द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

THE FIGHT RESUMED 269
between us are closed or whether you expect me still to
see and receive guidance from you as to the course I am to
pursue in advising the Congress.'
The Viceroy sent a long reply on December 31st and stated
at the end: 'His Excellency feels bound to emphasis that he
will not be prepared to discuss with you any measures which
the Government of India, with the fullest approval of His
Majesty's Government, found it necessary to adopt in Bengal,
the United Provinces and the North-West Frontier Province.'
Soon after receipt of this telegram the Working Committee
met on January 1st, 1932, and adopted the following resolution:
' . . . The Committee regards the Premier's declaration
as wholly unsatisfactory and inadequate, and in terms
of the Congress demands, opines that nothing short of
complete independence, carrying full control of defence,
external affairs and finance, with such safeguards as may be
demonstrably necessary in the interest of the nation, can
be regarded by the Congress as satisfactory. The Committee
notes that the British Government was not prepared to
regard the Congress at the Round Table Conference as
entitled to speak on behalf of the nation as a whole. At
the same time the Committee recognises, with sorrow that
communal harmony could not be attained at the said
Conference. The Committee invites the nation, therefore,
to make ceaseless efforts to demonstrate the capacity of the
Congress to represent the nation as a whole and promote an
atmosphere that would make the Constitution, framed
purely on a national basis, acceptable to the various com-
munities composing the nation. Meanwhile, the Com-
mittee is prepared to render co-operation to Government,
provided the Viceroy reconsiders his Thursday's telegram
to Mahatma Gandhi, adequate relief is granted in respect
of the Ordinances and its recent acts, a free scope is left
to the Congress in any future negotiations and consultations
to prosecute the Congress's claim for complete independence
and administration of the country is carried on with
popular representatives pending the attainment of such
independence.
'In the absence of a satisfactory response from Govern-
ment in terms of the foregoing paragraph, the Working

270 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
Committee will regard it as an indication on the part of the
Government that it has reduced to nullity the Delhi Pact.
‘In the event of a satisfactory response not forthcoming, the
Committee calls upon the nation to resume civil disobedience.’
The same day the Mahatma sent a long rejoinder to the
Viceroy asking him to reconsider his decision and grant an
interview without imposing any conditions as to the scope
of discussion. He enclosed a copy of the Working Committee’s
resolution and added: ‘If His Excellency thinks it worth
while to see me, the operation of the resolution will be
suspended pending our discussion, in the hope that it may
result in the resolution being finally given up.’
On January 2nd, 1932, the Viceroy informed Mahatma
Gandhi that an interview under the threat of civil disobedience
was out of the question. The Mahatma replied as follows:
‘... Surely it is wrong to describe an honest expression of
opinion as a threat. May I remind the Government that the
Delhi negotiations were opened and carried on whilst civil
disobedience was on and that when the Pact was made, civil
disobedience was not given up but only discontinued. This
position was reasserted and accepted by His Excellency and his
Government last year prior to my departure for London....
Meanwhile I wish to assure the Government that every
endeavour will be made on the part of the Congress to carry
on the struggle without malice and in a strictly non-violent
manner....’
That was the end of the negotiations. On January 4th, the
Government of India issued a statement justifying their
attitude and conduct. Simultaneously orders were issued to
local authorities throughout India to strike at the Congress
organisations at once. The ordinances carefully prepared by
the Government of India in 1931 during the period of the
truce, were at once put into operation. According to lists
previously prepared by the local authorities, sweeping
arrests of Congress leaders were made before they could find
time to launch the civil-disobedience campaign. Within a
week almost everybody who was somebody in the Congress
Party was in prison. Nevertheless, the campaign began to

THE FIGHT RESUMED 271
gain in strength and volume without any direction from
head-quarters. According to official statistics, 14,800 arrests
were made in January and 17,800 in February. The Govern-
ment soon realised that if arrests were continued at that rate
it would be impossible to deal with the large prison population.
In March, tactics were therefore changed and instead of
making arrests, force was used in dealing with Congressmen
and their demonstrations. Under the ordinances, the follow-
ing steps among others, were taken by the local authorities
all over India: orders were issued prohibiting meetings and
processions; Congress organisations were declared illegal and
Congress offices were taken possession of; Congress funds
were seized; orders were served on people not to help the
Congress in any way nor to harbour Congress volunteers, on
pain of punishment; land and property were seized for not
paying land revenue or other taxes; National literature was
banned; the Nationalist Press was gagged; shopkeepers
were ordered not to close their shops when asked by the
Congress to do so; 'lathi charges' and even firing were
resorted to for dispersing Congress demonstrations.
Despite all these restrictions, the civil-disobedience cam-
paign was in full swing. The following were some of the
activities of the Congress: holding meetings and conferences
in spite of Government prohibition; organising processions
in defiance of police orders; picketing foreign-cloth and liquor
shops; picketing British goods, banks, insurance companies,
etc.; publishing unauthorised bulletins, newspapers, etc.;
saluting the national flag in public and hoisting it over
Government buildings; manufacturing salt; attempting to
re-occupy buildings seized by the Government; withholding
of land revenue and taxes. Besides these activities, during the
first six months of the year, special campaigns were conducted
on an all-India basis under the orders of the Congress
Working Committee or of the Congress President. From
April 6th to April 13th, the national week was observed in
commemoration of the Amritsar massacre of 1919. This was
followed by the holding of the 47th session of the Congress
at Delhi on April 24th, in spite of the severest police restric-
tions. The Delhi Congress was followed up by a series of

272 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
provincial, district and sub-divisional political conferences
held throughout India in defiance of the police ban. A raid
on the Wadala Salt Depot was attempted on May 15th. An All-
India Swadeshi Day was observed on May 29th, to stimulate
the Swadeshi¹ (i.e., national industry) movement and an All-
India Prisoners' Day was observed on July 4th, to express
sympathy for political prisoners. On April 8th, during
the National Week Celebration at Allahabad, the police
attempted to disperse by force a Congress procession led
by the revered widow of Pandit Motilal Nehru. Among
those who were seriously injured during the police attack
was Mrs. Motilal Nehru herself. This event sent a thrill
of horror and indignation throughout the country.² The
Delhi Congress was carefully planned. Though the President-
elect, Pandit Madan Mohon Malaviya, was arrested on his
way to Delhi, the police could not prevent a large number of
delegates from arriving there for participating in the Congress.
The Congress session having been banned by the Govern-
ment, in the absence of a better arrangement, it was held
near the Clock Tower in the Chandni Chowk and Mr.
Ranchoddas Amritlal of Ahmedabad presided. There was a
short session and the resolutions adopted by the Subjects
Committee, which had been printed beforehand, were dis-
tributed among the public. The Congress reiterated the
resolution on independence, approved of the decision of the
Working Committee to revive the civil-disobedience move-
ment and reaffirmed its faith in the leadership of Mahatma
Gandhi. Soon after, the police arrived on the scene, dispersed
the gathering by force and made a large number of arrests.
Reviewing the Congress movement during the first four
months, Pandit M. M. Malaviya in a public statement, issued
on May 2nd, 1932, declared:
'During these four months up to April 20th last, accord-
ing to the reports published in the Press, 66,646 persons,
¹ After the Congress was banned, 'Buy Indian' Leagues were organised
within the ambit of the Law.
² The medical officer who attended on Mrs. Nehru reported as follows :-
'Her injuries were caused by something like a lathi. She has received
half a dozen injuries, including a bad cut on her head which caused profuse
bleeding.'

THE FIGHT RESUMED 273
among whom were included 5,325 women and many children,
have been arrested, imprisoned and humiliated. This could
not possibly include arrests in the far-off villages in the
interior of the country and, therefore, the Congress
estimates the total arrests to be over 80,000 up to that date.
The jails are overcrowded and ordinary prisoners are being
released before their time to make room for political
prisoners. To this has to be added the number of arrests
made during the last ten days, including those of the
delegates to the Delhi Congress. According to the reports
in the Press, firing has been resorted to in at least 29
cases with considerable loss of life. There have been lathi
charges on unarmed crowds at 325 places. There have been
633 cases of house searches and 102 cases of confiscation
of property. A general policy has been pursued of imposing
extraordinarily heavy fines on persons who have been con-
victed in connection with the movement and property far
in excess of what was necessary for realising the amount of
the fines has been attached and sold. The Press has been
gagged as it has never been gagged before. 163 cases have
been reported where the newspapers and public presses
have been regulated by orders for confiscation, demands
for security and consequent closing down of the presses,
warnings, searches and arrests of editors, printers or
keepers. Numerous public meetings and processions of
non-violent men and women have been dispersed by lathi
charges, and sometimes by firing.' (Indian Recorder,
Calcutta, p. 271.)
In connection with the above report, it may be noted, that
during the period under review, political prisoners in Karachi
Jail and in Haripur Jail in the Frontier Province were subjected
to whipping. In Rajshahi Jail in Bengal, political prisoners
were subjected to numerous humiliating punishments like
bar-fetters, night handcuffs, gunny clothing, etc. In Suri Jail
in Bengal, women prisoners went on hunger-strike as a protest
against ill-treatment.¹
¹ In many other prisons similar incidents took place. In Rajmundhry
Jail, a prisoner belonging to the Lahore Conspiracy Case was flogged.
In Bellary Jail, political prisoners were attacked by warders with sticks
(lathis). In the Deoli Detention Camp for Bengal state-prisoners near
Ajmer, the state-prisoners were assaulted by the guards and seriously
injured. In all such cases the usual charge against the prisoners was one
of insubordination.
S

274 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
On the whole the activities of the Congress in 1932 did
not compare unfavourably with those of 1930. Nevertheless,
every Congressman could feel one difference. In 1930, the
Congress had taken the offensive, while the Government was
on the defensive. In 1932 it was just the reverse. There is no
doubt that in spite of the manifold defects of the Delhi Pact,
die-hards in England and in India took it as a defeat or a
humiliation for the all-powerful British Government. They
were smarting under a sense of defeat and wanted to avenge
themselves. The overwhelming majority gained by the
Conservatives at the General Election in October 1931,
encouraged them greatly. Moreover, the attitude of Mahatma
Gandhi and the statements made by him in England, gave
them the impression that he was unwilling or unprepared to
face a fight again. That the Mahatma was honestly pursuing
a peaceful policy has to be admitted on all hands and his
very unpreparedness can be regarded as a proof of his sincerity
of purpose. In fact, the Mahatma carried his peaceful inten-
tions so far that he neglected to keep his 'powder dry.' He
was in reality dragged into a fight in 1932 because of the
non possumus attitude of the Viceroy on the one hand and the
rising temper of the public on the other. In this connection
it is significant that the aggressive steps taken by the Govern-
ment of India during the absence of the Mahatma, had the
full approval of His Majesty's Government. Apart from the
Government's attitude there were two other factors that
forced the Mahatma to resume the fight, the general temper
of the public and the influence of the Left Wing. As for the
first, in none of the major provinces was the public satisfied
at the attitude of the Government. Those who had given in
to the Mahatma hoping that something tangible would come
out of the Round Table Conference were disillusioned.
Further, the steady propaganda carried on by Left-Wing
Congressmen, youth-leaguers¹ and Left-Wing Labourites,
also had its effect. While in England the Mahatma did feel
now and again that another fight was unavoidable but the pit
¹ On December 22nd, 1931, the Maharashtra Youth Conference met at
Poona with the writer in the chair and passed a resolution calling upon the
Congress Working Committee to resume the civil-disobedience campaign.

THE FIGHT RESUMED 275
of it is that no preparations were made by the Congress for
the coming campaign and no plans were prepared in advance.
The campaign of 1932 was an imitation of that of 1930 and
the Government had prepared effective counter-measures for
dealing with a campaign of that sort. If the Congress wanted
to be successful in 1932 as well—it should have devised new
tactics to take the Government by surprise.
It is not generally understood why the Congress was
unsuccessful in 1932, though the same tactics had been
successful in 1930. The reason is that in 1930 the tactics of
the Congress had taken the Government by surprise. No
doubt, the same tactics had been employed in 1921 and 1922,
but owing to the sudden termination of the campaign in
February 1922, the Congress did not have to disclose all its
secrets. Moreover, eight years had elapsed since that cam-
paign and most of the men who had dealt with that campaign
were no longer in the service of the Government. Conse-
quently, the 1930 campaign was to all intents and purposes a
novel campaign and it took the Government some time to
comprehend it and to develop counter-tactics thereafter to
cope with it. The Delhi Truce gave the Government time to
do this work and on January 1st, 1932, when the Working Com-
mittee resolved to resume the civil-disobedience campaign,
the Government forces were in complete readiness to strike
immediately and ruthlessly. And they were not content with
striking at those who worked in the open, but made a clean
sweep of the brains and financiers of the movement as well.¹
During the first eight months of the year the fight went on
with unabated zeal. The declaration of the Government that
the Congress would soon be down and out was falsified.
The Congress was still alive and kicking, and there was no
sign that it would meet with an early death. In March the
movement was further strengthened because the Jamiat-ul-
ulema, the All-India organisation of the Moslem priests and
divines, under the leadership of Mufti Kifayetullah, declared
¹ Among those imprisoned in this way were Mr. Bhulabhai Desai, former
Advocate-General of Bombay and Mr. Sarat C. Bose, a prominent advocate
of Calcutta and a front-rank Congressman who was then an Alderman of
the Calcutta Municipality. At present (November 1934) the latter is
still in detention.

276 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
for non-co-operation and the leaders of the Jamiat soon found
themselves in prison. This decision of the Jamiat considerably
strengthened the position of the Nationalist Moslems, who
had all along been an integral part of the Congress, and of the
Moslems of the Frontier Province who were going through
the worst form of official repression. Nevertheless, the odds
were against the Congress. In Bombay, which had been the
storm centre in 1930, Hindu-Moslem riots broke out in May
and dragged on for nearly six weeks. Owing to this outbreak,
the Congress campaign in Bombay suffered a terrible set-back
from which it could not recover. In Gujerat, the harassed,
persecuted and impoverished peasantry could no longer
wage the brave fight of which they could boast in 1930. In
the United Provinces, after some months, the no-rent
campaign could not make further headway in the face of
official repression. In Bengal, more serious than the civil-
disobedience movement was the terrorist campaign of the
revolutionaries. But though terrorism was a thorn to the
Government, it brought untold hardship on the people, since
several districts like Chittagong, Midnapore and Dacca were
virtually handed over to martial law and the innocent
villagers were subjected to heavy collective fines for the
misdeeds committed by unknown people. During the year
a liberal use was made of fire-arms for dispersing Congress
demonstrations. Replying to a question in the Indian Legis-
lative Assembly, the Home member to the Government of
India, Mr. (now Sir) H. G. Haig stated that in dispersing
'assemblies, firing was resorted to seventeen times in Bengal,
seven times in the United Provinces, three times in Bihar
and Orissa, once in Madras Presidency, once in the Frontier
Province—while in Bombay Presidency the casualties from
shooting, were thirty-four killed and ninety-one wounded.
In this situation, when the Congress was engaged in a life
and death struggle, an unexpected development took place
which led to a complete side-tracking of the civil-disobedience
movement in the country. That was the fast of Mahatma
Gandhi on September 20th, 1932.
On March 11th, the Mahatma had written to Sir Samuel
Hoare informing him that in keeping with what he had

THE FIGHT RESUMED 277
stated at the Round Table Conference in London on Novem-
ber 13th, 1931, if the depressed classes were torn away from
the main body of Hindus by the grant of a separate electorate,
he would resist it with his life and in pursuance of that
resolve, he would fast unto death. On April 13th, Sir Samuel
Hoare had replied in a non-committal way, saying that the
Government would give the matter their fullest consideration
before coming to a decision. The 'Communal Award'¹ of
the Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, was thereafter
announced on August 17th. It provided for a certain number
of seats for the depressed classes in the Provincial Legislatures
which would be filled up on the basis of a separate electorate.
In addition to this, members of the depressed classes would
be entitled to stand for election from the general con-
stituencies earmarked for Hindus and would be registered in
a common electoral rôle along with other Hindus. The award
further provided that if His Majesty's Government were
satisfied that the communities concerned were mutually agreed
upon a practicable alternative scheme, either in respect of
one or more of the Governor's provinces or in respect of the
whole of British India, before the new Government of India
Bill was passed into law, they would be prepared to recom-
mend to Parliament that the alternative should be substituted
for the provisions now outlined. On August 18th the Mahatma
addressed a letter to the Premier informing him that in
accordance with what he had written to Sir Samuel Hoare
on March 11th, he had resolved to commence fast unto
death at noon on September 20th. 'The fast will cease if
during its progress, the British Government, of its own
motion or under pressure of public opinion, revise their
decision and withdraw their scheme of communal electorates
for the depressed classes whose representatives should be
elected by general electorate under common franchise, no
matter how wide it is.' The Mahatma further asked that the
entire correspondence be given immediate and full publicity.
¹ As the members nominated by the British Government to the Second
Round Table Conference in 1931 could not come to an agreement on the
question of representation, electorate, etc., for the legislatures under the
New Constitution, the British Prime Minister announced the Government's
decision. This decision is known as the Communal Award.

278 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
The Premier replied on September 8th, regretting the decision
of the Mahatma but affirming that the provisions of the award
could not be altered except on the condition stated therein.
The Mahatma received this communication the next day and
immediately replied saying that he felt compelled reluctantly
to adhere to the decision he had already conveyed.
Words cannot describe the anxiety and alarm that passed
from one end of the country to the other when the news about
the impending fast was published on September 13th. Frantic
appeals were made to the Mahatma to desist but the appeals
proved ineffective. Government offered to release him under
certain conditions but he declined conditional release. It
was therefore decided to leave him undisturbed in Poona
Prison, but to remove all restrictions regarding interviews
and correspondence. On an appeal from Pandit M. M.
Malaviya, a conference of Hindu leaders met at Bombay on
September 19th, in order to deliberate how the Mahatma's
life could be saved. After a preliminary discussion there, the
leaders adjourned to Poona in order to be in constant touch
with the Mahatma. After prolonged discussions, an agree-
ment was arrived at between the Hindu leaders on September
24th, which virtually did away with separate electorate for the
depressed classes. This agreement, hereafter known as the
Poona Agreement,¹ was ratified by the Hindu leaders' con-
ference and by the Hindu Mahasabha on September 25th,
and was cabled to the Government of India and to the Prime
Minister. On September 26th, His Majesty's Government
announced that they were prepared to recommend to Parlia-
ment to endorse the Poona Agreement. The whole country
breathed a sigh of relief. Prayers went up to heaven that the
Mahatma's life had been saved.
The Poona Agreement provided for a certain number of
reserved seats for members of the depressed classes in the
Legislatures on the basis of a common electorate for all
classes of Hindus. There was, however, one qualification.
The members of the depressed classes registered in the
general electoral roll in a constituency would form an electoral
college which would elect a panel of four candidates belonging
¹ Also called the Poona Pact.

THE FIGHT RESUMED 279
to the depressed classes for each of such reserved seats by
the method of the single vote. The provision for a primary
election, to be in operation for ten years, was insisted on by
Dr. Ambedkar (who had been nominated by the Government
to the Round Table Conference) though before the Simon
Commission and at the first Round Table Conference, he
had demanded reservation of seats for the depressed classes
on the basis of a common electorate for all Hindus. Mr.
M. C. Rajah, a prominent leader of the depressed classes
had, on the contrary, consistently stood for reservation of
seats for his community on the basis of a common electorate.
Earlier in the year he had entered into a pact with Dr.
Moonje, President of the Hindu Mahasabha, on this basis.
This pact—known popularly as the Rajah-Moonje Pact—was
however opposed by Dr. Ambedkar and his followers and on
that ground it was not accepted by the British Government.
As long as the Mahatma was on fast, rational thinking was
completely suspended and the one thought of his country-
men was how to save his life. Once he was out of danger,
people began to examine the Poona Agreement in the cold
light of reason. Then it was realised that while the Communal
Award had provided 71 seats in the Provincial Legislatures
for the depressed classes, the Poona Agreement had provided
148. These additional seats would be given them at the
expense of the rest of the Hindu community. In provinces
like Bengal, where Hindus had already been unjustly treated
in the award, the Poona Agreement was regarded as a further
injustice by the rest of the Hindu community—particularly
in view of the fact that the depressed classes problem
hardly existed there. Moreover, it was realised that the
Poona Agreement had not done away with separate electorate
altogether. People began to ask seriously if after all it was
worth while for Mahatma Gandhi to have staked his life for
such an issue, especially when the Communal Award was from
start to finish an objectionable document.
But whatever may be the permanent value of the Poona
Agreement, there is no doubt that the fast of Mahatma
Gandhi had a permanent and far-reaching effect in rous-
ing the conscience of the Hindu community. It was a

280 · THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
unique spectacle to see how the heart of the entire nation
throbbed for one man. All sections of the Hindus were
stirred to activity as they had never been before. The most
important result of the 'epic fast' was to give a powerful
impetus to the movement for the eradication of untouch-
ability. During the fast such a colossal amount of sympathy
had been generated not only for the Mahatma personally but
for the cause of the depressed classes as well, that it would
have been a great pity if that sympathy had not been harnessed
into permanent channels of activity through the organisation
of the All-India Anti-Untouchability League.
While the Mahatma's fast had a remarkable effect on his
countrymen, in the international sphere it did not prove to
be an unmixed blessing. It served to advertise to a dis-
proportionate degree the issue of the depressed classes.
Hitherto the world had known only one issue relating to India,
the political issue—India's grievance against England. Now
the leader of the Nationalist movement himself announced
to the world that there was another issue—the internal issue
—of such vital importance to India that he was prepared to
stake his life for it. And British propagandists were not slow
to take advantage of the opportunity. In September 1932,
the whole of Europe was told that the Mahatma was fasting
because he was against granting certain rights to the un-
touchables.¹ Ever since then the European public have been
constantly fed with stories that India is a land full of internal
dissensions where not only Hindus and Moslems, but Hindus
themselves are perpetually fighting with one another and only
the strong hand of Britain is able to maintain peace and order.
The fast had another unfortunate effect which proved to
be more serious. It served to side-track the political move-
ment at a time when all possible attention should have been
devoted to it. If with the termination of the fast the Mahatma
had handed over the anti-untouchability work to friends
outside, the effect of the fast would not have been so harmful.
But when the leader himself began to conduct the anti-
¹ In many countries in Europe the writer has heard this remark made
by people generally interested in Indian affairs. At first he did not realise
the significance of this remark—but later on he found out that in September
1932, this story had been told all over Europe.

THE FIGHT RESUMED 281
untouchability campaign from behind the prison-walls, what
could his followers do? The Mahatma had all along held
that a Satyagraha prisoner should regard himself as 'civilly
dead' and should not bother about the work outside prison.
But on this occasion he did not stick to his usual principle.
To make matters worse, when questions were put to him,
at this time, as to whether political work should be done or
social work, he gave replies that were rather confusing or he
did not reply at all, which led people to think that he preferred
social work to political. This lead of the Mahatma was
naturally followed more by his blind followers and by those
who were tired of repeated suffering and imprisonment and
wanted a convenient excuse for giving up the political fight.
Another theory has been put forward to explain the
Mahatma's conduct. It is advanced that he realised the
ultimate failure of the movement and therefore wanted to
create out of it—another movement which would be of
benefit to his countrymen. This theory cannot be accepted
since in November 1931, in London, the Mahatma had spoken
of his determination to resist with his life, special electorate
for the depressed classes. One feels inclined to think that this
side-tracking of the civil-disobedience movement was the
result of that subjectivism which seizes him at times and
makes him utterly blind to and oblivious of objective realities.
Ever since the Round Table Conference, he had begun to
ponder so deeply over the depressed classes problem that the
other problems receded to the background for the time being.
Whatever the real explanation may be, there is no doubt
that the fast served to side-track the civil-disobedience move-
ment and cause a diversion of men, money and public
enthusiasm to the anti-untouchability (or 'Harijan')¹ campaign
at a time when the position of the Congress, vis-à-vis the
Government, was none too strong. The effect was the same
as it would be if in the middle of a battle, a general gave the
order to his troops to start excavating a canal in order to
supply water to the thirsty people of the countryside.
In response to the appeal made by the Mahatma on
¹ The word 'Harijan' (literally, 'a man of God') was coined by the
Mahatma to denote a member of the depressed classes or untouchables.

282 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
September 26th, temples and public wells throughout India
began to be thrown open to the untouchables. In fact so rapid
was the march of progress, that it looked as if the demon of
untouchability would be laid low in no time. However,
a resistance was met with at Guruvayur in South India
where the Zamorin, the trustee of the temple, refused to throw
it open to the untouchables on the plea of tradition and
legal difficulties. Thereupon, Mr. Kelappan, a well-known
and highly-esteemed Congress worker, commenced a fast as
a protest against the exclusion of untouchables from the temple.
When his condition became critical, the Mahatma was pre-
vailed upon to intervene and save his life. At the request
of the Mahatma, who undertook to continue the fight, Kelap-
pan gave up the fast. About this time it was found that in
many places the authorities or trustees of several temples were
raising legal obstacles in the,way of throwing open the temples
to untouchables. It was therefore considered desirable to
introduce legislation in the Madras Legislative Council and
in the Indian Legislative Assembly to remove such legal
difficulties once for all. The Bill drafted for the Madras
Council was refused sanction by the Viceroy. Permission for
introduction of the Bill drafted for the Indian Legislative
Assembly was granted by the Viceroy on January 23rd, 1933,
but it was made clear that the Government would not commit
itself in any way with regard to the Bill and would afford full
opportunity for public opinion to express itself on the question.
A special request was made to the Government of India for
affording facilities for the speedy passage of the Temple
Entry Bill, but the Viceroy declined to offer any such facilities
and thanks to the dilatory tactics of the Government, the Bill
is still hanging fire. To strengthen the demand for temple
entry for untouchables, a plebiscite of temple-goers was taken
at Guruvayur on December 25th, 1932. Though Guruvayur
is regarded to be a socially backward place, out of 20,163
votes recorded, 77 per cent. were in favour of temple entry,
13 per cent. were against, while 10 per cent. were neutral.
Another beneficial result followed from the appeal of the
Mahatma made on September 26th to settle Hindu-Moslem
differences. A Unity Conference was convened at Allahabad

THE FIGHT RESUMED 283
in which Pandit Malaviya and Moulana Shaukat Ali took a
leading part. The Conference met on November 1st, under
the presidentship of Mr. Vijayaraghav Achariar, ex-President
of the Congress and a large number of representative Hindus
and Moslems attended. The atmosphere was one of perfect
cordiality. A great deal of progress was made in the nego-
tiations for a Hindu-Moslem settlement. But ultimately two
obstacles arose. On one side, the leaders of the communalist
section of the Moslems condemned the unity efforts. On the
other side, the Bengal problem proved insoluble, since the
Europeans would not surrender any seat allowed them
under the Communal Award and the Moslems would not be
content with less than 51 per cent. of the total number of
seats. Though the Conference did not come to a successful
conclusion, it had a moral value and it helped to clear the
atmosphere considerably.
We may now review the actions of the Government during
the year 1932. While taking the severest measures against the
Congress, the Viceroy constantly urged that the Government
would simultaneously push on the work of constitution-
making. About the middle of January, the Consultative
Committee was appointed for keeping the Government in
close touch with all the leaders of the other parties, barring
the Congress, through the Viceroy and especially for con-
sidering the recommendations of the Franchise, Federal
Finance and Indian States Inquiry Committees as a pre-
liminary to their consideration by His Majesty's Government.
Owing to the delay in issuing the Communal Award, the
Consultative Committee was twice postponed on the insistence
of the Moslem members. On June 27th, an announcement
was made by the Government to the effect that they had
decided to provide for Provincial Autonomy and Federation
in a single Bill and that they would abandon the Third
Session of the Round Table Conference. The Indian Liberal
leaders immediately lodged a strong protest against the
abandonment of the Round Table Conference and following
this, Messrs. Sastri, Jayakar, Joshi and Sir Tej Bahadur
Sapru resigned from the Consultative Committee. This
made the Government climb down a bit, and on July 7th,

284 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
Sir Samuel Hoare, in a speech before the Central Asian
Society, explained that the change of procedure did not
imply a change of policy. He further stated that when the
Joint Parliamentary Committee met to consider the Govern-
ment proposals, Indians would be enabled to appear not only
as witnesses but also to participate in the discussions of the
Committee. The explanation of the Secretary of State for
India was not considered adequate by the Liberal leaders who
persisted in their opposition. On September 5th, a fresh
announcement was made by the Viceroy before the Indian
Legislative Assembly to the effect that since the Consultative
Committee would not be able to make the contribution
anticipated from it, it had been decided to hold further
discussions in London. A small body of representatives from
British India and from the Indian States would therefore
meet in London about the middle of November. The work
would be in accordance with a fixed agenda and there would
be no public session. The Liberal leaders now felt satisfied
that their trip to London was restored. The Third Round
Table Conference commenced work on November 17th; and
ended on December 24th, the final session being open to the
public. The Labour Party did not participate in this Con-
ference on the ground that the Government had gone back
on the policy of conciliation. They also wanted that the Indian
members should keep aloof, but that desire was not complied
with. Sir Samuel Hoare summed up the results of the
Conference at the close of the session. The following are
some of the decisions made by the Government to which he
referred:

1. The Moslem community would have a representation
   of 33⅓ per cent. in the Federal legislature so far as
   British India was concerned.
2. It was not possible to give any definite date as to
   when the Federation would be in operation.
3. Sindh and Orissa would be separate provinces.
4. The Defence Budget would be non-votable.
5. For employing Indian troops outside India for
   purposes other than Indian, the decision of the
   Federal Ministry and the Federal Legislature would

THE FIGHT RESUMED 285
be taken, but the Crown would have full authority
when Indian troops were to be employed outside
India in the defence of India.
Finally, in response to an appeal for co-operation made
by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Sir Samuel Hoare said that he
wanted to see no empty chairs at the Round Table Con-
ference of the Joint Select Committee.
During the year the revolutionary movement was strong
in the province of Bengal. Special powers were given to the
Bengal Government by the Viceroy, in. addition to the
Viceregal ordinances. The Viceregal Ordinances, four in
number, designed mainly for coping with the civil-dis-
obedience movement, were issued on January 4th, 1932. On
June 30th, before these Ordinances were due to lapse, a fresh
but comprehensive Ordinance, called the Special Powers
Ordinance 1932, was promulgated by the Government of
India. In addition to this, the Bengal Emergency Powers
Ordinance had been issued in November 1931, for arming the
Bengal Government with powers similar to those enjoyed by
martial law authorities, for the suppression of the terrorist
movement. This Ordinance was renewed on May 29th, 1932.
Further powers were given to the Bengal Government on
July 20th, by the Government of India through the Bengal
Emergency Powers (Second Amendment) Ordinance 1932.
On September 1st, the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment
Act, 1932, was passed by the Bengal Legislative Council
which gave increased powers to the Executive, the most
important provision being that attempt at murder was made
punishable with death sentence. Another Act was passed on
September 6th, called the Bengal Suppression of Terrorist
Outrages Act, 1932, which empowered the executive to seize
buildings, to order citizens on pain of punishment to assist
them in the suppression of terrorism, to impose collective
fines on villagers, etc. The Legislation passed in the Bengal
Legislative Council armed the Government with permanent
powers—so that in future, emergency ordinances would not be
necessary. During the year, terrorist outrages took place
from time to time, the most important of them being the

286 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
murder of Mr. Douglas, the District Magistrate of Midnapore
and Mr. Ellison, Additional Superintendent of Police,
Comilla. On the side of the Government the severest measures
were taken. Troops were quartered in many districts where
trouble had taken place or was apprehended and heavy
collective fines were imposed in Chittagong, Midnapore and
twenty-four Parganas Districts. Moreover, the abandoned
prison for revolutionary prisoners in the Andaman Islands
in the Bay of Bengal was reopened in spite of public protest
and political prisoners were transported there.
During the year, two important Labour Conferences were
held. The first session of the Indian Trades Union Federation
(former Right Wing of the Trade Union Congress) was held
at Madras on July 15th, with Mr. V. V. Giri in the chair.
Among the resolutions passed was one relating to the position
of labour in the future Indian Constitution. The All-India
Trade Union Congress met on September 12th at Madras,
with Mr. J. N. Mitra as President. The Trade Union Con-
gress condemned the Communal Award and the Ottawa Pact
as harmful to the best interests of the workers. It also passed
a resolution saying that in view of the sporadic strikes at
Matunga (near Bombay), Kharagpur (seventy miles from
Calcutta), Lillooah (near Calcutta), Lucknow (in the United
Provinces) and other places, it was clear that the workers in
all the railways were resolved to declare a general strike
and that the responsibility for postponing it indefinitely, lay
upon leaders like Mr. Jamnadas Mehta,`Mr. V. V. Giri and
Mr. S. C. Joshi (Right-Wing leaders), who were guiding the
policy of the Railwaymen's Federation. Attempts were made
during the year to bring about unity between the Trades
Union Federation and the Trade Union Congress, but they
proved abortive. Though a ballot of the railway workers in
May resulted in a vote for a general strike, the strike was not
launched. There were sporadic strikes, however, in many
centres and in October there was a strike at the Perambur rail-
way workshop, near Madras, which dragged on for some months.
The communal situation in India was, on the whole,
fairly satisfactory—the only exception being Bombay, where.
Hindu-Moslem riots broke out in May. In some of the Indian

THE FIGHT RESUMED 287
States, however, there was trouble. The year before, there
was trouble in Kashmir, where the peasants (who are pre-
dominantly Moslems) rose in revolt against the Hindu
Maharajah. Though the grievances were mainly economic, a
communal colouring was given to the movement by Moslem
sympathisers in British India and also by the peasants them-
selves, who in some cases attacked their Hindu fellow-subjects.
However, with the help of troops from British India, the
revolt was suppressed but as a price for the assistance rendered
him, the Maharajah had to submit to the terms of the British
Government in the matter of appointing British officers. To
appease his subjects, the Maharajah undertook to make
concessions in land revenue, to extend primary education,
to give a share of state-appointments to all communities and
to introduce a measure of constitutional reforms, including a
Legislative Assembly. The first elections to the Kashmir
Legislative Assembly took place in September 1934. In
May 1932, trouble broke out in Alwar State, similar to that
in Kashmir, the only difference being that the trouble was
more communal and less economic than in Kashmir. To put
down the rebellious Moslem subjects, troops from British
India had to be called in. The assistance was welcomed by
the Maharaja, but when the British Government sought to
impose their conditions,¹ the Maharajah refused to submit.
The dispute between the Maharajah, and the British Govern-
ment went on for some time, but ultimately the former was
ordered to leave his state. That order holds good to-day.
One of the surprises of the year was the result of the
elections held in Burma in November 1932 to decide whether
Burma was in favour of separation from India. The year
before, Burma had been in the throes of a peasant rebellion,
a serious disturbance, the like of which India had not seen
since 1857. The rebellion continued for more than a year.
In 1932, the situation gradually became quiet and orders were
issued for a General Election. On the ground that the
electoral rolls had been prepared in 1931, when many of the
¹ One of the conditions was that the Maharajah should submit to a
Control Commission, The trouble of May 1932 subsided by September.
But agrarian unrest of a violent type broke out in January 1933. In
May 1933 the Maharajah was ordered to leave his state.

288. THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
     districts were in a state of revolt and the Anti-Separationist
     Party had no interest in an election, the Anti-Separationist
     leaders asked for fresh electoral rolls. The Government
     turned down the request and the elections were held on the
     basis of the old rolls. Nevertheless, the Anti-Separationists
     came out with a clear majority. When the newly-elected
     Council met in December, after a lengthy debate, the follow-
     ing resolution was carried without a division:
289. This Council opposes the separation of Burma from
     India on the basis of the Constitution for a separated
     Burma as outlined in the statement of the Prime
     Minister at the Burma Round Table Conference on
     January 12th, 1932.
290. This Council emphatically opposes the unconditional
     and permanent federation of Burma with India.
291. This Council will continue to oppose the separation
     of Burma from India until Burma is granted a Con-
     stitution on certain terms (as defined in the amend-
     ment).
     In the alternative, the Council proposes that Burma
     shall enter the Indian Federation on certain terms and
     conditions including the right of secession.
292. The Council urges that a conference be called at an
     early date for the purpose of determining the future
     Constitution of Burma as a separate unit on the basis
     defined or as a unit in the Indian Federation accord-
     ing to the terms defined with right to secede.
     (Clauses three and four were the amendments incor-
     porated in the resolution.)
     The Government, however, interpreted this resolution as a
     vote not given for unqualified federation with India, and they
     maintained that conditional federation, i.e., federation with
     the right to secede, was not possible. The present policy of
     the Government is to separate Burma from India and in
     accordance with that policy, Burma was not invited to send
     members to the third session of the Round Table Conference
     in November-December, 1932.
     Towards the end of November a very important matter
     came up for consideration before the Indian Legislative