वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

FIRST CHAPTER (Adhyāya)
SECOND QUARTER (Pāda)
Adhikarana 1: The section entitled ‘Celebrity
everywhere’. (Sūtras 1-8)
SŪTRA 1
“(THAT WHICH CONSISTS OF MIND IS BRAHMAN), BECAUSE OF THE
TEACHING OF WHAT IS CELEBRATED EVERYWHERE.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
Beginning ‘All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from him
disappearing into him and breathing in him,—tranquil, let one medi-
tate on him thus’ (Chānd. 3.14.1 ¹), Scripture continues: ‘Consisting
of mind, having the vital breath for his body’ (Chānd 3.14.2 ²).
Here, the object which is to be meditated on as consisting of mind is
to be understood as the Highest self, the cause of all, and not as the
individual soul. Why? Because the highest self alone, celebrated
in all the Vedāntas, is taught in the above passages, viz. ‘All this,
verily, is Brahman’ (Chānd. 3.14.1)
Vedānta-kaustubha
Thus, in the first section, the concordance of the scriptural texts
with regard to the holy Lord Vāsudeva has been shown,—He who is
the object of enquiry, the greatest Being, the cause of the origin and
‘the rest of the world, having Scripture for His sole proof, omniscient,
without an equal or a superior and the one mass of infinite auspicious
qualities. Now, in the following two sections, the reverend teacher
of the Veda is showing that those texts,—some of which indistinctly
indicate the individual soul and the rest, and some of which distinctly
do so,—all refer to Him alone.
The Chāndogas record the following ‘All this, verily, is Brahman,
emanating from him, disappearing into him, and breathing in him,—
tranquil, let one meditate (on him) thus. Now, a person consists of
¹ Ś, R, Bh, B.      ² Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

[SŪ. 1. 2. 1.
92 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 1.]
determination. According to what his determination is in this world,
so does he become on departing hence Let him form a determination.
He who consists of mind, has the vital-breath for his body, is of the
form of light' (Chānd. 3 14.1-2 ¹) and so on. Here, a doubt arises,
viz. whether the individual soul ² should be understood as the object
to be meditated on, possessed of the attributes of consisting of mind
and the rest, or the Highest self. What is reasonable here ?
(Prima facie view.)
If it be suggested: The individual soul. Why? Because the
individual soul is well-known to have the mind and the vital-breath as
its instruments, because Scripture declares that Lord Brahman, the
Supreme Being, has no connection with mind and the vital-breath, in
the passage 'Without the vital-breath, without mind, pure' (Muṇḍ.
2.1.2); and, finally, because having the heart for its abode as well as
being atomic, stated in the passage 'This is the soul ³ within the
heart, smaller than a grain of rice, or a barley-corn' (Chānd 3.14.3),
are possible in the case of the limited individual soul alone. If it be
objected: of the six proofs, viz scriptural statement, mark, text,
topic, place and name, each succeeding one is weaker than the preceding
one. Of these, scriptural statement means an independent statement,
and mark means the power of words (to indicate some meaning).
Now, here, the scriptural statement, viz.: 'All this, verily, is Brahman'
(Chānd. 3.14.1), is of a greater force than the mark of the individual
soul, viz consisting of mind and the rest, it being mentioned first,
(the rule being that of these six, each preceding one is of a greater
force than each succeeding one). Hence, Brahman alone, mentioned
above, is to be construed here as the object to be meditated on,―(we
reply:) no, because as that text fulfils its purpose simply by teaching,
as a means to the attainment of tranquillity, that everything has
Brahman for its soul, thus. 'Tranquil, let one meditate', so it is not
concerned with laying down any injunction regarding the meditation
on Brahman (here ends the original Prima facie view) . . .

¹ This passage occurs also in Śat. Br. 10.6.3. It forms a part of the famous
Śāṇḍilya-vidyā, or the Doctrine of Śāṇḍilya. For a further account see footnote
(5), p. 1078 f.
² 'Kṣetrajña, means 'Knower of the field', or the body, i.e. the soul, the
conscious principle in the corporeal frame.
³ Correct quotation. 'Eṣa ma ātmā . . .' Vide Chānd. 3 14.3, p. 158.

[sū. 1. 2. 1.
ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 93
(Correct conclusion)
We reply—The highest soul alone, possessed of the attributes
of consisting of mind and the rest, is the object to be meditated on.
Why? "Because" the cause of the origin and the rest of the world,
"celebrated everywhere", i.e. in all the Vedāntas, "is taught" as the
cause of all, as the soul of all, here in the text: 'All this, verily, is
Brahman' (Chānd. 3.14.1). Or, else, "because" the attributes of
'consisting of mind' and the rest, "celebrated" in all the Vedāntas as
belonging to the Supreme Brahman, thus: 'Consisting of mind, leader
of the vital-breath and the body' (Muṇḍ. 2.2.7), 'This ether that is
within the heart,—therein is the person, consisting of mind' (Tait. 1.6),
and so on, "are taught". Of these, 'consisting of mind' means
'capable of being apprehended by a purified mind'; 'having
the vital-breath for the body' means 'being the support and the ruler
of even the vital-breath', 'without the vital-breath' means 'abiding in-
dependently of the vital-breath'; and 'without mind' means 'having
knowledge not dependent on the mind'.
Or, else, the text: 'All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from
him, disappearing into him, and breathing in him;—tranquil, let one
meditate (on him) thus' (Chānd. 3.14.1) enjoins meditation, thus:
'Let one meditate on Brahman, the soul of all, in a tranquil spirit'.
The text: 'Let him form a determination' (Chānd. 3.14.1) is a repeti-
tion (of the same injunction), with a view to proving that the attributes
of 'consisting of mind' and the rest belong to the very same Being,
mentioned above, (viz. Brahman). Let one meditate on Brahman, the
soul of all and possessed of the attributes of consisting of mind and the
rest,—this is the sense of the text. Here, a doubt arises, viz. whether
Brahman, indicated as the soul of all, is the individual soul, or the
Highest self. What is reasonable here? If it be suggested: The
individual soul. Why? Because, it alone can possibly assume the
forms of all kinds of beings, Brahmā and so on, due to karmas, based
on beginningless nescience; while it is never possible for the Supreme
Brahman to assume identity with all sorts of low or vile forms, since
He is endowed with (the attributes of) omniscience, omnipotence,
freedom from sins, freed on by nature from all faults and so on. The
word 'Brahman' too, applies to the individual soul alone, it being
endowed with great qualities (like knowledge and the like). And
the origin and the rest of the world being due to karmas, it is reasonable
to indicate the individual soul as their cause,—

[SŪ. 1. 2. 1.
94 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH 1.]
We reply "Because of the teaching of what is celebrated every-
where", i e. the meaning of the word 'Brahman,' who is designated as
the soul of all and as the cause of the origin and the rest of all, is the
Highest Self alone. For this very reason, "everywhere", i e in the
Vedāntas, he is "taught" to be "celebrated" as the cause of the origin
and the rest of the world—because of this, and also because it is
impossible that the origin and the rest of the world can be due to the
individual soul, since in the passages—"He desired. 'May I be many,
may I procreate' . . He created all this" (Tait. 2.6) and
so on, the Supreme Lord alone is celebrated to be the cause of the
world This is stated in the 'Law of salvation' ¹. Beginning.
"'Whence has arisen this entire world, consisting of the immovable
and the movable, and to whom does it go during universal dissolution ?
Tell me that, O grandfather! By whom has this world, together
with the oceans, the sky, mountains, cloud, lands, fire and air,
been made?'" (Mahā. 12.6765-66 ²), having stated 'The scripture
which was related by Bhṛgu to Bhāradvāja, who asked' (Mahā 12
6769C ³); having stated the origin of all beings thus 'Of him who
is called Nārāyaṇa, who is unchangeable, the imperishable soul, who
is unmanifest, unknowable, higher than prakṛti;' ⁴ and having
stated: 'Then, a lustrous, celestial lotus was created by the self-born.
From that lotus arose Brahmā, the Lord, consisting of the Veda'
(Mahā. 12 6779 C–89A ⁵),—the text designates Lord Kṛṣṇa, Nārāyaṇa,
Brahman, as the cause of all sentient beings and non-sentient objects,
thus: 'For he is difficult to be known, undoubtedly inconceivable in
nature even by the perfected souls. He, verily, is Lord Viṣṇu, cele-
brated to be infinite, abiding as the inter controller of all beings,
difficult to be known by those who have not obtained the self,—who
is the creator of this principle of egoism for the production of
all beings, from whom arose the universe, about whom I have been
asked by you here' (Mahā. 12.6784–86A ⁶). Hence, the Highest Self
¹ Mokṣa-dharma is the name of a section of the 12th book of the Mahā-
bhārata, from Adhyāya 174 to the end.
² P. 604, lines 3-4, vol. 3. ³ Op cit., line 7
⁴ This is not traceable in any of the three editions, Asiatic Society, Vanga-
vāsī and Bombay.
⁵ P. 604, lines 17-18 (vol. 3). This verse is not found in the Bombay
edition.
⁶ P. 604, lines 22–24.

[sū. 1. 2. 2.
ADH. 1 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 95
alone is denoted by the word ‘Brahman’ here, and not the individual
soul.¹
COMPARISON
Rāmānuja
Reading same. He gives two alternative interpretations, which
tally with the last two explanations of Śrīnivāsa.²
SŪTRA 2
“AND BECAUSE OF THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE ATTRIBUTES
INTENDED TO BE STATED.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
And because the attributes, viz. ‘consisting of mind,’ ‘having
true resolves’ and the rest, “intended to be stated” in the text:
‘Consisting of mind, having the vital-breath for the body, of the
form of light, having true resolves’ (Chānd. 3 14 2 ³) and so on, are
‘appropriate’ on the part of Brahman alone
Vedānta-kaustubha
As the attributes of ‘having true resolves’ and the rest, ‘intended
to be stated’ as the peculiar attributes of Brahman in the passage
‘Consisting of mind, having the breath for the body, of the form of
light, having true resolves, having the ether as the soul, having all
desires, having all odours,⁴ . . . having all tastes, pervading all
this, unspeaking, indifferent’ (Chānd. 3.14.2) and so on, are “appro-
priate” on the part of Brahman alone,—so Brahman alone is under-
stood in the above text. The adjective ‘pervading all this’ means
that He has accepted ‘all this’—i.e. the sentient and the non-sentient
objects, ending with ‘taste’,—as His own; ‘unspeaking’ means that
He abides in silence because of His unsurpassed graveness; ‘indifferent’
means that ‘He has no concern’.
¹ Śrīnivāsa gives altogether three explanations of this Sūtra, the first of
which tallies with the explanation of Nimbārka.
² Śrī. B. 1 2.1. Pp. 231 et seq. Part 1.
³ R. B.
⁴ The original text reads ‘sarva-karma’ after this.

96 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 1. 2, 3.
ADH. 1.]
SŪTRA 3
"BUT ON ACCOUNT OF INAPPROPRIATENESS, NOT THE EMBODIED
(SOUL)."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
He who is possessed of the attributes of consisting of mind and
the rest is the Supreme Being alone, and not the individual soul,
because (the attributes like) 'consisting of mind', 'having true re-
solves' and so on, are "inappropriate" on its part.
Vedānta-kaustubha
Brahman alone is to be understood as consisting of mind, for
the purpose of meditation, and not "the embodied", i.e. the indivi-
dual soul, possessing a body. Why? Because the attributes of
'having true resolves' and the like are "inappropriate" on the part
of the individual soul. Moreover, the attributes of 'consisting of
mind' and the rest too, are inappropriate on the part of the indivi-
dual soul. Thus, the text says: 'Let him form a determination'
(Chānd. 3.14.1) Of what kind is he? 'Consisting of mind', again,
'having the vital-breath for his body'. These adjectives are not
appropriate on the part of the individual soul, because no such
implication is involved here, nor any purpose. But all these are
appropriate on the part of the Highest self. Thus, when it is said:
Let the worshipper, whether he desires for salvation, or for any
particular fruit, 'form a determination', i.e. perform meditation or
action, in a 'calm' spirit, the question arises: In reference to whom
is he to perform meditation or action? and in reply, the Highest
Person, the soul of all, and indicated above in the passage: 'All
this, verily, is Brahman' (Chānd. 3 14.1), is pointed out as the
object to be meditated on. And, this text: 'Consisting of mind,
having the vital-breath for the body' (Chānd. 3.14.2) and so on
refers to Brahman. Hence the attributes of 'consisting of mind'
and the rest are not appropriate on the part of the individual soul.
COMPARISON
Śrīkaṇṭha
Reading same, interpretation different. According to Śrīkaṇṭha,
a new adhikaraṇa begins with this sūtra (sūtras 3–8), concerned with

[sū. 1. 2. 4.
ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 97
the question whether a passage in the Mahā-nārāyaṇa-upaniṣad
(Mahānār. 11 3) refers to Nārāyaṇa or to Śiva Thus —‘(The
passage refers to Śiva, and not (to) the embodied (i e Nārāyaṇa),
because (the attributes of being the Lord of the universe and the
rest) are not appropriate (on the part of Nārāyaṇa)’.¹
SŪTRA 4
“AND BECAUSE OF THE DESIGNATION OF OBJECT AND AGENT.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
For this reason too, the object qualified by the adjectives ‘con-
sisting of mind’ and the rest is not the embodied soul, “because of the
designation of object and agent” in the text: ‘On departing hence,
I shall reach him’ (Chānd. 3 14.4 ²).
Vedānta-kaustubha
For this reason, too, that which consists of mind and has breath
for its body is not to be understood as the embodied soul. Why?
“Because of the designation” of the embodied soul as the “agent”,
i.e. as the worshipper, and “because of the designation” of the Highest
Self as the ‘object’, i e as the object to be meditated on and obtained,
in the passage: ‘On departing hence, I shall reach him’ (Chānd.
3.14.4). That is, ‘I’, or one desiring for salvation, ‘shall reach’, i.e.
shall obtain, ‘him’, i.e. Brahman, mentioned before as possessed of the
attributes of ‘consisting of mind’ and the rest, ‘hence’, i.e after the
fall of the body, after the destruction of the works which have begun
to bear fruits A worshipper who is endowed with such a right
insight attains Brahman.
COMPARISON
Śrīkaṇṭha
Reading same, interpretation different, viz.: ‘(The supreme soul,
viz. Śiva, the object to be meditated on, is other than Nārāyaṇa),
because of the designation of the object and the agent, (i.e. because
¹ ŚK. B. 1.1.3, pp. 318 et seq, Part 4.
² Ś, R, Bh, B.
7

[SŪ. 1. 2. 5.
98 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 1.]
Śiva is designated to be the object to be worshipped, Nārāyaṇa, the
worshipper).¹
SŪTRA 5
"ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFERENCE OF WORDS."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
That which possesses the attributes of 'consisting of mind' and
the like is the Highest Self, different from the embodied soul, because
in the text: 'This soul of mine within the heart' (Chānd. 3.14.3, 4²)
the individual soul and the Highest Self are denoted by different
words, viz the genitive and the nominative respectively.
Vedānta-kaustubha
For this reason, too, that which possesses the attributes of con-
sisting of mind and so on, is the highest self, different from the embodied
soul. Why? "On account of the difference of words", i e. because
of another scriptural passage of kindred subject-matter, viz. 'Like a
grain of rice, or a barley-corn, or a grain of millet, or the kernel of a
grain of millet, such is the Golden Person within the self' (Śat. Br.
10.6.3 2), there is "difference of words", viz. the locative 'within the
self' denotes the embodied self, while the nominative 'the Golden
Person' denotes the Highest self.³
COMPARISON
Śrīkaṇṭha
Reading same, interpretation different, viz. ('Brahman, viz.
Śiva, is other than and superior to Nārāyaṇa) on account of a particular
word (or scriptural passage) (to that effect)'.⁴
1 ŚK. B. 1.2.4, pp. 322–324, Part 4.
2 R, B.
3 Note that Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa refer to two different passages here.
4 ŚK. B. 1.2.5. (Pp. 324-25, Part 4.)

[SŪ. 1. 2 6.
ADH. 1 ] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 99
SŪTRA 6
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF SMṚTI"
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
"And on account of the Smṛti" text:—'The Lord abides, O
Arjuna! in the heart-region of all beings' (Gītā 18.61 ¹), there is a
difference between the individual soul and the Supreme Soul.
Vedānta-kaustubha
'"He who sees me everywhere, and sees everything in me, of him
I will never lose hold, and he shall never lose hold of me"' (Gītā 6 30),
'"He who, established in unity, worships me as abiding within all
beings, that ascetic abides in me, under whatever circumstances he
may live"' (Gītā 6.31), '"There is nothing higher than me, O Dha-
nañjaya! All this is strung on me, like gems on a string"' (Gītā
7.7), '"And I abide within the heart of all, and from me memory,
knowledge and their absence"' (Gītā 15.15), '"The Lord abides, O
Arjuna! in the heart-region of all, causing all beings to revolve by
His mysterious power, as if mounted on a machine"' (Gītā 18.61),
'"Because I excel the perishable and am superior even to the imperish-
able, I am celebrated in the world, and in the Veda as the Highest
Person"' (Gītā 15.18) The following scriptural texts too are referred
to by the term "and" (in the sūtra). ² 'The two unborn ones, the
knower and the non-knower, the Lord and the non-Lord' (Śvet. 1.9),
'The Lord of matter and souls, the ruler of the attributes' (Śvet. 6.16),
'The eternal among the eternal, the conscious among the conscious'
(Śvet. 6.13; Kaṭha 5 13) and so on. From such Smṛti and scrip-
tural texts, it is to be known that there is a difference between the
individual soul and Brahman. Thus, in this section, the difference
between the individual soul and the Supreme Soul is indicated by the
reverend author of the aphorisms in four aphorisms; ³ and this view
is most reasonable, since it is established by both Smṛti and Scripture.
The Highest Self is ever-free, omniscient, independent, all-pervading
¹ Ś, R, Bh, B.
² Note the different interpretations of the word 'Ca' in the sūtra, as given
by Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa. According to the former, it simply means 'also',
while according to the latter, 'on account of scriptural texts'.
³ Viz Br. Sū 1.2 3–6.

[SŪ. 1. 2. 7.
100 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 1.]
without an equal or a superior, the soul of all and the controller of all.
The individual soul, on the other hand, though of the nature of eternal
knowledge, has, as is well-known, its attribute of knowledge enveloped
by the beginningless māyā, is subject to bondage and release, possessed
of little knowledge, a part of Brahman, but through its aversion to
the Lord, revolves through many births owing to the works done
by itself. Non-difference also, established by the scriptural texts
like 'He is the self, thou art that' (Chānd. 6.9.4, 6.10.3, etc.),
'All this, verily, is Brahman' (Chānd. 3.14.1), 'This soul is Brahman'
(Bṛh. 4.4.5) and so on, is most reasonable. Thus, the reverend author
of the aphorisms will speak about the nature of difference and non-
difference, as held by himself, under the aphorism: 'A part, on
account of the designation of variety' (Br. Sū. 2.3.42) and so on.
We shall speak of it in detail in the same place.¹
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara
Reading and interpretation same. But in conclusion, he adds
his own view, viz. that this difference between the individual soul
and Brahman is not real, but due to limiting adjuncts only.²
Śrīkaṇṭha
Reading same, interpretation different, viz. 'On account of
Smṛti' (viz. Gītā 11.9) Nārāyaṇa is the worshipper—i.e. different
from Śiva.³
SŪTRA 7
"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF ITS OCCUPYING A
SMALL ABODE, AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF THAT,
(BRAHMAN IS) NOT (THE OBJECT OF MEDITATION), (WE REPLY:)
NO, BECAUSE (BRAHMAN) IS TO BE CONCEIVED THUS, AS IN THE
CASE OF THE ETHER."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be objected that on account of its having a small abode, as
mentioned in the text: 'This soul of mine within the heart' (Chānd.
¹ Vide V.K. 2.3.42. ² Ś.B. 1.2.7, p. 265.
³ ŚK. B. 1.2.7, pp. 325-26, Part 4.

[sū. 1. 2. 7.
ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 101
3.14 3), also on account of the designation of its smallness in the text :
‘Smaller than a grain of rice, or’ (Chānd. 3.14 3; Śat. Br. 10 6.3 2¹),
(the object of meditation) here is not Brahman,—
(We reply ) “Not so”, because Brahman is to be meditated on
in that way. Minuteness on the part of a great thing, however, fits
in, as in the case of a window and the ether.
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be objected.—Brahman cannot be understood here as the
object of meditation. Why? “On account of its occupying a small
abode and on account of the designation of that ” That is, that which
has a small abode, i e. place, viz. the individual soul which is like
the tip of the spoke of a wheel, is ‘arbhakaukas’, the state of that is
‘arbhakaukastvam’, on account of that,²—the resulting meaning
being: ‘on account of the characteristic mark of the individual soul’.
That is to say, occupying a limited place, viz. the heart, is the attribute
of the individual soul only, and not the attribute of Brahman. More-
over, “on account of the designation” of smallness by that very term
(viz ‘small’), in the passage ‘Smaller than a grain of rice, or a
barley-corn’ (Chānd. 3.14 3; Śat. Br. 10 6 3.2), the individual soul
alone is to be understood here, and not Brahman,—
(We reply ) “No.” Why? It is “because (Brahman) is to
be conceived thus”,—i e. “Because (Brahman) is to be conceived”,
or to be meditated on, “thus”, i.e. as abiding within the heart, small
in size,—that the Highest Self is designated in that way. And,
hereby His omnipresence is not contradicted. For, He is designated
to be minute with the object of designating a particular kind of medita-
tion on Him as very subtle. Nor, again, does He become small in
size (i.e small like the heart) hereby, since the text: ‘Greater than
the earth, greater than the sky’ (Chānd. 3 14.3) speaks of the great-
ness of the Lord. An analogous case is the following Just as the
ether, though all-pervasive, is spoken of as occupying a small place
and as small in reference to the eye of a needle, so is Brahman, the
topic of discussion,—this is the sense.
¹ P. 806, line 18.
² This explains the compound ‘arbhakaukastvāt’.

102 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 1. 2. 8.
ADH. 1.]
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara
Reading and interpretation same. He points out that just as
the Lord of the entire universe may be appropriately said to be the
Lord of Ayodhyā, so the Supreme Soul, abiding everywhere, may very
well be denoted as abiding within the heart ¹
Rāmānuja
Reading same, interpretation of the word ‘vyomavac ca’
different, viz —‘(The Lord is described to be) like the ether as well
(i e all-pervading as well, in that very passage, viz. Chānd. 3 14 3 ²).’
Hence the Lord is not really minute by nature, but is simply designated
to be so for the purpose of meditation
Śrīkaṇṭha
Reading and literal interpretation same, though this topic is
different, as noted above ³
Baladeva
Reading same, interpretation of the word ‘vyomavac cā’ different,
viz. ‘(The Lord though atomic as abiding within the heart of men,
is yet all-pervading) like the ether (as declared by the same passage,
viz. Chānd. 3.14 3 ⁴)’. And this is possible because the Lord is
possessed of inconceivable powers.
SŪTRA 8
“ IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (IF BRAHMAN WERE TO DWELL WITHIN
THE HEART, THEN) THERE FOLLOWS EXPERIENCE (OF PLEASURES
AND PAINS), (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF DIFFERENCE.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
If it be objected that owing to His connection with all hearts,
“there will follow experience ” of pleasure and pain on the part of
¹ Ś.B. 1.2.7, p. 266. ² Śrī. B. 1.2.7, p 237, vol 1
³ ŚK. B. 1 2.7 p. 327, Part 1
⁴ G.B 1 2.7, p. 114, Chap. 1. Note the difference from Rāmānuja.

[sū. 1. 2. 8.
ADH. 1 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 103
Brahman, as on the part of the individual soul,—(we reply.) no such
objection can be raised, because there is an absolute difference between
the individual soul and Brahman, as the soul is an enjoyer of the
fruits of the works done by itself, while Brahman is ever-free from
sins.
Vedānta-kaustubha
If it be objected. Owing to its connection with a single heart,
there results experience of pleasures and pains on the part of the
individual soul. Owing to His connection with all hearts simul-
taneously, there certainly results experience of all pleasures and
pains everywhere on the part of the all-pervading Highest Self. If this
be so, then the Highest Self, as the enjoyer of pleasures and pains,
will inevitably become subject to all sorts of faults, as the individual
soul itself is. Hence even the Supreme Being will be subject to
karmas,—
(We reply:) “No.” “On account of difference (vaiśeṣyāt)” The
word “vaiśeṣyāt” is formed by adding the suffix ‘ṣyañ’ to the
word ‘viśeṣa’ in an identical sense, (viz difference) or to indicate
excessive difference. That the individual soul is an enjoyer of the
fruits of works performed by itself and the Supreme Soul is just the
opposite is established in Scripture, in accordance with the Smṛti-
passage: ‘Of these, He who is the Supreme Self is said to be eternal
and free from the properties of matter. . . . ¹ He is not
affected even by the fruit, as a lotus-leaf is not touched by water.
The active self, on the other hand, is another, who is liable to release
and bondage’ (Mahā. 12.13754-13755 ²), and the declaration of
the Lord Himself. ‘Works do not affect me, I have no desire for
fruits of works’ (Gītā 4.14). Thus, on account of an absolute
difference between these two, it follows that the individual soul
alone experiences pleasures and pains, and not the Supreme Soul.
Hence it is established that that which consists of mind and has the
breath for its body, is none but the Highest Self.
Here ends the section entitled ‘Celebrity everywhere’ (1).
¹ One line omitted, viz. ‘Sa hi Nārāyaṇa jñeyaḥ sarvātmā puruṣo hi saḥ’
² P 852, lines 9-10, vol 3.

[sū. 1. 2. 8
104 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 1 ]
COMPARISON
Śaṃkara
Reading and literal interpretation same. Here, too, he is forced
to add his usual explanation that the difference between the individual
soul and Brahman is not real, but only phenomenal.¹
Rāmānuja
Interpretation of the word ‘vaiśeṣyāt’ different. According to
Nimbārka, ‘vaiśeṣyāt’ means ‘on account of the difference of nature
between the individual soul and Brahman’; while according to
Rāmānuja, it means ‘on account of the difference of the cause of
enjoyment’²; i. e. it is not abiding within the body which is the
cause of undergoing pleasure and pain, but being subject to karmas,
which is never possible in the case of the Lord.³
Bhāskara
Reading and interpretation same. The example cited is appro-
priate—Simply because the Lord abides within the heart, it does not
follow that He shares its experiences, for there is no rule that co-
existence and the consequent inter-relation imply the sharing of the
same attributes. The ether, e. g. though in connection with a burning
place, does not burn itself.⁴
Śrīkaṇṭha
Reading and literal interpretation same, though the topic is
different, as noted above.⁵
—————————————————————————————————————————
¹ Ś.B 1.2.8, p. 268
² ‘Hetu-vaiśeṣyāt.’
³ Śrī. B 1.2.8, p. 238, vol 1.
⁴ Bh. B 1 2.8, p. 40.
⁵ ŚK. B. 1 2.8, pp. 327 et seq., Part 4

[SŪ. 1. 2. 9.
ADH. 2.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 105
Adhikarana 2 The section entitled 'The eater'
(Sūtras 9-10)
SŪTRA 9
"THE EATER (IS BRAHMAN), ON ACCOUNT OF THE COMPREHENSION
(OR TAKING, I.E. DEVOURING) OF THE MOVABLE AND THE IM-
MOVABLE."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
In the text: 'He to whom both the Brāhmaṇa and the Kṣatriya
are the food and death the condiment, who thus knows where He is?'
(Kaṭha 2.25 ¹), the eater is the Lord, the Highest Person, "on account
of the comprehension (or taking, i.e. devouring)" ² of the food which
has death for its condiment, i.e of the Universe, consisting of the
movable and the immovable, implied by the terms 'Brāhmaṇa' and
'Kṣatriya'
Vedānta-kaustubha
In the preceding section, after having shown that the text:
'All this, verily, is Brahman' (Chānd. 3 14.1) and so on refers to
Brahman, the author has shown also the absence of any experience
of pleasure and pain due to karma on the part of Brahman. Now,
by showing that the text: 'He, of whom the Brāhmaṇa' (Kaṭha
2 25) and so on refers to Him, he removes the suspicion, that, as
before, He cannot be an eater of the movable and the immovable ³
In the Kaṭha-vallī it is recorded 'He, to whom both the Brāh-
maṇa and the Kṣatriya are the food and death the condiment, who
thus knows where He is?' (Kaṭha 2 25). Here by the word 'food'
edible objects are understood, and by the words 'of whom', indicating
connection, an eater is understood. A doubt arises, viz. whether the
eater here is fire, or the individual soul, or the Supreme Soul, since
here all the three have been referred to before. What is reasonable
¹ ŚK. B 1 2.8, pp 327 et seq., Part 4
² It is not clear what Nimbārka means exactly by the term 'grahaṇa'
here. It may mean appropriately both 'understanding' and 'taking or devour-
ing'. Thus, Brahman is the eater, because the movable and the immovable are
understood as the food here; or because, the movable and the immovable are
devoured as the food here.
The same remarks apply to Śrīnivāsa's interpretation.
³ I.e it may be thought that since Brahman is not an enjoyer, as shown
above, He cannot be an eater too

[SŪ. 1. 2 10.
106 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 2.]
here? If it be suggested: First, let fire be the eater here, because it
is well-known to have the power of burning the Brāhmaṇa and the
Kṣatriya; and because the scriptural text.—‘Fire is the eater of food’
(Bṛh. 1.4.6) declares so. Or, let the individual soul be the eater,
because it is well-known to be an enjoyer, because the scriptural text·
‘Of the two, the one tastes sweet berry’ (Śvet. 4.6; Muṇḍ 3.1.1)
declares so, and, finally, because in the preceding section, (viz. Br. Sū.
1 2 8) it alone has been established to be an enjoyer. In accordance
with the negative text. ‘Without eating’ (Śvet 4.6, Muṇḍ 3 1.1),
as well as on the ground of the negation, of experience in the preceding
section (viz. Br. Sū 1 2.8), the Highest Self cannot be understood as
the eater here,—
We reply: Here the eater can possibly be the Highest Self alone.
Whence is this known? “On account of the comprehension (or taking,
i e. devouring ¹) of the movable and the immovable,” i e. because
here the movable and the immovable are understood to be the food.
If it be objected that the words ‘movable’ and ‘immovable’ are not
found here,—(we reply) It may be so, (yet that does not falsify our
view), because by the terms ‘Brāhmaṇa’ and ‘Kṣatriya’, the movable
and the immovable are understood metaphorically; and because there
being a natural connection between death and the movable and the
immovable, that food which has death for its condiment, viz. the
movable and the immovable, is understood here. Hence the eater
is the Highest Self, the destroyer of the Universe,—this is the resulting
meaning, for neither fire, nor the individual soul, can possibly be the
eater of the entire world. The text ‘Without eating’ (Śvet. 4 6;
Muṇḍ 3.1 1) denies any experience of the fruits of works on the part
of the Lord
SŪTRA 10
“AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE TOPIC.”
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The eater is the Lord, the Highest Person, because He alone is
mentioned as the topic of discussion in the text ‘The great, the all-
pervading’ (Kaṭha 2.22 ²).
¹ See footnote (2), previous page. ² R, ŚK.

[sū. 1 2. 11.
ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 107
Vedānta-kaustubha
As the Highest Self is mentioned as the topic of discussion in the
texts: 'Knowing the great, all-pervasive self' (Kaṭha 2.22), 'By
him is (He) attainable, whom alone he chooses' (Kaṭha 2 23; Muṇḍ.
3.2.23), and as a peculiar mark of the Lord, viz. unintelligibleness, is
mentioned in the passage 'Who thus knows where He is?' (Kaṭha
2.25), it is established that the eater is the Highest Self alone.
Here ends the section entitled 'The eater' (2).
Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled 'The cave'.
(Sūtras 11-12)
SŪTRA 11
"THE SOULS ENTERED INTO THE CAVE (ARE THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL
AND THE SUPREME SOUL), BECAUSE THAT IS SEEN."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
In the text: 'There are two, drinking of righteousness in the
world of good deeds, entered into the cave' (Kaṭha 3.1 1), the two
souls, entered into the cave, should be known to be two sentient
beings, viz. the individual soul and the Supreme Soul Why? 2 "Be-
cause that is seen", i e. because it is found that this section desig-
nates the entering of these two alone,—of the Supreme Soul in the
passage: 'Him, who is difficult to see, who has entered into the hidden,
who is hidden in the cave' (Kaṭha 2.12 2); and of the individual soul
in the passage: 'She, who arises with the vital-breath, who is Aditi,
who is made of the deities, who, entering into the cave, abides therein,
who was manifested through the elements' (Kaṭha 4.7 3).
Vedānta-kaustubha
It has been pointed out above that the Supreme Soul, the topic
of discussion and the object to be meditated on, is the eater of the
movable and the immovable, and that He is difficult to be known, as
declared by the text: 'Who thus knows' (Kaṭha 2.25). Now, by
1 Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B 2 Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B. 3 R, B

[SŪ. 1. 2. 11.
108 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 3.]
teaching the following attributes of the Lord—viz. 'being easily
attainable', 'being easily knowable' and the rest—which result from
His close association (with the individual soul¹),—to one who desires
for salvation, who desires to attain His nature, who desires to know
Him, and who is submerged in the pit of mundane existence consisting
of the movable and the immovable, the author is showing that the
text: 'Righteousness' (Kaṭha 3. 1) and so on refers to the Lord.
Immediately after the above-quoted text, we find the following
in the Kaṭha-vallī: 'There are two, drinking of righteousness in the
world of good deeds, entered into the cave, in the highest upper
region. Those who know Brahman speak of them as "light" and
"shade", as well as those who maintain the five sacred fires,² and
those too who thrice kindle the Nāciketas fire'³ (Kaṭha 3.1). Here
a doubt arises as to whether here buddhi and the individual soul
are designated as entered into the cave, or the individual soul and
the Supreme Soul? What is reasonable here? If it be suggested:
Buddhi and the individual soul,—because in accordance with the
statement: 'Entered into the cave' (Kaṭha 3.1), entering into a
cave is impossible on the part of the Supreme Soul who is all-pervasive;
because it is impossible for the Supreme Being who has all His desires
fulfilled to be the enjoyer of the fruits of works, as stated in the
passage: 'Drinking of righteousness' (Kaṭha 3. 1); because any
connection with the 'world of good deeds',—i.e. with the world where
one enjoys the fruits of the works done by one's self, viz. the body
generated by works,—is impossible on His part, and, finally, because a
question is found, seeking to know the individual soul as different
from buddhi, viz. '"There is this doubt when a man is dead, some
saying, 'He is', others, 'He is not'. This I should know, as taught
by you"' (Kaṭha 1. 20⁴). Hence, these two alone (viz. buddhi
and individual soul) are established by this text,—
¹ I.e. the Lord abides with the individual soul in the same place, viz. the
heart, and as such is easily knowable and attainable by it.
² Viz. Anvāhārya-pacana or Dakṣiṇa, Gārhapatya, Āhavanīya, Sabhya, and
Āvasathya. M.W., p. 577, Col. 3.
³ Vide M.W., p. 458, Col. 2.
⁴ The sense is: Naciketā wants to know here what happens to the soul after
death, i.e. he wants to know the self as distinct from the body, buddhi and so
on. Hence, in reply, Yama must speak of the individual soul and buddhi, and
as such the passage in question must deal with these two alone.

[SŪ. 1. 2. 11.
ADH. 3] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 109
We reply: The souls entered into the cave, viz. the heart, are two
sentient beings alone. If it be objected: The entering of the individual
soul stands to reason, since it is atomic; but entering into a cave is
not appropriate on the part of the Supreme Soul who is all-pervasive,
and hence the above objection remains in force,—(we reply:) No.
"Because that is seen." That is, because in this very Upaniṣad, the
text: 'The Person, of the size of merely a thumb, abides within the
soul, the Lord of the past and the future' (Kaṭha 4.12) enjoins the
Supreme Soul to be looked upon as abiding within the caves (i.e.
hearts) of His sincere devotees in accordance with their wishes, though
He Himself is all-pervading; because this is found in the texts:
'Hidden in the cave, dwelling in the abyss' (Kaṭha 2.12), 'He who
knows him, hidden in the cave' (Tait. 2.1.1); and, lastly, because
in the text: 'She, who arises with the vital-breath, who is Aditi, who
is made of the deities, who, entering into the cave abides therein,
who was manifested through the elements' (Kaṭha 4.7), the individual
soul is designated as entering into the cave. Moreover, in the text:
'Drinking of righteousness' (Kaṭha 3.1), one being ascertained to
be a sentient being as the enjoyer of the fruits of works, the other too
must be understood to be a sentient being alone, because we find that
in ordinary life whenever a number is mentioned, beings of the same
class are meant. When, e.g. it is said 'Look out for a second for this
cow', people look out for a cow only, and not for a horse or an ass.
This is established in the Mahā-bhāṣya.
To the objection, viz. that a question is found which seeks to
know the individual soul as different from buddhi,—(we reply:) the
reply to this question is something else, and not this text. It cannot
be said also that there is anything inconsistent in the 'drinking of
righteousness' (Kaṭha 3.1), since the statement: 'Drinking of
righteousness' (Kaṭha 3.1) is justifiable, just like the statement:
'Men with umbrellas are going'; ¹ since it is possible to say that while
the individual soul drinks, the other (viz. the Lord) causes it to drink,
1 That is, referring to a crowd of hurrying people, we often say: 'Men with
umbrellas are going', though really only some of them are carrying umbrellas,
and not all. Similarly, here too, when it is said: 'The two drinking', etc. what
is really meant is that only one (viz. the individual soul) is drinking, and not the
other (viz. Brahman).

[SŪ. 1. 2. 12.
110 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 3.]
and is as such the causative agent; ¹ and since it is well-known every-
where that the Supreme Lord first experiences the fruits of the works
which are performed by one who is whole-heartedly devoted to Him,
and are entrusted to Him. Hereby, it is explained also how the
Supreme Being can abide in a body generated by works. The sense
is that just as 'shade' can be removed by 'light' and not 'light' by
'shade', so the 'light' and the 'shade' (in the above text) are none but
Brahman and the individual soul, the independent and the dependent.
Śaṃkara and Bhāskara
Interpretation of the phrase 'tad-darśanāt' different, viz.:
'Because it is seen (that numerals denote beings of the same nature)'. ²
SŪTRA 12
"AND ON ACCOUNT OF SPECIFICATION."
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
The individual soul and the Supreme Being alone are understood
here as entered into the cave, because in this section those two alone
are specified as the object to be worshipped and the worshipper, as
the object to be known and the knower, and so on, in the texts: 'By
knowing the knower of what is born from Brahman,³ the deity to be
worshipped, by revering (him), he goes to everlasting peace' (Kaṭha
1.17 ⁴), 'The bridge for sacrificers' (Kaṭha 3.2 ⁵) and so on.
Vedānta-kaustubha
The individual soul and the Supreme Soul are to be understood
as entered within the cave "also because of the specification" of
those two alone. The sense is that in this treatise (viz. the Kaṭha-
upaniṣad), the individual soul and the Supreme Soul alone are specified
as that which approaches and the goal approached, as the thinker
¹ That is, Brahman is not really an agent or drinker here, but only instigates
the other to drink. He is said to be drinking in this sense alone.
² Ś.B. 1.2.12, p. 272, Bh.B. 1.2.12, p. 41.
³ Correct quotation: 'Brahmaja-jña'. Vide C.S.S. ed., p. 8. 'Brahmaja-
jña' may be interpreted also as 'Brahmajaś cāsau jñaśceti'.
⁴ R. ⁵ Op. cit.