उपदेशसाहस्री (आदि शङ्कराचार्य - गद्य व पद्य भाग)

87-94] 'THOU ART THAT' 245
ममेदंप्रत्ययौ ज्ञेयौ युष्मद्येव न संशयः ।
अहमित्यस्मदीष्टः स्यादयमस्मीति चोभयोः ॥ ९१ ॥
91. 'Mine' and 'it' are ideas predicated of the
non-Self and the idea 'I' of the ego.¹ The ideas such
as, 'I am a man' are predicated of both the Self² and
the non-Self.
अन्योन्यापेक्षया तेषां प्रधानगुणतेष्यते ।
विशेषणविशेष्यत्वं तथा ग्राह्यं हि युक्तितः ॥ ९२ ॥
92. They³ should be regarded as principal and
subordinate with relation to one another and be taken
as the qualified or qualifying according to reason.
ममेदं द्वयमप्येतन्मध्यमस्य विशेषणम् ।
धनी गोमान्यथा तद्वद्देहोऽहंकर्तुरेव च ॥ ९३ ॥
93. Both the ideas 'mine' and 'it' are qualifications⁴
of the ego,⁵ as for example, 'a man having wealth' and
'a man having a cow⁵'; similarly, the gross body is the
qualification of the ego.⁶
बुद्ध्यारूढं सदा सर्वं साहंकर्त्रा च साक्षिणः ।
तस्मात्सर्वावभासो ज्ञः किंचिदप्यस्पृशन्सदा ॥ ९४ ॥
¹ Which appears like the Self through the reflection.
² The empirical Self, the ego.
³ The ideas about the empirical Self and the non-Self.
⁴ In relation to the idea, 'I am a man'. Wealth or a cow des-
cribed as 'it' is described as 'mine' in relation to One's gross body.
⁵ Spoken of in the middle of verse 91.
⁶ The empirical Self described as my Self. The ego again is the
qualification of the innermost Self when one says 'I am the Witness.'

246 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [CHAP. XVIII
94. Everything¹ pervaded by the intellect together
with the ego² is the qualification of the Witness. With-
out being connected with anything and pervading every-
thing by means of Its reflection the Self is, therefore,
always of the nature of Knowledge Itself.³
प्रतिलोममिदं सर्वं यथोक्तं लोकबुद्धितः ।
अविवेकधियामस्ति नास्ति सर्वं विवेकिनाम् ॥ ९५ ॥
95. All this, described according to popular ideas
is the reverse (of what is true) and exists for the
undiscriminating ; it⁴ does not exist at all for men of
Knowledge.
अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ हि पदार्थस्य पदस्य च ।
स्यादेतदहमित्यत्र युक्तिरेवावधारणे ॥ ९६ ॥
96. Agreement⁵ and contrariety⁵ with regard to
words and with regard to their meanings are the only
¹ The gross body and things connected with it.
² Including the whole of the subtle body.
³ This (verses 91—94) is how the Self is discriminated from the
non-Self. See verse 90 above.
⁴ Everything described as qualification in the two previous verses.
⁵ The Self is always the witness and never ceases to exist. It is
self-existent and never a qualification. (See verse 94 above), It is,
therefore, real.
The ego etc. that are witnessed by the Self and depend for their
existence on It are always of the nature of qualifications. (See
verse 94 above). They are, therefore, unreal.
These are what are called agreement and contrariety with regard
to the meanings of the words.
The words such as Self, Existence, Knowledge, Bliss, etc. imply
Pure Consciousness. They are neither qualifications nor denote
anything qualified.
The words agent, experiencer, knower, thin, fat and so on do not
denote Pure Consciousness. They are applied to the Self when the
body, the senses, etc. qualify It.
These are what are called agreement and contrariety with regard
to words.

94-100] 'THOU ART THAT' 247
means by which the meaning implied by the word 'I'
may be ascertained.¹
नाद्राक्षमहमित्यस्मिन्सुषुप्तेऽन्यन्मनागपि ।
न वारयति दृष्टिं स्वां प्रत्ययं तु निषेधति ॥ ९७ ॥
97. (Waking up from deep sleep one says) 'I did
not see anything at all in that state.' (From this it
is clear that) one denies the existence of the mental
modifications, (the knower, knowing and the known) in
deep sleep but not that of Knowledge Itself.
स्वयंज्योतिर्न हि द्रष्टुरित्येवं संविदोऽस्तिताम् ।
स्वयमेवाब्रवीच्छास्त्रं प्रत्ययावगती पृथक् ॥ ९८ ॥
98. The scriptures themselves discriminate between
Knowledge Itself on the one hand, and the mental
modifications, (the knower, knowing and the known) on
the other and prove that the former is changeless and
really existing and that the latter deviate from existence,
as they say 'It is self-luminous ²' and 'The Know-
ledge ³ of the knower does not (cease to exist).'
एवं विज्ञातवाक्यार्थे श्रुतिलोकप्रसिद्धितः ।
श्रुतिस्तत्त्वमसीत्याह श्रोतुर्मोहापनुत्तये ॥ ९९ ॥
ब्रह्मा दाशरथेर्यद्वदुक्त्यैवापानुदत्तमः ।
तस्य विष्णुत्वसंबोधे न यत्नान्तरमूचिवान् ॥ १०० ॥
¹ But not the absolute oneness of the meanings of the word,
'thou' and 'that'. See verse 99 of this chapter.
² Br. U., 4. 3. 9. ³ Br. U., 4. 3. 23.

248 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [CHAP. XVIII
99, 100. Just as Brahmâ removed the Ignorance$^1$ of
the son of Dasaratha by means of words$^2$ only, but
did not teach him any action in order that he might
know that he was Vishnu; so, in order that one's Igno-
rance may be removed the Sruti, teaches one ‘Thou
art That’ when one has learnt the meanings of the
subordinate sentences$^3$ according to the Srutis$^4$ and
popular grammar.
अहंशब्दस्य निष्ठा या ज्योतिषि प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
सैवोक्ता सदसीत्येवं फलं तत्र विमुक्तता ॥ १०१ ॥
101. It is the indirectly expressed meaning of the
word ‘I’ viz., the innermost and self-luminous Self
which is expressed in the teaching, ‘Thou art That.’
And the result is liberation.$^5$
श्रुतमात्रेण चेन्न स्यात्कार्यं तत्र भवेद्ध्रुवम्
व्यवहारात्पुरापीष्टः सद्भावः स्वयमात्मनः ॥ १०२ ॥
102. It would surely be necessary to admit an injunc-
tion$^6$ if right knowledge were not produced immediately
when one was taught (that one was Brahman). The
$^1$ It was assumed by him out of his own accord in order to veil
his Powers for some time.
$^2$ The words are :—you are Vishnu and not the son of Dasaratha.
$^3$ E.g., Existence, Knowledge, Unlimited Brahman. See Tai.
U., 2. 1.
$^4$ And thus has learnt the meaning implied by the word ‘I’.
$^5$ When the knowledge, ‘I am Brahman’ arises on being taught
‘Thou art That.’
$^6$ E.g., an injunction regarding the mental repetition of the idea.
‘I am Brahman’. See verses 9—18 of this chapter to which this is
a reply.

99-104] 'THOU ART THAT' 249
Self¹ exists in Its own nature even before² one is
taught (the meaning of the sentence, 'Thou art That').
अशनायादिनिर्मुक्त्यै तत्काला जायते प्रमा ।
तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यार्थे त्रिषु कालेऽप्यसंशयः ॥ १०३ ॥
103. The listening to the teaching and the production
of right knowledge are simultaneous, and the result is
the cessation³ of (the transmigratory existence consisting
of) hunger etc. There can be no⁴ doubt about the
meaning of the sentences like 'Thou art That' in the
past, present or future.
प्रतिबन्धविहीनत्वात्स्वयं चानुभवात्मनः ।
जायेतैव प्रमा तत्र स्वात्मन्येव न संशयः ॥ १०४ ॥
104. The right knowledge of the Self which is of
the nature of Pure Consciousness is, no doubt, produced
in one at the time (of listening to the teaching) as all
obstacles are removed⁵ (beforehand).
¹ The Sruti is the right evidence regarding the knowledge of the
eternally existing Self. It cannot, therefore, be said that a wrong
knowledge, a futile knowledge, a doubtful knowledge or no know-
ledge is produced from the sentence. Verses 102—104 refute these
objections.
² So the knowledge arising from the Sruti is not wrong.
³ Which is directly felt and therefore the knowledge is not futile.
⁴ It is felt that one is Brahman in the past, present and future.
The knowledge is, therefore, not doubtful.
⁵ Through the method of agreement and contrariety. See verses
96 and 97 above.
The ignorance of the implied meanings of the words, 'thou'
and 'that' is the only obstacle to the right knowledge of Self-
Brahman.
It cannot, therefore, be said that no knowledge is produced.

250 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [CHAP. XVIII]
किं सदेवाहमस्मीति किंवाऽन्यत्प्रतिपद्यते ।
सदेव चेदहंशब्दः सता मुख्यार्थ इष्यताम् ॥ १०५ ॥
अन्यच्चेत्सदहंग्राहप्रतिपत्तिमृषैव सा ।
तस्मान्मुख्यग्रहे नास्ति वारणावगतेरिह ॥ १०६ ॥
105, 106. Does one understand the word ‘I’ to mean
Brahman, Itself or something other than It (when one
is taught ‘Thou art Brahman’?) If it is understood to
mean Brahman Itself you must accept the absolute
identity¹ of the meaning of the word ‘I’ and that of the
word Brahman. But if (the word ‘I’ imply something)
other than Brahman the knowledge, ‘I am Brahman’
certainly becomes false. The arising of the knowledge
of their absolute identity from this sentence cannot,
therefore, be denied.
प्रत्ययी प्रत्ययश्चैव यदाभासौ तदर्थता ।
तयोरचितिमत्त्वाच्च चैतन्ये कल्प्यते फलम् ॥ १०७ ॥
107. Having the reflection of the Self in them the
intellect and its modifications exist² for It and are
non-conscious.² (Liberation,) the result is, therefore,
supposed to be in the conscious Self.
कूटस्थेऽपि फलं योग्यं राजनीव जयादिकम् ।
तदनात्मत्वहेतुभ्यां क्रियायाः प्रत्ययस्य च ॥ १०८ ॥
108. As neither the intellect (with the reflection
of the Self) nor its modification in the form of the
ego is of the nature of the result³ or its (material)
¹ Directly expressed by the word ‘art’ the copula in the sentence
‘Thou art Brahman’.
² Therefore they cannot be connected with liberation, the result
of right knowledge. ³ Liberation.

105-112] ' THOU ART THAT ' 251
cause the result is capable of being attributed to the
Self though immutable, like victory to a King.
आदर्शस्तु यदाभासो मुखाकारः स एव सः ।
यथैवं प्रत्ययादर्शो यदाभासस्तदा ह्यहम् ॥ १०९ ॥
109. Just as the reflection of a face which makes
a mirror appear like it, is the face itself,¹ so, the
reflection of the Self in the mirror of the ego making
it appear like the Self (is the Self).² So (the meaning
of the sentence,) ‘I am Brahman’ (is reasonable).
इत्येवं प्रतिपत्तिः स्यात्सदस्मीति च नान्यथा ।
तत्त्वमित्युपदेशोऽपि द्वाराभावादनर्थकः ॥ ११० ॥
110. It is only in this way³ and in no other that
one knows that one is Brahman (and that Brahman
is oneself). Otherwise the teaching, ‘Thou art That’
also becomes useless in the absence of a medium.⁴
श्रोतुः स्यादुपदेशश्चेदर्थवत्त्वं तथा भवेत्
अध्यक्षस्य न चेदिष्टं श्रोतृत्वं कस्य तद्भवेत् ॥ १११ ॥
111. Teaching becomes useful if it is meant for a
hearer (i.e. the aspirant). Who will be the hearer if
the Witness is not ?
अध्यक्षस्य समीपे स्याद्बुद्धेरेवेति चेन्मतम् ।
न तत्कृतोपकारोऽस्ति काष्ठाद्यद्वन्न कल्प्यते ॥ ११२ ॥
¹ Not different from the face. ² Not different from the Self.
³ I.e., when the reflection of the Self is accepted. See verse 78
above. ⁴ The reflection of the Self.

252 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [CHAP. XVIII
112. If you are of opinion that the intellect proximate
to the Witness¹ is the hearer it cannot be regarded
as deriving any benefit from the Witness as from a
piece of wood.
बुद्धौ चेत्तत्कृतः कश्चिन्नन्वेवं परिणामिता ।
आभासेऽपि च को दोषः सति श्रुत्याद्यनुग्रहे ॥ ११३ ॥
113. But the Witness must be admitted to be subject
to change if there be any benefit rendered by It to
the intellect.
What harm is there if the reflection of the Self is
accepted as it is supported by the Śrutis² and Smritis?³
आभासे परिणामश्चेन्न रज्ज्वादिनिभत्ववत् ।
सर्पादेश्च तथाऽवोचमादर्शे च मुखत्ववत् ॥ ११४ ॥
114. If you say that there will be changes in the
Self in case the reflection is accepted we say ‘No.’ For
we have already said (that the reflection of Consci-
ousness in the intellect is an unreality) like a snake
appearing to be a rope and (like the reflection of a
face) in a mirror appearing to be the face itself.
नात्माभासत्वसिद्धिश्चेदात्मनो ग्रहणात्पृथक् ।
मुखादेश्च पृथक्सिद्धिर्हि त्वन्योन्यसंश्रयः ॥ ११५ ॥
अध्यक्षस्य पृथक्सिद्धावाभासस्य तदीयता ।
आभासस्य तदीयत्वे ह्यध्यक्षव्यतिरिक्तता ॥ ११६ ॥
¹ Which only exists and is actionless.
² Br. U., 2. 5. 19. ³ Bh. Gîtâ, 15. 7.

112-119] ' THOU ART THAT ' 253
115, 116. (Objection). No. There will be the fallacy
of reciprocal dependence here as the knowlege of
the reflection depends on that of the Self (and the
knowledge of the Self depends on that of the reflec-
tion) ; (but it is not so in the case of the face etc. and
their reflections) as the face etc. are always known
independent of their reflections.
The reflection may be said to belong to the Self if the
latter be known to have an independent existence.
Again, the Self may have an independent existence if
the reflection belongs to It.¹
नैवं स्वप्ने पृथक्सिद्धेः प्रत्ययस्य दृशेस्तथा ।
रथादेस्तत्र शून्यत्वात्प्रत्ययस्यात्मना ग्रहः ॥ ११७ ॥
117. (Reply). It is not² so. For the intellect and
the Self are known to exist independent of each other
in dream (like the face and its reflection), as the Self
then illumines the modifications (of the intellect) in the
forms of objects such as, chariots ³ etc. though they are
not present in that state.
अवगत्या हि संव्याप्तः प्रत्ययो विषयाकृतिः ।
जायते, स यदाकारः स बाह्यो विषयो मतः ॥ ११८ ॥
कर्मेप्सिततमत्वात्स तद्वान्कार्ये नियुज्यते ।
आकारो यत्र चार्प्येत करणं तदिहोच्यते ॥ ११९ ॥
¹ The fallacy spoken of in verse 115 is explained here.
² The intellect is an object of the Self (Pure Consciousness) in
dream. The Self must, therefore, be admitted to have an existence
independent of that of Its reflection. ³ See Br. U., 4. 3. 9.

254 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [CHAP. XVIII
118, 119. Pervaded by Consciousness mental modi-
fications in the forms of objects come into existence.
External objects are what impart their forms to these
modifications. The most desirable of all things (on the
part of the agent), these external objects are called
objects of his action. One having such a desire is
enjoined to perform actions. The mental modifications
in which the forms of external objects are present are
called the instruments of his knowledge of objects.¹
यदाभासेन संव्याप्तः संज्ञातेति निगद्यते ।
त्रयमेतद्विविच्यैवात्र यो जानाति स आत्मवित् ॥ १२० ॥
120. The ego which is pervaded by the reflection
of Consciousness is called the knower or the agent
of the action of knowing. One who knows oneself, the
witness to be distinct from all these three² is a (real)
knower of the Self.
सम्यक्संशयमिथ्योक्ताः प्रत्यया व्यभिचारिणः ।
एकैवावगतिस्तेषु भेदस्तु प्रत्ययार्पितः ॥ १२१ ॥
121. The modifications of the intellect, called 'right
knowledge,' 'doubtful knowledge' and 'false knowl-
edge,' deviate from their existence. There is one and
the same Consciousness³ in all of them. The diffe-
rences are due to the modifications.
¹ In verses 118—122 the Self is shown in the waking state to be
distinct from the intellect as It is shown to be so in dream in
verse 117.
² The agent, the object and the instrument.
³ Pure Consciousness, the Self.

118-125] ‘ THOU ART THAT ’ 255
आधिभेदाद्यथा भेदो मणेरवगतेस्तथा ।
अशुद्धिः परिणामश्च सर्वं प्रत्ययसंश्रयात् ॥ १२२ ॥
122. Just as a jewel differs in colour owing to the
proximity of (coloured) things, so, Consciousness differs
(according to different modifications of the mind super-
imposed on It). Impurities and changes in the Self
are all due to Its connection with these modifications.
प्रथनं ग्रहणं सिद्धिः प्रत्ययानामिहान्यतः ।
आपरोक्ष्यात्तदेवोक्तमनुमानं प्रदीपवत् ॥ १२३ ॥
123. The modifications of the intellect are mani-
fested, known and endowed with existence¹ by another,
i.e. the Self which is immediately known and different
from them. It is inferred with the help of the example
of a lamp.²
किमन्यद्ग्राहयेत्कश्चित्प्रमाणेने तु केनचित् ।
विनैव तु प्रमाणेन निवृत्त्यान्यस्य शेषतः ॥ १२४ ॥
124. Does one make another accept the Self by
means of a positive evidence or without one by
merely negating the non-Self and leaving over the Self
only ? ³
शब्देनैव प्रमाणेन निवृत्तिश्चेदिहोच्यते ।
अध्यक्षस्याप्रसिद्धत्वाच्छून्यतैव प्रसज्यते ॥ १२५ ॥
¹ Kath. U. 5. 15. ² The discussion begun here ends in verse 140.
³ After stating that the Self is proved by positive evidence
in verse 123 the author refutes in verses 124-140 the doctrine that
It is proved by negative evidence only.

256 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [CHAP. XVIII
125. The possibility of a void comes in owing to
the witness being unknown ¹ if the non-Self be meant
to be negated by means of the evidence of words.²
चेतनस्त्वं कथं देह इति चेन्नाप्रसिद्धितः ।
चेतनस्यान्यतः सिद्धावेवं स्यादन्यहानतः ॥ १२६ ॥
126. (Objection). ‘You are a conscious being,
how³ can you be the body?’
(Reply). It cannot be so proved as the Self is not
known (from any other evidence). It might be proved
by negating the non-Self if Pure Conciousness were
known to exist through an evidence.
अध्यक्षः स्वयमस्त्येव चेतनस्यापरोक्षतः ।
तुल्य एवं प्रबोधः स्यादन्यस्यासत्त्ववादिना ॥ १२७ ॥
127. (Objection). The Self is self-existent as Pure
Consciousness is immediately known. (Reply). The
knowledge of the Self (according to you) then becomes
similar⁴ to that of the void assumed by the Nihilist.
अहमज्ञासिषं चेदमिति लोकस्मृतेरिह ।
करणं कर्म कर्ता च सिद्धास्त्वेकक्षणे किल ॥ १२८ ॥
128. (Objection). That the agent, the object and
instrument are known to exist simultaneously is proved
by memory, (e.g., when one says) ‘I⁵ knew it.’
¹ By any other evidence. ² The Srutis.
³ The idea is that the Self and the non-Self being contradictory
to each other, the former is left over when the latter is negated.
⁴ As regards the want of an evidence.
⁵ The objector tries to prove the independent existence of the Self
by showing that there must be a Self-evident principle through which
the three things are known simultaneously. And that is the Self.

125-131] ‘ THOU ART THAT ’ 257
प्रामाण्येऽपि स्मृतेः शैघ्र्याद्यौगपद्यं विभाव्यते ।
क्रमेण ग्रहणं पूर्वं स्मृतेः पश्चात्तथैव च ॥ १२९ ॥
129. (Reply).¹ Though memory is a right evidence
simultaneity is a misconception due to quick perception.
So they were perceived before one after another and
afterwards remembered in the same way.
अज्ञासिषमिदं मां चेत्यपेक्षा जायते ध्रुवम् ।
विशेषोऽपेक्ष्यते यत्र तत्र नैवैककालता ॥ १३० ॥
130. Relative to, and characteristically different
from, each other the things denoted by the words
‘it’ and ‘myself’ in the sentence, ‘I knew it and myself’,
cannot be the objects of simultaneous perception.
आत्मनो ग्रहणे चापि त्रयाणामिह संभवात् ।
आत्मन्यासक्तकर्तृत्वं न स्यात्करणकर्मणोः ॥ १३१ ॥
131. Three things (namely, an agent, an instrument
and an object) are necessary in the perception of each ²
one of the knower, knowledge and the known. (And in
order to avoid a regressus ad infinitum it cannot be said
that each of these three things will prove its own
existence, because) the agency of the agent exhausted
in proving its own existence will not be available to
prove that of the instrument and the object (at the
same time).
¹ Verses 129—132.
² And also in the perception of each one of the agent, the instru-
ment and the object. Hence there arises a regressus ad infinitum
with respect to each of them.
17

258 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [CHAP. XVIII
व्याप्तुमिष्टं च यत्कर्तुः क्रियया कर्म तत्स्मृतम् ।
अतो हि कर्तृतन्त्रत्वं तस्येष्टं नान्यतन्त्रता ॥ १३२ ॥
132. What is desired to be governed by the action
of an agent is an object of that action. The object,
therefore, depends on the agent and not on the Self
which is other than it.
शब्दाद्वानुमितेर्वापि प्रमाणाद्वा ततोऽन्यतः ।
सिद्धिः सर्वपदार्थानां स्यादज्ञं प्रति नान्यथा ॥ १३३ ॥
133. It is only through evidences such as, words,¹
inference, etc.² and in no other way that all things
become known to those who do not know them.
अध्यक्षस्यापि सिद्धिः स्यात्प्रमाणेन् विनैव वा ।
विना स्वस्य सिद्धिस्तु ज्ञानं प्रत्युपयुज्यते ॥ १३४ ॥
134. Is the Self also³ substantiated by means of an
evidence or not ? Though the Self Itself is independent
of evidence, evidence is necessary in order to know It.
तस्यैवाज्ञत्वमिष्टं चेज्ज्ञानत्वेऽन्या मतिर्भवेत् ।
अन्यस्यैवाज्ञतायां च तद्विज्ञाने ध्रुवा भवेत् ॥ १३५ ॥
135. If the conscious Self Itself is taken to be
ignorant an evidence is necessary,¹ in order that It may
know Itself to be so. It is surely necessary⁴ in knowing
the Self if one⁴ (i.e. the ego) other than It be regarded
as ignorant.
¹ The Sruti. ² E.g., sense-perception. ³ Like the non-Self.
⁴ In both the cases, therefore, a positive evidence is necessary.

[132-139] ' THOU ART THAT ' 259
ज्ञातता स्वात्मलाभो वा सिद्धिः स्यादन्यदेव वा ।
ज्ञानत्वेऽनन्तरोक्तौ त्वं पक्षौ संस्मर्तुमर्हसि ॥ १३६ ॥
सिद्धिः स्यात्स्वात्मलाभश्चेद्यत्नस्तत्र निरर्थकः ।
सर्वलोकप्रसिद्धत्वात्स्वहेतुभ्यस्तु वस्तुनः ॥ १३७ ॥
136, 137. Does substantiation¹ mean being known,
being endowed with existence or anything else² ? You
should remember the two alternatives spoken of in the
previous verse if it means 'being known'.
As it is well-known that all things come to existence
from their causes no effort (by way of the application
of an evidence³) is necessary for substantiation.
ज्ञानज्ञेयादिवादेऽतः सिद्धिर्ज्ञातत्वमुच्यते ।
अध्यक्ष्याध्यक्षयोः सिद्धिर्ज्ञेयत्वं नात्मलाभता ॥ १३८ ॥
138. Substantiation, therefore, means 'being known'
according to the doctrine in which the knower, knowing
and the known are admitted. In the case of both
the witness and the witnessed it denotes 'being known'
and not 'endowed with existence.'
स्पष्टत्वं कर्मकर्त्रादेः सिद्धिता यदि कल्प्यते ।
स्पष्टताऽस्पष्टते स्यातामन्यस्यैव न चात्मनः ॥ १३९ ॥
139. If it be assumed⁴ that the distinctness of the
agent, the object, etc. is what is substantiation (We
¹ See verse 134 above. ² See verse 139.
³ Even a negative evidence upheld by the objector is not neces-
sary. So this alternative is refuted.
⁴ By the Bhâttas.

260 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [CHAP. XVIII
say that) there can be distinctness¹ and indistinctness
with respect to the other (i.e., the witness) only, but not
the agent.²
अदृष्टुनैव चान्धस्य स्पष्टीभावो घटस्य तु ।
कर्त्रादेः स्पष्टतेष्टा चेद्दृष्टनाऽध्यक्षकर्तृता ॥ १४० ॥
140. There is no distinctness of a jar to a blind
man having no power of vision. (It is nothing more
than the jar being known.³) If, however, they⁴ want to
predicate distinctness about the agent etc., they must
admit that Knowingness belongs to the Self.⁵
अनुभूतेः किमन्यस्मिन्स्यात्तवापेक्षया वद ।
अनुभवितरीष्टा स्यात्सोऽप्यनुभूतिरेव नः ॥ १४१ ॥
141. Please tell us⁶ what benefit you derive by
holding that knowledge depends on other things. If
it is contended that dependence (of knowledge) on the
knower is desirable (we reply that) the knower also,
according to us, is nothing but Knowledge.
अभिन्नोऽपि हि बुद्ध्यात्मा विपर्यासितदर्शनैः ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्तिभेदवानिव लक्ष्यते ॥ १४२ ॥
142. The intellect itself, though indivisible, is looked
upon by deluded people as consisting of the divisions
of the knower, knowing and the known.
¹ When the Self is reflected in the intellect etc.
² Because the agent, the object, etc. are non-conscious by nature.
³ Therefore substantiation does not mean distinctness.
⁴ The Bhāṭṭas. ⁵ Different from the agent. Here ends
the discussion begun in verse 123 of this chapter.
⁶ The Idealists.

140-145] 'THOU ART THAT' 261
भूतिर्येषां क्रिया सैव कारकं सैव चोच्यते ।
सत्त्वं नाशित्वमस्याश्चेत्सकर्तृत्वं तथेष्यताम् ॥ १४३ ॥
143. Actions, agents etc. consist, according to us,
(Idealists), of knowledge only.
(Reply). You must accept an agent of this know-
ledge if you admit its existence and destruction (every
moment).¹
न कश्चिच्चेष्यते धर्म इति चेत्पक्षहानता ।
नन्वस्तित्वादयो धर्मा नास्तित्वादिनिवृत्तयः ।
न भूतेस्तर्हि नाशित्वं स्वालक्षण्यं मतं हि ते ॥ १४४ ॥
144. Your own conclusion is given up if you do not
admit any quality² (belonging to knowledge). (Objection).
The qualities of existence etc. are nothing but the nega-
tion of their non-existence and so on. (Reply). Even
then knowledge cannot be liable to destruction (every
moment) as it is self-existent (and known by itself ³)
according to you.
स्वलक्षणावधिर्नाशो नाशोऽनाशनिवृत्तिता ।
अगोरसत्त्वं गोत्वं ते न तु तद्गोत्वलक्षणम् ॥ १४५ ॥
145. Destruction has for its ultimate limit something
which is self-existent.⁴ (You say that) destruction ⁵ is
¹ See verse 23, Chap. 16.
² Such as, existence and destruction every moment.
³ In being born and known by itself it requires more than one
moment. It cannot, therefore, be called momentary.
⁴ The appearance and disappearance of things are impossible on
account of the absence of a permanent entity (according to you)
which must be their ultimate limit. Existence and destruction are,
therefore, not possible in your philosophy.
⁵ Destruction being impossible, non-destruction also is so.

262 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [CHAP. XVIII
the negation of non-destruction. A cow is defined
according to you as the non-existence of a non-cow.
It cannot be the definition of a cow.
क्षणवाच्योऽपि योऽर्थः स्यात्सोऽप्यन्याभाव एव ते ॥ १४६॥
146. Things denoted by the word ‘momentary’ are
also, according to you, only the negation of things
that are non-momentary.¹
भेदाभावेऽप्यभावस्य भेदो नामभिरिष्यते ।
नामभेदैरनेकत्वमेकस्य स्यात्कथं तव ॥ १४७ ॥
147. (The Idealists). As there cannot be any dif-
ference in non-existence² differences are due to names
only. (Reply). Please, tell me how there can be
manyness in one (indivisible non-existence) due only
to different names.
अपोहो यदि भिन्नानां वृत्तिस्तस्य कथं गवि ।
नाभावा भेदकाः सर्वे विशेषा वा कथंचन ॥ १४८ ॥
148. How³ can the negation (of a non-cow) denote a
cow if by the word negation the negation of different
things is meant ? (Again) no negation⁴ distinguishes
one thing from another, nor can special properties⁵ do it.
¹ You have, therefore, to accept a permanent real entity.
² The Idealist means to say that his negation is not that of a
reality.
³ For there is no limit to the number of things denoted by the
word non-cow. All of them cannot, therefore, be known. So a
cow cannot be defined.
⁴ E.g., the negation of a horse or that of a goat does not distinguish
a cow from either of them.
⁵ E.g., hornlessness etc. See the next verse.

146-152] 'THOU ART THAT' 263
नामजात्यादयो यद्वत्संविदस्तद्विशेषतः ॥ १४९ ॥
149. Just as names, species, etc. do not qualify
Knowledge) according to you as it has no special
properties, (so, the negation of a non-cow, hornless-
ness etc. do not qualify a cow).
प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं वा व्यवहारे यदिच्छसि ।
क्रियाकारकभेदैस्तदभ्युपेयं ध्रुवं भवेत् ॥ १५० ॥
150. You have to admit difference as you have to
accept sense-perception and inference consisting of
actions, agents and so on in everyday life.
तस्मान्नीलं तथा पीतं घटादिर्वा विशेषणम् ।
संविदस्तदुपैयं स्याद्येन चाप्यनुभूयते ॥ १५१ ॥
151. Entities qualifying knowledge such as, jars,
blue, yellow, etc. and also the knower by which these
are known must be accepted.¹
रूपादीनां यथान्यः स्याद्ग्राह्यत्वादग्राहकस्तथा ।
प्रत्ययस्तत्तथान्यः स्याद्व्यञ्जकत्वात्प्रदीपवत् ॥ १५२ ॥
152. Just as the perceiver is different from colours
etc. which are perceivable, so, the Knower, the Self,
is different from the modifications of the intellect which
are knowable. (Again) just as a lamp revealing things
¹ Here ends the refutation of the Idealists begun in verse 141
above.
Hence in addition to knowledge the knower and the known also
must be accepted. See verses 141 and 142.

264 A THOUSAND TEACHINGS [CHAP. XVIII
is different from them, so, the Knower is different from
things known.
अध्यक्षस्य दृशेः कीदृक्संबन्धः संभविष्यति ।
अध्यक्षेग¹ तु दृश्येन मुक्त्वान्यो द्रष्टृदृश्यताम् ॥ १५३ ॥
अध्यक्षेण कृता दृष्टिर्दृश्यं व्याप्नोत्यथापि वा ।
नित्याध्यक्षकृतः कश्चिदुपकारो भवेद्धियाम् ॥ १५४ ॥
153, 154. What other relation except that of the
seer and the seen can there be between the Self, the
Witness and the modifications of the intellect witnessed
by It ?
(Question :) Does the consciousness of the Self
pervade the modifications (really² or apparently) ?
(Answer). If apparently, the eternal Self must be
of some utility³ to the intellect.
स चोक्तस्तन्निभत्वं प्राक्संव्याप्तिश्च घटादिषु ।
यथालोकादिसंव्याप्तिर्व्यञ्जकत्वाद्धियस्तथा ॥ १५५ ॥
155. It has been said before⁴ that the benefit
derived from (the proximity of) the Self by the intellect
is that it appears conscious like the former. Being a
revealer the intellect⁵ pervading objects like light and
so on pervading jars etc.
आलोकस्थो घटो यद्वद्बुद्ध्यारूढो भवेत्तथा ।
धीव्याप्तिः स्याद्घटारोहो धियो व्याप्तौ क्रमो भवेत् ॥ १५६ ॥
¹ The reading should perhaps be अध्यक्षेण.
² Real pervasion is impossible as the Self is changeless.
³ See the following verse. ⁴ Verse 87 above.
⁵ The Self is thus related to external objects through Its reflection.