द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

MAHATMA GANDHI IN EUROPE 251
number of seats would be reserved in the Legislatures for the
Depressed Classes on the basis of a Common Electorate for
all sections of the Hindus. At that time, the Mahatma would
not think of any such compromise. When Dr. Ambedkar
joined the Minorities Pact, he was assured not only of a
number of seats for the Depressed Classes, but also of a
separate electorate for them. There is no doubt that if a
settlement had then been made with Dr. Ambedkar, the terms
would have been much better than the terms of the Poona
Pact concluded in September 1932, after the historic fast of
the Mahatma.
At the meeting of the Minorities Committee held on
November 13th, 1931, the Chairman, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald,
referring to the Minorities Pact, claimed that it was acceptable
to well over 115 million people in India. He also replied
to the Mahatma's attack at the previous meeting and urged
on the contrary, that inability to solve the communal question
was hampering the progress of Constitution-building. In his
speech the Mahatma emphatically challenged both these
assertions and with reference to the first, he claimed that the
Congress represented 85 or 95 per cent. of the population
not merely of British India but of the whole of India. In
the same speech the Mahatma made one significant assertion:
'I would like to repeat what I have said before—that while
it will always accept any solution that may be acceptable to
the Hindus, Mussalmans and Sikhs, the Congress will be
no party to special reservation or special electorates for any
other minorities.'¹ The Mahatma once again urged the
appointment by the Government of a judicial tribunal to
give a final decision on the communal question.
Before the Federal Structure Committee on October 23rd,
1931, Mahatma Gandhi put forward with due emphasis the
Congress view regarding a Supreme Court for India. He
urged that this Federal Court should be a court of the widest
jurisdiction possible and not one to decide only those cases
that arise from the administration of Federal laws. He
¹ In the light of this statement the Mahatma's endorsement of the
Poona Pact in September, 1932, is inexplicable, since the Poona Pact
provided for reservation of seats for the Depressed Classes.

252 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
opposed the idea of having two Supreme Courts, one to deal
merely with Federal Law and the other to deal with all the
other matters not covered by the Federal Administration or
the Federal Government. On November 17th, 1931, the
Mahatma spoke on the Congress demand for complete control
over the army and over external affairs. He said, that the
present army, whether Indian or British, was an army of
occupation. 'I would say emphatically that the whole of this
army should be disbanded if it does not pass under my control
before I could possibly shoulder the burden of running the
Government of India under the terrible handicaps under
which we are labouring as a legacy of alien rule. . . . If the
British people think that we shall require a century before
that can be done, then for that century the Congress will
wander in the wilderness and the Congress must go through
that terrible fiery ordeal . . . and if it becomes necessary and
if it is God's will—a shower of bullets.'
On November 19th, 1931, before the Federal Structure
Committee, the Mahatma opposed the resolution on com-
mercial safeguards for Britishers passed by the first Round
Table Conference as being detrimental to the interests of the
Indian people. He agreed that there should be no racial
discrimination against foreigners as such. He also agreed
that 'no existing interest legitimately acquired and not being
in conflict with the best interests of the nation in general,
shall be interfered with except in accordance with the law
applicable to such interests.' But he made it clear that the
National Government of the future might find it necessary
to dispossess the 'haves' in the interests of the 'have-nots,'
i.e., the famished millions of India. Existing interests should
be subjected to judicial scrutiny when necessary—but no
racial question would be involved therein. He further
opposed the existing rights¹ of the European community in
India in regard to criminal trials. In his next speech at the
Round Table Conference on November 25th, he maintained
that the obligations to be taken over by the future National
Government of India should be subject to audit and impartial.
¹ For instance the right to have a European judge or a European jury
in the trial.

MAHATMA GANDHI IN EUROPE 253
examination.¹ He condemned the fixing of the currency ratio
at 1s. 6d. instead of at 1s. 4d., as the Indian people had
demanded. Continuing, he said: 'I would want complete
control of Indian finance if India was really to have respon-
sibility at the centre. In my opinion, unless we have control
over our own purse, absolutely unrestricted, we shall not be
able to shoulder the responsibility nor will it be a respon-
sibility worth the name.' In another speech the same day,
he maintained that after mature consideration he had come
to the conclusion that provincial autonomy and central
responsibility must go together. 'A strong centre governed
and administered by an alien authority and a strong autonomy
(for the provinces) are a contradiction in terms.' Speaking of
central responsibility, he said: 'I want that responsibility at
the centre that will give me, as you all know, control of the
army and finance. I know that I am not going to get that
here and now and I know there is not a British man ready
for that. Therefore, I know I must go back and yet invite
the nation to a course of suffering.'
Mahatma Gandhi's first speech at the plenary session of
the Round Table Conference on November 30th, is a priceless
document, though it affords painful reading, being a record
of disillusionment complete. He started by saying: 'All the
other parties at this meeting represent sectional interests. The
Congress alone claims to represent the whole of India and all
interests. . . . And yet here I see that the Congress is treated
as one of the parties . . . . I wish I could convince all the
British public men, the British Ministers that the Congress is
capable of delivering the goods. . . . But no, although you
have invited the Congress you distrust the Congress. Although
you have invited the Congress, you reject its claim to represent
the whole of India.' Referring to the communal question, he
told the unpleasant truth 'that so long as the wedge in the
shape of foreign rule divides community from community
and class from class, there will be no real living solution,
there will be no living friendship between these communities.'
On the question of the national demand he said: 'Call it

¹ In this connection he referred to the Report of the Public Debt Enquiry
Committee appointed by the Karachi Congress in 1931.

254 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
by any name you like, a rose will smell as sweet by any other
name, but it must be the rose of liberty that I want and not
the artificial product.' Then in order to soften his demand
for independence he appealed in these words: 'I want to -
become a partner with the English people; but I want to
enjoy precisely the same liberty that your people enjoy and
I want to seek this partnership not merely for India and not
merely for mutual benefit.' Then finding that all appeals
were useless, he flared up and said: 'Will you not see the
writing that these terrorists are writing with their blood?'
And then he said: 'I shall hope against hope, I shall strain
every nerve to achieve an honourable settlement for my country.
... It can be a matter of no joy and comfort to me to lead
them again to a fight of that character, but if a further ordeal of
fire has to be our lot, I shall approach that with the greatest joy
and with the greatest consolation that I was doing what I felt
to be right, that the country was doing what it felt to be right.'
At the last sitting of the plenary session of the Round
Table Conference on December 1st, 1931, the Prime Minister,
Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, made the following declaration:
'At the beginning of the year (1931) I made a declaration
of the policy of the then Government and I am authorised
by the present one to give you and India specific assurance
that it remains its policy. I shall repeat the salient sentences
of that declaration.
'The view of His Majesty's Government is that respon-
sibility for the Government of India should be placed upon
the Legislatures, Central and Provincial, with such pro-
visions as may be necessary to guarantee during the period
of transition the observance of certain obligations and to
meet other special circumstances and also with such
guarantees as are required by the minorities to protect their
political rights. In such statutory safeguards as may be
made for meeting the needs of the transitional period, it
will be the primary concern of His Majesty's Government
to see the reserved powers so framed and exercised as not
to prejudice the advance of India through the new Con-
stitution to full responsibility for her own Government.
'Regarding the Central Government it made it plain
that, subject to defined conditions, His Majesty's late

MAHATMA GANDHI IN EUROPE 255
Government was prepared to recognize the principle of
responsibility of the executive to the Legislature if both
were constituted on an All-India Federal basis.
'The principle of responsibility was to be subject to the
qualification that in the existing circumstances, defence and
external affairs must be reserved to the Governor-General
and that regarding finance, such conditions must apply as
would insure the fulfilment of the obligations incurred
under the authority of the Secretary of State (for India)
and the maintenance unimpaired of the financial stability
and credit of India.
'Finally, it was our view that the Governor-General
must be granted the necessary powers to enable him to
'fulfil his responsibility for securing the observance of the
constitutional rights of the minorities and for ultimately
maintaining the tranquillity of the State.'
Moving a vote of thanks to the Premier the Mahatma said
that in all probability he had come to the parting of the
ways but he hoped that if a fight was unavoidable, it would
be conducted without malice on either side. Three days later
the Mahatma said good-bye to the Premier and left London.
Before leaving London in an interview to the Press he stated
that an immediate nation-wide resumption of civil dis-
obedience was out of the question—but he did foresee the
possibility of local civil disobedience being launched as a
protest against specific acts of injustice and tyranny, as for
example the ordinances promulgated in Bengal, the United
Provinces and the Frontier Province.
During his stay of nearly three months in England, the
Mahatma had an exceedingly busy time. A glance at his
daily routine would show that he was overstraining himself
—sometimes not allowing himself to have more than two
hours' sleep for days together. He met all sorts of people
there—M.P.s, politicians, journalists, missionaries, society
ladies, social workers, litterateurs, artists, students, and what
not. During week-ends he would undertake tours to Cam-
bridge or Oxford or Lancashire, in order to awaken interest
in and sympathy for India. But it seems that there was lack
of co-ordination and unity of purpose in all his activities.

256 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
Indian members of the Round Table Conference complained
that it was difficult to get at the Mahatma when they wanted
him. Indian Liberal members of the Round Table Con-
ference complained that instead of playing a lone hand, he
could have rallied all the anti-communal forces and become
the leader of a united Nationalist Party.¹ Whatever the truth
of these criticisms may be, there is no doubt that the Mahatma's
visit to England was badly planned—if there was any plan at
all—and his personal entourage did not consist of any advisers
worth the name. His indecision, till the eleventh hour, about
attending the London Conference was largely responsible for
his lack of plan and for his late arrival in London which
considerably handicapped him. As contrasted with him, the
Government had made elaborate arrangements and all their
plans had been carefully worked out in advance. It was only
in London that he realised what it meant to have a conference
with members chosen by the Government, with the Congress
as one of the several parties present there and with himself
as the only representative of the Congress. The wonder of
it is that such a shrewd politician as the Mahatma made
such a belated discovery in spite of the warnings given by
lesser folk in India.
But the causes of the Mahatma's failure in London go
much deeper. If the Mahatma meant to co-operate with the
Round Table Conference, he should have gone there in 1930.
The terms which he got in March 1931—he could have easily
got in August 1930. The assurance regarding Dominion
Status which he had demanded in 1929 and 1930—he could
not get even in 1931 and as for the other concessions in the
Gandhi-Irwin Pact, Lord Irwin would in all probability have
agreed to them at any time. In 1930, the Congress could
easily have got half the number of seats at the Conference.
By going there in 1931, alone and unfriended, the Mahatma
had the tactical disadvantage of having to meet a conference
which had come into existence without the participation of
the Congress and of having to build on sectarian foundations
laid by communalist members. With the Labour Cabinet in
¹ This was the view expressed by the Right Hon. V. S. Sastri in the Indian
Review of January, 1932.

MAHATMA GANDHI IN EUROPE 257
power in England in 1930 and Lord Irwin in Delhi, the
Congress could have given a different turn to the Conference.
In 1931 the situation was altered completely The Labour
Cabinet was replaced by a virtually Conservative Cabinet;
Lord Irwin made room for Lord Willingdon, while Sir
Samuel Hoare succeeded Capt. Wedgwood-Benn at the India
Office. The last flickering hope died out when the General
Election in October brought the Conservatives into power
(under the name of the National Government) with a thump-
ing majority.
In spite of these unfavourable circumstances when the
Mahatma did go to England, he should have concentrated
entirely on the work of the Conference, with a view to
counteracting all the mischievous moves of the Government.
Probably under the influence of pro-Indian Britishers like
Mr. C. F. Andrews, he unfortunately took it into his head
that he should go about rousing sympathy for India among
Britishers. That was not the purpose for which he had come
to England nor was it possible for him to do so within the
short time and with the limited energy at his disposal. Going
over the list of persons whom the Mahatma met, one cannot
help feeling that for the purpose for which he had come to
England, most of the engagements were unnecessary, if not
useless. If he had come on an ordinary propaganda tour, a
programme such as he had, would have been quite helpful
and in order.
There was another deeper cause which accounted for the
Mahatma's failure. During his stay in England he had to
play two rôles in one person, the rôle of a political leader
and that of a world-teacher. Sometimes he conducted himself
not as a political leader who had come to negotiate with the
enemy, but as a master who had come to preach a new faith
—that of non-violence and world-peace. Because of his
second rôle, he had to spend much of his time with people
who were quite useless in promoting his political mission.
In the absence of advisers from his own party, the place was
filled by some of his British admirers. From the moment of
his landing in Europe till the moment of his departure, he
was surrounded by them. In order to demonstrate his fair-
R

258 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
.ness and universal love, he accepted as his hostess an English
lady. As contrasted with the Mahatma, the Irish Sinn Fein
delegation to London in 1921 had lived a different life. They
used to live entirely among themselves and avoid all social
engagements with Britishers, though attempts were made to
drag the delegation into them. This aloofness and indifference
had impressed British politicians much more than the
Mahatma’s friendliness did. But being a world-teacher, the
Mahatma had his own code of ethics.
There is no doubt that in 1930, when the Mahatma was in
prison, he had exerted a much greater influence on the
Round Table Conference. At the Conference, the Indian
Liberal politicians had fully exploited his influence. But
when he appeared in person and all alone, he lost much of
the glamour and the halo that had attached to his name. He
was at a physical disadvantage, being a single frail individual
in a group of 107. If he had accepted the offer made by the
Government, of fifteen or sixteen seats for the Congress
Delegation, his position would have been stronger. His
colleagues would have been of great help to him in meeting,
and crossing swords with, a solid phalanx of reactionaries.
Moreover, the Mahatma did not seem to be cut out for the
rôle of a bargainer. He therefore met the fate which over-
took President Wilson at the time of the Versailles Treaty.
The Professor-President of America was no match for the
Welsh wizard, Mr. Lloyd George—nor was the saint-
politician from India any match for the wily Mr. Ramsay
Macdonald. On the British side, the Mahatma was handled
very tactfully. He had on the whole a very friendly welcome
in England which he recognised publicly before he left the
country. Special facilities were afforded him while moving
about in London. On the plea of guarding his person, two
stalwarts from Scotland Yard were detailed to be near him
—so that the authorities had not the slightest difficulty in
knowing everything about his daily routine and engagements.
I have not been able to understand why the Mahatma
accepted this escort from Scotland Yard. If an escort was
really necessary, his numerous admirers and followers in
London could have easily served the purpose.

MAHATMA GANDHI IN EUROPE 259
It has been already remarked that the last hope of a settle-
ment faded away when the Conservatives were returned to
power. Their estimate of the Indian situation as also of the
India leader, was quite different from that of the Labourites.
His goodness, his frankness, his fairness, his humble ways,
his profound consideration for his opponents—not only did
not impress John Bull, but was construed as weakness. His
habit of putting all his cards on the table was all right for
India and the Indians, but damaged his prestige among
British politicians. His proneness to confess his ignorance on
intricate questions of finance or law would have been all
right in the company of truth-seeking philosophers, but
lowered him in the estimation of the British public who
were accustomed to see their leaders looking more wise than
they really were. His repeated offer of wholehearted co-
operation at the Round Table Conference had a most tragic
effect and made them think—‘Gandhi is on his last legs.’
What impression could such a statement make on a veteran
politician in England? ‘I shall be here as long as I am
required, because I do not want to revive civil disobedience.
I want to turn the truce that was arrived at at Delhi into a
permanent settlement. But for heaven’s sake give me, a frail
man sixty-two years gone, a little bit of a chance. Find a little
corner¹ for him and the organisation that he represents.’²
If on the contrary, the Mahatma had spoken in the language
of Dictator Stalin, or Il Duce Mussolini or Fuehrer Hitler
—John Bull would have understood and would have bowed
his head in respect. As it was, the Conservative politicians
began to think: ‘Is this frail man in loin-cloth so formidable
that the powerful British Government should yield to him?
India was being ruled by a man who was fit to be a bishop
and so we had so much trouble. If only we had a strong man
at Delhi and at the India Office—everything would be all
right.’ This is how the Indian situation was summed up
after the General Election of October 1931. And all his
propaganda among Church dignitaries, professors and cranks
¹ It is to be regretted that they cornered him successfully.
² The Mahatma’s speech at the plenary session of the Round Table
Conference on November 30th, 1931.

260 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
was of no use to India. The secret of political bargaining is to
look more strong than you really are. Indian politicians, if
they want to match themselves successfully against their
British opponents, will have to learn many things which they
do not know and unlearn many things which they have learnt.
Going through the speeches of the Mahatma at the Round
Table Conference, one is pained at every step. That from the
very beginning he had to speak at length on the status of the
Congress as contrasted with other parties and had to repeat
his remarks over and over again—only shows that a conspiracy
had been hatched in advance to ignore the Congress com-
pletely. At the Conference the Mahatma remarked that in
the reports submitted by the different committees, the views
of the so-called majority were given prominence—while his
dissentient note was condemned to insignificance, as if it
reflected the opinion of just one individual. Some weeks after
his arrival in London, the Mahatma did realise the hopeless-
ness of the situation. If he had any political diplomacy, he
should have sought a convenient opportunity of getting out
of the Conference as soon as possible and then should have
made an extensive tour in America and on the Continent to
expose the unreality of the Conference and to popularise the
Indian cause. By sticking to the Conference till the end, he
unnecessarily lent prestige to a body that should have been
exposed before the bar of world-opinion.
The Mahatma after leaving England spent a few days in
Paris. There he had a group of friends and admirers, who
were however more interested in his non-violence as a message
to the world, than in his struggle for India's freedom. His
brief stay in Paris was well utilised, but unfortunately no
attempt was made to get into touch with politicians—or with
the people who really count in the modern political world.
Nor was any attempt made by him to raise the Indian issue
as an international political issue. From Paris he went to
Geneva. There also he had a group of friends many of whom
were interested more in his philosophy than in his politics.
Though he visited Geneva, no serious attempt was made to
bring him into touch with the people who count in the
organisation of the League of Nations. He paid a visit to

MAHATMA GANDHI IN EUROPE 261
the International Labour Office and that was about all.
However, the most useful part of his time in Switzerland was
spent in the company of that great man and thinker—that
great friend of India and India’s culture, M. Romain
Rolland. India to-day has not a warmer friend outside her
shores than this great soul, and therefore the Mahatma
rendered a great public service to India by spending some of
his time in the company of the French savant. From Switzer-
land the Mahatma travelled to Italy. He was given a warm
reception by the Government and the people of Italy, and
was received in audience by the head of the Government,
Signor Mussolini. That meeting was certainly an historic
one. The Dictator of Italy conveyed his best wishes for the
success of the Mahatma’s efforts. It was the only occasion
on the Continent that the Mahatma came into contact with a
man who really counts in the politics of modern Europe.
The Mahatma’s attitude towards the Fascist authorities,
including his attendance at a demonstration of the Fascist
boys (the Balilla) was severely criticised in anti-Fascist circles.
But there is no doubt that from the point of view of India,
the Mahatma rendered great public service by his visit to
Italy. The only regret is that he did not stay there longer
and did not cultivate more personal contacts.
Reviewing the Mahatma’s visit to Europe as a whole, one
must say that it is to be regretted that he spent so much of
his time in England and so little on the Continent. Even on
the Continent he did not devote sufficient time or attention
to politicians, industrial magnates and other people who
really count in present-day politics. There were many
countries on the Continent eagerly expecting a visit from
him and where he would have received a most cordial
reception. If he had desired, he could without difficulty,
have come in touch with the most important individuals and
organisations in Europe—to the great benefit of India. But
may be, that did not interest him so much. Outside India he
had another rôle to play besides that of a politician and it is
not always easy to play two rôles in one person.

CHAPTER XIII
THE FIGHT RESUMED (1932)
TRUE to his habit of travelling by the lowest class available,
the Mahatma arrived in Bombay as a deck-passenger by S.S.
Pilsna on December 28th, 1931. Elaborate arrangements had
been made by the Bombay Congress Committee to accord
him a right royal reception. Thanks to the propaganda of
the Congress, the failure of the Mahatma to achieve something
tangible for his country at the London Conference had not
produced any depressing effect. And judging from the
warmth, cordiality and affection displayed at the reception,
one would think that the Mahatma had returned with Swaraj
in the hollow of his hand. The same evening he spoke at a
mass meeting of 200,000 people at Azad Maidan. Only with
the help of loudspeakers could his voice be audible to that
vast gathering. The festivity over, the Mahatma settled down
to business. Reports from different parts of the country
were duly placed before him. It was soon evident that the
situation was materially different from what it was when he
had sailed from Bombay towards the end of August. It looked
as if the Government had been waiting till Mahatma Gandhi
sailed from Bombay in order to start a policy of ruthless
repression. The two authors of the Delhi Pact being away
from India, the Government could treat that document as a
scrap of paper.
It is necessary to recapitulate briefly the events of 1931
which led to a crisis at the end of the year rendering imperative
a resumption of the civil-disobedience campaign. After the
Karachi Congress, youth and labour circles continued to
condemn the Delhi Pact. The Provincial Youth Conference
(Naujawan Bharat Sabha) of the United Provinces held at
Muttra in May and presided over by the writer, passed a
resolution of disapproval. In July a session of the All-India
Trade Union Congress was held in Calcutta under the
262

THE FIGHT RESUMED 263
Presidency of the writer, where a similar resolution was
passed. The Right-Wing trade unions had seceded in the
meantime, but all the other unions joined the Congress.
Trouble arose from the very beginning over the question of
credentials. After the Nagpur session of the Trade Union
Congress held in 1929, a split had occurred among those
trade unionists who were generally regarded as Communists.
Mr. M. N. Roy, the erstwhile representative of India, on the
Communist International, was expelled from that body.
Following this incident, a split occurred among the prisoners
in the Meerut Conspiracy Case and also among their followers
in Bombay. One group was reported to follow the lead of
the official Communist Party and the other of Mr. M. N.
Roy. The Girni-Kamgar Union (Textile Workers' Union)
of Bombay, formerly controlled jointly by members of both
the groups, was the scene of a split and the Credentials Com-
mittee of the Trade Union Congress reported that the Roy
group was in possession of the union and was therefore
entitled to be represented on the Trade Union Congress.
This was resented by the other group, who thereupon resorted
to constitutional obstruction culminating in a motion of
no-confidence in the President. This motion being defeated,
the anti-Roy group withdrew from the Congress after creating
a lot of disturbance and set up a Red Trade Union Congress.¹
After the defection, the Congress continued its deliberations.
It resolved not to affiliate with any international body but to
continue unaided the struggle for the rights of the Indian
workers. Mr. Ruikar, President of the Nagpur Textile
Workers' Union, was elected President for the coming year,
and Mr. S. Mukundalal of Calcutta was elected the Secretary.
In spite of the internal dissensions in the Trade Union
Movement, barring the Right-Wingers, all other trade-
unionists were opposed to the Delhi Pact. The Pact contained
no clause benefiting the workers in any way and neither
the under-trial Meerut prisoners nor those convicted in
connection with industrial strikes, were granted amnesty.
Two Right-Wing leaders, Mr. V. V. Giri and Mr. Shiva Rao
¹ From the beginning the Red Trade Union Congress has not shown
much sign of activity except occasionally in Bombay and in Calcutta.

264 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
were, however, nominated by the Government as members
of the second Round Table Conference.
While trade union circles merely kept up vocal opposition
to the Delhi Pact, the revolutionaries in Bengal exasperated
by the repressive policy of the Government, created a serious
crisis in the province. The Armoury Raid in Chittagong in
April 1930, was an aggressive act, but it was on the whole
an isolated one. The subsequent acts of terrorism in other
parts of Bengal, were acts of retaliation or reprisal rather than
acts of aggression. In Dacca, the principal city of East Bengal,
in August 1930, Mr. Lowman, the head of the Intelligence
Branch of the Police was assassinated and the District
Superintendent of Police was seriously wounded. But prior
to that, there had been Hindu-Moslem riots in Dacca and
Mymensingh Districts, in connection with which the conduct
of the police had been open to serious question. Moreover,
the Dacca police had been harsh and brutal in dealing with
Satyagrahi volunteers engaged in peaceful picketing of foreign-
cloth and liquor shops and in other non-violent activity.
Towards the end of 1930, the Inspector-General of Prisons,
Bengal, Lieut-Col. Simpson, was assassinated in his office
in the Government Secretariat buildings in Calcutta. But
prior to that, there had been indescribable ill-treatment of
political prisoners in many prisons in Bengal and all appeals
made to the Government for redress had been of no avail.
The murder of Mr. Peddie, Magistrate of Midnapore, in
1931, and subsequently of two of his successors, was the
result of the untold atrocities committed by the forces of the
Crown in Midnapore District in the attempt to suppress the
non-violent no-tax campaign. The public of Calcutta had
appointed an impartial committee consisting mostly of
Moderate men to inquire into and report on some of the
atrocities committed in that district. The report was duly
published and the facts brought to the notice of the Govern-
ment. But no redress followed. It was then that in a fit of
exasperation, people took to terrorism by way of reprisal.
These acts of terrorism served to stiffen the attitude of the
Government and a stronger dose of repression was adminis-
tered. A golden opportunity of putting an end to the regrett-

THE FIGHT RESUMED 265
able state of affairs arose in March 1931, when the Delhi
Pact was concluded. But instead of turning over a new leaf,
the authorities decided to copy the Black and Tan methods
that had been employed in Ireland. Between June and
October 1931, three regrettable incidents took place suc-
cessively—at Chittagong, at Hijli Detention Camp, seventy
miles from Calcutta and at Dacca. At Chittagong an Indian
police-officer was murdered. 'The next morning, hooligans
were let loose on the town and while the police remained
inactive, looting went on in broad daylight. The idea was to
teach the people of Chittagong a 'moral' lesson. An inquiry
committee appointed by the Calcutta public came to the
conclusion after investigation, that the conduct of some
local officials was open to serious question and the late Mr.
J. M. Sengupta openly made the allegation in a public
meeting in Calcutta. On the report of the Divisional Com-
missioner, official action against some officers was taken
after a very long time. At the Hijli Camp there was some
understanding between the state-prisoners and the armed
guards. Following this, one night the armed warders made a
surprise attack on the state-prisoners' barracks and after
firing indiscriminately at the barracks, attacked the state-
prisoners with the butt-end of their rifles. During the firing,
two of the state-prisoners, Santosh Mitra and Tarakeswar
Sen, were killed and twenty seriously injured. An official
committee appointed by the Government consisting of a
judge of the High Court, came to the conclusion after an
open inquiry, that the firing was altogether unjustified. At
Dacca, there was an unsuccessful attempt to murder the
District Magistrate. The same night, four parties of police-
men went out to different parts of the city, raided the houses
of respectable citizens, destroyed furniture and other articles,
assaulted people and carried away whatever valuables they
could—besides making a large number of indiscriminate
arrests. The Calcutta public sent a Committee of Inquiry,¹
which after due inquiry, corroborated all the above facts.
¹ The writer was a member of this Committee but when he arrived near
Dacca, he was removed from the District by sheer physical force by
police-officers. The moment he was free he started for Dacca again when
he was put in prison. He was subsequently released and could then
continue the inquiry.

· 266 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
In November a new ordinance was promulgated by the
Government which introduced a veiled form of martial law
in the District of Chittagong. Under this ordinance, hardship
and penalty were imposed on the people as one would expect
under martial law. The curfew order was introduced, people
were ordered to carry identification cards, young men were
prohibited to use bicycles, political suspects were ordered to
remain indoors for weeks at a stretch, collective fines were
imposed on villages which were suspected to be frequented
by revolutionaries. Moreover, soldiers were made to march
through the villages as a display and people were ordered on
pain of penalty, to come out and receive them. Many of these
orders were issued subsequently in Midnapore and Dacca
Districts. While this double dose of repression was being
administered, no steps were taken to punish the officials
responsible for the happenings at Chittagong, Hijli and
Dacca, nor was any compensation or relief given to the
sufferers. To add to the unrest, during the period of truce,
some revolutionary prisoners were condemned to death and
hanged. The vicious circle of official repression—revolutionary
terrorism¹—official counter-terrorism—thus went on. A
further complication arose when the Calcutta Municipal
Corporation passed a resolution² expressing grief at the
execution of one of the revolutionary prisoners, Dinesh
Chandra Gupta. In the midst of this turmoil, the position of
the Congress in Bengal was unenviable. Theoretically, there
was peace between the Government and the people, but in
reality the relations were strained and there were 'hostilities'
on both sides. To consider the situation, a special session of
the Bengal Provincial Conference was held at Berhampore in
December. The Conference resolved that the Government
had virtually violated the Delhi Pact and the Congress should
therefore formally give notice to the Government and revive
the civil-disobedience campaign, emphasis being laid on the
boycott of British goods. It was hoped that the revival of
the civil-disobedience movement would divert the energy of
¹ In December 1931, two schoolgirls named Shanti and Suniti, shot
dead the Magistrate of Comilla.
² This resolution was resented by the Government as well as by all
Britishers.

THE FIGHT RESUMED 267
the youths and thereby help to stop the terrorist campaign
in the province.
But the trouble was not only in Bengal. During the absence
of the Mahatma from India, a crisis had arisen in the Frontier
Province, and also in the United Provinces. The official
complaint was that the Red Shirt Volunteers¹ of the Frontier
leader, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, were engaged in sub-
versive activities, though as a matter of fact they were per-
fectly non-violent. No notice was sent to the Congress
head-quarters about this' complaint. Suddenly an Ordinance
was issued declaring the Red Shirt Volunteers an illegal body.
Simultaneously Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the Frontier
Gandhi and his brother, along with some other leaders, were
put under arrest and taken to distant prisons. Several
hundred Red Shirts were immediately cast into prison, and
within a few months their number rose to several thousand.
Thereafter, troops were sent into the remotest villages in
order to terrorise the people and break up the Red Shirt
organisation.
In the United Provinces there had been an acute economic
'crisis for some time past. In November 1930, Mr. H. N.
Brailsford, the well-known Socialist writer, who was an
altogether independent observer, told the writer in Calcutta
that the conditions in the United Provinces were verging on
an agrarian revolution. About this time the no-rent campaign
was started by the Congress in the province. After the Delhi
truce, when the no-tax campaign was suspended, the peasants
being in the same condition as in 1930, could not pay their
rent. In May, the Mahatma tried to mediate in the matter
and advised the peasants to pay 50 per cent. of their dues
—but that also they could not. Thereupon the Government
remitted a portion of the land revenue and maintained that
that was enough. The peasants thought otherwise and on their
behalf, the Provincial Congress Committee tried to carry
on negotiations with the Government. In November matters
reached a crisis. The Government demanded that the peasants
¹ These volunteers were so called from the colour of their uniform. They
were Congress Volunteers and had nothing to do with the Communist
Party.

268 · THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
should pay up their dues pending negotiations. The peasants
demanded, on the contrary, that pending negotiation, the
collection should be suspended. At this stage the Provincial
Congress Committee approached Sardar V. Patel, the Con-
gress President, and Mahatma Gandhi, who was then in
Europe, for advice. The Mahatma left it to the Committee
to do as they thought best. The Peasants' League (Kishan
League) of the United Provinces then took the matter in
hand and informed the Congress Committee that if they did
not start the no-rent campaign—it would be launched by the
Kishan League. Faced with the possibility of losing its hold
on the masses, the Provincial Congress Committee decided
to commence the no-rent campaign. Immediately this was
done, an ordinance was issued for suppressing that campaign.
A large number of arrests was made under the ordinance
and about the middle of December, when Pandit Jawaharlal
Nehru and Mr. Sherwani were leaving Allahabad for Bombay,
to make preparations for the reception of the Mahatma, they
were arrested in the train.
As has been stated at the beginning of this chapter, on
December 28th, 1931, Bombay city was en fête for the reception
of India's beloved leader. Never was a king or a victorious
general given a warmer welcome. A hostile demonstration
was attempted by the followers of Dr. Ambedkar as also by
the local Communist Party—but the smallness of it only
served to throw into bolder relief the tremendous hold
which the Mahatma had over the masses. The next day the
Congress Working Committee met and authorised Mahatma
Gandhi to apply for an interview¹ with the Viceroy and
accordingly he sent the following telegram:
'I was unprepared on landing yesterday to find the
Frontier and the U.P. Ordinances, shootings in the Frontier
and arrests of valued comrades in both and on the top, the
Bengal Ordinance awaiting me. I do not know whether I
am to regard these as an indication that friendly relations
¹ The writer, who was one of those invited to attend this meeting of
the Working Committee, expressed the opinion that in the circumstances
it would be humiliating for the Mahatma to apply for an interview. But
all the others present thought differently.

THE FIGHT RESUMED 269
between us are closed or whether you expect me still to
see and receive guidance from you as to the course I am to
pursue in advising the Congress.'
The Viceroy sent a long reply on December 31st and stated
at the end: 'His Excellency feels bound to emphasis that he
will not be prepared to discuss with you any measures which
the Government of India, with the fullest approval of His
Majesty's Government, found it necessary to adopt in Bengal,
the United Provinces and the North-West Frontier Province.'
Soon after receipt of this telegram the Working Committee
met on January 1st, 1932, and adopted the following resolution:
' . . . The Committee regards the Premier's declaration
as wholly unsatisfactory and inadequate, and in terms
of the Congress demands, opines that nothing short of
complete independence, carrying full control of defence,
external affairs and finance, with such safeguards as may be
demonstrably necessary in the interest of the nation, can
be regarded by the Congress as satisfactory. The Committee
notes that the British Government was not prepared to
regard the Congress at the Round Table Conference as
entitled to speak on behalf of the nation as a whole. At
the same time the Committee recognises, with sorrow that
communal harmony could not be attained at the said
Conference. The Committee invites the nation, therefore,
to make ceaseless efforts to demonstrate the capacity of the
Congress to represent the nation as a whole and promote an
atmosphere that would make the Constitution, framed
purely on a national basis, acceptable to the various com-
munities composing the nation. Meanwhile, the Com-
mittee is prepared to render co-operation to Government,
provided the Viceroy reconsiders his Thursday's telegram
to Mahatma Gandhi, adequate relief is granted in respect
of the Ordinances and its recent acts, a free scope is left
to the Congress in any future negotiations and consultations
to prosecute the Congress's claim for complete independence
and administration of the country is carried on with
popular representatives pending the attainment of such
independence.
'In the absence of a satisfactory response from Govern-
ment in terms of the foregoing paragraph, the Working

270 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
Committee will regard it as an indication on the part of the
Government that it has reduced to nullity the Delhi Pact.
‘In the event of a satisfactory response not forthcoming, the
Committee calls upon the nation to resume civil disobedience.’
The same day the Mahatma sent a long rejoinder to the
Viceroy asking him to reconsider his decision and grant an
interview without imposing any conditions as to the scope
of discussion. He enclosed a copy of the Working Committee’s
resolution and added: ‘If His Excellency thinks it worth
while to see me, the operation of the resolution will be
suspended pending our discussion, in the hope that it may
result in the resolution being finally given up.’
On January 2nd, 1932, the Viceroy informed Mahatma
Gandhi that an interview under the threat of civil disobedience
was out of the question. The Mahatma replied as follows:
‘... Surely it is wrong to describe an honest expression of
opinion as a threat. May I remind the Government that the
Delhi negotiations were opened and carried on whilst civil
disobedience was on and that when the Pact was made, civil
disobedience was not given up but only discontinued. This
position was reasserted and accepted by His Excellency and his
Government last year prior to my departure for London....
Meanwhile I wish to assure the Government that every
endeavour will be made on the part of the Congress to carry
on the struggle without malice and in a strictly non-violent
manner....’
That was the end of the negotiations. On January 4th, the
Government of India issued a statement justifying their
attitude and conduct. Simultaneously orders were issued to
local authorities throughout India to strike at the Congress
organisations at once. The ordinances carefully prepared by
the Government of India in 1931 during the period of the
truce, were at once put into operation. According to lists
previously prepared by the local authorities, sweeping
arrests of Congress leaders were made before they could find
time to launch the civil-disobedience campaign. Within a
week almost everybody who was somebody in the Congress
Party was in prison. Nevertheless, the campaign began to