द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

CHAPTER XIV
DEFEAT AND SURRENDER (1933-34)
WITH the dawn of the new year, Congressmen who were more
politically-minded, began to realise that the civil-disobedience
movement was in danger of fizzling out. The Independence
Day celebrations on January 26th, 1933, were therefore
organised with much enthusiasm with a view to rousing the
people again. The response everywhere was encouraging.
In Calcutta alone, the police had to make 300 arrests besides
using force to break up the demonstrations. In Badanganj in
Arambagh Sub-division of Hooghly District in Bengal, the
police resorted to shooting for dispersing the Congress
procession. 'Following the Independence Day celebrations,
Mrs. Gandhi was arrested at Borsad in Gujerat and sentenced
to six months' imprisonment on February 7th, for leading a
procession of women. As soon as the White Paper embodying
the Government proposals regarding the Indian Con-
stitutional Reforms was announced on March 17th, the annual
session of the India National Congress was convened at
Calcutta with Pandit Madan Mohon Malaviya as the President-
elect. The Congress session was at once banned like the
Delhi session of 1932—nevertheless, delegates and leaders
assembled in Calcutta from all parts of the country on April
11th, for the occasion. The important leaders who could be
easily spotted out were all arrested—including Pandit Mala-
viya, Mrs. Motilal Nehru, Mr. M. S. Aney (Central Pro-
vinces), Dr. Alam (Punjab), Dr. Syed Mahmud (Bihar), all of
them being members of the Congress Working Committee
with the exception of Mrs. Nehru. Thereafter, Mrs. J. M.
Sengupta proceeded to the appointed place at the head of
2,500 Congressmen for holding the meeting and under her
presidentship the meeting was held. Resolutions were passed
reaffirming (1) the goal of independence; (2) the efficacy of
the method of civil disobedience for attaining that goal, and
291

292 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
(3) the boycott of foreign cloth and of British goods of all
kinds. The most important resolution was one emphatically
condemning the White Paper proposals. Before the meeting
ended, large contingents of police arrived on the scene,
arrested Mrs. Sengupta and 250 others, including 40 ladies
and dispersed the meeting by force. The following extract
from the speech of the President-elect, the venerable Pandit
Malaviya, reflects the feeling of the country at the time:
'It is estimated that nearly 120,000 persons including
several thousand women and quite a number of children
have been arrested and imprisoned during the last fifteen
months. It is an open secret that when the Government
started repression, the official expectation was that they
would crush the Congress in six weeks' time. Fifteen
months have not enabled the Government to achieve that
object. Twice fifteen months will not enable it to do so.'
This was not the review made by a young hot-head but by
one of the oldest and most moderate leaders of the Congress.
Consequently, the response made by the country to the
Congress appeal in 1932 and 1933, in spite of lack of prepara-
tion, in spite of the sudden arrest of the organisers and
financiers of the Party early in January 1932, and in spite of
the diversion caused by the Mahatma's fast in September
1932 and the anti-untouchability campaign thereafter—can
by no means be regarded as unsatisfactory. Nevertheless,
the country was startled one fine morning in May to hear that
the Mahatma had suspended the civil-disobedience campaign.
While in prison the Mahatma had decided to go on a three
weeks' fast¹ as a penance, because his followers outside had
not made sufficient progress with the anti-untouchability
campaign. The object of the fast was to bring about a change
of heart—not in the bureaucracy but in his countrymen—
who were responsible for the sad plight of the untouchables.
The Government had no objection to a fast of that kind and
¹ After the famous September fast, the Mahatma had fasted once again
in December, but that fast had been a short one. The present fast was
described by him as a 'heart-prayer for purification of myself and my
associates for greater vigilance and watchfulness in connection with the
Harijan cause.'

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 293
as a matter of fact, thanks to British news-agencies, the fast
was given wide publicity in the European Press,¹ because it
helped to advertise the internal differences of the Indian
people. However, the Government considered it prudent to
set him free. The day after his release he made the announce-
ment referred to above.² At first the civil-disobedience cam-
paign was suspended for six weeks, but the suspension
was subsequently extended for six weeks more, i.e., till
the end of July. The sudden suspension of the campaign
without rhyme or reason, would under ordinary circumstances
have produced a widespread revolt in the Congress organi-
sation, but since he was in the middle of a fast which could
end fatally, all judgment was suspended for the time being.
While suspending the civil-disobedience campaign, the
Mahatma made an appeal to the Government of India to
withdraw the Ordinances and release the civil-disobedience
prisoners. But, unfortunately, a settled Government pre-
serves a continuity of policy and cannot alter its policy over-
night as an individual can. The Government’s reply was
therefore a refusal. While responsible Congressmen in India
were unwilling or afraid to speak out against the Mahatma
after his surrender of May 1933, a manifesto was issued by
the late Mr. Vithalbhai J. Patel³ and the writer from Vienna,
condemning the Mahatma’s decision. The manifesto stated
that the decision virtually undid the work and the sacrifice
of the last thirteen years. It signified a failure of the civil-
¹ The writer was in Vienna when the news regarding the fast appeared
in the Continental Press. After 14 months' incarceration when his health
was in an alarming condition, Lt.-Col. Buckley, I.M.S. of Lucknow who
had been treating him, recommended his transfer to Europe for treatment.
Thereupon the Government of India permitted him to leave for Europe
on his own financial responsibility. He was released at Bombay when
he sailed and arrived in Vienna in March, 1933.
² It is a matter for conjecture if the Government knew that the Mahatma
would suspend the civil-disobedience campaign if he were set free. On
May 8th, 1933, when the Mahatma started his fast the Government issued a
communiqué stating that in view of the nature of the object of the fast
and the attitude of mind which it disclosed, the Government had decided
that the Mahatma should be set at liberty. After his release, the sus-
pension of civil disobedience was ordered by the Acting President of the
Congress, Mr. Aney, on the 'recommendation' of the Mahatma.
³ The late Mr. V. J. Patel had returned from the United States after
three months' strenuous propaganda on behalf of India which ultimately
cost him his life. He, as well as the writer, were undergoing treatment
in Vienna at the time.

294 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
disobedience campaign, as also of Mahatma Gandhi's leader-
ship. It was therefore time to turn to a more radical policy
and leadership. Owing to the preoccupation of the public
over Mahatma Gandhi's health, the manifesto did not, how-
ever, produce the effect which it would otherwise have.
Even friends thought that it was an outrageous act to criticise
the Mahatma when his life was in jeopardy because of the fast.
In July, a Conference of important Congressmen, then out
of prison, was held at Poona. It could be regarded as an
unofficial meeting of the All-India Congress Committee.
Two groups were represented at the Conference—one in
favour of calling off the movement altogether and the other
in favour of resuming it with full vigour. The former group
had probably a majority and most of the members of this
group were in favour of reviving the Swarajist policy of
carrying the fight inside the Legislatures which had been
abandoned at the Lahore Congress in December 1929. Never-
theless, at the end, the Conference decided to give in to the,
Mahatma. At his instance it was decided that the Mahatma
should make a further attempt to see the Viceroy and come to
an understanding with him. If this failed, the Congress
should resume 'individual' civil disobedience, but that 'mass'
civil disobedience should be given up altogether. The purpose
of this was that the Congress should not organise any cam-
paign on a mass scale but should leave it to individuals to
break any laws that they felt called upon to on their personal
responsibility. Soon after the Poona Conference the Mahatma
approached the Viceroy for an interview—but all that he got
was a humiliating rebuff. He and some of his closest fol-
lowers, thereupon, proceeded to start civil disobedience
individually and by August 1933, they found themselves in
prison once again. This time even the Mahatma's incarcera-
tion did not create a great stir.
'Individual' civil disobedience was offered all over India
by the loyal adherents of the Mahatma and a few hundred
persons were thereby thrust back into prison. But it was a
foregone conclusion that where mass civil disobedience had
failed, individual civil disobedience would not produce any
appreciable effect. On reaching prison, the Mahatma found

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 295
that the facilities afforded him since September 1932, during
his last incarceration, for conducting the anti-untouchability
campaign from behind the prison walls—would not be given
*him this time.*¹ He thereupon gave notice to the Government
that if he did not get those facilities, he would feel called upon
to resort to fasting. It is difficult for a layman to reconcile
this attitude of the Mahatma with his lifelong principle that
a Satyagrahi prisoner should voluntarily submit to jail dis-
cipline. However, the Government once again found them-
selves in an uncomfortable position. By that time they had
realised that individual civil disobedience was going to fizzle
out and consequently there would be no risk in setting the
Mahatma at liberty. So once more the Mahatma found
himself a free man. On coming out from prison, the Mahatma
announced that since he had been sentenced to one year's
imprisonment in August 1933, and since he had been released
by the Government before the expiry of his term, he would
consider himself as a prisoner till August 1934, and would
not offer civil disobedience during that period.
Before offering civil disobedience, the Mahatma had issued
a statement in July to the effect that there was too much
secrecy in the affairs of the Congress and in the management
of the civil-disobedience campaign and this secrecy was
largely responsible for the failure that had overtaken the
Congress. In the Mahatma's opinion, the Congress organisa-
tions had become corrupt bodies. Soon after this, at the
instance of the Mahatma, the Acting-President of the Congress,
Mr. M. S. Aney, issued orders, dissolving all Congress
organisations in the country. Confusion worse confounded!
What were the people to do? Normal human reason could
not follow the logic of the Mahatma and those who could be
expected to speak out 'the plain truth, were not available.
At this juncture, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was released from
prison after serving his term of two years' imprisonment. All
eyes were turned on him. He was the one man who could
influence the Mahatma—who could drag the Congress out of
¹ The reason given by the Government was that on the former occasion
he had been incarcerated without trial, whereas on this occasion he was
convicted after trial.

296 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
the mess into which it had fallen. Pandit Nehru had long
talks with the Mahatma and following that, an interchange of
letters. The correspondence was duly published, but on
perusal it was found to be more doctrinaire than practical.
What the public wanted to know urgently was not whether
and wherein Pandit J. L. Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi
agreed or disagreed fundamentally—but how the Congress
could be restored to life and vigour. During his four months
of comparative freedom, Pandit Nehru wrote and spoke
freely and gave expression to his socialistic—or communistic
—ideas, but the Congress did not show any signs of resus-
citation. In an exceedingly interesting and able article under
the caption 'Whither India?'—he pleaded for social and
economic equality—for the ending of all special class-privi-
leges and vested interests—but that did not help the Congress
one jot or tittle. With a popularity only second to that of the
Mahatma, with unbounded prestige among his countrymen,
with a clear brain possessing the finest ideas, with an up-to-
date knowledge of modern world movements—that he
should be found wanting in the essential quality of leadership,
namely the capacity to make decisions and face unpopularity
if need be,¹ was a great disappointment. But there was no help
for it. What had been expected of him had to be accom-
plished by lesser men.
After Pandit Nehru, Mr. K. F. Nariman the Bombay
leader, was released and without delay he began to give public
expression to his views² on the decisions of the Poona
Conference in July 1933. Referring to the Mahatma's decision
to start civil disobedience in August 1933, because the Viceroy
did not grant him an unconditional interview, he said, ' "Inter-
view or Death" is the national slogan for the present. : . .
The renewed fight in August last is not for Swaraj, nor even
for political constitutional advance, but for the assertion of a
supposed "national right" of an unconditional interview. If
¹ This defect in Pandit J. L. Nehru was manifest on other occasions as
well, when the Congress was passing through a crisis—e.g., in the crisis
of 1923-24 and subsequently in the crisis of 1928-29.
² For a full statement of his views one should refer to his book, Whither
Congress? Bombay Book Depot, Girgaon, Bombay, November 1933.
Mr. Nariman has been a member of the Congress Working Committee
since January 1930.

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 297
that right was conceded, even the modified individual fight
would be called off and peace between Government' and the
people restored, though the Congress political goal is not
satisfied.' Speaking of the Mahatma's condemnation of
secrecy, he remarked: 'By what rule of modern warfare or
sport are we bound to disclose our plans and schemes before-
hand to the enemy? But I forget, it is a religious fight and
not political; so neither the rules of sport nor the canons of
modern warfare apply! Secrecy of one's plans and future
actions is the very essence of all modern national movements
and struggles.' On the decision to call off 'mass,' but retain
'individual' civil disobedience, he stated: 'Does it need an
Indian National Congress to tell an individual to break laws
on his own responsibility and take the consequences? . . .
That eternal liberty to act as he likes and take the consequences
is given to man since the days of Adam.' Then he dealt with
the Mahatma's assertion that 'continuance by even one
person (of civil disobedience) ensures revival into such an
irrepressible mass movement as no amount of repression will
suppress.' And Mr. Nariman asserted on the contrary:
'If this "one man" theory were true, India as well as Ireland
should have been transformed after this most inspiring,
unforgettable, blood-curdling, patriotic, heroic example
(referring to the self-immolation of Terence MacSwiney and
Jatin Das).... The whole misconception is again based on
the same unsustainable theory and slippery foundation—the
"change of heart" theory exploded above, that the Britisher
would pine at the suffering and yield.' Criticising the decision
to dissolve or suspend all Congress organisations, he main-
tained: 'None can dissolve the National Assemblies that have
come into existence by popular vote.' Then finally he asked:
'How can we induce Gandhiji to rid himself of this almost
incorrigible habit . . . this perpetual blundering, blending of
religion and politics?' Mr. Nariman opined that the remedy lay
in securing for Gandhiji, in place of the late Pandit Motilal Nehru,
another political taskmaster—'a plain-speaking outspoken
giant and not lip-sealed mummies who always shake their
heads like spring dolls, perpendicularly or horizontally, accord-
ing as the Mahatma pulls the strings straight or sideways.'

298 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
It was refreshing and heartening to find in the Working
Committee, at least one man who could think boldly and have
the courage to call a spade a spade. But though Mr. Nariman
was brilliant in his analysis, he was weak in action. His
suggestion for summoning the All-India Congress Committee
to end the existing stalemate was not taken seriously by the
General Secretary, Pandit Nehru and when the latter was
clapped in prison in January 1934, for making an alleged
seditious speech in Calcutta, no silver lining was visible in the
dark horizon. It was left to Dr. M. A. Ansari, the Moslem
leader of Delhi, to tackle the situation. During his visit to
England in 1933 he had been pained and humiliated by the
arrogance of the Conservative politicians and their assertion
that the Congress was down and out. That feeling was
heightened on finding on his return to India that the Congress
was in a state of suspended animation. After appealing to
the Mahatma to bring the Congress back to life once again,
he along with Dr. B. C. Roy of Calcutta, summoned a con-
ference of Congressmen of their way of thinking at Delhi in
March 1934. By that time, civil disobedience was as dead as
a door-nail, but the Congress could not function because of
the Ordinances and the Ordinances would not be withdrawn
by the Government till civil disobedience was unconditionally
withdrawn. The only way out of the mess was for the
Congress leaders to eat the humble pie, call off the civil-
disobedience campaign and thereby secure the withdrawal or
suspension of the Ordinances. The Delhi Conference pre-
pared the ground for that by resolving to revive the All-India
Swaraj Party to contest the elections to the Legislatures.¹ The
next month a larger Conference was summoned to pursue the
same topic and Ranchi (in Bihar) was chosen as the venue,
because the Mahatma would be there at the time. The
Conference confirmed the decision arrived at at Delhi to
revive the All-India Swaraj Party and the prime-movers,
Drs. Ansari and Roy, were able to secure the support of the
¹ Before the Delhi Conference, another Conference, called the Democratic
Swarajya Party Conference, had been held at Bombay at the instance of
Mr. N. C. Kelkar of Poona and Mr. Jamnadas Mehta of Bombay for
popularising the idea of fighting the next elections. This Conference had
large support from all parts of Maharashtra.

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 299
Mahatma. The next month in May—a meeting of the All-
India Congress Committee was summoned at Patna after an
interval of about three years. This meeting offered a surprise
to the public in as much as Mahatma Gandhi himself spon-
sored the idea that Congressmen should enter the Legislatures.
This decision had added importance in view of the fact that
meanwhile the Government had decided to dissolve the
Indian Legislative Assembly and hold a General Election in
November. The All-India Congress Committee decided that
instead of permitting the Swaraj Party to function, the Con-
gress should itself undertake the responsibility and a Parlia-
mentary Board was therefore set up for running the elections.
The Committee further decided to call off the civil-dis-
obedience campaign, the Mahatma, however, retaining the
right to offer civil disobedience.¹ Once again the Government
came to know in advance what the decision of the All-India
Congress Committee would be and no obstacles were there-
fore placed in the way of the Committee meeting openly,
though it was still an unlawful body. After the meeting,
when the Government felt that the defeat and humiliation of
the Congress were complete—they withdrew the ban on most
of the Congress organisations in the country and allowed
them to function.
The decision of the All-India Congress Committee to
contest the coming elections did not pass unchallenged. There
was a solid group opposed to it—but this time it was not the
old ‘No-Change’ Party that was opposing, because the leader
of that Party, the Mahatma, was himself the sponsor of the
council-entry proposal—but the newly-formed Congress
Socialist Party. While the All-India Congress Committee
was deliberating, the oppositionists held an All-India Con-
ference of their Party. This Party had strong support from
the United Provinces and Bombay, besides a fair measure of
support from all parts of India. From such information as is
¹ As early as April 7th, 1934, the Mahatma issued a statement advising
all Congressmen to suspend civil disobedience as a means of obtaining
Swaraj and asserting that in the existing circumstances, only one person,
and that himself, should bear the responsibility of civil disobedience.
This curious reservation was accepted by the All-India Congress Committee
in May and the Bombay Congress in October 1934.

300 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
available, it appears that the Congress Socialist Party has
offered a platform not only to those who are Socialists by
conviction, but also to those who are dissatisfied with the
Congress policy of council-entry. It is unfortunate that the
opposition to council-entry came from the Socialist Party,
because there is nothing anti-Socialist in fighting within the
Legislatures, if such a policy is otherwise deemed expedient.
But it may be that the Socialist Party, representing some of
the radical forces in the Congress, instinctively felt called
upon to oppose a party that had rallied all the moderate
elements. And there is no doubt that those who have taken a
leading part in the Swarajist revival of 1934, are of a different
calibre from that militant group which formed the backbone
of the Swaraj Party in 1923. It is interesting to note here
that as in 1928, the erstwhile Swarajists and 'No-Changers'
made common cause against the Independence-wallahs—so
also in 1934, these two groups seem to have closed up their
ranks against the common enemy. Though the Congress
Socialist Party has, in some respects, been harking back to
the ideas and shibboleths that were popular forty or fifty
years ago, it does stand for a radical tendency in the Nationalist
movement and the formation of such a party is a very hopeful
feature of the times. The latest reports go to show that the
organisation of the party is making headway in most of the
provinces and in the recent elections to the Bombay Congress
Committee, the Socialists claimed to have captured half the
seats.
In spite of the menace of the Socialists, the official bloc in
the Congress have not been a happy family. At the meetings
of the Working Committee held at Bombay and Benares, after
the Patna meeting in May, differences appeared over the
attitude that should be adopted towards the so-called 'Com-
munal Award' of the British Government. Pandit M. M.
Malaviya and Mr. M. S. Aney held that the Communal
Award, like the White Paper, should be strongly condemned.
The rest of the Working Committee under the influence of
the Moslem members, maintained that the Congress should
'neither accept nor reject' the Communal Award, though
they admitted that the Award was thoroughly obnoxious.

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 301
Why the Moslem leaders in the Congress have taken up this
attitude, it is difficult to say—especially when one remembers
that after the Karachi Congress, it was they, who by their
firm attitude, prevented the Mahatma from yielding to the
demand of the communalist Moslems for separate electorate.
Whatever the reason may be, the fact remains that to-day they
are holding a pistol at the Working Committee—and because
of their insistence, the Committee has been forced to take up
this ridiculous attitude of neither accepting nor rejecting the
Award. The argument ordinarily urged in favour of not
rejecting the Award is a twofold one. Firstly, the Congress
should represent all parties in the country, including the
Communalist Moslems, and secondly, that until the parties
arrive at an agreed solution, the present solution should
stand. Both the arguments are fallacious. The Congress
does not represent all the parties in the land—for instance, it
certainly does not represent the loyalists, whether Hindus or
Moslems. Secondly, it is the rejection of a bad solution that
will force us to arrive at a good solution. Like the White
Paper, the Communal Award should be straight away
rejected—no matter whether an alternative solution is
immediately available or not. Moreover, this ‘all parties’
idea is a false and dangerous idea. The party that is fighting
for freedom is the party that is solely responsible for producing
the Constitution. And so far as the Communal question is
concerned, the Congress solution is already there. Be that
as it may, in the present circumstances one is reluctantly
driven to the conclusion that the Nationalist Moslems have
been gradually—may be unconsciously—coming into line
with their Communalist co-religionists.
All attempts at a compromise having failed, Pandit Malaviya
and Mr. Aney resigned from the Congress Working Committee
and the Parliamentary Board and proceeded to form a separate
party—under the name of the Congress Nationalist Party—
with the object of fighting the Communal Award and the
White Paper. This Party held an All-India Conference in
Calcutta on August 19th, under the Presidentship of Pandit
M. M. Malaviya—the Chairman of the Reception Com-
mittee being Sir P. C. Roy, the well-known chemist and

302 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
philanthropist. The Conference was a successful one
and it was evident that public opinion in Bengal—especially
of the Hindu community—was behind the Party. Bengal
Hindus have been suffering from a just grievance because the
Communal Award has allotted them only 80 seats out of 250
in the new Legislature, while Moslems have been given 119
seats.¹ To add to this, the Poona Agreement concluded at
the time of the Mahatma's fast, has allotted 30 seats to the
depressed classes, out of these 80 seats, as against the pro-
vision for 10 in the Communal Award, though the depressed
classes issue hardly exists in Bengal. Bengal Hindus² have
therefore been greatly offended by the decision of the Work-
ing Committee not to reject the Communal Award. It is
difficult to say at this stage what will be the result of the
elections. It may, however, be a safe forecast to say that the
majority of the elected seats for Hindus will be captured by
the official Congress Party. But though the Congress
Nationalist Party will have a smaller number of seats, they
will have the solid support of the Hindu community in their
propaganda as also in their work in the Assembly. In non-
communal matters, the two Congress groups will be found
in the same lobby. So far as the Nationalist Moslems are
concerned, they hope to capture a fair percentage of the seats.
The last meeting of the Congress Working Committee and
of the Congress Parliamentary Board was held at Wardha
(Central Provinces) on September 8th, 9th and 10th. An
eleventh-hour attempt was made to bring about a com-
promise between the two Congress groups, but the effort
failed. At this meeting it transpired that the Mahatma had
been thinking seriously of retiring from active politics. It
was first surmised that the split among the Congress leaders
over the Communal Award had upset him seriously. But one
of his trusted lieutenants, Mr. Rajagopalachariar of Madras,
issued a statement on September 7th, saying: 'The cause of
¹ Under the existing Constitution, Hindus have 60 per cent. of the elected
seats in the Bengal Legislative Council. This is in accordance with the
Lucknow Pact of 1916—the agreement arrived at between the Indian
National Congress and the All-India Moslem League.
² This is also the case with the Punjab Hindus. Many of the Hindu
constituencies in Bengal and Punjab have therefore returned members
of the Congress Nationalist Party to the Assembly.

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 303
the rumour that Gandhiji is giving up the leadership of the
Congress is to be traced to the fact that Gandhiji has been
thinking of introducing reforms in the Constitution of the
Congress in order to make it more definitely purged of all
forms of violence. . . . If the Congress does not adopt his
reforms, he may even be prepared after the ensuing Congress
session to start an independent organisation to have a body
of strictly non-violent workers.' About ten days later, the
Mahatma himself issued a statement confirming the rumour
that `he had the intention of retiring, but saying that at the
request of friends, he had postponed his decision until after
the session of the Congress at Bombay. He referred to
corruption in the ranks of the Congress and declared that he
' proposed to move the following three amendments to the
constitution of the Congress:

1. Replacing the words 'legitimate and peaceful' by
   'truthful and non-violent' means to achieve the aims
   of the Congress.
2. Replacing the four-anna (anna is one-sixteenth of a
   rupee; Rs. 13½ = £1 approximately) franchise¹ by
   the delivery by every member to the Congress Depot
   of 8,000 feet of well-tested even yarn of not less
   than fifteen counts spun by himself.
3. No one to be entitled to vote in a Congress election
   unless he has been on the Congress register for six
   months and has been a habitual wearer of Khaddar
   only during the same period.
   The Mahatma concluded by saying that he apprehended
   that his suggestions would not be acceptable to the majority,
   but there was room for compromise, and if they wanted him
   as leader, they would have to give due consideration to his
   proposals.
   The annual session of the Indian National Congress is to
   be held at Bombay on October 26th, 27th and 28th, 1934,
   and the elections to the Indian Legislative Assembly under the
   ¹ According to the present constitution of the Congress, every member
   has to pay a minimum annual subscription of four annas. The Mahatma's
   idea is to make spinning obligatory on the members instead of merely
   paying a subscription.

304 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
existing Constitution are due in November. The withdrawal
of the Congress Party from the Assembly in January 1930,
made it possible for the Government to get the Ottawa
Agreement ratified by the Assembly for three years and to
have the Ordinances for suppressing the civil-disobedience
movement placed on the Statute Book. The presence of
Congressmen in the Assembly once again will cause embar-
rassment to the Government, but the Government will then
have no law-breaking campaign in the country to keep them
pre-occupied. So far as the ensuing Congress session is
concerned, a lively fight is expected on two issues. Firstly,
the Congress Nationalist Party will appeal to the All-India
Congress Committee and to the plenary session of the Con-
gress to reject the Communal Award. Secondly, the Congress
Socialist Party will press for the adoption of a Socialist
programme. Both these attempts are sure to be defeated.
On both these questions the Mahatma will get the support of
the majority of his erstwhile opponents—the Swarajists. If
they were to oppose him to a man, then he would run the
risk of being defeated on either of the above two issues. But
by sponsoring their proposal of entering the Legislatures, the
Mahatma has won the majority of them over to his side and
has thereby ensured his position within the Congress. The
present intention of the Mahatma to retire¹ from active
politics and strengthen his own Satyagrahi organisation,
or in the alternative to alter the Congress constitution accord-
ing to his own ideas, will not come as a surprise to those who
know him well. It is reminiscent of his attitude after his
release from prison in 1924 and at the Belgaum Congress that
year, when he left the field to his opponents, allowing them to
stew in their own juice. The ultimate challenge to his leader-
ship will, however, arise from the side of the Congress Socialist
Party but not from that of the Congress Nationalist Party.²
¹ After the above was written, the Mahatma announced his retirement
to the plenary session of the Congress which met in Bombay on October
26th, 1934. This so-called retirement has been referred to in Chapter XVIII.
² A message from India dated the 1st October, 1934, said that a Con-
ference of the Congress Socialist Party was recently held at Benares.
It was decided not to assist in the election campaign of the Congress
nor to accept office in any Congress organisation which did not carry
out the economic policy of the Party. Both the official Congress Party and
the Congress Nationalist Party were condemned by the Socialist Party.

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 305
During the period of 1933-34 while the Congress proceeded
from step to step in the direction of surrender, the Govern-
ment was able to strengthen its position in other directions as
well. In January 1933, judgment was finally delivered in the
long-drawn Meerut Conspiracy Case, and out of thirty-one
accused, twenty-seven were sentenced to various terms of
imprisonment. About this time the leader of the Chittagong
revolutionaries, Mr. Surjya Sen, who had successfully
evaded arrest for three years, was captured, and after a trial
before a special tribunal, was hanged together with another
comrade. In February and March, there was trouble with
some of the independent frontier tribes. But with the
assistance of the friendly Afghan Government of King Nadir
Shah and with the help of aerial bombing, the Government
were able to cope successfully with the menace. After the
publication of the White Paper in March, the Assembly
passed the following resolution moved by Sir Abdur Rahim,
the leader of the opposition:
'Unless the proposals for constitutional reform are
substantially amended in the direction of conceding greater
responsibility and freedom of action to the people's
representatives in the central and provincial spheres of
government, it will not be possible to ensure peace, content-
ment and progress of the country.'
The Government, it is hardly necessary to add, had no need
to feel embarrassed at this milk-and-water resolution.
There was some amount of public agitation over the ill-
treatment of political prisoners. For instance, in the Nasik
Jail on October 27th, 1932, Mr. Amritlal Morarji, a political
prisoner who had been given bar-fetters, was taken to a cell,
beaten by five jail-officials with batons and lifted up and
dashed down till he became unconscious. There was intense
indignation, when the news saw the light of day and Govern-
ment had to order the prosecution of the jail-officials respon-
sible for the incident. Likewise, in the Amraoti Jail in the
Central Provinces some political prisoners had been severely
assaulted on April 22nd, 1932. Agitation and inquiry went
on for about a year. Ultimately, on March 1st, 1933, the
U

306 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
Government issued a white-washing report, which, however,
admitted the use of physical force on the occasion and pro-
mised a modification of the rules applying to civil-disobedience
prisoners.
Following the publication of the White Paper in March
1933, early in April, the British Parliament appointed a Joint
Select Committee consisting of sixteen members from each
House. There were debates in both Houses on the occasion.
In the House of Commons, the Opposition was led by Mr.
Winston Churchill and Sir Henry Page-Croft and in the
Lords by Lord Lloyd and Lord Halsbury. The Committee
on April 12th, elected Lord Linlithgow as Chairman and
approved of a list of 'assessors' from India who would sit
with them, but would not be entitled to vote on any issue
nor submit any report to Parliament. The sittings of the
Joint Select Committee, with the collaboration of the Indian
assessors, commenced on May 10th, and continued for an
unusually long period. The Secretary of State for India took
the unusual step of appearing as a witness with a view to
acquainting the Committee and the Indian assessors with the
intentions of Government. His examination lasted several
weeks and he answered about 16,000 questions. In view of the
agitation against constitutional advance in India carried on
by the diehards in England led by Mr. Winston Churchill
since 1929, and especially since the publication of the White
Paper, in March 1933, it is likely that the Joint Parliamentary
Committee will further whittle down the provisions of the
White Paper.¹ The report of the Committee is expected to
be out in November 1934.
During the year 1933, the country suffered a serious loss
through the death of two of her worthiest sons. Mr. J. M.
Sengupta, who had been the Mayor of Calcutta for five
years and had been a member of the Congress Working
Committee since 1925, suddenly died of apoplexy on July
26th, while he was in internment in Ranchi under Regulation
III of 1818. On October 22nd, Mr. Vithalbhai J. Patel,
¹ Since the above was written, the Report of the Joint Parliamentary
Committee has been published and the apprehensions of the writer have
proved to be true.

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 307
former President of the Indian Assembly, and one of the
outstanding leaders of the Congress, died of heart trouble in
a Swiss clinic near Geneva. In accordance with his last
wishes his mortal remains were brought to Bombay for crema-
tion, where they were received by a procession of 200,000
people. He left all his assets (more than Rs. 100,000) for
national work.
Towards the end of 1933, the second Burma Round Table
Conference was held in London. The first Conference had
been held in November 1931, and the representatives from
Burma were not therefore invited to the second and third
session of the Indian Round Table Conference. As the
composition of the first Burma Round Table Conference had
been strongly criticised on the ground that the anti-separa-
tionists had been poorly represented, the Government had
agreed to a General Election in Burma on the issue of separa-
tion from India. This election held in November 1932, gave
a majority to the anti-separationists but taking advantage of
the fact that the Burma Legislative Council did not vote for
unconditional federation with India, the Government pro-
ceeded with their pet scheme of separation from India. The
second Burma Round Table Conference was therefore called
in 1933 and the anti-separationists, though in a majority in
Burma, were given less seats than the separationists. It is
now certain that Burma will be separated from India¹ and will
be given a bi-cameral legislature for dealing with both 'pro-
vincial' and 'central' subjects.
In December, important conferences were held as usual.
The Liberal Federation met at Madras with Mr. J. N. Basu
in the chair and condemned the White Paper. The All-
India's Women Conference had a successful session in Cal-
cutta and great enthusiasm was evinced by women represen-
tatives from all parts of India in the matter of educational
and social reform as well as in the matter of representation in
International Committees in Geneva. The Trade Union
Congress met at Cawnpore and among the resolutions passed
¹ The Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee published on
November 22nd, 1934, has provided 'for the separation of Burma from
India.

308 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
was one dealing with the grievances of the textile workers in
Bombay Presidency and the necessity of a general strike of
textile workers for enforcing their demands. Following this
decision, in the early part of 1934, a strike of textile workers
was declared in Bombay. There was enthusiastic response to
the strike-call in Bombay and there were sympathetic strikes
in other parts of the country as well. To break the strike,
the bogey of Communism was raised once again and on that
pretext, a large number of influential labour leaders in
Bombay were thrown into prison. Following Bombay, other
provinces like Punjab also saw the spectre of Communism
stalking over the land and the Kirti (Workers), Kishan
(Peasant) Party of Punjab was therefore declared illegal as
being a Communist body. While strengthening the grip over
the radical wing of the Worker's movement, the Government
also took further measures in Bengal to crush the terrorist
campaign of the revolutionaries. While the year before,
mere attempt to murder had been made punishable with
death, in 1934, possession of arms, explosives, etc., was
similarly made punishable with death. The recent attempt
to assassinate the Governor of Bengal, Sir John Anderson,
which is reminiscent of a similar attempt made two years ago¹
—shows, however, that the terrorist campaign is unfortunately
not dead as yet—though public opinion has been expressing
itself more and more against it.
The favourable situation created for the British Govern-
ment through the surrender of the Congress and the official
policy of ruthless repression, was utilised for promoting the
trade interests of Great Britain in India. Reference has
already been made to the ratification of the Ottawa Agree-
ment, whereby the principle of Empire Preference was forced
on India, in spite of her opposition and to her detriment.
During the period under consideration, two other measures
were adopted in connection with the textile trade of India
¹ In February 1932, a young woman graduate, Miss Bina Das, attempted
to shoot the Governor of Bengal, Sir Stanley Jackson, at the convocation
of the University of Calcutta. The Governor had a providential escape
and Miss Das was sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.
The latest news is to the effect that some of the would-be assassins
of Sir John Anderson have been sentenced to death.

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 309
—the Indo-Japanese Agreement and the Indo-British Agree-
ment. In spite of all the specious arguments urged in favour
of the two Agreements, Indian public opinion regards the
first agreement as a conspiracy between British and Japanese
industrialists to exploit the Indian market and the second
agreement as an unholy alliance between the British capitalists
and a section of the Indian capitalists to get the most out of
the poor Indian consumer. Till the Nationalist Party is once
again installed inside the Legislatures, it will not be possible
to undo the harm done to India by these two measures.
The elections to the Indian Legislative Assembly are at
present (November, 1934) in progress. During 1935, public
attention in India will be directed towards the tactics of the
Congress Party in the Assembly. It is extremely unlikely
that there will be any startling developments between now
and the inauguration of the new constitutional reforms.

CHAPTER XV
THE WHITE PAPER AND THE COMMUNAL AWARD¹
THE proposals contained in the White Paper issued in March,
1933, represented the tentative conclusions arrived at by the
British Government after three sessions of the Round Table
Conference. According to this scheme, India is no longer
to be divided into British India ruled directly by the British
Government, and the Indian States ruled by Indian Princes,
or Rulers or Maharajahs under the suzerainty of the British
Crown. India is to be a federation composed of the provinces
of British India, eleven in number including Sindh and
Orissa, and such of the Indian States as would voluntarily
join the Federation. Those Rulers who signify their desire
to join the Federation will have to execute a formal Instrument
of Accession transferring to the British Crown for the pur-
poses of the Federation their powers and jurisdiction in
respect of those matters which they are willing to recognise
as Federal matters. The powers and jurisdiction so trans-
ferred will be exercised by the appropriate Federal organs
created by the new Constitution Act. The Federation will
be brought into existence by the issue of a Proclamation by
His Majesty, the King-Emperor, but the proclamation will
not be issued until:
I. His Majesty has received intimation that the Rulers
of States representing not less than half the aggregate
population of the Indian States and entitled to not
less than half the seats to be allotted to the States
in the Federal Upper Chamber have signified their
desire to accede to the Federation.
and
¹ This chapter gives only a rough idea of the provisions of the White
Paper and the Communal Award. For further details which are uninter-
esting to the general reader, one should refer to—Proposals for Indian
Constitutional Reform 1933. printed and published by His Majesty's
Stationery Office, Adastral House, Kingsway London, W.C.2. Price 2s. nett.
310