they
proved abortive. Though a ballot of the railway workers in
May resulted in a vote for a general strike, the strike was not
launched. There were sporadic strikes, however, in many
centres and in October there was a strike at the Perambur rail-
way workshop, near Madras, which dragged on for some months.
The communal situation in India was, on the whole,
fairly satisfactory—the only exception being Bombay, where.
Hindu-Moslem riots broke out in May. In some of the Indian

THE FIGHT RESUMED 287
States, however, there was trouble. The year before, there
was trouble in Kashmir, where the peasants (who are pre-
dominantly Moslems) rose in revolt against the Hindu
Maharajah. Though the grievances were mainly economic, a
communal colouring was given to the movement by Moslem
sympathisers in British India and also by the peasants them-
selves, who in some cases attacked their Hindu fellow-subjects.
However, with the help of troops from British India, the
revolt was suppressed but as a price for the assistance rendered
him, the Maharajah had to submit to the terms of the British
Government in the matter of appointing British officers. To
appease his subjects, the Maharajah undertook to make
concessions in land revenue, to extend primary education,
to give a share of state-appointments to all communities and
to introduce a measure of constitutional reforms, including a
Legislative Assembly. The first elections to the Kashmir
Legislative Assembly took place in September 1934. In
May 1932, trouble broke out in Alwar State, similar to that
in Kashmir, the only difference being that the trouble was
more communal and less economic than in Kashmir. To put
down the rebellious Moslem subjects, troops from British
India had to be called in. The assistance was welcomed by
the Maharaja, but when the British Government sought to
impose their conditions,¹ the Maharajah refused to submit.
The dispute between the Maharajah, and the British Govern-
ment went on for some time, but ultimately the former was
ordered to leave his state. That order holds good to-day.
One of the surprises of the year was the result of the
elections held in Burma in November 1932 to decide whether
Burma was in favour of separation from India. The year
before, Burma had been in the throes of a peasant rebellion,
a serious disturbance, the like of which India had not seen
since 1857. The rebellion continued for more than a year.
In 1932, the situation gradually became quiet and orders were
issued for a General Election. On the ground that the
electoral rolls had been prepared in 1931, when many of the
¹ One of the conditions was that the Maharajah should submit to a
Control Commission, The trouble of May 1932 subsided by September.
But agrarian unrest of a violent type broke out in January 1933. In
May 1933 the Maharajah was ordered to leave his state.

288. THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
     districts were in a state of revolt and the Anti-Separationist
     Party had no interest in an election, the Anti-Separationist
     leaders asked for fresh electoral rolls. The Government
     turned down the request and the elections were held on the
     basis of the old rolls. Nevertheless, the Anti-Separationists
     came out with a clear majority. When the newly-elected
     Council met in December, after a lengthy debate, the follow-
     ing resolution was carried without a division:
289. This Council opposes the separation of Burma from
     India on the basis of the Constitution for a separated
     Burma as outlined in the statement of the Prime
     Minister at the Burma Round Table Conference on
     January 12th, 1932.
290. This Council emphatically opposes the unconditional
     and permanent federation of Burma with India.
291. This Council will continue to oppose the separation
     of Burma from India until Burma is granted a Con-
     stitution on certain terms (as defined in the amend-
     ment).
     In the alternative, the Council proposes that Burma
     shall enter the Indian Federation on certain terms and
     conditions including the right of secession.
292. The Council urges that a conference be called at an
     early date for the purpose of determining the future
     Constitution of Burma as a separate unit on the basis
     defined or as a unit in the Indian Federation accord-
     ing to the terms defined with right to secede.
     (Clauses three and four were the amendments incor-
     porated in the resolution.)
     The Government, however, interpreted this resolution as a
     vote not given for unqualified federation with India, and they
     maintained that conditional federation, i.e., federation with
     the right to secede, was not possible. The present policy of
     the Government is to separate Burma from India and in
     accordance with that policy, Burma was not invited to send
     members to the third session of the Round Table Conference
     in November-December, 1932.
     Towards the end of November a very important matter
     came up for consideration before the Indian Legislative

THE FIGHT RESUMED 289
Assembly—the Ottawa Agreement. This Agreement had
been entered into by the nominees of the Government of
India who had attended the Imperial Economic Conference
at Ottawa, in Canada, in August 1932. The purpose of the
Agreement was to force on India a scheme of Empire pre-
ference whereby India was to give to Great Britain pre-
ferences covering no less than twenty-six per cent. of her
imports. There was considerable agitation in the country
against the ratification of the Ottawa Agreement. In the
absence of the Nationalist members in the Assembly, it was
however impossible to throw out the Agreement. The
Agreement was referred to a Select Committee and the majority
report moved by Sir H. S. Gour was adopted by the Assembly.
The Agreement was ratified for a period of three years at the
end of which the matter would come up again before the
Assembly for consideration. It was further provided that the
Government should prepare an annual report reviewing the
effect on India’s export and import trade of the preferences
and that the report should be examined by a Committee of
fifteen members appointed by the Assembly. The new
Ottawa duties came into operation on January 16th, 1933.
In this connection it should be noted that since England
went off the Gold Standard on September 21st, 1931, the
total value of gold exported from Bombay up to December
31st, 1932, amounted to Rs. 105, 27, 60, 190 (Rs. 13½ = £1
approximately) or about 1,053 million rupees. Repeated
appeals were made to the Government by Chambers of
Commerce, business men and public leaders to stop this flow
of gold from the country, but to no avail. The Maharashtra
Chamber of Commerce, Bombay, for instance, wrote to the
Government of India towards the end of October, that fol-
lowing the example of the Bank of England, the Government
of India should buy up gold. According to the Chamber,
since India had a gold bullion reserve of only Rs. 112.3 millions
against a note circulation of Rs. 1,752.6 millions, the Govern-
ment would be well advised to buy up more gold.¹
¹ The flow of gold from India has been going on unchecked ever since.
According to a Press statement issued from Bombay on October 6th, 1934,
the total value of gold exported from Bombay since England went off the
Gold Standard amounts to Rs. 197,89,40,886—or about 1979 million rupees.
T

290 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
There was another important matter which came up before
the Assembly in September—the Criminal Law Amendment
Bill 1932. The purpose of this Bill was to place on the Statute
Book the Ordinances which had been promulgated in January
by the Viceroy and had been renewed in June as Special
Powers Ordinance, 1932. As the Ordinance was to lapse in
December, it had either to be renewed again or permanently
placed on the Statute Book. In connection with this Bill, as
in connection with the Ottawa Agreement, the absence of
the Nationalist members, who had resigned in 1930, was
keenly felt. The Bill was passed into Law in November.
In August a delegation of the India League of London,
consisting of Miss Wilkinson, ex-M.P., Miss Monica Whately,
Mr. Leonard Matters and Mr. Krishna Menon (Secretary),
arrived in India to study the political situation in the country.
During their stay in India they did not make public speeches,
nor did they give interviews to the Press. Only once on the
occasion of the fast of Mahatma Gandhi—were they moved
to breaking their silence and they declared: ‘The removal of
Mahatma Gandhi means the disappearance of the greatest
force working for moderation, peace and friendship towards
Britain.’
Reviewing the year 1932 as a whole, one may say that it
opened in the midst of excitement and enthusiasm. But as
had happened before with Mahatma Gandhi’s movement, it
ended in an anti-climax. The ‘epic fast’ of the Mahatma
was the turning-point and from that moment onwards, the
Government definitely got the better of the Congress. As
the year came to a close, the thought that was uppermost in
the minds of most Congressmen was how to push on the
anti-untouchability campaign and resolutions were being
passed from many a platform at the instance of the Congress
leaders, asking the Viceroy to accord sanction to the Temple
Entry Bills in the Madras Legislative Council and the Indian
Legislative Assembly. Civil disobedience indeed!

CHAPTER XIV
DEFEAT AND SURRENDER (1933-34)
WITH the dawn of the new year, Congressmen who were more
politically-minded, began to realise that the civil-disobedience
movement was in danger of fizzling out. The Independence
Day celebrations on January 26th, 1933, were therefore
organised with much enthusiasm with a view to rousing the
people again. The response everywhere was encouraging.
In Calcutta alone, the police had to make 300 arrests besides
using force to break up the demonstrations. In Badanganj in
Arambagh Sub-division of Hooghly District in Bengal, the
police resorted to shooting for dispersing the Congress
procession. 'Following the Independence Day celebrations,
Mrs. Gandhi was arrested at Borsad in Gujerat and sentenced
to six months' imprisonment on February 7th, for leading a
procession of women. As soon as the White Paper embodying
the Government proposals regarding the Indian Con-
stitutional Reforms was announced on March 17th, the annual
session of the India National Congress was convened at
Calcutta with Pandit Madan Mohon Malaviya as the President-
elect. The Congress session was at once banned like the
Delhi session of 1932—nevertheless, delegates and leaders
assembled in Calcutta from all parts of the country on April
11th, for the occasion. The important leaders who could be
easily spotted out were all arrested—including Pandit Mala-
viya, Mrs. Motilal Nehru, Mr. M. S. Aney (Central Pro-
vinces), Dr. Alam (Punjab), Dr. Syed Mahmud (Bihar), all of
them being members of the Congress Working Committee
with the exception of Mrs. Nehru. Thereafter, Mrs. J. M.
Sengupta proceeded to the appointed place at the head of
2,500 Congressmen for holding the meeting and under her
presidentship the meeting was held. Resolutions were passed
reaffirming (1) the goal of independence; (2) the efficacy of
the method of civil disobedience for attaining that goal, and
291

292 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
(3) the boycott of foreign cloth and of British goods of all
kinds. The most important resolution was one emphatically
condemning the White Paper proposals. Before the meeting
ended, large contingents of police arrived on the scene,
arrested Mrs. Sengupta and 250 others, including 40 ladies
and dispersed the meeting by force. The following extract
from the speech of the President-elect, the venerable Pandit
Malaviya, reflects the feeling of the country at the time:
'It is estimated that nearly 120,000 persons including
several thousand women and quite a number of children
have been arrested and imprisoned during the last fifteen
months. It is an open secret that when the Government
started repression, the official expectation was that they
would crush the Congress in six weeks' time. Fifteen
months have not enabled the Government to achieve that
object. Twice fifteen months will not enable it to do so.'
This was not the review made by a young hot-head but by
one of the oldest and most moderate leaders of the Congress.
Consequently, the response made by the country to the
Congress appeal in 1932 and 1933, in spite of lack of prepara-
tion, in spite of the sudden arrest of the organisers and
financiers of the Party early in January 1932, and in spite of
the diversion caused by the Mahatma's fast in September
1932 and the anti-untouchability campaign thereafter—can
by no means be regarded as unsatisfactory. Nevertheless,
the country was startled one fine morning in May to hear that
the Mahatma had suspended the civil-disobedience campaign.
While in prison the Mahatma had decided to go on a three
weeks' fast¹ as a penance, because his followers outside had
not made sufficient progress with the anti-untouchability
campaign. The object of the fast was to bring about a change
of heart—not in the bureaucracy but in his countrymen—
who were responsible for the sad plight of the untouchables.
The Government had no objection to a fast of that kind and
¹ After the famous September fast, the Mahatma had fasted once again
in December, but that fast had been a short one. The present fast was
described by him as a 'heart-prayer for purification of myself and my
associates for greater vigilance and watchfulness in connection with the
Harijan cause.'