द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

CHAPTER V
DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER (1924-25)
THE year 1924 opened with an outlook hopeful in every
direction, but the Swarajists had no time to rest. The
elections to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, the largest
municipality in India, were to be held in March. Thanks to
the Minister for Local Self-Government, Sir Surendranath
Bannerji, the Calcutta Municipal Act had been amended in
1923. Therein, larger powers had been conferred on the
municipality, the franchise had been considerable enlarged
and the elective element strengthened. Under the con-
stitution, it was possible for the Swaraj Party to capture the
municipal administration if they were successful at the polls.
An intensive campaign was therefore started early in 1924
with the object of capturing the elected seats. So great was
the enthusiasm of the people who attended in their thousands
the meetings addressed by the Swarajist leaders that the
election forecast was a very favourable one. As a matter of
fact the Swaraj Party was returned with a very safe majority,
a large number of the successful Swarajist candidates being
Moslems. This result was all the more creditable because the
elections were held on the basis of separate electorate, whereby
Hindu voters alone could vote for Hindu candidates and Mos-
lem voters for Moslem candidates. At the first meeting of the
newly-elected municipal councillors, Deshbandhu Das was
elected Mayor and Mr. Shaheed Suhrawady, a Moslem
gentleman, Deputy-Mayor. The Corporation soon after
appointed me as the Chief Executive Officer, that is, the head
of the municipal administration.¹ Though my appointment
to this important post at the age of twenty-seven was generally
¹ Under the new constitution of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation
there was a division of function—the Chief Executive Officer being the
head of the administration and the Mayor being the head of the Corporation
as a whole. Under the old constitution both these functions were combined
in the ‘Chairman’.
112

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 113
approved in Swarajist circles, it did not fail to cause a certain
amount of heart-burning in some circles within the Party.
To the Government it gave great annoyance and it was
not without a great deal of hesitation that they decided to
give their approval, as they were required to do under the
Statute.
The election of the Deshbandhu as the first Mayor under
the new constitution symbolised our capture of the Calcutta
Municipality and was attended by popular demonstrations.
Under the new regime, new measures calculated to benefit the
citizens, were set in motion in quick succession. The newly-
elected Swarajist Councillors and Aldermen, including the
Mayor, all came dressed in home-made Khadi. Among the
employees of the Municipality, Khadi became the official
uniform. Many of the streets and parks were renamed after
India’s greatest men. For the first time an Education Depart-
ment was started and a distinguished Indian graduate of
Cambridge¹ was put in charge. Free primary schools for
boys and girls sprang up all over the city. Health-Associations,
financed by the Municipality, were started in every ward of
the city by public-spirited citizens for carrying on health
propaganda among the people. Dispensaries were opened by
the Municipality in the different districts for giving free
medical treatment to the poor. In purchasing stores, pre-
ference was given to Swadeshi (i.e., home-made) goods. In
making new appointments, the claims of Moslems and other
minorities were recognised for the first time. Infant clinics
were established in different parts of the city and to each
clinic was added a milk-kitchen for supplying milk free to the
children of the poor. Last, but not least, the Municipality
arranged to give civic receptions to Nationalist leaders like
Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Motilal Nehru and Mr. V. J. Patel,
when they visited the city and the previous custom of giving
civic receptions to Viceroys, Governors and officials was dis-
continued once for all.
The above measures adopted for promoting the welfare of
‘¹ K. P. Chattopadhyaya who has continued to hold office till the present
day. At present there are about 40,000 boys and girls in the Municipal
Schools.
H

114 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
the citizens brought about a new civic consciousness.¹
People for the first time began to look upon the Municipality
as their own institution and upon Municipal officers and
employees as Public Servants and not bureaucrats. But the
British vested interests in the city felt that they were losing
their importance and that they could no longer dominate the
Municipality. At that time nearly all the departmental heads
were Britishers, but with one or two exceptions, I had no
difficulty whatsoever, in dealing with them. The majority of
them were quite loyal to the new Swarajist administration and
some of them were even enthusiastic in praising it. Though
within a few months the efficiency of the administration was
considerably raised and citizens' complaints were attended to
more promptly than before, the official bloc in the Corporation,
as also the Government, continued their policy of opposition,
with the result that constant friction used to take place. In
the matter of appointments, they were opposed to the Swarajist
policy of doing justice to the minorities. With regard to the
drainage problem of the city, they were also in conflict with
the Swarajists. The scheme sponsored by the Government
for the new drainage works was rejected by the Swarajists as
being unscientific and useless. In this they had the support
of the Drainage Engineer of the Municipality, the late Mr.
O. J. Wilkinson and of the Director of Public Health, Dr.
C. A. Bentley, while the Chief Engineer, Mr. J. R. Coats,
was on the side of the Government. The drainage controversy
between the Municipality and the Government continued for
a long time and it took the Government ten years to give in
to the Municipality on the drainage question.²
The doings of the Swaraj Party in the Calcutta Corporation
would not have embarrassed the Government so much but
for the fact that there was a simultaneous pressure on the latter
from many quarters. In the Indian Legislative Assembly the
Swaraj Party was fairly strong and on behalf of the Party,
notice of a resolution was given demanding the release of
Mahatma Gandhi. Mahatma Gandhi had fallen seriously
¹ To give expression to this new consciousness, a weekly journal, called
the Calcutta Municipal Gazette was started by the Municipality.
² The drainage scheme which has been adopted now was drawn up by the
Indian Chief Engineer, Dr. B. N. Dey, who is still holding that office.

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 115
ill on January 12th and had been operated upon. This
news had caused anxiety and alarm from one end of the
country to the other and there was a very strong public
demand for his release. On the morning of February 5th,
the day on which the above resolution was to be moved,
the Mahatma was quietly released. A few days later, on
February 8th, Pandit Motilal Nehru, the leader of the
Swaraj Party in the Assembly, moved a resolution demand-
ing that a Round Table Conference be convened for drawing
up a Constitution for India, establishing full responsible
Government and that the new Constitution be placed before a
newly-elected Indian Legislature and be submitted before
the British Parliament for being embodied in a statute. Reply-
ing to this resolution on behalf of the Government of India,
Sir Malcolm Hailey, promised an investigation into the
complaints against and criticism of, the Constitution. If
after the investigation it was found that there was possibility
of constitutional advance within the four corners of the Act,
the Government would have no objection in making recom-
mendations to the British Cabinet to that effect. But if on
the other hand, further constitutional advance involved an
amendment of the Government of India Act, 1919, then the
Government could not promise any action at that stage.
This reply was extremely disappointing and as a retort, the
Assembly threw out some of the demands for grants and
refused leave to introduce the entire Finance Bill. The
Finance Bill had therefore to be restored with the help of
the special powers of certification vested in the Viceroy.
The debate over the demand for a Round Table Conference
was followed by the appointment of a Committee with the
following terms of reference—to inquire into the difficulties
arising from or the defects inherent in the working of the
Government of India Act, 1919; to investigate the feasibility
and desirability of securing remedies for such difficulties and
defects, consistent with the structure, policy and purpose of
the Act, either by action taken under the Act and the rules or
by such amendments of the Act as appear necessary to rectify
any administrative imperfections. This Committee was
presided over by the Home Member, Sir Alexander Muddi-

116 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
man and among the members were Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru
(Allahabad), Sir Sivaswami Aiyer (Madras), Mr. M. A.
Jinnah (Bombay) and Dr. Paranjpye (Poona)—all of them
being Liberal (Moderate) politicians—who submitted a
minority report. The Committee as a whole reported that
there were serious defects in the Constitution and in the
manner in which it had been worked. The majority of the
members, consisting mostly of officials, recommended a
number of minor modifications which would help the working
of the Constitution. The minority reported that such modi-
fications would be of little avail and that a satisfactory opera-
tion of the Constitution would be possible only when it was
revised with a view to introducing responsible government
in the provinces and at least a measure of responsibility in
the Central Government. It should be noted in this con-
nection that the Swaraj Party in the Assembly did not
co-operate with the Muddiman Committee in any way and
the report of the Committee was altogether disappointing
from the Swarajist point of view.
While the major issues were being tackled by its members
in the Assembly, the Swaraj Party was following obstructive
tactics in all the provincial legislatures. In the Assembly
there was hardly any room for obstruction or deadlock be-
cause the Viceroy could easily override the legislature by his
special powers of ‘veto’ and ‘certification.’ Moreover, all
the departments of the Central Government were adminis-
tered by members who were under the full control of the
Viceroy and were neither elected members of the Assembly
nor removable by a vote of that body. In the provinces, on
the other hand, the departments called ‘transferred’ depart-
ments were administered by ‘ministers’ who were elected
members of the provincial legislature and were subject to the
vote of that body—while the other departments called
‘reserved’ departments, were administered by members who
were quite independent of the vote of the legislature.¹ The
Swarajist tactics in the provincial legislatures therefore con-
sisted in attacking the ministers and their ‘transferred’
departments. The salaries of the ministers would be either
¹ Because of this dual system, the constitution was called ‘diarchy’.

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 117
rejected altogether, in which case no ministers could be
appointed at all—or votes of no-confidence in the ministers
would be moved repeatedly so that no set of ministers could
continue in office long. At the same time attempts would be
made to throw out the Budget of the transferred departments
which could not be restored by certification. By such tactics,
the Governor of the province would be forced to suspend the
working of the transferred departments, take over the
administration into his own hands and go on ruling as he
would in the pre-reform days. In the Central Provinces
Legislative Council where the Swarajists had an absolute
majority—the entire Budget was thrown out without any
difficulty and no ministers could therefore be appointed.
In Bengal the situation was somewhat similar to that in the
Central Provinces. The salaries of the ministers were rejected
and repeated attempts to restore them proved unavailing. The
ministers had therefore to lay down their office. Thus, in
the Central Provinces and in Bengal, the working of the
constitution was rendered impossible. It is not possible to
describe the enthusiasm of the public when diarchy was
overthrown in these two provinces. It was regarded as a
great triumph for the Swarajists and this victory brought a
sense of elation all over the country. In 1920, the Congress
had tried to paralyse the new constitution, by boycotting the
polls but this attempt had failed, because not a single seat
had remained vacant and undesirable men had flooded the
legislatures. In 1924, on the other hand, the Swarajists, by
carrying the fight inside the legislatures, were able to wreck
the constitution, in at least some of the provinces.
People belonging to the Liberal Party and even 'No-
Changer' Congressmen have not sometimes been able to under-
stand the utility of the Swarajist policy of constitutional
obstruction. They argue that if ministers are allowed to
continue in office they could do more good than if those
departments are taken over by the Governor and his officials.
As against that, the Swarajists argue that three years' exper-
ience (from 1920 to 1923) has shown that there is hardly any
scope for useful work for a minister under the Constitution
of 1919. All the more important departments, like public

118 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
security, justice, prisons, finance, etc., are in the hands of
officials and the budget allotments for these departments are
made first. What is left is handed over to the ministers and
this amount is so inadequate that it barely suffices for their
minimum establishment, rendering it quite impossible to
undertake nation-building work on a decent scale. Moreover,
the principal officials working under the Ministers, including
their secretaries, cannot be subjected to disciplinary action
by them and being quite independent of the legislature in
the matter of their pay and emoluments, they are not respon-
sive to popular sentiment. In these circumstances, the
the unhampered working of the constitution cannot benefit
the country in any way—whereas successful obstruction not
only brings pressure to bear on the Government by putting
obstacles in its path, but also develops a spirit of resistance
in the country as a whole. As a matter of fact, when the
constitution of the Swaraj Party was first drawn up in
March 1923, it was explicitly stated in the preamble that
the object of the Swarajist policy was to create an atmos-
phere of resistance to the bureaucracy, without which the
Government could never be made to respond to popular
demands.
While the Swarajists were enjoying the first flush of
victory, the Labour Secretary of State for India, Lord
Olivier, in a striking speech delivered in the House of Lords,
analysed the causes which led to the birth of Swarajism in
India. Among the causes he mentioned were—firstly, the
resolution passed by the House of Lords supporting General
Dyer, the author of the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre; secondly,
the 'steel-frame speech' of the Premier, Mr. Lloyd George,
in 1922, eulogising the Indian Civil Service; thirdly, the
doubling of the Salt Tax by the Government of India, in
1923, in the teeth of intense popular opposition and despite
the adverse vote of the Indian Legislative Assembly; and
fourthly, the injustice meted out to Indians in the Crown
Colony of Kenya in Africa. This clever and sympathetic
analysis of the causes of the Indian unrest leading to the birth
of the Swaraj Party, showed that for once at least the India
Office in London was able to appreciate public sentiment

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 119
and public opinion in India. It is to be regretted, therefore,
that this understanding was not followed up by appropriate
action.
Not content with his activities in the legislature, the
Municipality and in other directions, the Deshbandhu
launched another important movement at this time—the
Tarakeswar Satyagraha movement. Not far from Calcutta,
at a place called Tarakeswar, there is an old temple of 'Baba
Taraknath' or 'Shiva.' As in the case of other holy shrines,
there was considerable property attached to the temple, which
had been endowed in order to provide for its upkeep. Fol-
lowing the Hindu custom, there was a trustee, called the
Mohunt, in charge of the temple and the attached property.
Though the Mohunts are expected to live a chaste and
abstemious life, there were allegations against the Mohunt of
Tarakeswar with regard to his personal character and to his
administration of the endowed property. As Tarakeswar
happens to be one of the most holy places of pilgrimage in
Bengal and is visited every year by people from all parts of
the province, the allegations made against the Mohunt were
widely known. After the success of the Akali movement in
the Punjab, pressure was brought to bear on the Bengal
Congress Committee for starting a similar movement at
Tarakeswar. Notices were served on the Mohunt calling upon
him to mend his ways but as these attempts were of no avail,
in April 1924, the Deshbandhu launched a movement for
taking peaceful possession of the temple and the attached
property, with a view to placing them under the administra-
tion of a public committee. The Mohunt appealed to the
Government for help and as soon as volunteers began to
move towards the temple and the palace of the Mohunt—the
police appeared on the scene. The usual Satyagraha scenes
were re-enacted at Tarakeswar—peaceful volunteers moving
up from one side and the police attacking them mercilessly on
the other and occasionally making arrests. Owing to the
intervention of the Government, the issue became a political
one. Once again, in order to set an example to the people,
the Deshbandhu sent his son to prison at the head of the
volunteers. Within a short time, the movement became

120 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
extremely popular and there was a warm response from every
corner of the province.¹
In May, 1924, the annual conference of Bengal Congress-
men, called the Provincial Conference, was held at a place
called Sirajganj. Prior to this the Deshbandhu had drawn up
an agreement between Hindus and Moslems, covering
religious as well as political questions, but it had been rejected
by the Coconada Congress in December 1923, on the ground
that it conceded too much to the Moslems. This agreement,
known as the Bengal Pact—was placed before the Sirajganj
Conference for ratification. There was a stormy debate and
the political opponents of the Deshbandhu, joined by some
reactionary Hindus, put up a formidable opposition. Never-
theless, the passionate eloquence of the leader carried the
day and the Bengal Pact was adopted by a large majority.
After this, another resolution was discussed and passed which
was to stir up a hornet's nest in the days to come. This was
the Gopinath Saha resolution. Some months earlier, a young
student, named Gopinath Saha, had attempted to assassinate
the Commissioner of Police of Calcutta, Sir Charles
Tegart. Through mistaken identity, he shot at and killed
another Englishman, Mr. Day. At the trial before the High
Court of Calcutta, Saha made a statement which created a
sensation at the time. He stated in effect that he really had
intended to murder the Police Commissioner and expressed
his sincere sorrow for having killed the wrong person. He
was glad to pay with his life and hoped that every drop of his
blood would sow the seeds of freedom in every Indian home.
Saha was sentenced to death by the High Court and duly
hanged. But, after his death, resolutions were passed in
several meetings in Bengal appreciating his courage and
spirit of sacrifice, while condemning his action. A similar
¹ The Satyagraha Campaign went on for several months. The Mohunt
ultimately was forced to come to a compromise with Deshbandhu C. R.
Das and an agreement was drawn up whereby the temple and the major
portion of the property was to be handed over to a public committee.
This agreement had to be placed before a court of law but at this stage a
third party, under the name of the Brahman Sabha, raised objections. While
the whole matter was under consideration, the Deshbandhu died. After
his unfortunate death, the agreement was set at nought and the result
of the Satyagraha Campaign was nullified,

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER ' 121
resolution was unanimously passed at the Sirajganj Con-
ference and it caused considerable annoyance to the Govern-
ment.
While these stirring events were happening in Bengal,
interesting developments were taking place elsewhere.
Mahatma Gandhi, as we have already seen, was released on
February 5th. He went to a seaside resort near Bombay for
rest and change of climate. After some weeks he was able
to take interest once again in public affairs and gradually to
assume his normal activities. Speculation at once arose as to
what attitude Gandhiji would take up with regard to the
Swaraj Party. On principle he was of course bitterly opposed
to the Swarajist policy of ‘Council-entry,’ nevertheless, he
did not adopt a hostile attitude. It may be that he found the
position of the Swarajists to be too strong in the country to
be able to overthrow them and so he bowed to the inevitable.
Or it may be that he felt that the changed circumstances in
the country warranted a change in tactics. Be that as it may,
he met the Swarajist leaders, Deshbandhu Das and Pandit
Motilal Nehru and arrived at an understanding with them.
This agreement, known as the Gandhi-Das Pact, was to the
effect that the Mahatma was to devote himself to the Khadi
Campaign, while the Swarajists were to be in charge of
the political campaign. In order to carry on his work
without any interference on the part of the Congress or the
Swaraj Party, the Mahatma was empowered to organise
an autonomous body to be called the All-India Spinners’
Association. This body was to have its own funds and its own
Secretariat.
The Swaraj Party, on the other hand, was to carry on its
work as an autonomous body independently of the Congress
and to have its own Secretariat.¹ The alliance thus struck
between the Mahatma and the Swaraj Party soon ripened into
friendship as a result of conciliatory statements made by the
former from time to time. On one occasion, for instance, he
said in his characteristic style, ‘My political conscience is in
the keeping of the Swarajists.’ On another occasion he is
¹ This agreement was ratified at the annual session of the Congress
held at Belgaum in December, over which Mahatma Gandhi presided.

122 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
reported to have remarked: 'I shall cling to the Swaraj
Party as a child clings to its mother.'
After establishing peace within the Congress camp through
his understanding with the Swaraj Party, the Mahatma turned
to another acute problem. Since 1923, Hindu-Moslem
dissensions had appeared in different parts of India and
Mahatma Gandhi was far-sighted enough to realise that if
the evil was not nipped in the bud, it would soon grow into
a national calamity. The communal storm might not break
while the Swarajist Campaign, supported by both Hindus
and Moslems, was in full swing—but the moment there was
a lull in the campaign, the evil was sure to rear its head. So
in September, 1924, at his instance, a Unity Conference was
convened at Delhi. The Conference was largely attended,
even the Anglican Metropolitan of India and representatives
of the Britishers in India, participating in it. At the time of
the Conference the Mahatma embarked on a three weeks' fast
as a self-imposed penance for the wrongs committed by
members of different communities who by their action dis-
turbed intercommunal peace in India. The Conference was a
successful one. A formula was devised for promoting unity
between the different communities in India and a Conciliation
Board of fifteen members was set up which was to intervene
whenever and wherever any communal trouble arose. In
spite of the success of the Unity Conference, practical results
did not follow. In March 1924, Mustapha Kemal Pasha took
the extraordinary step of abolishing the Khalifate altogether.
Those Moslems who had been drawn towards the Indian
National Congress owing to the desire to secure support for
the Khilafat Campaign, no longer felt any urge to remain
friendly towards the Congress. The Khilafat Committees
themselves went out of existence in most parts of India and
many of the erstwhile members of those organisations were
absorbed into reactionary mushroom organisations. About
this time the All-India Moslem League came back to life
again. This body had been the premier organisation for
Moslems in India till 1920. Since that year it had been
practically replaced by the All-India Khilafat Committee
which had succeeded in drawing most of the active elements

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 123
among the Indian Moslems. The abolition of the Khalifate
by the Turks themselves, struck at the root of the Khilafat
Committees in India and indirectly helped the revival of the
All-India Moslem League. In December 1924, when the
All-India Moslem League met once again, the Khilafatists
were defeated for the first time since 1920. The newly-
revived All-India Moslem League, as we shall see later,
became more sectarian and reactionary than it had been prior
to 1920.
About the middle of 1924, matters began to approach a
crisis once again. This crisis was of course different in
character from that of 1921-22. The Government felt hard-
pressed from all sides. Not only in Bengal, but throughout
the country, the local bodies (municipalities, district boards,
etc.) were coming under the control of the Nationalists and to
that extent, official power and influence were being eliminated.
In all the legislatures, a stiff fight was being waged and in
two provinces, Central Provinces and Bengal, the working of
the new constitution was paralysed. In Bengal, the Tarakes-
war Satyagraha, though it began as a movement for the
reform of the temple administration, soon developed into a
political movement and gradually assumed serious propor-
tions. Over and above this, according to the Government,
there was a strong undercurrent of revolutionary activity and
the Government were particularly annoyed by public resolu-
tions, praising the revolutionary Gopinath Saha, though the
appreciation was of a qualified and conditional character. In
August, when the influence of the Swaraj Party was at its
height, the annual conference of the Party was held in Cal-
cutta. Leaders from the different provinces were present on
the occasion. The attendance was large and the enthusiasm
very great. That was the signal for the Government to strike.
During the last twelve months they had not been altogether
inactive and had been closely following events. Soon after
the Delhi Congress in September 1923, a number of Congress
workers belonging to the Swaraj Party of Bengal had been
suddenly arrested and put in prison without any trial under
an old regulation called 'Regulation III of 1818.' The
explanation given by the Government at the time was that

124 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
the revolutionary movement was raising its head again and
it was therefore necessary to resort to speedy suppression.
Though the arrests created considerable resentment at the
time, it was not followed by any further developments and the
excitement gradually subsided. After a year, the Government
decided to repeat those tactics again. They did not know
how to suppress the Swaraj Party otherwise. The activities
of the Party, except in the case of the Tarakeswar Satyagraha
and similar campaigns, were carried on within the bounds of
the law, but they caused considerable embarrassment to the
Government; nevertheless the Government could not take
any legal proceedings against the Swarajists. All attempts to
suppress the Tarakeswar Satyagraha campaign had not only
failed but had served to evoke greater enthusiasm on the part
of the people. In sheer desperation the Government therefore
decided to strike at the root of the organisation and since
that was not possible through a trial in a court of law, they
resolved to imprison some of the principal organisers of the
Swaraj Party without trial.
On October 25th, 1924, in the early hours of the morning,
they made a clean sweep of a large number of Congressmen
in Calcutta and other places in Bengal. These arrests were
made partly under Regulation III of 1818, and partly under
an emergency ordinance (called the Bengal Ordinance) pro-
mulgated by the Viceroy at midnight on October 24th.
This ordinance conferred on the Government of Bengal
powers of arrest and imprisonment similar to those conferred
on the Government of India by Regulation III of 1818, and
the ordinance was issued in order to help the Government of
Bengal to order arrest and imprisonment without trial of
persons in Bengal, without any reference to the Government
of India. Among those arrested were two prominent Swarajist
members of the Bengal Legislative Council, Mr. Anil Baran
Roy and Mr. S. C. Mitra,¹ and myself. Some of the warrants
as in the case of three of us, had been issued under the
Regulation, whereas in the case of the others, they had been
¹ Mr. Ail Baron Roy has since retired from politics and joined the
Ashrama of Sri Aurobindo Ghosh at Pondicherry. Mr. S. C. Mitra has
since joined the Assembly and been a prominent member of the Opposition
between 1928 and 1934.

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 125
issued under the newly-promulgated Bengal Ordinance.
The warrants under the Regulation had been signed as early
as July last, the day after the Government were finally
defeated in their attempt to retain the ministers in office and
work the diarchical constitution. It has not been explained
yet as to why the warrants had not been executed for nearly
three months. The conjecture generally made is that the
Bengal Government waited for sanction to a larger number
of arrests and also for the promulgation of the Bengal
Ordinance. Moreover, the whole matter had to be placed
before the then Labour Secretary of State for India, Lord
Olivier, and so the delay was unavoidable. With regard to the
raison d'être of these arrests, the public notion at the time
was that the pressure of the Swarajists in the local bodies
(especially the Calcutta Municipality), in the legislatures and
at Tarakeswar had unnerved the Government. And the
reason why they struck only in Bengal, was that the anti-
Government forces were strongest in that province.
The large number of arrests made so suddenly and
unexpectedly on October 25th, created tremendous excite-
ment in the country. Official circles came out with the excuse
that a revolutionary conspiracy was on foot and the arrests
had to be made before anything serious happened. But it
was hard to persuade the public that those who had been
arrested were engaged in a revolutionary conspiracy. Public
clamour against the arrests continued to be very strong and
one month after my arrest, Government began to think
seriously of releasing me. But the prestige of the police, at
whose instance the arrests had been made, stood in the way
and the proposal had to be dropped. The agitation over my
arrest was the strongest at the time because the public thought
that the object of the Government was to strike at the Swarajist
administration of the new Corporation. Everyone knew,
including the extreme loyalists, that I was engaged day and
night in my municipal duties and had been forced to give up
Politics altogether, since I was appointed Chief Executive
Officer of the Calcutta Corporation. Official and semi-official
circles were therefore at pains to put forward an excuse for
the arrests which would find some credence among the public.

126 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
The Anglo-Indian papers of Calcutta, The Statesman, and
The Englishman (now defunct), came out with statements to
the effect that I was the brain of the revolutionary conspiracy.
My solicitors at once filed legal proceedings against both the
papers for defamation. The proceedings dragged on for
months and in the meantime attempts were made to secure
the help of the Government in the suit in the matter of
obtaining proofs to substantiate the charges made against me
in the Press in support of the Government. As the Govern-
ment did not agree to help in the matter, an attempt was
made to secure the assistance of the India Office in London.
By that time there had been a change in the Cabinet in
England. A General Election had taken place in October
and as a result of the scare created by the Zinovieff letter,
there had been a landslide in favour of the Conservative
Party. Following the defeat of the Labour Party at the polls,
the Labour Secretary of State for India, Lord Olivier, had
made room for the Conservative Secretary of State, Lord
Birkenhead. Though the India Office was inclined to help
the Anglo-Indian papers in the suit brought against them for
defamation, they were unable to find any documentary evidence
to prove my complicity in a revolutionary conspiracy. For-
ward, the Swarajist paper of Calcutta, happened to get hold
of and publish a letter, written to Calcutta from London on
the subject, in which an agent of the India Office was reported
to have said that I had been arrested on the verbal testimony
borne against me by certain people, but that there was no
documentary evidence against me. The publication of this
letter further embarrassed the Government.
No one in India felt these persecutions more than Desh-
bandhu Das did. In a magnificent speech delivered from the
Mayoral chair of the Calcutta Corporation, he gave vent to
the deep indignation which stirred the public at the time.
He accepted full responsibility for what the Chief Executive
Officer had done and challenged the Government to arrest him.
The Government did not accept the challenge but replied
in a different way. They opened negotiations with him for
settlement of the entire Indian question. At that time,
Mahatma Gandhi was politically a back-number. He had

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 127
confined himself to the Khadi campaign, having retired from
the political movement which was under, the control of the
Swarajist leaders. The memory of the negotiations in
December 1921, had left an impression on the official mind
that it was possible to come to an understanding with the
Deshbandhu if the major issues were tackled in an earnest
and sincere manner. Lord Lytton personally had a very
high appreciation of him as a man. And at the time no
official felt the pressure of the popular movement more than
the Governor of Bengal did. In those days, to settle with the
Congress, meant to settle with Deshbandhu C. R. Das.
Therefore, unknown to the outside world, negotiations between
the Deshbandhu and the Governor of Bengal, Lord Lytton,
went on for some months.
With his shrewd political instinct, the Deshbandhu
thought of making use of the public feeling roused by the
arrests of October 1924. He appealed at once for a fund to
be used for national reconstruction. The economic situation
in the country was not favourable and many people thought
that the response to the appeal would be disappointing. But
the leader knew better. In spite of unfavourable forecasts,
he had a very good response and that was a further proof of
public confidence in him. At the end of the year, the annual
session of the Congress was held at Belgaum in Bombay
Presidency. This Congress was presided over by Mahatma
Gandhi and it was the last Congress attended by the Desh-
bandhu. The proceedings were marked by extreme cordiality
between the Mahatma and the Swarajists. The principal
programme of work adopted for the coming year was the
extension of home-spinning and home-weaving and it was
enjoined on every member of the Congress to produce a
certain quantity of yarn as his membership subscription. The
only other significant fact about the Belgaum Congress was
the attempt of Mrs. Annie Besant to get her Commonwealth
of India Bill ratified by the Congress. This Bill, which was
to confer Home Rule on India, had been drafted by her and
her intention was to have it introduced in the British Parlia-
ment as a private Bill. She felt that her hands would be
considerably strengthened if the Congress gave the stamp of

128 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
approval to her pet constitution, but none of the Congress
leaders would be drawn into her net. She therefore had to
leave the Belgaum Congress disappointed.
The political situation remained unchanged when the year
1925 was ushered in. Deshbandhu Das continued in power.
In the early part of 1925, there was a further trial of strength
between the Government and the Swarajists in Bengal. The
Ordinance which the Governor-General had promulgated in
October 1924, conferring on the Bengal Governor powers of
summary arrest and imprisonment without trial, was to
expire in April 1925. Thereafter, if the Bengal Government
desired to have those powers, they would have to introduce
legislation to that effect in the Bengal Legislative Council. A
Bill was therefore duly introduced and the Government
strained every nerve to have it passed into law. As the
Swarajists were really in a minority in the Legislative Council,
the Government felt hopeful that they would be able to carry
the legislation through. The Deshbandhu was then taking
rest at Patna as he had been suffering from a nervous break-
down. But in spite of his ill-health, he resolved to inflict a
crushing defeat on the Government in person. On the
appointed day he arrived at the Council Hall in time and had
actually to be carried in an invalid-chair. Once again the
laurels of the day were his. The Bill was thrown out, but by
virtue of the extraordinary powers given to the Governor
under the Constitution, he was able to certify the Bill as
law.
Soon after this incident the annual conference of Bengal
Congressmen was summoned at Faridpur and in view of the
critical situation in the country, Deshbandhu Das was elected
President. Against all medical advice, he resolved to go there
and preside over the deliberations. People did not understand
at the time why he was so insistent on attending this con-
ference. Anything that he said would have drawn the same
amount of attention even if it happened to be a Press state-
ment. The real reason, however, as to why he wanted to go
there was that he had to give a public indication of his
demands, for the benefit of the Government. Moreover, he
wanted to demonstrate to the Government that his views

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 129
were acceptable to the bulk of Congressmen so that the
Government would feel that in the event of a settlement being
arrived at, the Deshbandhu was in a position to deliver the
goods. At that time the Government attached great value to
the Bengal Provincial Conference, because Bengal was then
the storm centre and contained some of the most radical
elements in the Indian National Congress. Therefore a
proposal which was carried in Bengal, would in all probability
be acceptable to Congressmen elsewhere. Deshbandhu Das
made a speech which was regarded as rather tame for a
Bengal audience. He discussed the question of Dominion
Status versus Independence as the goal of the Congress, and
declared that he stood for the former. Moreover, he spoke
in condemnation of terrorism. The speech as a whole appeared
to be an appeal to the Government and to the more extreme
elements among Indians to adopt a compromising attitude so
that the ground could be prepared for a settlement. It was,
however, not welcomed by the youthful section of the audience
and there was a possibility that he would be defeated when
the matter was put to the vote. Nevertheless, so great was
his personal influence at the time and so transparent his
sincerity of purpose that he carried the day. The delibera-
tions of the Faridpur Conference were on the whole satis-
factory to the authorities with whom the Deshbandhu was
engaged in negotiating.
Soon after this, Lord Reading left India for London, as
the Conservative Cabinet and the Secretary of State for
India, Lord Birkenhead, wanted to consult him. By that
time it was in the air that negotiations had been going on
between Deshbandhu Das and the Government, though
hardly anyone knew any details. It was announced that after
consulting Lord Reading, Lord Birkenhead would make an
important pronouncement about India. Everyone in India
awaited this speech with the greatest interest and eagerness.
Then came a sudden bolt from the blue. In June 1925,
when Deshbandhu Das was having a rest in the hill-station of
Darjeeling, the summer capital of the Bengal Government,
he fell seriously ill. After a brief attack he suddenly died.
The whole country was at once plunged in grief. He was at
I

130 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
the height of his glory and was expected to achieve great
things for his country. While in memoriam meetings and
processions were going on in the country, the British Cabinet
in London made up their mind as to what they should do.
Their arch-enemy was dead; therefore, things would settle
down now for a while. They would accordingly not decide
anything in a hurry but would watch developments. But
it had already been announced that Lord Birkenhead would
make an important pronouncement about India on July 7th,
1925. Therefore, the announcement carefully prepared on
behalf of the Cabinet had to be entirely suppressed and in its
place Lord Birkenhead, on the previously announced date,
made an uninteresting speech. Besides talking about plati-
tudes, he merely endorsed Lord Reading's panacea for India's
ills in the form of development of industry and the stabilisa-
tion of finance.
The death of the Deshbandhu on June 16th, 1925, was for
India a national calamity of the first magnitude. Though his
active political career consisted of barely five years, his rise
had been phenomenal. With the reckless abandon of a
Vaishnava devotee, he had plunged into the political move-
ment with heart and soul and he had given not only himself
but his all in the fight for Swaraj. When he died, whatever
worldly possessions he still had, were left to the nation. By
the Government he was both feared and admired. They feared
his strength, but admired his character. They knew that he
was a man of his word. They also knew, that though he was
a hard fighter, he was none the less a clean fighter and further,
he was also the man with whom they could bargain for a
settlement. He was clear-headed, his political instinct was
sound and unerring and unlike the Mahatma he was fully
conscious of the rôle he was to play in Indian politics. He
knew more than anyone else, that situations favourable for
wresting political power from the enemy do not come often
and when they do come, they do not last long. While the
crisis lasts, a bargain has to be struck. He knew also that to
sponsor a settlement, when public enthusiasm is at its height,
needs much courage and may involve a certain amount of
unpopularity. But he was nothing if not fearless. He was

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 131
conscious of his exact rôle, namely that of a practical politician
and he was therefore never afraid of courting unpopularity.
In contrast with the Deshbandhu, the rôle of the Mahatma
has not been a clear one. In many ways he is altogether an
idealist and a visionary. In other respects, he is an astute
politician. At times he is as obstinate as a fanatic; on other
occasions he is liable to surrender like a child. The instinct,
or the judgment, so necessary for political bargaining is
lacking in him. When there is a real opportunity for a
bargain as in 1921, he is liable to stick out for small things
and thereby upset all chances of a settlement. Whenever he
does go in for a bargain, as we shall see in 1931, he gives
more than he takes. On the whole, he is no match in diplo-
macy for an astute British politician.
After the death of Deshbandhu Das the Mahatma spent
several months in Bengal trying to raise a memorial fund in
honour of the departed great and helping to reorganise
the Congress machinery in the absence of the leader. His
public activities, nevertheless, continued on the whole to be
non-political in character and the political mantle of the
Deshbandhu therefore fell on Pandit Motilal Nehru, the
Swarajist leader in the Assembly. While Lord Reading was
still in England and Lord Lytton, the Governor of Bengal,
was acting as the Governor-General of India, the Pandit
attempted to resume the threads of the negotiations which
the Deshbandhu had been carrying on with the Government.
But the Government in London had already decided to drop
the negotiations for the time being and watch developments.
Nothing therefore came out of this attempt of Pandit Motilal
Nehru.
June 1925 proved to be a turning point in the recent history
of India. The disappearance of the towering personality of
the Deshbandhu from the political arena was for India a
colossal misfortune. The Swaraj Party, which owed so much
to him, was paralysed after his death and dissensions gradually
arose within the Party. Nevertheless, the Party at the time
of his death was an institution of which anyone would be
proud. The Capital of Calcutta, the organ of British com-
mercial interests, writing after his death, compared the Swaraj