द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

MAHATMA GANDHI IN EUROPE 259
It has been already remarked that the last hope of a settle-
ment faded away when the Conservatives were returned to
power. Their estimate of the Indian situation as also of the
India leader, was quite different from that of the Labourites.
His goodness, his frankness, his fairness, his humble ways,
his profound consideration for his opponents—not only did
not impress John Bull, but was construed as weakness. His
habit of putting all his cards on the table was all right for
India and the Indians, but damaged his prestige among
British politicians. His proneness to confess his ignorance on
intricate questions of finance or law would have been all
right in the company of truth-seeking philosophers, but
lowered him in the estimation of the British public who
were accustomed to see their leaders looking more wise than
they really were. His repeated offer of wholehearted co-
operation at the Round Table Conference had a most tragic
effect and made them think—‘Gandhi is on his last legs.’
What impression could such a statement make on a veteran
politician in England? ‘I shall be here as long as I am
required, because I do not want to revive civil disobedience.
I want to turn the truce that was arrived at at Delhi into a
permanent settlement. But for heaven’s sake give me, a frail
man sixty-two years gone, a little bit of a chance. Find a little
corner¹ for him and the organisation that he represents.’²
If on the contrary, the Mahatma had spoken in the language
of Dictator Stalin, or Il Duce Mussolini or Fuehrer Hitler
—John Bull would have understood and would have bowed
his head in respect. As it was, the Conservative politicians
began to think: ‘Is this frail man in loin-cloth so formidable
that the powerful British Government should yield to him?
India was being ruled by a man who was fit to be a bishop
and so we had so much trouble. If only we had a strong man
at Delhi and at the India Office—everything would be all
right.’ This is how the Indian situation was summed up
after the General Election of October 1931. And all his
propaganda among Church dignitaries, professors and cranks
¹ It is to be regretted that they cornered him successfully.
² The Mahatma’s speech at the plenary session of the Round Table
Conference on November 30th, 1931.

260 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
was of no use to India. The secret of political bargaining is to
look more strong than you really are. Indian politicians, if
they want to match themselves successfully against their
British opponents, will have to learn many things which they
do not know and unlearn many things which they have learnt.
Going through the speeches of the Mahatma at the Round
Table Conference, one is pained at every step. That from the
very beginning he had to speak at length on the status of the
Congress as contrasted with other parties and had to repeat
his remarks over and over again—only shows that a conspiracy
had been hatched in advance to ignore the Congress com-
pletely. At the Conference the Mahatma remarked that in
the reports submitted by the different committees, the views
of the so-called majority were given prominence—while his
dissentient note was condemned to insignificance, as if it
reflected the opinion of just one individual. Some weeks after
his arrival in London, the Mahatma did realise the hopeless-
ness of the situation. If he had any political diplomacy, he
should have sought a convenient opportunity of getting out
of the Conference as soon as possible and then should have
made an extensive tour in America and on the Continent to
expose the unreality of the Conference and to popularise the
Indian cause. By sticking to the Conference till the end, he
unnecessarily lent prestige to a body that should have been
exposed before the bar of world-opinion.
The Mahatma after leaving England spent a few days in
Paris. There he had a group of friends and admirers, who
were however more interested in his non-violence as a message
to the world, than in his struggle for India's freedom. His
brief stay in Paris was well utilised, but unfortunately no
attempt was made to get into touch with politicians—or with
the people who really count in the modern political world.
Nor was any attempt made by him to raise the Indian issue
as an international political issue. From Paris he went to
Geneva. There also he had a group of friends many of whom
were interested more in his philosophy than in his politics.
Though he visited Geneva, no serious attempt was made to
bring him into touch with the people who count in the
organisation of the League of Nations. He paid a visit to

MAHATMA GANDHI IN EUROPE 261
the International Labour Office and that was about all.
However, the most useful part of his time in Switzerland was
spent in the company of that great man and thinker—that
great friend of India and India’s culture, M. Romain
Rolland. India to-day has not a warmer friend outside her
shores than this great soul, and therefore the Mahatma
rendered a great public service to India by spending some of
his time in the company of the French savant. From Switzer-
land the Mahatma travelled to Italy. He was given a warm
reception by the Government and the people of Italy, and
was received in audience by the head of the Government,
Signor Mussolini. That meeting was certainly an historic
one. The Dictator of Italy conveyed his best wishes for the
success of the Mahatma’s efforts. It was the only occasion
on the Continent that the Mahatma came into contact with a
man who really counts in the politics of modern Europe.
The Mahatma’s attitude towards the Fascist authorities,
including his attendance at a demonstration of the Fascist
boys (the Balilla) was severely criticised in anti-Fascist circles.
But there is no doubt that from the point of view of India,
the Mahatma rendered great public service by his visit to
Italy. The only regret is that he did not stay there longer
and did not cultivate more personal contacts.
Reviewing the Mahatma’s visit to Europe as a whole, one
must say that it is to be regretted that he spent so much of
his time in England and so little on the Continent. Even on
the Continent he did not devote sufficient time or attention
to politicians, industrial magnates and other people who
really count in present-day politics. There were many
countries on the Continent eagerly expecting a visit from
him and where he would have received a most cordial
reception. If he had desired, he could without difficulty,
have come in touch with the most important individuals and
organisations in Europe—to the great benefit of India. But
may be, that did not interest him so much. Outside India he
had another rôle to play besides that of a politician and it is
not always easy to play two rôles in one person.

CHAPTER XIII
THE FIGHT RESUMED (1932)
TRUE to his habit of travelling by the lowest class available,
the Mahatma arrived in Bombay as a deck-passenger by S.S.
Pilsna on December 28th, 1931. Elaborate arrangements had
been made by the Bombay Congress Committee to accord
him a right royal reception. Thanks to the propaganda of
the Congress, the failure of the Mahatma to achieve something
tangible for his country at the London Conference had not
produced any depressing effect. And judging from the
warmth, cordiality and affection displayed at the reception,
one would think that the Mahatma had returned with Swaraj
in the hollow of his hand. The same evening he spoke at a
mass meeting of 200,000 people at Azad Maidan. Only with
the help of loudspeakers could his voice be audible to that
vast gathering. The festivity over, the Mahatma settled down
to business. Reports from different parts of the country
were duly placed before him. It was soon evident that the
situation was materially different from what it was when he
had sailed from Bombay towards the end of August. It looked
as if the Government had been waiting till Mahatma Gandhi
sailed from Bombay in order to start a policy of ruthless
repression. The two authors of the Delhi Pact being away
from India, the Government could treat that document as a
scrap of paper.
It is necessary to recapitulate briefly the events of 1931
which led to a crisis at the end of the year rendering imperative
a resumption of the civil-disobedience campaign. After the
Karachi Congress, youth and labour circles continued to
condemn the Delhi Pact. The Provincial Youth Conference
(Naujawan Bharat Sabha) of the United Provinces held at
Muttra in May and presided over by the writer, passed a
resolution of disapproval. In July a session of the All-India
Trade Union Congress was held in Calcutta under the
262

THE FIGHT RESUMED 263
Presidency of the writer, where a similar resolution was
passed. The Right-Wing trade unions had seceded in the
meantime, but all the other unions joined the Congress.
Trouble arose from the very beginning over the question of
credentials. After the Nagpur session of the Trade Union
Congress held in 1929, a split had occurred among those
trade unionists who were generally regarded as Communists.
Mr. M. N. Roy, the erstwhile representative of India, on the
Communist International, was expelled from that body.
Following this incident, a split occurred among the prisoners
in the Meerut Conspiracy Case and also among their followers
in Bombay. One group was reported to follow the lead of
the official Communist Party and the other of Mr. M. N.
Roy. The Girni-Kamgar Union (Textile Workers' Union)
of Bombay, formerly controlled jointly by members of both
the groups, was the scene of a split and the Credentials Com-
mittee of the Trade Union Congress reported that the Roy
group was in possession of the union and was therefore
entitled to be represented on the Trade Union Congress.
This was resented by the other group, who thereupon resorted
to constitutional obstruction culminating in a motion of
no-confidence in the President. This motion being defeated,
the anti-Roy group withdrew from the Congress after creating
a lot of disturbance and set up a Red Trade Union Congress.¹
After the defection, the Congress continued its deliberations.
It resolved not to affiliate with any international body but to
continue unaided the struggle for the rights of the Indian
workers. Mr. Ruikar, President of the Nagpur Textile
Workers' Union, was elected President for the coming year,
and Mr. S. Mukundalal of Calcutta was elected the Secretary.
In spite of the internal dissensions in the Trade Union
Movement, barring the Right-Wingers, all other trade-
unionists were opposed to the Delhi Pact. The Pact contained
no clause benefiting the workers in any way and neither
the under-trial Meerut prisoners nor those convicted in
connection with industrial strikes, were granted amnesty.
Two Right-Wing leaders, Mr. V. V. Giri and Mr. Shiva Rao
¹ From the beginning the Red Trade Union Congress has not shown
much sign of activity except occasionally in Bombay and in Calcutta.

264 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
were, however, nominated by the Government as members
of the second Round Table Conference.
While trade union circles merely kept up vocal opposition
to the Delhi Pact, the revolutionaries in Bengal exasperated
by the repressive policy of the Government, created a serious
crisis in the province. The Armoury Raid in Chittagong in
April 1930, was an aggressive act, but it was on the whole
an isolated one. The subsequent acts of terrorism in other
parts of Bengal, were acts of retaliation or reprisal rather than
acts of aggression. In Dacca, the principal city of East Bengal,
in August 1930, Mr. Lowman, the head of the Intelligence
Branch of the Police was assassinated and the District
Superintendent of Police was seriously wounded. But prior
to that, there had been Hindu-Moslem riots in Dacca and
Mymensingh Districts, in connection with which the conduct
of the police had been open to serious question. Moreover,
the Dacca police had been harsh and brutal in dealing with
Satyagrahi volunteers engaged in peaceful picketing of foreign-
cloth and liquor shops and in other non-violent activity.
Towards the end of 1930, the Inspector-General of Prisons,
Bengal, Lieut-Col. Simpson, was assassinated in his office
in the Government Secretariat buildings in Calcutta. But
prior to that, there had been indescribable ill-treatment of
political prisoners in many prisons in Bengal and all appeals
made to the Government for redress had been of no avail.
The murder of Mr. Peddie, Magistrate of Midnapore, in
1931, and subsequently of two of his successors, was the
result of the untold atrocities committed by the forces of the
Crown in Midnapore District in the attempt to suppress the
non-violent no-tax campaign. The public of Calcutta had
appointed an impartial committee consisting mostly of
Moderate men to inquire into and report on some of the
atrocities committed in that district. The report was duly
published and the facts brought to the notice of the Govern-
ment. But no redress followed. It was then that in a fit of
exasperation, people took to terrorism by way of reprisal.
These acts of terrorism served to stiffen the attitude of the
Government and a stronger dose of repression was adminis-
tered. A golden opportunity of putting an end to the regrett-

THE FIGHT RESUMED 265
able state of affairs arose in March 1931, when the Delhi
Pact was concluded. But instead of turning over a new leaf,
the authorities decided to copy the Black and Tan methods
that had been employed in Ireland. Between June and
October 1931, three regrettable incidents took place suc-
cessively—at Chittagong, at Hijli Detention Camp, seventy
miles from Calcutta and at Dacca. At Chittagong an Indian
police-officer was murdered. 'The next morning, hooligans
were let loose on the town and while the police remained
inactive, looting went on in broad daylight. The idea was to
teach the people of Chittagong a 'moral' lesson. An inquiry
committee appointed by the Calcutta public came to the
conclusion after investigation, that the conduct of some
local officials was open to serious question and the late Mr.
J. M. Sengupta openly made the allegation in a public
meeting in Calcutta. On the report of the Divisional Com-
missioner, official action against some officers was taken
after a very long time. At the Hijli Camp there was some
understanding between the state-prisoners and the armed
guards. Following this, one night the armed warders made a
surprise attack on the state-prisoners' barracks and after
firing indiscriminately at the barracks, attacked the state-
prisoners with the butt-end of their rifles. During the firing,
two of the state-prisoners, Santosh Mitra and Tarakeswar
Sen, were killed and twenty seriously injured. An official
committee appointed by the Government consisting of a
judge of the High Court, came to the conclusion after an
open inquiry, that the firing was altogether unjustified. At
Dacca, there was an unsuccessful attempt to murder the
District Magistrate. The same night, four parties of police-
men went out to different parts of the city, raided the houses
of respectable citizens, destroyed furniture and other articles,
assaulted people and carried away whatever valuables they
could—besides making a large number of indiscriminate
arrests. The Calcutta public sent a Committee of Inquiry,¹
which after due inquiry, corroborated all the above facts.
¹ The writer was a member of this Committee but when he arrived near
Dacca, he was removed from the District by sheer physical force by
police-officers. The moment he was free he started for Dacca again when
he was put in prison. He was subsequently released and could then
continue the inquiry.

· 266 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
In November a new ordinance was promulgated by the
Government which introduced a veiled form of martial law
in the District of Chittagong. Under this ordinance, hardship
and penalty were imposed on the people as one would expect
under martial law. The curfew order was introduced, people
were ordered to carry identification cards, young men were
prohibited to use bicycles, political suspects were ordered to
remain indoors for weeks at a stretch, collective fines were
imposed on villages which were suspected to be frequented
by revolutionaries. Moreover, soldiers were made to march
through the villages as a display and people were ordered on
pain of penalty, to come out and receive them. Many of these
orders were issued subsequently in Midnapore and Dacca
Districts. While this double dose of repression was being
administered, no steps were taken to punish the officials
responsible for the happenings at Chittagong, Hijli and
Dacca, nor was any compensation or relief given to the
sufferers. To add to the unrest, during the period of truce,
some revolutionary prisoners were condemned to death and
hanged. The vicious circle of official repression—revolutionary
terrorism¹—official counter-terrorism—thus went on. A
further complication arose when the Calcutta Municipal
Corporation passed a resolution² expressing grief at the
execution of one of the revolutionary prisoners, Dinesh
Chandra Gupta. In the midst of this turmoil, the position of
the Congress in Bengal was unenviable. Theoretically, there
was peace between the Government and the people, but in
reality the relations were strained and there were 'hostilities'
on both sides. To consider the situation, a special session of
the Bengal Provincial Conference was held at Berhampore in
December. The Conference resolved that the Government
had virtually violated the Delhi Pact and the Congress should
therefore formally give notice to the Government and revive
the civil-disobedience campaign, emphasis being laid on the
boycott of British goods. It was hoped that the revival of
the civil-disobedience movement would divert the energy of
¹ In December 1931, two schoolgirls named Shanti and Suniti, shot
dead the Magistrate of Comilla.
² This resolution was resented by the Government as well as by all
Britishers.

THE FIGHT RESUMED 267
the youths and thereby help to stop the terrorist campaign
in the province.
But the trouble was not only in Bengal. During the absence
of the Mahatma from India, a crisis had arisen in the Frontier
Province, and also in the United Provinces. The official
complaint was that the Red Shirt Volunteers¹ of the Frontier
leader, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, were engaged in sub-
versive activities, though as a matter of fact they were per-
fectly non-violent. No notice was sent to the Congress
head-quarters about this' complaint. Suddenly an Ordinance
was issued declaring the Red Shirt Volunteers an illegal body.
Simultaneously Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the Frontier
Gandhi and his brother, along with some other leaders, were
put under arrest and taken to distant prisons. Several
hundred Red Shirts were immediately cast into prison, and
within a few months their number rose to several thousand.
Thereafter, troops were sent into the remotest villages in
order to terrorise the people and break up the Red Shirt
organisation.
In the United Provinces there had been an acute economic
'crisis for some time past. In November 1930, Mr. H. N.
Brailsford, the well-known Socialist writer, who was an
altogether independent observer, told the writer in Calcutta
that the conditions in the United Provinces were verging on
an agrarian revolution. About this time the no-rent campaign
was started by the Congress in the province. After the Delhi
truce, when the no-tax campaign was suspended, the peasants
being in the same condition as in 1930, could not pay their
rent. In May, the Mahatma tried to mediate in the matter
and advised the peasants to pay 50 per cent. of their dues
—but that also they could not. Thereupon the Government
remitted a portion of the land revenue and maintained that
that was enough. The peasants thought otherwise and on their
behalf, the Provincial Congress Committee tried to carry
on negotiations with the Government. In November matters
reached a crisis. The Government demanded that the peasants
¹ These volunteers were so called from the colour of their uniform. They
were Congress Volunteers and had nothing to do with the Communist
Party.

268 · THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
should pay up their dues pending negotiations. The peasants
demanded, on the contrary, that pending negotiation, the
collection should be suspended. At this stage the Provincial
Congress Committee approached Sardar V. Patel, the Con-
gress President, and Mahatma Gandhi, who was then in
Europe, for advice. The Mahatma left it to the Committee
to do as they thought best. The Peasants' League (Kishan
League) of the United Provinces then took the matter in
hand and informed the Congress Committee that if they did
not start the no-rent campaign—it would be launched by the
Kishan League. Faced with the possibility of losing its hold
on the masses, the Provincial Congress Committee decided
to commence the no-rent campaign. Immediately this was
done, an ordinance was issued for suppressing that campaign.
A large number of arrests was made under the ordinance
and about the middle of December, when Pandit Jawaharlal
Nehru and Mr. Sherwani were leaving Allahabad for Bombay,
to make preparations for the reception of the Mahatma, they
were arrested in the train.
As has been stated at the beginning of this chapter, on
December 28th, 1931, Bombay city was en fête for the reception
of India's beloved leader. Never was a king or a victorious
general given a warmer welcome. A hostile demonstration
was attempted by the followers of Dr. Ambedkar as also by
the local Communist Party—but the smallness of it only
served to throw into bolder relief the tremendous hold
which the Mahatma had over the masses. The next day the
Congress Working Committee met and authorised Mahatma
Gandhi to apply for an interview¹ with the Viceroy and
accordingly he sent the following telegram:
'I was unprepared on landing yesterday to find the
Frontier and the U.P. Ordinances, shootings in the Frontier
and arrests of valued comrades in both and on the top, the
Bengal Ordinance awaiting me. I do not know whether I
am to regard these as an indication that friendly relations
¹ The writer, who was one of those invited to attend this meeting of
the Working Committee, expressed the opinion that in the circumstances
it would be humiliating for the Mahatma to apply for an interview. But
all the others present thought differently.

THE FIGHT RESUMED 269
between us are closed or whether you expect me still to
see and receive guidance from you as to the course I am to
pursue in advising the Congress.'
The Viceroy sent a long reply on December 31st and stated
at the end: 'His Excellency feels bound to emphasis that he
will not be prepared to discuss with you any measures which
the Government of India, with the fullest approval of His
Majesty's Government, found it necessary to adopt in Bengal,
the United Provinces and the North-West Frontier Province.'
Soon after receipt of this telegram the Working Committee
met on January 1st, 1932, and adopted the following resolution:
' . . . The Committee regards the Premier's declaration
as wholly unsatisfactory and inadequate, and in terms
of the Congress demands, opines that nothing short of
complete independence, carrying full control of defence,
external affairs and finance, with such safeguards as may be
demonstrably necessary in the interest of the nation, can
be regarded by the Congress as satisfactory. The Committee
notes that the British Government was not prepared to
regard the Congress at the Round Table Conference as
entitled to speak on behalf of the nation as a whole. At
the same time the Committee recognises, with sorrow that
communal harmony could not be attained at the said
Conference. The Committee invites the nation, therefore,
to make ceaseless efforts to demonstrate the capacity of the
Congress to represent the nation as a whole and promote an
atmosphere that would make the Constitution, framed
purely on a national basis, acceptable to the various com-
munities composing the nation. Meanwhile, the Com-
mittee is prepared to render co-operation to Government,
provided the Viceroy reconsiders his Thursday's telegram
to Mahatma Gandhi, adequate relief is granted in respect
of the Ordinances and its recent acts, a free scope is left
to the Congress in any future negotiations and consultations
to prosecute the Congress's claim for complete independence
and administration of the country is carried on with
popular representatives pending the attainment of such
independence.
'In the absence of a satisfactory response from Govern-
ment in terms of the foregoing paragraph, the Working

270 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
Committee will regard it as an indication on the part of the
Government that it has reduced to nullity the Delhi Pact.
‘In the event of a satisfactory response not forthcoming, the
Committee calls upon the nation to resume civil disobedience.’
The same day the Mahatma sent a long rejoinder to the
Viceroy asking him to reconsider his decision and grant an
interview without imposing any conditions as to the scope
of discussion. He enclosed a copy of the Working Committee’s
resolution and added: ‘If His Excellency thinks it worth
while to see me, the operation of the resolution will be
suspended pending our discussion, in the hope that it may
result in the resolution being finally given up.’
On January 2nd, 1932, the Viceroy informed Mahatma
Gandhi that an interview under the threat of civil disobedience
was out of the question. The Mahatma replied as follows:
‘... Surely it is wrong to describe an honest expression of
opinion as a threat. May I remind the Government that the
Delhi negotiations were opened and carried on whilst civil
disobedience was on and that when the Pact was made, civil
disobedience was not given up but only discontinued. This
position was reasserted and accepted by His Excellency and his
Government last year prior to my departure for London....
Meanwhile I wish to assure the Government that every
endeavour will be made on the part of the Congress to carry
on the struggle without malice and in a strictly non-violent
manner....’
That was the end of the negotiations. On January 4th, the
Government of India issued a statement justifying their
attitude and conduct. Simultaneously orders were issued to
local authorities throughout India to strike at the Congress
organisations at once. The ordinances carefully prepared by
the Government of India in 1931 during the period of the
truce, were at once put into operation. According to lists
previously prepared by the local authorities, sweeping
arrests of Congress leaders were made before they could find
time to launch the civil-disobedience campaign. Within a
week almost everybody who was somebody in the Congress
Party was in prison. Nevertheless, the campaign began to

THE FIGHT RESUMED 271
gain in strength and volume without any direction from
head-quarters. According to official statistics, 14,800 arrests
were made in January and 17,800 in February. The Govern-
ment soon realised that if arrests were continued at that rate
it would be impossible to deal with the large prison population.
In March, tactics were therefore changed and instead of
making arrests, force was used in dealing with Congressmen
and their demonstrations. Under the ordinances, the follow-
ing steps among others, were taken by the local authorities
all over India: orders were issued prohibiting meetings and
processions; Congress organisations were declared illegal and
Congress offices were taken possession of; Congress funds
were seized; orders were served on people not to help the
Congress in any way nor to harbour Congress volunteers, on
pain of punishment; land and property were seized for not
paying land revenue or other taxes; National literature was
banned; the Nationalist Press was gagged; shopkeepers
were ordered not to close their shops when asked by the
Congress to do so; 'lathi charges' and even firing were
resorted to for dispersing Congress demonstrations.
Despite all these restrictions, the civil-disobedience cam-
paign was in full swing. The following were some of the
activities of the Congress: holding meetings and conferences
in spite of Government prohibition; organising processions
in defiance of police orders; picketing foreign-cloth and liquor
shops; picketing British goods, banks, insurance companies,
etc.; publishing unauthorised bulletins, newspapers, etc.;
saluting the national flag in public and hoisting it over
Government buildings; manufacturing salt; attempting to
re-occupy buildings seized by the Government; withholding
of land revenue and taxes. Besides these activities, during the
first six months of the year, special campaigns were conducted
on an all-India basis under the orders of the Congress
Working Committee or of the Congress President. From
April 6th to April 13th, the national week was observed in
commemoration of the Amritsar massacre of 1919. This was
followed by the holding of the 47th session of the Congress
at Delhi on April 24th, in spite of the severest police restric-
tions. The Delhi Congress was followed up by a series of

272 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
provincial, district and sub-divisional political conferences
held throughout India in defiance of the police ban. A raid
on the Wadala Salt Depot was attempted on May 15th. An All-
India Swadeshi Day was observed on May 29th, to stimulate
the Swadeshi¹ (i.e., national industry) movement and an All-
India Prisoners' Day was observed on July 4th, to express
sympathy for political prisoners. On April 8th, during
the National Week Celebration at Allahabad, the police
attempted to disperse by force a Congress procession led
by the revered widow of Pandit Motilal Nehru. Among
those who were seriously injured during the police attack
was Mrs. Motilal Nehru herself. This event sent a thrill
of horror and indignation throughout the country.² The
Delhi Congress was carefully planned. Though the President-
elect, Pandit Madan Mohon Malaviya, was arrested on his
way to Delhi, the police could not prevent a large number of
delegates from arriving there for participating in the Congress.
The Congress session having been banned by the Govern-
ment, in the absence of a better arrangement, it was held
near the Clock Tower in the Chandni Chowk and Mr.
Ranchoddas Amritlal of Ahmedabad presided. There was a
short session and the resolutions adopted by the Subjects
Committee, which had been printed beforehand, were dis-
tributed among the public. The Congress reiterated the
resolution on independence, approved of the decision of the
Working Committee to revive the civil-disobedience move-
ment and reaffirmed its faith in the leadership of Mahatma
Gandhi. Soon after, the police arrived on the scene, dispersed
the gathering by force and made a large number of arrests.
Reviewing the Congress movement during the first four
months, Pandit M. M. Malaviya in a public statement, issued
on May 2nd, 1932, declared:
'During these four months up to April 20th last, accord-
ing to the reports published in the Press, 66,646 persons,
¹ After the Congress was banned, 'Buy Indian' Leagues were organised
within the ambit of the Law.
² The medical officer who attended on Mrs. Nehru reported as follows :-
'Her injuries were caused by something like a lathi. She has received
half a dozen injuries, including a bad cut on her head which caused profuse
bleeding.'

THE FIGHT RESUMED 273
among whom were included 5,325 women and many children,
have been arrested, imprisoned and humiliated. This could
not possibly include arrests in the far-off villages in the
interior of the country and, therefore, the Congress
estimates the total arrests to be over 80,000 up to that date.
The jails are overcrowded and ordinary prisoners are being
released before their time to make room for political
prisoners. To this has to be added the number of arrests
made during the last ten days, including those of the
delegates to the Delhi Congress. According to the reports
in the Press, firing has been resorted to in at least 29
cases with considerable loss of life. There have been lathi
charges on unarmed crowds at 325 places. There have been
633 cases of house searches and 102 cases of confiscation
of property. A general policy has been pursued of imposing
extraordinarily heavy fines on persons who have been con-
victed in connection with the movement and property far
in excess of what was necessary for realising the amount of
the fines has been attached and sold. The Press has been
gagged as it has never been gagged before. 163 cases have
been reported where the newspapers and public presses
have been regulated by orders for confiscation, demands
for security and consequent closing down of the presses,
warnings, searches and arrests of editors, printers or
keepers. Numerous public meetings and processions of
non-violent men and women have been dispersed by lathi
charges, and sometimes by firing.' (Indian Recorder,
Calcutta, p. 271.)
In connection with the above report, it may be noted, that
during the period under review, political prisoners in Karachi
Jail and in Haripur Jail in the Frontier Province were subjected
to whipping. In Rajshahi Jail in Bengal, political prisoners
were subjected to numerous humiliating punishments like
bar-fetters, night handcuffs, gunny clothing, etc. In Suri Jail
in Bengal, women prisoners went on hunger-strike as a protest
against ill-treatment.¹
¹ In many other prisons similar incidents took place. In Rajmundhry
Jail, a prisoner belonging to the Lahore Conspiracy Case was flogged.
In Bellary Jail, political prisoners were attacked by warders with sticks
(lathis). In the Deoli Detention Camp for Bengal state-prisoners near
Ajmer, the state-prisoners were assaulted by the guards and seriously
injured. In all such cases the usual charge against the prisoners was one
of insubordination.
S

274 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
On the whole the activities of the Congress in 1932 did
not compare unfavourably with those of 1930. Nevertheless,
every Congressman could feel one difference. In 1930, the
Congress had taken the offensive, while the Government was
on the defensive. In 1932 it was just the reverse. There is no
doubt that in spite of the manifold defects of the Delhi Pact,
die-hards in England and in India took it as a defeat or a
humiliation for the all-powerful British Government. They
were smarting under a sense of defeat and wanted to avenge
themselves. The overwhelming majority gained by the
Conservatives at the General Election in October 1931,
encouraged them greatly. Moreover, the attitude of Mahatma
Gandhi and the statements made by him in England, gave
them the impression that he was unwilling or unprepared to
face a fight again. That the Mahatma was honestly pursuing
a peaceful policy has to be admitted on all hands and his
very unpreparedness can be regarded as a proof of his sincerity
of purpose. In fact, the Mahatma carried his peaceful inten-
tions so far that he neglected to keep his 'powder dry.' He
was in reality dragged into a fight in 1932 because of the
non possumus attitude of the Viceroy on the one hand and the
rising temper of the public on the other. In this connection
it is significant that the aggressive steps taken by the Govern-
ment of India during the absence of the Mahatma, had the
full approval of His Majesty's Government. Apart from the
Government's attitude there were two other factors that
forced the Mahatma to resume the fight, the general temper
of the public and the influence of the Left Wing. As for the
first, in none of the major provinces was the public satisfied
at the attitude of the Government. Those who had given in
to the Mahatma hoping that something tangible would come
out of the Round Table Conference were disillusioned.
Further, the steady propaganda carried on by Left-Wing
Congressmen, youth-leaguers¹ and Left-Wing Labourites,
also had its effect. While in England the Mahatma did feel
now and again that another fight was unavoidable but the pit
¹ On December 22nd, 1931, the Maharashtra Youth Conference met at
Poona with the writer in the chair and passed a resolution calling upon the
Congress Working Committee to resume the civil-disobedience campaign.

THE FIGHT RESUMED 275
of it is that no preparations were made by the Congress for
the coming campaign and no plans were prepared in advance.
The campaign of 1932 was an imitation of that of 1930 and
the Government had prepared effective counter-measures for
dealing with a campaign of that sort. If the Congress wanted
to be successful in 1932 as well—it should have devised new
tactics to take the Government by surprise.
It is not generally understood why the Congress was
unsuccessful in 1932, though the same tactics had been
successful in 1930. The reason is that in 1930 the tactics of
the Congress had taken the Government by surprise. No
doubt, the same tactics had been employed in 1921 and 1922,
but owing to the sudden termination of the campaign in
February 1922, the Congress did not have to disclose all its
secrets. Moreover, eight years had elapsed since that cam-
paign and most of the men who had dealt with that campaign
were no longer in the service of the Government. Conse-
quently, the 1930 campaign was to all intents and purposes a
novel campaign and it took the Government some time to
comprehend it and to develop counter-tactics thereafter to
cope with it. The Delhi Truce gave the Government time to
do this work and on January 1st, 1932, when the Working Com-
mittee resolved to resume the civil-disobedience campaign,
the Government forces were in complete readiness to strike
immediately and ruthlessly. And they were not content with
striking at those who worked in the open, but made a clean
sweep of the brains and financiers of the movement as well.¹
During the first eight months of the year the fight went on
with unabated zeal. The declaration of the Government that
the Congress would soon be down and out was falsified.
The Congress was still alive and kicking, and there was no
sign that it would meet with an early death. In March the
movement was further strengthened because the Jamiat-ul-
ulema, the All-India organisation of the Moslem priests and
divines, under the leadership of Mufti Kifayetullah, declared
¹ Among those imprisoned in this way were Mr. Bhulabhai Desai, former
Advocate-General of Bombay and Mr. Sarat C. Bose, a prominent advocate
of Calcutta and a front-rank Congressman who was then an Alderman of
the Calcutta Municipality. At present (November 1934) the latter is
still in detention.

276 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
for non-co-operation and the leaders of the Jamiat soon found
themselves in prison. This decision of the Jamiat considerably
strengthened the position of the Nationalist Moslems, who
had all along been an integral part of the Congress, and of the
Moslems of the Frontier Province who were going through
the worst form of official repression. Nevertheless, the odds
were against the Congress. In Bombay, which had been the
storm centre in 1930, Hindu-Moslem riots broke out in May
and dragged on for nearly six weeks. Owing to this outbreak,
the Congress campaign in Bombay suffered a terrible set-back
from which it could not recover. In Gujerat, the harassed,
persecuted and impoverished peasantry could no longer
wage the brave fight of which they could boast in 1930. In
the United Provinces, after some months, the no-rent
campaign could not make further headway in the face of
official repression. In Bengal, more serious than the civil-
disobedience movement was the terrorist campaign of the
revolutionaries. But though terrorism was a thorn to the
Government, it brought untold hardship on the people, since
several districts like Chittagong, Midnapore and Dacca were
virtually handed over to martial law and the innocent
villagers were subjected to heavy collective fines for the
misdeeds committed by unknown people. During the year
a liberal use was made of fire-arms for dispersing Congress
demonstrations. Replying to a question in the Indian Legis-
lative Assembly, the Home member to the Government of
India, Mr. (now Sir) H. G. Haig stated that in dispersing
'assemblies, firing was resorted to seventeen times in Bengal,
seven times in the United Provinces, three times in Bihar
and Orissa, once in Madras Presidency, once in the Frontier
Province—while in Bombay Presidency the casualties from
shooting, were thirty-four killed and ninety-one wounded.
In this situation, when the Congress was engaged in a life
and death struggle, an unexpected development took place
which led to a complete side-tracking of the civil-disobedience
movement in the country. That was the fast of Mahatma
Gandhi on September 20th, 1932.
On March 11th, the Mahatma had written to Sir Samuel
Hoare informing him that in keeping with what he had

THE FIGHT RESUMED 277
stated at the Round Table Conference in London on Novem-
ber 13th, 1931, if the depressed classes were torn away from
the main body of Hindus by the grant of a separate electorate,
he would resist it with his life and in pursuance of that
resolve, he would fast unto death. On April 13th, Sir Samuel
Hoare had replied in a non-committal way, saying that the
Government would give the matter their fullest consideration
before coming to a decision. The 'Communal Award'¹ of
the Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, was thereafter
announced on August 17th. It provided for a certain number
of seats for the depressed classes in the Provincial Legislatures
which would be filled up on the basis of a separate electorate.
In addition to this, members of the depressed classes would
be entitled to stand for election from the general con-
stituencies earmarked for Hindus and would be registered in
a common electoral rôle along with other Hindus. The award
further provided that if His Majesty's Government were
satisfied that the communities concerned were mutually agreed
upon a practicable alternative scheme, either in respect of
one or more of the Governor's provinces or in respect of the
whole of British India, before the new Government of India
Bill was passed into law, they would be prepared to recom-
mend to Parliament that the alternative should be substituted
for the provisions now outlined. On August 18th the Mahatma
addressed a letter to the Premier informing him that in
accordance with what he had written to Sir Samuel Hoare
on March 11th, he had resolved to commence fast unto
death at noon on September 20th. 'The fast will cease if
during its progress, the British Government, of its own
motion or under pressure of public opinion, revise their
decision and withdraw their scheme of communal electorates
for the depressed classes whose representatives should be
elected by general electorate under common franchise, no
matter how wide it is.' The Mahatma further asked that the
entire correspondence be given immediate and full publicity.
¹ As the members nominated by the British Government to the Second
Round Table Conference in 1931 could not come to an agreement on the
question of representation, electorate, etc., for the legislatures under the
New Constitution, the British Prime Minister announced the Government's
decision. This decision is known as the Communal Award.

278 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
The Premier replied on September 8th, regretting the decision
of the Mahatma but affirming that the provisions of the award
could not be altered except on the condition stated therein.
The Mahatma received this communication the next day and
immediately replied saying that he felt compelled reluctantly
to adhere to the decision he had already conveyed.
Words cannot describe the anxiety and alarm that passed
from one end of the country to the other when the news about
the impending fast was published on September 13th. Frantic
appeals were made to the Mahatma to desist but the appeals
proved ineffective. Government offered to release him under
certain conditions but he declined conditional release. It
was therefore decided to leave him undisturbed in Poona
Prison, but to remove all restrictions regarding interviews
and correspondence. On an appeal from Pandit M. M.
Malaviya, a conference of Hindu leaders met at Bombay on
September 19th, in order to deliberate how the Mahatma's
life could be saved. After a preliminary discussion there, the
leaders adjourned to Poona in order to be in constant touch
with the Mahatma. After prolonged discussions, an agree-
ment was arrived at between the Hindu leaders on September
24th, which virtually did away with separate electorate for the
depressed classes. This agreement, hereafter known as the
Poona Agreement,¹ was ratified by the Hindu leaders' con-
ference and by the Hindu Mahasabha on September 25th,
and was cabled to the Government of India and to the Prime
Minister. On September 26th, His Majesty's Government
announced that they were prepared to recommend to Parlia-
ment to endorse the Poona Agreement. The whole country
breathed a sigh of relief. Prayers went up to heaven that the
Mahatma's life had been saved.
The Poona Agreement provided for a certain number of
reserved seats for members of the depressed classes in the
Legislatures on the basis of a common electorate for all
classes of Hindus. There was, however, one qualification.
The members of the depressed classes registered in the
general electoral roll in a constituency would form an electoral
college which would elect a panel of four candidates belonging
¹ Also called the Poona Pact.