१८५७ का स्वातन्त्र्य समर (वीर विनायक दामोदर सावरकर - अंग्रेजों द्वारा छपने से पूर्व प्रतिबन्धित महाग्रन्थ)

THE CONFLAGRATION
Thus was this strange battle fought. In the beginning,
the front of Kumar was opposed to the front of the English
army and now the rear of the British army is opposed to
the front of Kumar ; now he has even set the rear of the
enemy on fire ! When Mark Kerr saw the rear surround-
ed in flames of fire, he determined to leave the battlefield
and began to press on to Azimgarh. For, if not victory,
at least the secondary purpose of carrying succour to
Azimgarh should be accomplished if possible. His guns
did him a splendid service, especially as Kumar Singh had
none with him. At midnight, Lord Mark brought his
army to Azimgarh. About this battle and the strategic
movements and errors of Kumar Singh and the difficulties
under which he laboured, Malleson says :—" That leader
had showed himself greater as a strategist than a tacti-
cian. His plan of campaign was admirable but, in carry-
ing it into execution, he committed many serious errors.
Milman gave him a great, an unexpected opportunity.
He had that officer at his mercy. When Milman's men
were waiting for their breakfast in the mango grove near
Atrolia, it was in the power of Kumar Singh to cut them
off from Azimgarh. He preferred to attack them in front.
Then, when he had forced him to fall back, he did not
press the pursuit with sufficient vigour. A capable com-
mander would still have cut them off. Once having seen
them housed in Azimgarh, he should have left a portion
of his force to blockade them, pressed on with the remain-
der towards Benares, and occupied a position in which he
could have engaged Lord Mark Kerr with advantage. He
had at his disposal, it subsequently transpired, about
twelve thousand men. To oppose these the few men led
by Lord Mark were alone available. Everything was
within his grasp had he dared to stretch out his hand.
The chances are that, capable man as he was, he saw all
this. But he was not supreme master of the situation.
Every petty leader who had brought his contingent to
serve under him wished to dictate a programme. The
counsels of the rebels tended, then, almost always to a
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