पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

THE JUDGMENT 121
Nana Phadnis, than whom no veracious and correct writer can be found, writes
definitely about this difference in his autobiography.⁹ The irritability of temper
and in general the loss of balance of mind, which is ascribed to the Peshwa
during his last illness, was not a sudden growth after Panipat, but was a
gradual development. Govindpant Bundele¹⁰ notes this change in the Peshwa's
temper even from the north. It will be seen from this detailed discussion that
the death of the Peshwa had little to do with the shock of Panipat. He would
not have survived it long, even if it had ended in a victory. We have thought
it necessary to enter into this detailed treatment of the problem as all historians
have fallen into the trap by treating it as a result of Panipat
We agree with Sir Jadunath¹¹ in thinking that the Peshwa's marriage at
Hiradpuri had nothing to do with the issue in the north, because we do not
think that the Peshwa was at this time in a fit physical or mental condition to
help Bhau by proceeding post haste to the north. It was a national misfortune
of the Marathas that the supreme head of the state should, in these critical years
not be in a fit condition to direct the affairs of the state with a single minded
devotion to the cause of the nation. A Shivaji or Santaji Ghorpade or Baji
rao would have possibly relieved Bhau by marching to Delhi in the rear of
Abdali in about a month with all the spare troops. Such an exploit was be-
yond the capacity of Balaji Bajirao (alias Nanasaheb), to judge from his
whole life.
HISTORICAL OPINIONS ABOUT THE BATTLE OF PANIPAT
That the disaster of Panipat ultimately led to the destruction of the
Maratha power, was understood by Rajwade more than forty five years ago.¹
Even before him, other historians had also said the same thing. But while the
foreigners were conscious of this result the Marathas were not, which only
means that they had no proper understanding of the situation and were thus
living in a fool's paradise. On the other hand, the English writers after Plassey
seemed to be perfectly conscious of the things shaping in those times. Their
knowledge and their self-consciousness ultimately made them the masters
of India.
A national disaster of the type of Panipat has naturally resulted in cast-
'ing a shadow of gloom over the Maratha nation. But the defeat has been
treated differently by various students of history, who have given quite a dif-
ferent turn to the whole discussion. Evans BELL wrote long ago that 'even the
battle of Panipat was a triumph and a glory for the Marathas. They fought
in the cause of 'India for the Indians,' while the great Muhammedan princes
of Delhi, of Oude and the Deccan, stood as de, intriguing and trimming. And
though the Marathas were defeated, the victorious Afghans retired and never
again interfered in the affairs of India." Prof. RAWLINSON writes,² 'A defeat is
9 Ait Patre Yadi 192, RAJ 6 415
10 RAJ 1.143
11 Fall, 2.364
1 RAJWADE I Introduction, p. 46.
2 KASHIRAJ Introduction, p. xiii.

THE JUDGMENT 125
none can say that they were inferior to any in India of those days With all
their internal quarrels, no other state in India could muster so many troops for
war under a unitary command. No other nation was less bigoted or more
tolerant in religious and social matters, as is proved by their behaviour towards
their Muslim neighbours or their rule over Muslim subjects. There is no in-
stance of their having fabricated a document like Clive, none where they tried
to gain a point by assassination or intimidation. They did not hire mercenaries
for slaughtering their opponent in an unguarded moment. They would not
murder persons by calling them for an interview. They would not kill foreign
emissaries at their Court. No other war-like nation is known to be milder in
their peace-time actions. There are no instances where the Marathas entered
into the slaughter of civilians after a victory, or during conquest to have
created terror. It is nowhere noted that they slaughtered disarmed prisoners,
like the Durranis after Panipat, or uselessly cut off the head of a fallen soldier
as in the case of Dattaji Shinde at Buradi. They did not apply torture to ex-
tract hidden wealth like the Afghans at Delhi in 1757. In fact, one feels many
a time that their comparative mildness their humane behaviour, their civil man-
ners, their unwillingness to gain their ends by back-door machinations or solve
their problems, internal or external, by swift unscrupulous actions such as mur-
dering an opponent, or doing away with their unwanted brethren like the
Mughals, has had the effect of their not succeeding in history. Be that
as it may, none can charge them as being morally condemnable in comparison
with many other military nations in the world. When a responsible historian of
India like Sir Jadunath SARKAR charges the Marathas with being "lesser breeds
beyond the law,"³ one does not know how to characterize such a statement and
what standard of conduct and morality he wants to apply. He seems to belong
to that category of historians-cum moralists "who justify Providence by the
event and hold nothing so deserving as success. To them there can be no vic-
tory in a bad cause, prescription and duration legitimate, and whatever exists
is right and reasonable, and God manifests His will by that which He tolerates.
Men must confirm to the divine decree by living to shape the future after the
ratified image of the past."⁴ These writers should learn to know that there
are many Marathas—perhaps the majority—who think it better to have lost
the Empire than to have followed a line of conduct after the manner of a
Clive or Najib or Abdali.
GENERAL THOUGHTS ON WAR
Mankind since it began to think and take a retrospective view of human
affairs, has been sharply divided on the moral basis of war, and it will prob-
ably remain so divided for all time. Indian civilisation, at least after the
Aryan imposition, has not only sanctioned war but has consecrated a particular
class for that work and given it the second rank in society. This is in sharp
contrast with the neighbouring Chinese civilisation which had relegated the
soldier to the last place in society and only tolerated him as an unavoidable
³ Fall II.291
⁴ Lord Acton, Lectures on Modern History (1907) (Inaugural Lecture) p 25 ,

122 PANIPAT 1761
under some circumstances as honourable as a victory, and never, in all their
annals, did the Maratha armies cover themselves with greater glory than when
the flower of the chivalry of the Deccan perished on the stricken field of Pani-
pat, fighting against the enemies of their creed and country But, after all,
the general who wins a campaign is the one who makes the fewest mistakes
The Bhausaheb did not commit a tithe of the blunders of both Wellington and
Napoleon in the Waterloo campaign He lost not because he was a bad gen-
eral, but because his opponent was a better one
We have shown above that these opinions are correct as far as they
go But that is beside the point The wisdom for the Marathas lay in not
coming to grips with such an awkward enemy as Ahmad Shah Abdali Had
Panipat resulted in a defeat of the Afghans it would not have meant the same
thing to them or to others Nobody was going to invade barren Afghanistan
and try to rule over it Instead of consolidating and making sure of what
they had got, the Marathas had no business to march forward, lengthen their
lines of communication and multiply their responsibilities This wrong policy
had begun already with Bajirao s invasion of Delhi in 1736 Geographic fac-
tors were completely ignored, because they were completely misunderstood by
the Marathas The Marathas boasted all along that the Deccan was as good
as theirs," but had never once understood the implications underlying that state
ment Even in their hey day before Panipat, others had coolly stolen a march
on them The implication of the destruction of the Angre s naval power seems
to have been understood by Alivardi Khan³ in Bengal just before his death,
but not by the Peshwa The short sighted policy pursued by the Peshwa even
after his experience in the Vijayadurg affair resulted in his directly playing into
the hands of his enemy and assured Clive's success in Bengal A similar thing
occurred at Mysore and made the line clear for Haidar Ali It should never
be forgotten that Surat and Janjira never came into the hands of the Peshwa,
much less could he have hoped to touch the European citadels on his coast,
Bombay and Goa While the Marathas were exhilarated by their march be-
yond the Indus, the English were silently entering Surat by the back door of
the sea A big army of the Marathas was encamping outside Surat and their
navy had also entered the Tapti estuary Diplomats were coming and going
and taking sides in the civil struggle at Surat, but still the English could carry
on independent correspondence with the Wazir Ghazi ud-din (a so-called crea-
ture of the Marathas) and get a Firman from the Mughal Emperor (who
thought himself a protege of the Peshwa) appointing them the keepers of the
Surat fort and admirals of the Mughal fleet This neglected Surat episode
throws a flood of light on Marathi politics during its most triumphant days.
Sadashivrao's defects have been well pointed out by the English envoy John

122 PANIPAT 1761
under some circumstances as honourable as a victory, and never, in all their
annals, did the Maratha armies cover themselves with greater glory than when
the flower of the chivalry of the Deccan perished on the stricken field of Pani-
pat, fighting against the enemies of their creed and country But, after all,
the general who wins a campaign is the one who makes the fewest mistakes
The Bhausaheb did not commit a tithe of the blunders of both Wellington and
Napoleon in the Waterloo campaign He lost not because he was a bad gen-
eral, but because his opponent was a better one '
We have shown above that these opinions are correct as far as they
go But that is beside the point The wisdom for the Marathas lay in not
coming to grips with such an awkward enemy as Ahmad Shah Abdali Had
Panipat resulted in a defeat of the Afghans, it would not have meant the same
thing to them or to others Nobody was going to invade barren Afghanistan
and try to rule over it Instead of consolidating and making sure of what
they had got the Marathas had no business to march forward, lengthen their
lines of communication and multiply their responsibilities This wrong policy
had begun already with Bajirao's invasion of Delhi in 1736 Geographic fac-
tors were completely ignored, because they were completely misunderstood by
the Marathas The Marathas boasted all along that "the Deccan was as good
as theirs," but had never once understood the implications underlying that state-
ment Even in their hey day before Panipat, others had coolly stolen a march
on them The implication of the destruction of the Angre's naval power seems
to have been understood by Alivardi Khan³ in Bengal just before his death,
but not by the Peshwa The short sighted policy pursued by the Peshwa even
after his experience in the Vijayadurg affair resulted in his directly playing into
the hands of his enemy and assured Clive's success in Bengal A similar thing
occurred at Mysore and made the line clear for Haidar Ali It should never
be forgotten that Surat and Janjira never came into the hands of the Peshwa,
much less could he have hoped to touch the European citadels on his coast,
Bombay and Goa While the Marathas were exhilarated by their march be-
yond the Indus, the English were silently entering Surat by the back door of
the sea A big army of the Marathas was encamping outside Surat and their
navy had also entered the Tapti estuary Diplomats were coming and going
and taking sides in the civil struggle at Surat, but still the English could carry
on independent correspondence with the Wazir Ghazi ud din (a so called crea-
ture of the Marathas) and get a Firman from the Mughal Emperor (wh
thought himself a protege of the Peshwa) appointing them the keepers of th
Surat fort and admirals of the Mughal fleet This neglected Surat episode
throws a flood of light on Maratha politics during its most triumphant days
Sadashivrao's defects have been well pointed out by the English envoy John
Spencer⁴ four years before Panipat He knew him to be a man with great
capacity for business, but as hasty and avaricious, too The impatience men-
tioned by the English Vakil was born of ignorance The ignorance was due
to the defective educational system or rather absence of a progressive system
marching with the times and adequate for making its votaries able to cope with
³ S C HILL, Bengal in 1756-57 (1905), Vol II, pp 16, 65, &
⁴ C H F

THE JUDGMENT 123
any situation arising around them. Balaji Bajirao's studies in Sanskrit were
advanced to the extent of writing verses in that language, but there is no evi-
dence to prove that the Peshwa had enough geographical information to cope
with that of the contemporary Europeans. RAJWADE'S statement⁵ that the
Peshwas possessed maps of the various provinces in India is not borne out by
any positive proof till after the First Maratha War. What knowledge they pos-
sessed was gained from gossipy news or orally from visitors to their Court, but
it was not sufficient to make these aspiring conquerors of India visualise either
the shape of their country or correctly point to the directions of the various
parts of the continent, nor an understanding of its correct extent. This had
a disastrous effect on the policy of the Marathas. Their avarice made them
grab everything which their hands could reach, but the political repercussions
of that grabbing and the pressure it would exert on their military machine they
were unable to comprehend. The non comprehension of political and military
facts surrounding them is the chief defect which made the Peshwas act as way-
wardly as they did. No other reason can explain their actions otherwise. The
contrast can be best understood by studying the English documents and publi-
cations of those times. All their military campaigns, naval fights, political ag-
grandisements, are found fully reported, discussed threadbare and lines of
policy deduced therefrom for future guidance. Not an iota of knowledge once
gained, not a point of vantage once secured, not an inch of ground once oc-
cupied was wasted or lost by them. The Marathas in their career had to go
through many a campaign, to enter into diplomatic talks, to carry on political
controversies and to devise various ways and means for securing their end, but
scarcely any of these things are found published for public edification, for the
use of the younger students in various walks of life. A nation which carried on
wars in all directions over a wide continent for more than a century, has not
produced a single treatise on warfare. That is the basic defect in the nation.
Its want could not be supplied by any other means. When one finds such a
book published in English in the very year of the Panipat disaster with de-
tailed maps, plans of battles, illustrations of the positions of forts giving a
visual demonstration of their military situation, naval manœuvres with drawings
of the anchored ships, together with their full political and diplomatic back-
ground, one is forced to exclaim that want of such training led to the Panipat
disaster (Vide R. O. Cambridge's War in India, etc., 1761).
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE PANIPAT CAMPAIGN
The Panipat campaign takes away the charge against the Marathas that
they were not the rulers of India, but only robbers in the dominions of other
rulers. This one campaign bears evidence not only to the military organiza-
tion developed under the Peshwas, but also to the fact that they were waging
war not for aggrandisement but for the defence of a principle, India for the
Indians, governed by Indians. The Peshwa had accepted the responsibility of
defending the Mughal Empire from its internal and external foes through his
⁵ RAJWADE, op. cit., p. 99

THE JUDGMENT 123
any situation arising around them. Balaji Bajirao's studies in Sanskrit were
advanced to the extent of writing verses in that language, but there is no evi-
dence to prove that the Peshwa had enough geographical information to cope
with that of the contemporary Europeans. RAJWADE'S statement⁵ that the
Peshwas possessed maps of the various provinces in India is not borne out by
any positive proof till after the First Maratha War. What knowledge they pos-
sessed was gained from gossipy news or orally from visitors to their Court, but
it was not sufficient to make these aspiring conquerors of India visualise either
the shape of their country or correctly point to the directions of the various
parts of the continent, nor an understanding of its correct extent. This had
a disastrous effect on the policy of the Marathas. Their avarice made them
grab everything which their hands could reach, but the political repercussions
of that grabbing and the pressure it would exert on their military machine they
were unable to comprehend. The non-comprehension of political and military
facts surrounding them is the chief defect which made the Peshwas act as way-
wardly as they did. No other reason can explain their actions otherwise. The
contrast can be best understood by studying the English documents and publi-
cations of those times. All their military campaigns, naval fights, political ag-
grandisements, are found fully reported, discussed threadbare and lines of
policy deduced therefrom for future guidance. Not an iota of knowledge once
gained, not a point of vantage once secured, not an inch of ground once oc-
cupied was wasted or lost by them. The Marathas in their career had to go
through many a campaign, to enter into diplomatic talks, to carry on political
controversies and to devise various ways and means for securing their end, but
scarcely any of these things are found published for public edification, for the
use of the younger students in various walks of life. A nation which carried on
wars in all directions over a wide continent for more than a century, has not
produced a single treatise on warfare. That is the basic defect in the nation.
Its want could not be supplied by any other means. When one finds such a
book published in English in the very year of the Panipat disaster with de-
tailed maps, plans of battles, illustrations of the positions of forts, giving a
visual demonstration of their military situation, naval manœuvres with drawings
of the anchored ships, together with their full political and diplomatic back-
ground, one is forced to exclaim that want of such training led to the Panipat
disaster (Vide R. O. Cambridge's War in India, etc., 1761).

THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE PANIPAT CAMPAIGN

The Panipat campaign takes away the charge against the Marathas that
they were not the rulers of India, but only robbers in the dominions of other
rulers. This one campaign bears evidence not only to the military organiza-
tion developed under the Peshwas, but also to the fact that they were waging
war not for aggrandisement but for the defence of a principle, India for the
Indians, governed by Indians. The Peshwa had accepted the responsibility of
defending the Mughal Empire from its internal and external foes through his

⁵ RAJWADE, op. cit., p. 99.

124 PANIPAT 1761
agents in 1752. From that date they had waged war against practically all
the potentates in India, great and small. Jayapa Shinde had waged war unto
death against Bijesingh of Marwar as a Mughal Subahdar of Ajmer and Mal-
harrao Holkar had fought against Madhosingh of Jaipur and Surajmal Jat,
as a Subahdar of Agra, in order to bring these recalcitrant chiefs under the rule
of the Mughal Empire. In the campaign against the Nizam in 1760, Bhau had
actually talked with him on the same basis. Bhau had received the Imperial Fir-
man¹ from Alamgir II through his confidential secretary Kamyar Khan sent in
August 1759 three months before that Emperor's assassination. In it, the Emperor
had besought Bhau's help against his unprincipled and unscrupulous Wazir
Ghazi ud din whose behaviour had become unbearable to the Emperor. The
Emperor had given a carte blanche to Bhau to take over the sole charge of the
Mughal Empire, with power to appoint his own Wazir and Mir Bakshi or
any other official. The Emperor wished Bhau to arrange matters in such a way
as to leave him in the position of the Maratha Chhatrapati at Satara. Those
who are ticklish about the constitutional procedure cannot criticize the Marathas
with high handedness in their dealings with the various Indian chiefs if they bear
in mind this important fact often overlooked by the historians. There was no
need for the Marathas to take upon themselves the onerous burden of running
the Mughal Empire, had they wished only for self aggrandisement. As a
matter of fact, matters became difficult for the Marathas by the acceptance of
this burden, because they had to become enemies of all and sundry by this
procedure. But they wished to preserve the grand fabric of the Mughal Em-
pire in so far as it was possible. They had no wish to sweep away all trace of
old rule and begin their rule anew. They did not wish to create anarchy
throughout the length and breadth of India. But they were counting against
the time. None of the chiefs and potentates who had risen in India during
the 18th century, had a wish to lose what they had grabbed or usurped. The
selfishness and machinations of these rulers foiled the attempts of the Marathas
to run the empire on its Mughal basis. It looks as if it would have been far
better for the Maratha state to have run its own course without getting into
this entanglement with the Mughal Empire. But this is by the way. The
critics of the Marathas cannot charge them with not knowing the constitu-
tional ways or want of principles. They tried to follow the constitutional way,
they fought for a principle. They understood the responsibility devolving on
them by the acceptance of a treaty, which they did not treat as a scrap of
paper, to be torn when it did not suit them. They would not sign away the
rights of the Mughal Empire even when these had been usurped by such a
potentate as Ahmad Shah Abdali. Raghunathrao would not part with Kabul
and Kandahar² in 1758, Bhau would not accept the boundary of Sirhind in
1760. In these instances, the Marathas were fighting for regions and rights
already lost by the Mughal Empire. Can any one say with this history be-
fore him that the Marathas had no idea of a state, that they did not know the
constitutional ways, that they had no respect for treaties or had no regard for
principles? They certainly aspired to be the Regents of the Indian Empire and
¹ BISMQ 11 p. 44.
² Itihasa Sangraha— Ait. Sphuta Lekha, 1.11.

THE JUDGMENT 125
none can say that they were inferior to any in India of those days With all
their internal quarrels, no other state in India could muster so many troops for
war under a unitary command No other nation was less bigoted or more
tolerant in religious and social matters, as is proved by the r behaviour towards
their Muslim neighbours or their rule over Muslim subjects There is no in
stance of their having fabricated a document like Clive, none where they tried
to gain a point by assassination or intimidation They did not hire mercenaries
for slaughtering their opponent in an unguarded moment They would not
murder persons by calling them for an interview They would not kill foreign
emissaries at their Court. No other war like nation is known to be milder in
their peace time actions There are no instances where the Marathas entered
into the slaughter of civilians after a victory, or during conquest to have
created terror It is nowhere noted that they slaughtered disarmed prisoners,
like the Durranis after Panipat, or uselessly cut off the head of a fallen soldier
as in the case of Dattaji Shinde at Buradi They did not apply torture to ex
tract hidden wealth like the Afghans at Delhi in 1757 In fact, one feels many
a time that their comparative mildness, their humane behaviour their civil man
ners, their unwillingness to gain their ends by back door machinations or solve
their problems, internal or external, by swift unscrupulous actions such as mur-
dering an opponent, or doing away with their unwanted brethren like the
Mughals, has had the effect of their not succeeding in history Be that
as it may, none can charge them as being morally condemnable in comparison
with many other military nations in the world When a responsible historian of
India like Sir Jadunath SARKAR charges the Marathas with being 'lesser breeds
beyond the law,' ³ one does not know how to characterize such a statement and
what standard of conduct and morality he wants to apply He seems to belong
to that category of historians-cum moralists "who justify Providence by the
event and hold nothing so deserving as success To them there can be no vic-
tory in a bad cause, prescription and duration legitimate, and whatever exists
is right and reasonable, and God manifests His will by that wh ch He tolerates
Men must confirm to the divine decree by living to shape the future after the
ratified image of the past "⁴ These writers should learn to know that there
are many Marathas—perhaps the majority—who think it better to have lost
the Empire than to have followed a line of conduct after the manner of a
Clive or Najib or Abdali
GENERAL THOUGHTS ON WAR
Mankind since it began to think and take a retrospective view of human
affairs, has been sharply divided on the moral basis of war, and it will prob-
ably remain so divided for all time Indian civilisation, at least after the
Aryan imposition, has not only sanctioned war but has consecrated a particular
class for that work and given it the second rank in society This is in sharp
contrast with the neighbouring Chinese civilisation which had relegated the
soldier to the last place in society and only tolerated him as an unavoidable
³ Fall II.291
⁴ Lord Action, Lectures on Modern History (1907) (Inaugural Lecture) p 25 ,

126 PANIPAT 1761
evil Turks who conquered India and held their sway over it for half a mil
lennium were a moving nation in arms In addition, the Islamic teachings
which they followed had charged them with waging an incessant war upon the
infidels till they were converted to Islam When the Marathas rose upon the
horizon of history they had perforce to take to the military profession for solving
the Indian riddle It was a necessity imposed on them by the Epoch and they
had no choice of refusing it How mild and inoffensive the Marathas otherwise
are has been proved after the extinction of their sovereign power, for by the
end of the 19th century they were relegated to the rank of non martial races in
India in the Indo British political phraseology It means that the Marathas
as a race take to arms only when they are insulted or forced to as the Chinese
monk Yu an Chwang remarked long ago in his itinerary Spilling of blood
never became a pastime with them as with the Afghans On the whole, the
battles fought by the Marathas were the least bloody, the casualties on both
sides being as few as possible Their so called guerilla mode of warfare was
nothing more than seeking to gain their ends by manoeuvring and strategy more
than by actual crossing of swords face to face Having acted throughout their
career in this spirit, they naturally felt intensely such a disaster as Panipat on
account of the heavy massacres following it When estimating the effects of
Panipat on the Marathas, this fact should not be lost sight of
The best of political thinkers have allowed war as a human necessity
in solving uncompromising questions Some go so far as to call it a moral neces
sity Taking the historic view, certainly the recorded history of mankind is
mostly a history of wars waged by the various races of mankind between and
amongst themselves as Sir John FORTESCUE says, but all would not agree with
him in thinking the military force of a nation as a manifestation of its moral
force At the same time it is certain that in history the military force has stood
as the test of material civilisation if not of moral The best soldier has always
manifested the highest human virtues personally, but collectively it is difficult
to characterise war as a school for virtues If sometimes the best qualities of a
nation are called forth and mobilised by war, it is also true and much more
often true that the worst side of human nature is exhibited and given a licence
as a result of war Whether a state lapses into degeneracy as a result of long
peace is also a debatable point, because for counteracting such a possibility some-
one else has to suffer The cruelty and the futility of war for final settlement
of human world problems has become more and more manifest with the
progress of modern civilisation and coming together of mankind Be that as it
may, speaking about Panipat, it is very correct to say that the inferiority of
the Marathas, in the material sense, became very manifest But on the moral
side their record is very clean They had not fought for the three primary
(and also primitive) aims of war as given by HOBBES, viz (1) material gain,
(2) fear, or (3) glory It means they fought for a fourth cause unknown to
that political philosopher, viz principle, the sanctity of the contract they had
entered into with the Delhi Emperor for the guarding of his Empire On the
other hand Ahmad Shah Abdali individually was also fighting for a cause
he thought right, viz the cause of Islam in India He triumphed by his superior
power, won glory, freed himself from the fear of the Marathas once for all,

THE JUDGMENT 127

but did not gain anything, materially speaking, thus proving the futility of
war in the material sense to any party, long before Sir Norman ANGEL wrote
his Great Illusion. Incidentally it also proved the correctness of the Maratha
stand in the political sense. The Marathas lost the Panjab no doubt, but it was
gained not by Abdali a foreigner, but by the Sikhs in the long run. The
treacherous Najib-ud-daulah, the arch-villain of the piece, outwardly succeeded
in warding off the Marathas, but found himself thrown between two mill-
stones—the Sikhs from the north and the Jats from the south—never getting
a moment's rest till his death a decade later. The hated Marathas again ruled
in Delhi and uprooted Najib's family together with his buried bones in the
grave at Najibabad.
The trans-Ganges Ruhelas under Hafiz who had joined Abdali as
Afghans, also experienced the scourge of the Marathas after Najib's death.
Shuja-ud-daulah who had been enticed away into joining the side of Abdali
by cajoling and threatening, not only left the Afghan side just after Panipat,
but became the annihilator of the Ruhelas with the help of Warren Hastings,
thus historically proving that he had acted under "duress" the wrong party.
He himself had escaped falling under the suzerainty of the Marathas, only to
find himself obliged to fall a victim to the utterly foreign English. In fact,
the ultimate result of Panipat was to make the way smooth and clear for the
English, a result which could have been avoided only by a victory for the
Marathas. History thus vindicates the correctness of the Maratha stand and
exposes the basic hollowness of their critics. Further, it also proves the com-
plexity of the Afghan border problem, which has not been satisfactorily solved
by the British even after a rule of 150 years. The irony of history can have no
better illustration than Panipat.

a superior official, but thought him to be an ordinary munshi Kashiraj is
self-contradictory in his account of Bhau's behaviour On the one hand, he
condemns Bhau on his pride and obstinacy, on the other he depicts Bhau as
ready to submit to any conditions mediated through the agency of such persons
as Kashiraj himself Now to judge Bhau from his own letters, one thing is
certain about him and that is that he was never proud, though his tone was
often harsh and his manner peremptory Bhau should be the last person to
assume a cringing role before a man of Kashiraj's position or to be over confi-
dent about him
There seems to be some discrepancy in the account of Kashiraj, as is
acknowledged by Sir Jadunath Sarkar who has carefully studied the original
manuscript. He thinks it due to lapse of memory or loose narrative of events ⁶
We cannot treat it so lightly Kashiraj tells us of Bhau's writing his last chit
just before the battle of Panipat, a thing which no thoughtful person will be
ready to believe A commander in chief intimating in his autograph the last
desperate movement of his army, just before the commencement of the fatal
battle, is a thing which cannot be inserted or allowed in fiction or poetry, much
less can it be believed in a primary source of history Was Bhau such a fool
as to believe and hope that his last note would bear any good and immediate
results, after his experience in diplomacy for six months? Would he not rather
fear the fatal consequence of pre-intimating his movement to such a consummate
general as Ahmad Shah Abdali? It was a matter of astonishment to us when
we tried to study this point deeply and found none of the previous writers
even suspecting the full import of this, to us, a cock and bull story We call it
such because fortunately for the historian there is the clear evidence of a con-
temporary letter directly falsifying Kashiraj's narrative Sir Jadunath in his
new translation of Kashiraj's narrative has given the name of Bhau's valet who
took the last chit to Kashiraj as Balakram, who is styled as Bhau's betel-bearer,
and is taken as the most confidential servant of his master ⁷ Anybody with an
acquaintance with the Maratha names knows that Balakram is not a common
Maratha name On the other hand, a letter from the Purandare Archives pub-
lished by Rajwade in his sixth volume clearly gives the name of Bhau's valet
as Balaram, a common name amongst the Marathas ⁸ Anupgir Gosawi writes
in this post-Panipat letter to Nana Purandare that the Peshwa's valet, Balaram
Vaghoji Naik, and some others also had gone to Shuja-ud-daulah's camp on
some errand on the Sunday prior to the battle of Panipat, fought on Wednesday,
14th January, 1761 This proves that the chit Kashiraj is talking of as hav-
ing been dramatically sent three hours prior to the battle had been actually
sent (if at all) three days previous to it We suggest from this small but vital
point that Kashiraj had not only forgotten the days and their proper order, but
was narrating the whole story with a dramatic touch, as the battle of Panipat
is a good theme for such treatment.
6 Fall 2.369
7 Ibid 2 320
8 Rajwade 6 No 407, p 472.
P. F—9

A CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SOURCES
(PUBLISHED AND UNPUBLISHED)
1 Kashiraj •
Persian account of the battle of Panipat and the events leading to it
(Oxford University Press, 1926) Corrected by the translation of Sir JADUNATH
SARKAR, published in Indian Historical Quarterly, 1934 and 1935
Kashiraj Shivdev was a Deshastha Brahmin (native of the Nizam's
Dominions) at the court of Shuja ud daulah of Oudh, who was present through
out the campaign in the camp of his master His narrative is taken as the
best authority on the battle of Panipat He seems to have been working in
the north for some twenty five years before Panipat since the time of Safdar
Jang He had occasional correspondence with the Peshwas¹ for more than
twenty years His exact status at the court of Shuja-ud daulah is not quite
clear He is called a Vakil or a diplomat, but is scarcely sent anywhere as an
emissary with full powers In his account he is found assuming superior airs,
standing tightly on his dignity But there is no mention of him in the whole
range of Marathi political correspondence,² an omission which seems to us
rather significant His account was written nineteen years after the battle of
Panipat, and from memory It appears to have been purposely written for some
one inquisitive on the point, possibly a British official at the Oudh Court In
1780 when this account was written, the British power in India was already
combating with that of the Maratha power The glory of the Maratha power
was on the wane Kashiraj, though racially a Maratha, had culturally, by this
time, become by his long sojourn in northern India, almost a U P Kayasth
with all that it means When he wrote his account he was almost seventy, an
age when the mental faculties are on the decline He seems to have been, at
first, a disappointed candidate for service under the Peshwa,³ and later on moved
to the north in search of employment, which he secured on account of his profi-
ciency in the Persian language That there was no particular love lost between
him and the Maratha nation or their Empire is evident from the tone of his ac-
count. According to him, Sadashivrao Bhau was defeated on account of his
arrogance and pride⁴ Throughout his narrative, he seems to have been con-
vinced that fate had ordained the miscarriage of the Maratha enterprise⁵
On the other hand, whenever he had occasion to write about Ahmad Shah
Abdali, he is found completely over awed by his superior prowess and his divine
role of punishing the Marathas for their wicked pride, for in the eyes of
Kashiraj, pride is sin This much for the mental make up of the man
Bhau's munshi once wrote a letter to Kashiraj at which Kashiraj was
offended on account of some deficiency in the proper form of address due to
his station It means that the Maratha Court did not think Kashiraj to be
1 SPD 40.25 dated Feb 1741
2 KASHIRAJ 14
3 SPD 30.329
4 KASHIRAJ 52
5 Ibid. 8 IHQ 11.552, 10.266.
[128]

CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 129
a superior official, but thought him to be an ordinary munshi Kashiraj is
self contradictory in his account of Bhau's behaviour On the one hand, he
condemns Bhau on his pride and obstinacy, on the other he depicts Bhau as
ready to submit to any conditions mediated through the agency of such persons
as Kashiraj himself Now to judge Bhau from his own letters, one thing is
certain about him and that is that he was never proud, though his tone was
often harsh and his manner peremptory Bhau should be the last person to
assume a cringing role before a man of Kashiraj's position or to be over confi
dent about him
There seems to be some discrepancy in the account of Kashiraj, as is
acknowledged by Sir Jadunath SARKAR who has carefully studied the original
manuscript. He thinks it due to lapse of memory or loose narrative of events ⁶
We cannot treat it so lightly Kashiraj tells us of Bhau's writing his last chit
just before the battle of Panipat, a thing which no thoughtful person will be
ready to believe A commander in chief intimating in his autograph the last
desperate movement of his army, just before the commencement of the fatal
battle, is a thing which cannot be inserted or allowed in fiction or poetry, much
less can it be believed in a primary source of history Was Bhau such a fool
as to believe and hope that his last note would bear any good and immediate
results, after his experience in diplomacy for six months? Would he not rather
fear the fatal consequence of pre-intimating his movement to such a consummate
general as Ahmad Shah Abdali? It was a matter of astonishment to us when
we tried to study this point deeply and found none of the previous writers
even suspecting the full import of this, to us, a cock and bull story We call it
such because fortunately for the historian there is the clear evidence of a con-
temporary letter directly falsifying Kashiraj's narrative Sir Jadunath in his
new translation of Kashiraj's narrative has given the name of Bhau's valet who
took the last chit to Kashiraj as Balakram, who is styled as Bhau's betel bearer,
and is taken as the most confidential servant of his master ⁷ Anybody with an
acquaintance with the Maratha names knows that Balakram is not a common
Maratha name On the other hand, a letter from the Purandare Archives pub-
lished by RAJWADE in his sixth volume clearly gives the name of Bhau's valet
as Balaram, a common name amongst the Marathas ⁸ Anupgir Gosawi writes
in this post Panipat letter to Nana Purandare that the Peshwa's valet, Balaram
Vaghoji Naik, and some others also had gone to Shuja ud daulah's camp on
some errand on the Sunday prior to the battle of Panipat, fought on Wednesday,
14th January, 1761 This proves that the chit Kashiraj is talking of as hav
ing been dramatically sent three hours prior to the battle had been actually
sent (if at all) three days previous to it We suggest from this small but vital
point that Kashiraj had not only forgotten the days and their proper order, but
was narrating the whole story with a dramatic touch, as the battle of Panipat
is a good theme for such treatment.
6 Fall, 2.369
7 Ibid 2 320
8 RAJWADE 6 No 407, p 472
P. F-9

130 PANIPAT: 1761
Bhau Sahebanchi Bakhar,⁹ on the other hand, gives quite the opposite
story It tells us of Abdali's Vakil coming to Bhau just before the battle and
asking him to postpone the fight for the day in order to give a last chance fot
peace talks Bhau is reported to have unceremoniously driven him back, be-
ginning the fight at once thereafter Sir Jadunath, though he considers the
Marathi Bakhars "as later gossipy fabrications no better than opium-eaters'
tales,"¹⁰ has still to acknowledge that "there are some true traditions (as proved
by authentic records) and some statements .which have every appearance of
being true though unsupported elsewhere" We do not know whether Sir
Jadunath would like to believe in this Bakhar story, which, we think, as most
improbable and written to suit the whole tenor of the author, who was out to
condemn Bhau and make a scapegoat of him
Kashiraj was on the battle field that whole day, no doubt, but that fact
cannot make any person see the whole line of battle with his own eyes, much
less can it give him a correct idea of the order of the battle on the opposite
side Kashiraj, with all his sagacity, was a civil official and not a soldier who
could judge military matters correctly For the most part, he was standing
ready in his own camp throughout the day of the battle He himself confesses
that Shuja's side was the least affected part in the line of battle, because none
came to attack it The whole line of battle is taken by Sir Jadunath to cover
some seven miles So it was physically impossible for Kashiraj to see anything
but a small part of the actual battle, and that, too, from a distance His value
as an eye-witness must, therefore, be discounted to a great extent, and his
version of the battle must be taken as gathered after the event from the gen-
eral reports which came to his ears This work of collecting news from various
sources and afterwards collating and correlating it into the form of a running
narrative could be done by others also, and, therefore, we have no valid ground
to reject the version given in the Marathi Bakhars and letters only because we
are unaware of the status of the narrators We have shown in the detailed de-
scription of the battle the various points wherein Kashiraj is proved to be
wrong
2 Bhau Sahebanchi Bakhar (1922) and 3 Shrimant Bhau Saheb Yanchi
Kaifiyat (1887)
These two are the most important primary sources about the battle of
Panipat in Marathi Their authors are unknown but they were certainly much
nearer to the event than Kashiraj when they wrote, as can be proved from the
language, the tone and the textual criticism of their manuscripts Certain pas-
sages in the narration of the events in the Kaifiyat are found bodily incorporated
in the Bakhar¹¹ which is a bigger narrative of the event From this we can say
that the Kaifiyat, small and to the point, was the earlier narrative of the two,
of which the Bakhar was an amplified edition with enlarged paraphrase. The
Kaifiyat gives the life of Bhau from the point of his start for the Udgir cam-
paign of 1759-60 and closes with the retreat from Panipat. The Bakhar, on
the other hand, narrates the Maratha activities in the north from 1753 on-
9 Bhau Bakhar (1922) p 115
10 Fall 2.367
11 Cf Kaifiyat 21 and Bakhar 141, K 22, B 144, K. 23, B. 143.

CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 131
wards It is ostensibly written to glorify the achievements of the Shindes and
these have no direct connection with the battle of Panipat. The author is
evidently a biased person and on that account tries to supply and explain the
genesis, the events and the activities behind the scenes of actual narration with
all the personal bickerings of the actors in their full gusto The reports of
these bickerings and their actual wording may or may not be true in their full
import, but it is clear that they throw a necessary light on the seamy side of
history We shall have to discount much of this report due to the bias of
the author Another thing which has to be borne in mind is the fact that
these reports must have necessarily come from the persons who ran away from
the field of battle and as such were dubbed as renegades by the people at
large The odium of this obloquy and the guilty conscience of having failed
to be with their leaders in the thick of the fight, made the reports from these
survivors naturally colourful and excusatory Most of these persons had di
rect blame attached to their conduct and in sheer self-justification they gave
such a retrospective turn to their own and Bhaus conduct as to lead to the
disaster which would then appear inevitable If we compare the tone of the
letters¹² which some of these survivors sent previous to the battle with those
they wrote after it, we can understand the difference worked out in the minds
of these writers by the fatal disaster When the authors of the Kaifiyat and
the Bakhar wrote their accounts after a few years, the public in Maharashtra
had come to form some sort of plausible opinion about the great disaster, after
hearing, explaining, accounting and guessing about the various reports brought
from the distant field The boiled essence of all these is found written in the
Bakhar Sadashivrao Bhau was out to give a new turn to the ancient mode
of Maratha warfare which was taken to be of the guerilla type Bhau had
introduced the trained infantry tactics and tried to combine them with the
original mode The good result of this innovation had been reaped in the
Udgir campaign The Udgir victory had naturally increased the prestige of
Ibrahim Khan Gardi and his mode of warfare Throughout the Panipat cam-
paign, Bhau had put his main confidence in these infantry corps and they
also gave a very good account of themselves The idea of entrenching at
Panipat was a result of these tactics It made the Marathas unassailable so
long as they remained within their entrenchments Bhau expected Abdali to
attack them in this strong position, as he was sure of victory in the event of
such an attack But Abdali had understood it equally well He himself never
once tried to attack, and had strictly forbidden any one from his camp to go
out with a view to attacking He played a game of waiting and hoped to get
a victory when the Maratha army would come out due to starvation That is
why Bhau is found raging and almost railing against Govindpant Bundele for
not attacking Abdali from behind and making him compulsorily fall on the
Maratha entrenchments to his sure destruction When, due to the failure of
Govindpant and due to starvation, Bhau himself had to come out, that combi
nation of artillery, infantry and cavalry tactics which it was necessary to keep
12 RAJ Vol. 6 Cf Satvoji Jadhavrao's letters No 404 dated 18-9-1760 and No 409
dated 10-3-1761 also cf Nana Purandare's letters No 391 of 14-11-1760 in Purandare

• Daftar Pt. 1, and No 118 in Pt. III

132 PANIPAT 1761
with an army on the march with all their camp followers, could not be
kept up and the disaster inevitably followed The Maratha army was
mainly composed of veteran horsemen with a life long belief in the guerilla mode
of warfare It seems they neither understood nor had a mind to follow the cor-
rect orders of their commander based on the tactics advised by Ibrahim Khan
Gardi, and when the inevitable disaster followed, due to their misunderstand-
ing and faint heartedness in the fight, they laid the whole blame on the new
mode of "entrenched warfare" On this point the whole opinion in Maha-
rashtra seems to be unanimous and it is reflected in these chronicles
Notwithstanding these prepossessions, however, the Bakhar correctly
reports Bhau's plan of the battle which was unknown to Kashiraj Pandit on
the other side and which was not followed to the end Unaware of the plan
and the aim, Kashiraj reports the battle in an inexplicable way, while the
author of the Bakhar charges Bhau himself with breaking the plan decided on
the previous night and thus becoming the author of the disaster All the his-
torians up till now have been so much obsessed with the idea of the complete
reliability of Kashiraj s report that they have never stopped to inquire how
the account in the Bakhars is to be explained and why it should be disbe-
lieved and set aside The full import of the intended plan in the Bakhar can-
not be understood unless one studies the detailed maps of the battle-field in their
complete environment, and tries to construe a connected idea with the help of
every line reported in the Bakhar in combination with it The authors of the
chronicles seem to be well acquainted with the topography of the battle field and
its surroundings, and they might have been personally present in the Maratha
camp themselves The chronicles correctly report the changes in Abdali's camp-
ing ground during the two months and a half, while the impression created by
Kashiraj's account fixes Abdali's camp once for all, a very serious discrepancy
on the part of this eye witness ¹³ When one begins to re read the Bakhars in
the light of the original letters, one is impressed by the substantiality of their
account.
THE COMMON POINTS IN KASHIRAJ'S NARRATIVE AND THE BAKHAR
Comparison
That Kashiraj wrote his account after reading some other accounts is
proved by certain curious coincidences in the arrangement of his writing and
that of Bhau Bakhar, which was definitely a northern Indian production The
short Kaifiyat was definitely written earlier than the Bakhar But what seems
strange to the reader is that the correct consecutive narration of events is fol-
lowed by the writer of the Kaifiyat, and an absence of the sense of time char-
acterises the writer of the gossipy Bakhar Thus the Bakhar gives Govindpant
Bundele's death as the first event while it was actually the fourth during the
beleagurement Similarly, the cutting off of Parashar Dadaji's treasure carry-
ing party was the last event which is subsequently dealt with by the Bakhar
¹³ Bhau Kaifiyat pp. 14, 21

CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 133
The first event of the Shinde Ruhela fight is given next and Balvantrao Mehen-
dale's event the last¹ Kashiraj is found following the incorrect order of the
Bakhar in his narrative, giving the events of Govindpant, Parashar Dadaji,
Shinde and Balvantrao consecutively. We cannot treat this as a mere accident
in writing. Either Kashiraj had the Bakhar in his mind when writing his nar-
rative, or both the Bakhar and Kashiraj copied from a third unknown, com
mon source. This is further proved by Kashiraj's attempt at giving dates of
certain events which are proved to be utterly wrong by other direct evidence.
The Ka ffyat gives the correct dates wherever it has given these, while Kashiraj
is found to be wrong—even in his date of the great battle, reckoning by the
Muslim calendar. Sir Jadunath treats these points as 'lapses of memory or
hurried writing.' But no serious student of textual criticism can be satisfied
with this explanation. Kashiraj tries to foist authenticity on his hearsay nar-
rative by introducing dates into it, thereby impressing upon the reader the cor-
rectness thereof. We do not think he had kept a diary of the events. Had
there been no verifying proofs for the events he narrates, he would have passed
on as the writer on Panipat, eye witness as he was for the events from begin-
ning to end. Unfortunately for Kashiraj, a few Marathi papers have survived
the ravages of time, exposing him to the hilt. A man who treats the whole
episode as a sort of play of destiny, who charges Bhau with pride, who though
a Maharashtra Brahmin himself, cannot properly know Bhau's relationship
to Balvantrao Mehendale, a man who could not understand the constitutional
thread behind the Maratha politics in the north, a man who treats Surajmal's
episode without understanding the politics behind it, who introduces rumours to
heighten the romantic effect of his narrative, a man who omits important facts
which militate against the tenor of his narrative (e.g. Bhau's deposition of Shah
Jahan Sani and the proclamation of Shah Alam as Emperor), a man who
gives incorrect dates, a man who does not report Abdali's shifting of camps,
a man who is incorrect even in his narration of the actual battle in certain par-
ticulars, and finally a man who would not mention the important fact of
Abdali's appointment of the regicide Maratha protege Ghazi ud din as the
Wazir with full powers before his departure because it would mar the effect
of his whole narrative, shedding a powerful light as it does on the whole of the
Panipat episode from beginning to end,—to call such a man's narrative as the
most trustworthy authority on the Panipat campaign and to say that "no other
author can be set against him in point of authenticity," is something beyond
the range of historical research.
The main points on which the chronicles differ from Kashiraj's ac-
count are the following:
(1) Changes in the sites of Abdali's camp.
(2) Bhau's plan of battle.
(3) The directions of the rival armies on the battle field.
(1) The cause of the so-called Maratha right wing and the Durrani
left wing never coming to grips throughout the battle.

134 PANIPAT 1761
(5) The actual site of the battle
On all these points Kashiraj is proved to be wrong and loose in his
account by the evidence of original letters. Because Sir Jadunath and others
have placed their faith in Kashiraj, they have been completely misled in their
account of the battle. Kashiraj's account should be relied upon only in so far
as the Durrani side is concerned. The Maratha side cannot be understood un-
less we rely upon the evidence of the Marathi chronicles and original letters.
4-5. Purandare Daftar Vols. 1 and 3 (1929 and 1934). These form
a valuable primary source not only for the events after the battle of Panipat,
but also for the events prior to it, because they throw a rare flood of light on
the mental make-up and character of some of the chief characters in the Pani-
pat episode. What Sadashivrao Bhau was really like cannot be understood
without his early personal letters. The characters of Nanasaheb Peshwa, Nana
Purandare, Sakharam Bapu and Raghoba Dada are properly understood in
all their setting by a study of these volumes of intimate personal letters. Sir
Jadunath has missed this point and so cannot properly appraise their part in
the great drama of history.
6-7-8. RAJWADE V. K. Marathyanchya Itihasachin Sadhane Vols. 1,
3 and 6. They are the basic sources containing original letters direct from the
scene of the battle as well as throughout the campaign and for events leading to
it from the very beginning. When RAJWADE published his first volume in 1898
after accidentally getting possession of a number of original letters addressed
to Govindpant Bundele, it was the only, and therefore, partial side of the cam-
paign that was open to him. He should have corrected it when his own third
and sixth volumes were published later on. But RAJWADE, after his own man-
ner, left the scathing criticism of Govindpant in the first volume untouched
throughout his life, though he lived twenty-eight years thereafter. Whatever
excuse he had in his day for obstinately sticking to his own view based on one
source only, we in 1946 have none. After the publication of the Peshwa
Daftar in its forty-five volumes a decade ago, a flood of light has been thrown
on the Maratha activities in the north in all their bearings. It is clear from
evidence adduced in these volumes that Govindpant was not the only, if
culprit he was, who should be made the scapegoat for the whole disaster.
How historical perspective is blurred when only a part of the material is avail-
able and historians try to draw a complete picture out of it, is best exempli-
fied by RAJWADE's classical introduction to his first volume on the Panipat
period. We shall have occasion to point out how far RAJWADE had been car-
ried astray¹⁴ in his attempt. Psychological proof for it is available in that volume
itself though none of his deep students uptil now have either detected it or
have shown the candour to point it out openly.
9-10-11. Selections from The Peshwa Daftar Vols. 2, 21, 27. These
directly deal with the north Indian activities of the Marathas for a period of
almost two decades previous to the battle of Panipat, though cross-references.
¹⁴ RAJ. I. 1-5 and Note, 170. 183. 181. 181. 182. Note 325.

CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 135
will be found interspersed in many other volumes also For studying the char-
acters of the main actors in the Panipat drama it is necessary to study most
of the other volumes for the pre Panipat period, and sometimes even the later
volumes The characters of the individuals are the one sure and constant guide
from which we can correctly judge their activities in a proper perspective A
man's life is never compartmental, and it is unjust and unhistorical to judge
events in the lives of these individuals, from the bare data concerning particu
lar events and, therefore, from a partial angle What a man will do under
given circumstances mainly depends on his past, which is reflected in his char-
acter Historians are not the advocates of the historical characters but their
post mortem judges Unfortunately, very few historians correctly understand
their proper role and praise or blame the historical characters in detail We
have tried to study each single character separately, completely and in detail,
and then come to form certain notions about the proper manner of judging
their actions in this study, a procedure we think absolutely essential To at-
tain this end, we had to utilize all the available material in the var ous volumes
of original letters concerning these individuals
12-13-14 Shindeshahi Itihasach n Sadhane Part I (1929), Part II
(1930), and Part III (1937) These contain a few original letters from Panipat
itself Others throw a flood of light on the inner workings of Shinde affairs.
Specially valuable is the correspondence of the diplomats connected with the
Shinde family which is collected for publication in the third volume Ramaji
Anant Dabholkar who was the Diwan of the Shindes from 1750 to 1761, and
died after Panipat, was the chief director of Shinde affairs and his corre-
spondence is the most valuable of all Sir Jadunath has overlooked these
volumes and his description of the battle is deficient on that account.
15 16 17-18 Four Incomplete Manuscript Bakhars about Panipat
were examined by us but they contain no authentic or new material They are
gossipy in their contents and their burthen is all the same Malika Zamani is
given as the ch ef instigator in calling Ahmad Shah Abdali Bhau and Bal-
vantrao Mehendale are depicted as proud and bad Holkar and Shinde were
against the war, but Bhau was adamant and bent on honour Only three per
sons remained fighting to the last, v.z Bhau, Jankoji and Tukoji Shinde A
portion of these Bakhars, especially that containing Malika Zamani's part in it
is found incorporated in Bhausahebanchi Bakhar, the Bakhar published by
Parasnis in his Marathyanche Parakrama (Bundelkhand part) and similar
other attempts The theme was a favourite one with all Maratha clerks of the
Peshwa times and they copied the story from wherever they could
19 A few pages of Bhausahebanchi Ka fijat were supplied to us by
Mr K V PURANDARE These pages contain a few verbal changes but no new
information We note this fact here to show that even the Ka fijat, though it
was over shadowed by the more complete and the enlarged Bakhar, was still
copied by a few in Maharashtra Rao Bahadur SANE was able to get only one
copy of this Ka fijat and had to rely on that one alone He concluded there-
from, that the Kaifijat was a rare brochure But this does not seem to have
been the case

136 PANIPAT 1761
20 Raghunath Yadav's Panipat Bakhar Though ostensibly written
by a court clerk and that by order of a member of the Peshwa's family, this is
the most worthless of all the Panipat Bakhars
21 Aitihasik Lekha Samgraha Vol I (1897) by V V KHARE con
tains a few letters on the Panipat Campaign
22 23 Chandrachuda Daftar Vol I (1920), and Vol II (1934) also
contain a few letters dealing with the northern India affairs and bear evidence
to the Maratha advance and rule upto Attock on the Indus
24 25 Holkarachin Kaifiyat (published in the Kavyetihasa Samgraha
by K N SANE (1886), and Holkarachi Thaili (RAJ III, No 172 and
Itihasa Samgraha) These are both explanatory after-thoughts, to justify Mal
harrao Holkar's conduct in the Panipat affair That he ran away at the
previous behest of Bhau in order to escort Parvatibai, the wife of Bhau, is now
proved to be false, on the authority of contemporary letters How an imaginary
turn can be given to historic events is proved by these attempts
26 Aitihasik Patren, Yadi Vagaire Lekha (2nd Ed 1929) This
contains the autobiography of Nana Phadnis which we take to be written some-
time soon after the event when the author was extremely grieved and repentant
and almost on the point of forsaking the world to lead the life of a recluse, and
not after thirty years as assumed by Sir Jadunath There is nothing incorrect
in it when compared with the original letters Other letters in this volume are
also important for the northern Indian affairs of the Marathas
27 Aitihasik Patravyavahara (1930) This volume also contains
valuable correspondence, amongst them being an important letter by Nana
Phadnis from the Panipat camp Sir Jadunath has wrongly understood it, as
his translation of a line in it gives exactly the reverse meaning
28 Persian Akhbars (news letters) in manuscript form existing in the
archives of the Bharat Itihasa Samshodhak Mandal contain valuable material
not found elsewhere about the Panjab campaign of the Marathas, ending in
the far famed carrying of the Maratha banners beyond the Attock to Peshawar
29 Bhau's Ballad (published in BDCRI 4 3) in the Jathi dialect of
Hindusthani copied for us after the dictation of a Muslim ballad singer of Siwa,
five miles to the south of Panipat, contains a more complete version of the
ballad than that published in the Sardesai Commemoration Volume by Dr
KANUNGO and also one given in pieces in the Marathi publication 'Bhaunchya
Virakatha' Our copy which contains both prose and poetry, gives valuable
information in deciding the field of battle, the environment and the actual point
on the river Jamuna where Abdali crossed
30 ELLIOT and DOWSON, History of India (1877), Vol VIII, con
tains selected translations of
(1) Tarikh i Alamgir-Sani, (E & D CII)
(ii) Manazil ul Futuh, by Md Ja'far Shamlu (E & D CIII)