द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

156 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
Captain Smith had a genial temperament, Major Findlay
had a rough exterior and a rather saturnine temperament.
We soon fell out with Major Findlay over trifling matters
and this led to hunger-strike. Through Mr. Brown's med-
iation, the misunderstanding was however cleared up. There-
after, when we came to know one another more intimately,
I discovered that he was an exceedingly nice and straight-
forward man. Another official who acted as Superintendent
for a time, was Major Sheppard, with whom there was
constant friction, but since he did not stay long, matters did
not reach a crisis.
Ours was not the first batch of state prisoners to be deported
to Burma. About a year before we arrived, another batch
had been sent across there. When the first batch came they
were not confined in the same prison, but were transferred in
twos to different prisons in Burma. They had a very hard
time and as they were separated, they could not put up a joint
fight for improving their conditions. During this period
two of the state prisoners, Mr. Jibon Lal Chatterji and Mr.
Bhupendra Kumar Dutt, sent a representation to the then
Secretary of State for India, Lord Olivier, severely criticising
the conduct of the Political Branch of the Bengal Police, called
in India, the Intelligence Branch. The main thesis was that
agent-provocateurs were employed by the police for entrap-
ping innocent but over-enthusiastic young men and that the
bogey of a revolutionary conspiracy was deliberately raised
by the Intelligence Branch because they could thereby draw
extra allowances, like 'danger allowance,' and could also have
at their disposal, large sums of money for employing informers.
Certain facts and figures were given by way of substantiating
this charge. This letter somehow found its way to the Indian
Press and after its publication, it was quoted by the Swarajist
leader, Pandit Motilal Nehru, in a speech in the Assembly,
attacking the policy of imprisoning people without trial.
The publication of the letter so annoyed the Government
that severe restrictions were imposed on the state prisoners
in Burma. After some time the temper of the Government
cooled down and the state prisoners were allowed then to
come together in one prison. An exception was however

IN BURMESE PRISONS 157
made in the case of Mr. Bhupendra Kumar Dutt, whom the
Government wanted to punish for the publication of the
letter.
In prison we were able to meet from time to time Burman
political prisoners from whom we learned a lot about the
intricacies of Burma politics. Among those whom we met
there were some priests (called in Burma 'hpongyis'). These
priests, or hpongyis, whom I met in the prisons of Burma,
are some of the finest specimens of humanity I have ever met.
Burma is a land where there is no caste and no class. It is
probably the most classless country outside Russia. Buddhism
there is a living religion and the priests who live that religion
are held in high esteem. For centuries, they have been
imparting free elementary education to men and women,
with the result that in the matter of literacy, Burma to-day is
far ahead of India. Since the British annexation, the hpongyis
alone have kept up the flame of dying nationalism, since they
were never reconciled to British domination or to British
culture. Under their leadership for many a year, guerilla
warfare was carried on. Owing to their consistent opposition
to the foreign Government, they are intensely hated by all
Britishers, official and non-official. Strangely enough, though
they are anti-British, they are nevertheless pro-Indian and
they are strongly opposed to separation from India. Apart
from the cultural affinity they have with India, they feel that
when they are separated from India, it will be more difficult
for them to fight Great Britain for their political freedom.
Among the mass of the Burmese people the influence of the
priests is very strong. The English-educated Burmans are
politically a divided community. The majority are politically
opposed to the priests and are anti-Indian and pro-British.¹
A minority among them is however allied politically with the
priests. The English-educated Burmans generally think that
separation from India will improve their lot, though the fact
remains that it is the Britishers who have the best of every-
thing in the country and not the Indians. The 'anglicised'
¹ The New Constitution, outlined by the Joint Parliamentary Committee
on the basis of separation from India, is likely to prove disappointing to
English-educated Burmans and may bring about a change in their general
attitude.

158 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
Burmans generally have no idea or intention of fighting for
their freedom and they think that once the Indians are
eliminated from Burma, everything will be all right for them.
The hpongyis or priests on the contrary, are politically-
minded and they follow the policy and tactics of the Indian
National Congress. When I was in Burma, the uncrowned
king of the Burmans was Rev. U. Ottama, a priest.¹ The
impression that I had during my stay there was that the
priests had the largest following in the country. They had
boycotted the Burma Legislature since 1920 and they did
not have their representatives there. That led the Govern-
ment to think that the Burmans really wanted separation from
India, as the English-educated Burmans generally were
saying. The recent elections have shown, however, that the
people are against separation. The significance of the last
elections will be understood better when it is remembered
that they were fought on the basis of the old electoral roll and
that the request of the anti-separationist party for a revision
of the electoral roll prior to the elections, was turned down.
Among the separationists (the English-educated Burmans) as
also among the anti-separationists, it is very difficult to have
a united party, because personal considerations play an
important rôle in Burma. The priests who are anti-separa-
tionists are on the whole a compact party. Among the
English-educated Burmans, when I was in Burma, there
were several parties, the most important of them being the
Twenty-One Party²—so called because twenty-one persons
joined together and formed the party. The Nationalist Party
in Burma is called the G.C.B.A.—that is, the General Council
¹ Rev. U. Ottama is now an exile living in Calcutta and is not allowed
to return to Burma. His health is completely shattered as a result of
repeated incarceration. When I was in Burma an interesting incident
took place. Rev. U. Ottama was in prison and a rumour got afloat that
he had been secretly transported to a prison in India. In the Burma
Legislative Council, questions were put on this point. The Home Member,
himself a Burman, felt annoyed at the questions and replied that U.
Ottama was one of the ten thousand criminals in his jails and he could
not be expected to know where he was confined at the time. At this in-
sulting reference to U. Ottama, all the non-official members of the Legis-
lative Council walked out as a protest. They resolved to dissolve their
separate parties and start a united party—called the People's Party.
² The policy of the Twenty-One Party was to work the Constitution,
while that of the G.C.B.A. was to boycott it.

IN BURMESE PRISONS 159
of Burmese Association and there are as many G.C.B.A.'s
as there are parties. Many people wonder to-day, why
Britain is so keen on separating Burma from India—but if
one knew Burma, there would be no reason to wonder.
Many Britishers think that even if India be a lost Dominion,
it is still desirable to try and keep Burma. Burma is so
thinly populated, is so rich in minerals and in certain parts
has such a pleasing climate that it would be fit for colonisation
by Britishers. Besides, Burma is the gateway of the Far
East and has an important strategic position.
Interesting as Burmese politics was to me, the country
and the people were even more so. I spent a great deal of
my time in studying the ancient history of Burma and in
discovering the old cultural contacts between the two coun-
tries. There is no doubt that many Kshatriya tribes migrated
to Burma from India. They, as well as the people from
Ceylon and South India, brought to Burma, Buddhism and
the Pali Literature. The culture and philosophy of Burma
have been largely influenced by India. The alphabets have
been taken from Sanskrit and even the script is much like
some of the Indian scripts. The pagodas (temples) of Burma
which have a unique charm of their own, are not devoid of
Indian influence. In Pagan and in other old centres of
Burmese culture, one can still see structures which form the
transition between the typical Hindu temple and the typical
Burmese pagoda. I have already said that the artistic sense
of the ordinary Burman is of a very high order. One had
only to see the exquisite handiwork of the prisoners in
Mandalay and other prisons to believe this. In Mandalay, on
two or three jail holidays in the year, the Superintendent
would give the prisoners permission to sing and dance. On
these days they would organise a variety performance. They
would play dramas and sing songs specially composed for the
occasion, would dance their exquisite national dance and
would even improvise a jail orchestra to supply the necessary
music. All this was possible only among a people with a
highly-developed artistic sense.
In October 1925, our national religious festival—the Durga
Pujah—falling due, we applied to the Superintendent for

160 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
permission and for funds to perform the ceremony. Since
similar facilities were given to Christian prisoners in Indian
prisons, the Superintendent gave us the necessary facilities,
in anticipation of Government sanction. The Government,
however, not only refrained from giving sanction but censured
the Superintendent, Major Findlay, for acting on his own
responsibility. Thereupon we informed the Government
that they should reconsider their decision, otherwise we
would be forced to go on hunger-strike. The reply being in
the negative, we commenced hunger-strike in February 1926.
All our correspondence with the outside world was at once
stopped. Nevertheless, three days after the hunger-strike
began, the Calcutta paper, Forward, published the news of our
hunger-strike and also the ultimatum we had sent to Govern-
ment. About the same time Forward published extracts
from the report of the Indian Jail Committee of 1919-21.
Before this Committee a high official of the Prison Depart-
ment, Lieut-Col. Mulvany, had given evidence to say that
he had been forced by his superior officer, the Inspector-
General of Prisons of Bengal, to withdraw the health reports
he had sent of some state-prisoners in his jail and to send in
false reports instead. These disclosures raised a storm of
indignation among the public. In the Indian Legislative
Assembly which was then sitting in Delhi, Mr. T. C. Goswami
a Swarajist member, moved the adjournment of the House
over the hunger-strike in Mandalay Jail and referred to the
evidence of Lieut.-Col. Mulvany to the effect that false
reports about the state prisoners are manufactured by the
Prison Department. The Home Member found himself in
an uncomfortable position and promised to redress the
grievances of the state prisoners on hunger-strike. No sooner
was the debate over than a searching inquiry was instituted
with a view to finding out how Forward got the necessary
material for publication. However, the Government issued
orders without delay that they would sanction the money
that had been spent by us and that in future they would
provide facilities and funds for our religious requirements.
So after fifteen days' starvation, having won our point, we
ended the strike.

IN BURMESE PRISONS 161
In the latter half of 1926 an interesting development took
place. The Legislatures were dissolved and fresh elections
were due in November. My fellow-prisoner, Mr. S. C.
Mitra, was offered a constituency for the Indian Legislative
Assembly by the Bengal Congress Party, and I was offered a
Calcutta constituency for the Bengal Legislative Council.
Both of us accepted the offer and decided to stand. While
Mr. Mitra was returned unopposed, I had a formidable
opponent in Mr. J. N. Basu, the leader of the Liberal Party
in Bengal. At the last election Mr. Basu had retained his
seat by defeating the Swarajist candidate and the Congress
Party thought that it was necessary to put me up against
him in order to dislodge him. He was exceedingly popular
in his constituency and was a fine type of gentleman and
he had nothing against him except his Liberal Politics. This
was the key-election of the year in Bengal and so the Party
had to put forward its best efforts in order to win. The
election was reminiscent of the early Sinn Fein elections in
which political prisoners were candidates and the slogan was
—'Put him in to get him out.' Modern electioneering
methods were used by the Party, including the use of rockets
for distributing leaflets and posters showing the candidate
behind prison bars. The voters felt that my success would
be a public vote of confidence in me and force the Government
either to release me or send me up for trial. So I got a
thumping majority. But the Government of India was less
responsive to public opinion than the Government in
Ireland and my incarceration continued.
Meanwhile, as a result of the unfavourable climatic con-
ditions and of the hunger-strike earlier in the year, my health
had begun to give way. Matters grew serious when during
the winter of 1926 I had an attack of broncho-pneumonia.
After the attack, I could not shake off the temperature and
simultaneously I began to lose weight. I was therefore
transferred to Rangoon for examination by a medical board.
The medical board composed of Lieut.-Col. Kelsall and my
brother, Dr. Sunil C. Bose, made a recommendation to the
effect that I should not be detained in prison. While I was
awaiting the orders of Government in Rangoon Jail, I had
L

162 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
a quarrel with the Superintendent, Major Flowerdew (now
the Inspector-General of Prisons, Bengal), whereupon I was
transferred to Insein Jail. My transfer to Insein proved to be
a godsend. On arrival I found as Superintendent, Major
Findlay, who had been the Superintendent of Mandalay Jail
for some time. He was painfully surprised to see the condition
of my health. After keeping me under observation for three
weeks, he wrote a very strong note to Government about my
health. On receiving this note the Government were forced
to act. But they were still opposed to the idea of releasing
me. In the meantime they had made an offer in the Bengal
Legislative Council saying that if I wanted to go to Switzer-
land at my own expense, they would release me and put me
on board a ship at Rangoon sailing for Europe. This offer I
had rejected, partly because I could not accept the conditions
attached to the offer and partly because I did not like the
idea of going to Europe direct from Burma for an indefinite
period. After the rejection of this offer, the next order that
I received from Government, was for my transfer to Almora
Jail in the United Provinces. Once again arrangements for
my transfer were made with the utmost secrecy and early
one morning in May 1927, I was removed from Insein Jail
to a boat sailing from Rangoon. On the fourth day I reached
Diamond Harbour at the mouth of the river Hooghly. Before
our boat reached Calcutta, she was stopped and I was met
by Mr. Lowman (who was then the head of the Intelligence
Branch of the Police) who wanted me to alight. Thinking
that he wanted to smuggle me out of Calcutta, I refused.
But I was assured that His Excellency the Governor had
placed his launch at our disposal and that I had to appear
before a Medical Board who were waiting for me there and
I then agreed. The board composed of Sir Nilratan Sirkar,
Dr. B. C. Roy, Lieut.-Col. Sands and Major Hingston, the
Governor's physician, examined me and sent their report by
wire to the Governor at Darjeeling. I spent the day in the
Governor's launch and next morning Mr. Lowman, with a
telegram in his hand, came to inform me that the Governor
had ordered my release. Saying this, he handed over the
official order of release. It was May 16th, 1927, but the

IN BURMESE PRISONS 163
order was signed on May 11th. It looked like intriguing. I
asked Mr. Lowman why they had made a show of a medical
examination on May 15th, when the release order had actually
been signed on the 11th. He would not reply at first, but
on being pressed he said that on May 11th, other orders had
also been signed and kept in readiness, including my transfer
to Almora and it had been decided that the final decision
would come from Darjeeling after the Governor received the
report of the Medical Board. Later on, I was to discover
that when the Medical Board were considering what report
they would make, the police-officers tried their best to make
them submit a report in favour of my transfer to Almora, or
of my departure to Switzerland, with a view to preventing
my release, but fortunately for me, the board refused to do
so. Thus, it was clear that till the last moment the Police
Department tried to prevent my release. They would
undoubtedly have succeeded, if anyone else had been the
Governor. Fortunately for me, the new Governor, Sir
Stanley Jackson, had come with an open mind and he was a
strong man. With the unerring instinct of a trained politician
he had sensed the grievance of the people. He had realised
within a few days of his arrival that what the people demanded
was some protection from the tyrannical Police Department.
Under Lord Lytton's regime, the Police Department had
ruled and the Commissioner of Police of Calcutta had been
the virtual Governor of Bengal. All that was now changed.
Within a few weeks of his taking over the reins of office, Sir
Stanley Jackson gave everyone to understand that henceforth
he was to rule Bengal and not the Commissioner of Police.
When any conflict arose between the public and the police he
endeavoured to do justice even at the risk of offending the
latter. For nearly four years he was able to avoid trouble
through his firmness and tact. Only when the whole of
India was plunged again into the throes of another gigantic
upheaval, did Bengal become once again the political storm-
centre of India.

CHAPTER VIII
THE BAROMETER RISES (1927-28)
By the middle of 1927 the darkest hour had ended and the
horizon began to light up. Disgusted with the narrow
sectarianism, selfishness and fanaticism, which had seized
the country after the death of the Deshbandhu, the soul of
the people began to stir itself again. In the new awakening
the contribution of the youth was the largest. The leadership
of the Congress was, on the whole, found wanting. Mahatma
Gandhi was suffering from an acute mental depression and
was living in retirement from active politics. Pandit Motilal
Nehru had left for Europe, partly owing to professional
reasons and partly because of the serious illness of his daughter-
in-law. In the circumstances, the responsibility of leadership
was vested in Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar and he endeavoured to
rise to the occasion. He spent much of his time in 1927 in
touring the country for restoring inter-communal amity and
friendship. His crowning achievement during the year was
a successful session of the Unity Conference in Calcutta in
November, convened and presided over by him, which was
to pave the way for the coming upheaval in which all com-
munities and parties were to join once again. In Bengal,
where the worst demonstration of communal passion had
taken place during 1926, there were signs of the dawn of a
new era. In August, as a result of a vote of no confidence in
the Bengal Legislative Council, the Ministers were once again
thrown out. About this time a strike broke out in the biggest
railway workshop of the Bengal Nagpur Railway at Kharagpur,
seventy miles from Calcutta. The workers' organisation was
so strong that the Company had to climb down and meet the
demand of the workers. In November, the Unity Conference
in Calcutta helped to clear the atmosphere and restore the
friendly feelings hitherto existing between the Hindu and
Moslem communities. Later in the month, when the annual
164

THE BAROMETER RISES 165
meeting of the Bengal Congress Committee¹ was held, there
were signs of enthusiasm among the Congress workers of
Bengal. The most potent impetus to the new awakening
came, however, from the side of the Government.
It was an auspicious moment for the Indian Nationalists
when in November 1927 the Viceroy, Lord Irwin, made an
announcement, regarding the appointment of the Indian
Statutory Commission. The appointment was made under
Section 84a of the Government of India Act, 1919, which
provided for decennial reviews of the political situation in
India, somewhat reminiscent of the periodical surveys made
by the British Parliament into the affairs of the East India
Company at the time of the renewal of the Company's`
Charter. Since the Statutory Commission was due in 1929,
it was rather surprising to find a Tory Government accelerat-
ing the date of the Commission. The Indian National
Congress had been pressing since 1920 for a Round Table
Conference for revising the Constitution, with a view to the
early introduction of Dominion Home Rule, but this demand
had been consistently turned down by the British Govern-
ment. The Conservative Party had never taken kindly to
the Reforms of 1919, for which the Liberal, Mr. Montagu,
had been largely responsible, though Indian opinion con-
sidered them inadequate and unsatisfactory. They, therefore,
wanted to dispose of the Indian question themselves while
they were in power, so that the Labour Party, if they hap-
pened to succeed them, would not be able to make any further
concession to the Indian demand for Home Rule. Since the
next General Election in England was due in 1929, the
Conservative Cabinet found it necessary to appoint the
Statutory Commission in 1927.
The Commission was composed of Sir John Simon (Chair-
man), Viscount Burnham, Lord Strathcona, Hon. Edward
Cadogan, Mr. Stephen Walsh, Major Attlee and Col. Lane
Fox. (Mr. Walsh resigned and was succeeded by Mr. Vernon
Hartshorn.) There were seven members, of whom two were
Labourites, one (viz., the Chairman) was a Liberal, and the
¹ At this meeting of the Bengal Congress Committee the writer was
elected President and Mr. Kiron Sankar Roy, Secretary.

166 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
rest were Conservatives. Thus the co-operation of all the
political parties in Britain was secured for the work of the
Commission. The Commission was charged with inquiring
into 'the working of the system of government, the growth
of education and the development of representative institutions
in British India and matters connected therewith and to what
extent it is desirable to establish the principle of responsible
government or to extend, modify or restrict the degree of
responsible government then existing therein, including the
question whether the establishment of second chambers of
the local legislatures is or is not desirable.' It was stated
on behalf of the Government that Indians had perforce to
be excluded from the Commission because it was an ex-
clusively Parliamentary Commission and the necessity of
having a Parliamentary Commission was explained by the
Viceroy in the following words: 'It would be generally
agreed that what is required is a Commission which would
be unbiased and competent to present an accurate picture
of facts to Parliament; but it must also be a body on whose
recommendations Parliament should be found willing to take
whatever action a study of these facts may indicate to be
appropriate.' Simultaneously with the announcement of the
Commission, the Viceroy and the Governor of Provinces
invited a number of public men in order to explain to them
the motive and intention of the Government. The Com-
mission was appointed by Royal Warrant of November 26th,
1927, and Lord Birkenhead, the Secretary of State for India,
while speaking in the House of Lords the same month on the
appointment of the Commission, challenged Indian politicians
to produce an agreed constitution for India.
The announcement regarding the Statutory Commission
evoked a chorus of condemnation from Congress leaders of
all parts of India as also from the public at large. The public
had become so much accustomed to the idea of self-deter-
mination for India, that they no longer regarded the British
Parliament as the arbiter of India's destiny. It was therefore
but natural that the Congress should, without hesitation or
delay, decide to boycott the Commission (popularly known
as Simon Commission). That was, of course, no surprise for

THE BAROMETER RISES 167
the Government. But what did surprise them was the
decision of the Indian Liberals to boycott the Commission.
It was not the violation of the principle of self-determination
which offended them but the exclusion of Indians from the
All-White Commission. In the face of this non-co-operation
on the part of the British Government, how could the Liberals
maintain their pet theory of Indo-British collaboration? The
attitude of the Liberals was explained by a resolution passed
at a public meeting held at Allahabad in December, which
was presided over by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and which
considered 'the exclusion of Indians a deliberate insult to the
people of India, as not only does it definitely assign to them
a position of inferiority, but what is worse, it denies them the
right to participate in the determination of the Constitution
of their own country.' The tenth session of the Liberal
Federation held at Bombay the same year and presided over
by the same gentleman, decided to reject the Simon' Com-
mission.
Following the Unity Conference in November, the All-India
Moslem League met in Calcutta in December. The League
passed a resolution recommending Hindu-Moslem unity on
the lines laid down by the Unity Conference. It also urged
the boycott of the Simon Commission and accepted the
principle of joint electorates with reservation of seats for
Moslems. This decision was a triumph for the Nationalist
Moslems and it was possible only because such prominent
Moslems as Mr. M. A. Jinnah and the Ali brothers partici-
pated in the conference and advocated the Nationalist point
of view. The same month the All-India Trade Union
Congress met at Cawnpore and it witnessed for the first time
a compact body of Communists who stood for an independent
Socialist Republic and for a definite break with the British
Trades Union Congress and the International Federation of
Trade Unions in Amsterdam. Towards the end of December,
the annual session of the Indian National Congress was held
at Madras and was presided over by Dr. M. A. Ansari, the
Nationalist Moslem leader of Delhi. The Madras Congress
is memorable for two reasons. A resolution was of course
passed boycotting the Simon Commission 'at every stage

168 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
and every form.' But along with that another resolution was
passed directing the Executive to convene an All-India All
Parties Conference with a view to drawing up a constitution
for India acceptable to all parties. A somewhat contradictory
resolution was also passed declaring the goal of the Indian
people to be 'complete independence.'
The proceedings of the Madras Congress clearly indicated
that the appointment of the Simon Commission had been
made at an auspicious moment and it had a wonderful effect
in whipping up the enthusiasm of the people. From one end
to the other, the country exhibited a solidarity which it had
seldom shown before in recent times. It was this feeling of
solidarity, as also the resolve to give an effective reply to
Lord Birkenhead's challenge in the House of Lords, which
was responsible for the decision to convene an All-Parties
Conference. Apart from the effect produced by the appoint-
ment of an All-White Commission, there was another factor
which at this time put an indelible stamp on the Congress.
That was the awakening among the youths. The youthful
element in the Congress had been demanding a more extremist
ideology for some time past and under their influence,
resolutions had been passed from time to time by Provincial
Conferences recommending to the Indian National Congress
that the goal of the Indian people should be defined as
complete national independence. The resolution of the
Madras Congress regarding independence¹ was therefore but
the logical fulfilment of a process going on within the Congress
for a long time. Along with this resolution the Madras
Congress took a significant step in appointing to the Working
Committee, representatives of the Left Wing. And as
General Secretaries for the coming year were appointed
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru (i.e., Nehru Junior), Mr. Shuaib
Qureshi and the writer. Thus the Madras Congress may be
regarded as standing for a definite orientation towards the Left.
¹ This resolution was passed unanimously at the Madras Congress but
after the Congress was over, Mahatma Gandhi declared that it had been
'hastily conceived and thoughtlessly passed.' Lala Lajpat Rai declared
that it was passed because 'many people believed that Dominion Status,
also meant complete national independence.' At the Lahore Congress in
December, 1929, a similar resolution was moved by the Mahatma and
unanimously adopted.

THE BAROMETER RISES 169
Another factor which lent significance to the proceedings
of the Madras Congress was the return of Pandit Jawaharlal
Nehru from Europe and his participation in the Congress
deliberations. Pandit J. L. Nehru had had a most interesting
career. After completing his studies at Cambridge he had
been called to the Bar. But when in 1920 the non-co-operation
movement was launched, he threw up his professional work
and joined the Mahatma. According to popular gossip, he
was largely responsible for persuading his father, Pandit
Motilal Nehru, to do the same. He did not agree with the
Swarajists on the question of working inside the Legislatures
and since they came into power, he had voluntarily occupied
a back seat in the councils of the Congress. Latterly he had
been to Europe with his sick wife and during his stay there
he studied some of the latest developments in Europe and
especially in Soviet Russia. Since his return to India he gave
expression to a new ideology and declared himself to be a
Socialist, which was extremely welcome to the Left Wing in
the Congress and to the youth organisations in the country.
The new phase in his public career was first given expression
to at the Madras Congress.
The solid wall of opposition put up against the Simon
Commission came as an eye-opener to the Government.
Something had to be done to soften the opposition. There-
fore, soon after his arrival in India, in February 1928, Sir
John Simon wrote to the Viceroy suggesting that the sittings
of the Commission should be in the nature of a 'Joint Free
Conference' consisting of the seven British members and a
body of representatives chosen by the Indian Legislatures.
In response to an inquiry from Sir Sankaran Nair, Sir John
Simon further stated that the reports, submitted by the
Committees appointed by the Legislatures would be attached
to the main report to be submitted to Parliament by the
Commission. In spite of the above modification proposed by
Sir John Simon, leaders of all parties soon after declared in a
manifesto issued from Delhi that their opposition to the
Simon Commission still held good. In the Indian Legislative
Assembly, Lala Lajpat Rai moved a resolution repudiating
the Simon Commission and this was duly carried. No com-

170 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
mittee could accordingly be appointed by the Assembly to
co-operate with the Simon Commission. Of the Provincial
Legislatures, the Central Provinces Legislative Council alone
was able to resist the appointment of a committee. In spite
of the opposition of the Congress and Liberal Parties, all the
other Provincial Legislatures, however, appointed com-
mittees to co-operate with the Commission.
The arrival of the Simon Seven in India in February 1928,
was greeted with an All-India 'hartal' or boycott-demonstra-
tion, organised under the direction of the Congress Working
Committee. Enthusiasm all over the country and particularly
in Bengal was very great. The public expected a positive
lead from the Congress leaders, which could bring the
boycott home to those against whom it was directed. But no
such directions came from the Congress headquarters. Only
in Bengal, the Provincial Congress Committee on its own
responsibility launched an intensive campaign for the boycott
of British goods, the day the Commission landed in Bombay.
There is absolutely no doubt that if the Congress Working
Committee had taken courage in both hands, they could
have anticipated the movement of 1930 by two years and the
appointment of the Simon Commission could have been
made the starting point of such a movement. When the
writer visited the Mahatma in May 1928, at his Ashrama at
Sabarmati, he reported to him the public enthusiasm which
he had met with in many provinces and begged him to come
out of his retirement and give a lead to the country. At
that time the reply of the Mahatma was that he did not see
any light, though before his very eyes the peasantry of
Bardoli were demonstrating through a no-tax campaign that
they were ready for a struggle. During the whole of 1928
and 1929, there was so much unrest in the labour world that
if a political campaign had been started at that time, it would
have been well-timed. Moreover, in 1928 and 1929, there
was more enthusiasm and excitement in provinces like Punjab
and Bengal than in 1930. In 1930, when the movement was
launched by the Mahatma, the labour unrest had subsided to
a large extent and the situation in some provinces was much
quieter than before. After starting the movement in 1930, the

THE BAROMETER RISES 171
Mahatma observed in his paper, Young India, that he could
have launched the campaign two years earlier. The respon-
sibility for not utilising the situation in 1928 devolves not
only on the Mahatma but also on the Swarajist leaders who
had the Congress machinery in their hands at the time, but
who had unfortunately lost their dynamic impulse. If a
leader like Deshbandhu Das had been available then, the
events following the boycott of the Prince of Wales' visit to
India in 1921 would have been repeated in 1928.
Undeterred by the opposition which faced them, the Simon
Seven travelled from place to place. Wherever they went,
they met black flags, hostile demonstrations and shouts of
'Simon go back.' The Government tried to organise counter-
demonstrations with the help of a section of the Moslems and
a section of the depressed classes but such attempts did not
meet with success. Though the boycott campaign was kept
strictly within the limits of non-violence, elaborate police
arrangements were made wherever the Commission went and
in some places unnecessarily harsh repression was resorted to.
In the clashes that took place between the unarmed public
and the armed police in different parts of the country,
generally there were no serious consequences except in one
place—Lahore. There the black flag procession which was
being led by Lala Lajpat Rai was charged by the police with
sticks and batons. Lala Lajpat Rai, who was in the front rank
of the procession, was seriously injured in the attack and was
laid up in bed for some time. He recovered to some extent
at first but there was some permanent injury to his heart
which caused a relapse leading to his death. Great sorrow
and indignation followed the death of Lalaji and since the
Simon Commission was indirectly responsible for his death,
the Commission became more unpopular with the people
who used to idolise the great Punjab leader.
The activities of the leaders were not confined to a negative
boycott of the Simon Commission. The great task ahead of
them was to give a fitting reply to the challenge of Lord
Birkenhead by producing an agreed Constitution. To that
end, the All-Parties Conference met at Delhi in February
and March, 1928. The most thorny problem which the

172 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
Conference had to tackle was the question of Hindu-Moslem-
Sikh representation in the Legislatures under the new
Constitution. When the Conference re-assembled in May at
Bombay, the outlook appeared gloomy, because no progress
whatsoever had been made. Thanks to the prudence of
Mahatma Gandhi, the Conference instead of publicly record-
ing its failure, appointed a small committee with Pandit
Motilal Nehru as Chairman, to determine the principles of
the new Constitution for India and draft a report thereon.
The Committee met frequently at Allahabad and ultimately
issued its report¹ in August which was unanimous, subject
to certain reservations made in the preamble, and was signed
by Pandit Motilal Nehru, Sir Ali Imam, Sir Tej Bahadur
Sapru, Mr. M. S. Aney, Sardar Mangal Singh, Mr. Shuaib
Qureshi, Mr. G. R. Pradhan and the writer. The Report of
the Committee, popularly known as the Nehru Committee,
was cordially welcomed by all Nationalists in the country as
it rendered the work of the Simon Commission superfluous.
Mahatma Gandhi sent his warmest congratulations to Pandit
Motilal Nehru who had worked so much over the report
and for whom it was a great achievement. The report was
placed before the plenary session of the All-Parties Con-
ference in Lucknow in August and was unanimously adopted.
It was again placed before the All-Parties Convention in
December 1928, in Calcutta and objections were raised at
that meeting by the representatives of the Moslem League,
Sikh League and Hindu Mahasabha. The opposition of the
Moslem League was the most serious and served to rouse the
opposition of the other two bodies.
It was stated in the preamble to the Nehru Report that the
Committee could not be unanimous on the question of the
fundamental basis of the Constitution, since a minority²
would not accept Dominion Status and pressed for complete
national independence as the basis of the Constitution.
The majority of the members of the Nehru Committee, how-
ever, adopted Dominion Status as the basis of the Constitution
¹ Report of the Committee appointed by the All-Parties Conference to
determine the principles of the Constitution for India. Published by the
Indian National Congress, Allahabad, 1928.
² The present writer was among them.

THE BAROMETER RISES 173
'without restricting the liberty of action of those political
parties whose goal was complete independence.' The Con-
stitution outlined in the Report was only for British India.
With regard to the Indian States, the Report stated that the
Central Government should exercise the same rights in rela-
tion to, and discharge the same obligation towards, the Indian
States, arising out of the treaties or otherwise, as the present
Government of India had exercised and discharged. A future
federal linking up of the Indian States with the rest of India
was, however, looked forward to, whenever the States were
ready for the surrender of rights which federation necessitated.
The Report recommended autonomy for the provinces and
suggested the creation of Sindh and Karnataka as separate
provinces. The Executive, both in the provinces and at the
centre, was to be responsible to the Legislature. The Central
Legislature was to be composed of a Senate and House of
Representatives—the Senate to be elected by the Provincial
Legislatures. Every adult of either sex was to be entitled to
vote and there would be joint electorates for Hindu, Moslem
and other communities. For a minority community, there
would be reservation of seats for a period of ten years only.
In Bengal and Punjab there would be no reservation of seats at
all. There would be a Supreme Court for India and a radical
restriction of appeals to the Privy Council. The Civil Services
would be under the control of the Central Government. The
Report further enumerated nineteen fundamental rights
which were to be embodied in the Statute. The residuary
powers were to be vested in the Central Government.
The greatest achievement of the Nehru Committee was the
settlement of the question of Hindu-Moslem-Sikh represen-
tation in the Legislatures under the proposed Constitution.
Such an achievement would not have been possible so soon
after the recent inter-communal disturbances, but for the
new situation created by the appointment of the Simon
Commission. The Report provided for a common electorate
for all communities. Minority communities would be entitled
to a reservation of seats in the Legislature in-proportion to
their population and they would, in addition, have the right
to contest the elections for the other seats. The reservation

174 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
would, however, be only for a period of ten years. For
Bengal and Punjab, the Committee decided to have no
reservation at all. The Hindus, who are in a minority in
these two provinces, did not demand any reservation, as
being against the principle of nationalism—and the Com-
mittee considered it unfair and unreasonable that there
should be a reservation of seats for the majority community
—namely, the Moslems. As for the Sikhs, they were prepared
to forego reservation of seats for their community if the
other two communities did so—and if they did not, then the
Sikhs demanded representation in excess of their numbers.
Besides the question of principle which appealed to the
Nehru Committee, practical considerations also showed that
the best solution of the Bengal and Punjab problem would
be not to have any reservation there. In Bengal, under the
existing Constitution, the Moslems have 40 per cent. of the
elected seats and the Hindus 60 per cent.—while the Moslem
population is about 54 per cent. and the Hindu population
about 46 per cent. In Punjab under the existing Constitution,
the Moslems have 50 per cent. of the elected seats, the
Hindus 31 per cent. and the Sikhs 19 per cent., while in
population the Moslems are 55 per cent., the Hindus 34 per
cent. and the Sikhs 11 per cent. The Hindu-Moslem-Sikh
representation now in vogue is based on the 'Congress
League Scheme' which was adopted as a compromise between
the Indian National Congress and the All-India Moslem
League at Lucknow in 1916. In proportion to their popula-
tion, the Moslem representation in Bengal and Punjab was
reduced under the 'Congress League Scheme,' because in
the other provinces the Moslems got representation far in
excess of their numbers and the adjustment of Hindu-Moslem
interests was made on an All-India basis. Moslem representa-
tion as provided under the Congress League Scheme was no
longer acceptable to the Moslems of Bengal and Punjab. At
the same time the Nehru Committee found it well-nigh
impossible to fix another proportion which would be accept-
able to the parties concerned. Therefore, from the practical
point of view also, the Committee found it advisable to decide
on non-reservation of seats in Bengal and Punjab.

THE BAROMETER RISES 175
While the Nehru Committee was engaged in threshing out
the principles of the new Constitution, interesting events
were taking place elsewhere. In May 1928, I was called upon
to preside over the Maharashtra Provincial Conference at
Poona. The enthusiasm I met with there was striking. In my
speech I advocated some new lines of activity for Congress-
men which I had decided on during my prolonged incar-
ceration in Burma. For instance, I urged that the Congress
should directly take up the task of organising labour and that
youths and students should start organisations of their own
for looking after their own interests and also for serving
their country. I also urged separate political organisations
for women, in addition to their participation in the Congress
organisations. From Poona I went to Bombay and found
that the youths there had already founded the Bombay
Presidency Youth League and were preparing to take the
initiative in national service at a time when the Congress
Committee was not giving the lead expected of it. The
month of June found a no-tax campaign in full swing in the
Bardoli sub-division in Gujerat where in 1922 the Mahatma
had sounded the order of retreat. A 20 per cent. increase in
land revenue assessment had been ordered by the Govern-
ment and the peasants under the leadership of Mr. Vallabhbhai
Patel (the younger of the Patel brothers) refused to pay and
resorted to Satyagraha. The usual police repression followed,
including the confiscation of property and land. A heroic
non-violent battle was waged by the peasantry of Bardoli for
several months and ultimately the Government had to yield.
The whole of Bombay Presidency—and particularly Bombay
city—rallied to the support of the Bardoli peasants and women
took an active part in the movement. The Bardoli campaign
was the precursor of the larger fight that Bombay was to wage
in 1930. Out of this campaign Mr. Vallabhbhai Patel emerged
with a great reputation. Prior to this he was of course known
as one of the sincerest and staunchest lieutenants of the
Mahatma but the Bardoli victory brought him into the front
rank of India's leaders. In appreciation of his heroic service,
the Mahatma gave him the title of 'Sardar' (meaning Leader)
by which he is now generally called.