द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

286 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
murder of Mr. Douglas, the District Magistrate of Midnapore
and Mr. Ellison, Additional Superintendent of Police,
Comilla. On the side of the Government the severest measures
were taken. Troops were quartered in many districts where
trouble had taken place or was apprehended and heavy
collective fines were imposed in Chittagong, Midnapore and
twenty-four Parganas Districts. Moreover, the abandoned
prison for revolutionary prisoners in the Andaman Islands
in the Bay of Bengal was reopened in spite of public protest
and political prisoners were transported there.
During the year, two important Labour Conferences were
held. The first session of the Indian Trades Union Federation
(former Right Wing of the Trade Union Congress) was held
at Madras on July 15th, with Mr. V. V. Giri in the chair.
Among the resolutions passed was one relating to the position
of labour in the future Indian Constitution. The All-India
Trade Union Congress met on September 12th at Madras,
with Mr. J. N. Mitra as President. The Trade Union Con-
gress condemned the Communal Award and the Ottawa Pact
as harmful to the best interests of the workers. It also passed
a resolution saying that in view of the sporadic strikes at
Matunga (near Bombay), Kharagpur (seventy miles from
Calcutta), Lillooah (near Calcutta), Lucknow (in the United
Provinces) and other places, it was clear that the workers in
all the railways were resolved to declare a general strike
and that the responsibility for postponing it indefinitely, lay
upon leaders like Mr. Jamnadas Mehta,`Mr. V. V. Giri and
Mr. S. C. Joshi (Right-Wing leaders), who were guiding the
policy of the Railwaymen's Federation. Attempts were made
during the year to bring about unity between the Trades
Union Federation and the Trade Union Congress, but they
proved abortive. Though a ballot of the railway workers in
May resulted in a vote for a general strike, the strike was not
launched. There were sporadic strikes, however, in many
centres and in October there was a strike at the Perambur rail-
way workshop, near Madras, which dragged on for some months.
The communal situation in India was, on the whole,
fairly satisfactory—the only exception being Bombay, where.
Hindu-Moslem riots broke out in May. In some of the Indian

THE FIGHT RESUMED 287
States, however, there was trouble. The year before, there
was trouble in Kashmir, where the peasants (who are pre-
dominantly Moslems) rose in revolt against the Hindu
Maharajah. Though the grievances were mainly economic, a
communal colouring was given to the movement by Moslem
sympathisers in British India and also by the peasants them-
selves, who in some cases attacked their Hindu fellow-subjects.
However, with the help of troops from British India, the
revolt was suppressed but as a price for the assistance rendered
him, the Maharajah had to submit to the terms of the British
Government in the matter of appointing British officers. To
appease his subjects, the Maharajah undertook to make
concessions in land revenue, to extend primary education,
to give a share of state-appointments to all communities and
to introduce a measure of constitutional reforms, including a
Legislative Assembly. The first elections to the Kashmir
Legislative Assembly took place in September 1934. In
May 1932, trouble broke out in Alwar State, similar to that
in Kashmir, the only difference being that the trouble was
more communal and less economic than in Kashmir. To put
down the rebellious Moslem subjects, troops from British
India had to be called in. The assistance was welcomed by
the Maharaja, but when the British Government sought to
impose their conditions,¹ the Maharajah refused to submit.
The dispute between the Maharajah, and the British Govern-
ment went on for some time, but ultimately the former was
ordered to leave his state. That order holds good to-day.
One of the surprises of the year was the result of the
elections held in Burma in November 1932 to decide whether
Burma was in favour of separation from India. The year
before, Burma had been in the throes of a peasant rebellion,
a serious disturbance, the like of which India had not seen
since 1857. The rebellion continued for more than a year.
In 1932, the situation gradually became quiet and orders were
issued for a General Election. On the ground that the
electoral rolls had been prepared in 1931, when many of the
¹ One of the conditions was that the Maharajah should submit to a
Control Commission, The trouble of May 1932 subsided by September.
But agrarian unrest of a violent type broke out in January 1933. In
May 1933 the Maharajah was ordered to leave his state.

288. THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
     districts were in a state of revolt and the Anti-Separationist
     Party had no interest in an election, the Anti-Separationist
     leaders asked for fresh electoral rolls. The Government
     turned down the request and the elections were held on the
     basis of the old rolls. Nevertheless, the Anti-Separationists
     came out with a clear majority. When the newly-elected
     Council met in December, after a lengthy debate, the follow-
     ing resolution was carried without a division:
289. This Council opposes the separation of Burma from
     India on the basis of the Constitution for a separated
     Burma as outlined in the statement of the Prime
     Minister at the Burma Round Table Conference on
     January 12th, 1932.
290. This Council emphatically opposes the unconditional
     and permanent federation of Burma with India.
291. This Council will continue to oppose the separation
     of Burma from India until Burma is granted a Con-
     stitution on certain terms (as defined in the amend-
     ment).
     In the alternative, the Council proposes that Burma
     shall enter the Indian Federation on certain terms and
     conditions including the right of secession.
292. The Council urges that a conference be called at an
     early date for the purpose of determining the future
     Constitution of Burma as a separate unit on the basis
     defined or as a unit in the Indian Federation accord-
     ing to the terms defined with right to secede.
     (Clauses three and four were the amendments incor-
     porated in the resolution.)
     The Government, however, interpreted this resolution as a
     vote not given for unqualified federation with India, and they
     maintained that conditional federation, i.e., federation with
     the right to secede, was not possible. The present policy of
     the Government is to separate Burma from India and in
     accordance with that policy, Burma was not invited to send
     members to the third session of the Round Table Conference
     in November-December, 1932.
     Towards the end of November a very important matter
     came up for consideration before the Indian Legislative

THE FIGHT RESUMED 289
Assembly—the Ottawa Agreement. This Agreement had
been entered into by the nominees of the Government of
India who had attended the Imperial Economic Conference
at Ottawa, in Canada, in August 1932. The purpose of the
Agreement was to force on India a scheme of Empire pre-
ference whereby India was to give to Great Britain pre-
ferences covering no less than twenty-six per cent. of her
imports. There was considerable agitation in the country
against the ratification of the Ottawa Agreement. In the
absence of the Nationalist members in the Assembly, it was
however impossible to throw out the Agreement. The
Agreement was referred to a Select Committee and the majority
report moved by Sir H. S. Gour was adopted by the Assembly.
The Agreement was ratified for a period of three years at the
end of which the matter would come up again before the
Assembly for consideration. It was further provided that the
Government should prepare an annual report reviewing the
effect on India’s export and import trade of the preferences
and that the report should be examined by a Committee of
fifteen members appointed by the Assembly. The new
Ottawa duties came into operation on January 16th, 1933.
In this connection it should be noted that since England
went off the Gold Standard on September 21st, 1931, the
total value of gold exported from Bombay up to December
31st, 1932, amounted to Rs. 105, 27, 60, 190 (Rs. 13½ = £1
approximately) or about 1,053 million rupees. Repeated
appeals were made to the Government by Chambers of
Commerce, business men and public leaders to stop this flow
of gold from the country, but to no avail. The Maharashtra
Chamber of Commerce, Bombay, for instance, wrote to the
Government of India towards the end of October, that fol-
lowing the example of the Bank of England, the Government
of India should buy up gold. According to the Chamber,
since India had a gold bullion reserve of only Rs. 112.3 millions
against a note circulation of Rs. 1,752.6 millions, the Govern-
ment would be well advised to buy up more gold.¹
¹ The flow of gold from India has been going on unchecked ever since.
According to a Press statement issued from Bombay on October 6th, 1934,
the total value of gold exported from Bombay since England went off the
Gold Standard amounts to Rs. 197,89,40,886—or about 1979 million rupees.
T

290 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
There was another important matter which came up before
the Assembly in September—the Criminal Law Amendment
Bill 1932. The purpose of this Bill was to place on the Statute
Book the Ordinances which had been promulgated in January
by the Viceroy and had been renewed in June as Special
Powers Ordinance, 1932. As the Ordinance was to lapse in
December, it had either to be renewed again or permanently
placed on the Statute Book. In connection with this Bill, as
in connection with the Ottawa Agreement, the absence of
the Nationalist members, who had resigned in 1930, was
keenly felt. The Bill was passed into Law in November.
In August a delegation of the India League of London,
consisting of Miss Wilkinson, ex-M.P., Miss Monica Whately,
Mr. Leonard Matters and Mr. Krishna Menon (Secretary),
arrived in India to study the political situation in the country.
During their stay in India they did not make public speeches,
nor did they give interviews to the Press. Only once on the
occasion of the fast of Mahatma Gandhi—were they moved
to breaking their silence and they declared: ‘The removal of
Mahatma Gandhi means the disappearance of the greatest
force working for moderation, peace and friendship towards
Britain.’
Reviewing the year 1932 as a whole, one may say that it
opened in the midst of excitement and enthusiasm. But as
had happened before with Mahatma Gandhi’s movement, it
ended in an anti-climax. The ‘epic fast’ of the Mahatma
was the turning-point and from that moment onwards, the
Government definitely got the better of the Congress. As
the year came to a close, the thought that was uppermost in
the minds of most Congressmen was how to push on the
anti-untouchability campaign and resolutions were being
passed from many a platform at the instance of the Congress
leaders, asking the Viceroy to accord sanction to the Temple
Entry Bills in the Madras Legislative Council and the Indian
Legislative Assembly. Civil disobedience indeed!

CHAPTER XIV
DEFEAT AND SURRENDER (1933-34)
WITH the dawn of the new year, Congressmen who were more
politically-minded, began to realise that the civil-disobedience
movement was in danger of fizzling out. The Independence
Day celebrations on January 26th, 1933, were therefore
organised with much enthusiasm with a view to rousing the
people again. The response everywhere was encouraging.
In Calcutta alone, the police had to make 300 arrests besides
using force to break up the demonstrations. In Badanganj in
Arambagh Sub-division of Hooghly District in Bengal, the
police resorted to shooting for dispersing the Congress
procession. 'Following the Independence Day celebrations,
Mrs. Gandhi was arrested at Borsad in Gujerat and sentenced
to six months' imprisonment on February 7th, for leading a
procession of women. As soon as the White Paper embodying
the Government proposals regarding the Indian Con-
stitutional Reforms was announced on March 17th, the annual
session of the India National Congress was convened at
Calcutta with Pandit Madan Mohon Malaviya as the President-
elect. The Congress session was at once banned like the
Delhi session of 1932—nevertheless, delegates and leaders
assembled in Calcutta from all parts of the country on April
11th, for the occasion. The important leaders who could be
easily spotted out were all arrested—including Pandit Mala-
viya, Mrs. Motilal Nehru, Mr. M. S. Aney (Central Pro-
vinces), Dr. Alam (Punjab), Dr. Syed Mahmud (Bihar), all of
them being members of the Congress Working Committee
with the exception of Mrs. Nehru. Thereafter, Mrs. J. M.
Sengupta proceeded to the appointed place at the head of
2,500 Congressmen for holding the meeting and under her
presidentship the meeting was held. Resolutions were passed
reaffirming (1) the goal of independence; (2) the efficacy of
the method of civil disobedience for attaining that goal, and
291

292 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
(3) the boycott of foreign cloth and of British goods of all
kinds. The most important resolution was one emphatically
condemning the White Paper proposals. Before the meeting
ended, large contingents of police arrived on the scene,
arrested Mrs. Sengupta and 250 others, including 40 ladies
and dispersed the meeting by force. The following extract
from the speech of the President-elect, the venerable Pandit
Malaviya, reflects the feeling of the country at the time:
'It is estimated that nearly 120,000 persons including
several thousand women and quite a number of children
have been arrested and imprisoned during the last fifteen
months. It is an open secret that when the Government
started repression, the official expectation was that they
would crush the Congress in six weeks' time. Fifteen
months have not enabled the Government to achieve that
object. Twice fifteen months will not enable it to do so.'
This was not the review made by a young hot-head but by
one of the oldest and most moderate leaders of the Congress.
Consequently, the response made by the country to the
Congress appeal in 1932 and 1933, in spite of lack of prepara-
tion, in spite of the sudden arrest of the organisers and
financiers of the Party early in January 1932, and in spite of
the diversion caused by the Mahatma's fast in September
1932 and the anti-untouchability campaign thereafter—can
by no means be regarded as unsatisfactory. Nevertheless,
the country was startled one fine morning in May to hear that
the Mahatma had suspended the civil-disobedience campaign.
While in prison the Mahatma had decided to go on a three
weeks' fast¹ as a penance, because his followers outside had
not made sufficient progress with the anti-untouchability
campaign. The object of the fast was to bring about a change
of heart—not in the bureaucracy but in his countrymen—
who were responsible for the sad plight of the untouchables.
The Government had no objection to a fast of that kind and
¹ After the famous September fast, the Mahatma had fasted once again
in December, but that fast had been a short one. The present fast was
described by him as a 'heart-prayer for purification of myself and my
associates for greater vigilance and watchfulness in connection with the
Harijan cause.'

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 293
as a matter of fact, thanks to British news-agencies, the fast
was given wide publicity in the European Press,¹ because it
helped to advertise the internal differences of the Indian
people. However, the Government considered it prudent to
set him free. The day after his release he made the announce-
ment referred to above.² At first the civil-disobedience cam-
paign was suspended for six weeks, but the suspension
was subsequently extended for six weeks more, i.e., till
the end of July. The sudden suspension of the campaign
without rhyme or reason, would under ordinary circumstances
have produced a widespread revolt in the Congress organi-
sation, but since he was in the middle of a fast which could
end fatally, all judgment was suspended for the time being.
While suspending the civil-disobedience campaign, the
Mahatma made an appeal to the Government of India to
withdraw the Ordinances and release the civil-disobedience
prisoners. But, unfortunately, a settled Government pre-
serves a continuity of policy and cannot alter its policy over-
night as an individual can. The Government’s reply was
therefore a refusal. While responsible Congressmen in India
were unwilling or afraid to speak out against the Mahatma
after his surrender of May 1933, a manifesto was issued by
the late Mr. Vithalbhai J. Patel³ and the writer from Vienna,
condemning the Mahatma’s decision. The manifesto stated
that the decision virtually undid the work and the sacrifice
of the last thirteen years. It signified a failure of the civil-
¹ The writer was in Vienna when the news regarding the fast appeared
in the Continental Press. After 14 months' incarceration when his health
was in an alarming condition, Lt.-Col. Buckley, I.M.S. of Lucknow who
had been treating him, recommended his transfer to Europe for treatment.
Thereupon the Government of India permitted him to leave for Europe
on his own financial responsibility. He was released at Bombay when
he sailed and arrived in Vienna in March, 1933.
² It is a matter for conjecture if the Government knew that the Mahatma
would suspend the civil-disobedience campaign if he were set free. On
May 8th, 1933, when the Mahatma started his fast the Government issued a
communiqué stating that in view of the nature of the object of the fast
and the attitude of mind which it disclosed, the Government had decided
that the Mahatma should be set at liberty. After his release, the sus-
pension of civil disobedience was ordered by the Acting President of the
Congress, Mr. Aney, on the 'recommendation' of the Mahatma.
³ The late Mr. V. J. Patel had returned from the United States after
three months' strenuous propaganda on behalf of India which ultimately
cost him his life. He, as well as the writer, were undergoing treatment
in Vienna at the time.

294 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
disobedience campaign, as also of Mahatma Gandhi's leader-
ship. It was therefore time to turn to a more radical policy
and leadership. Owing to the preoccupation of the public
over Mahatma Gandhi's health, the manifesto did not, how-
ever, produce the effect which it would otherwise have.
Even friends thought that it was an outrageous act to criticise
the Mahatma when his life was in jeopardy because of the fast.
In July, a Conference of important Congressmen, then out
of prison, was held at Poona. It could be regarded as an
unofficial meeting of the All-India Congress Committee.
Two groups were represented at the Conference—one in
favour of calling off the movement altogether and the other
in favour of resuming it with full vigour. The former group
had probably a majority and most of the members of this
group were in favour of reviving the Swarajist policy of
carrying the fight inside the Legislatures which had been
abandoned at the Lahore Congress in December 1929. Never-
theless, at the end, the Conference decided to give in to the,
Mahatma. At his instance it was decided that the Mahatma
should make a further attempt to see the Viceroy and come to
an understanding with him. If this failed, the Congress
should resume 'individual' civil disobedience, but that 'mass'
civil disobedience should be given up altogether. The purpose
of this was that the Congress should not organise any cam-
paign on a mass scale but should leave it to individuals to
break any laws that they felt called upon to on their personal
responsibility. Soon after the Poona Conference the Mahatma
approached the Viceroy for an interview—but all that he got
was a humiliating rebuff. He and some of his closest fol-
lowers, thereupon, proceeded to start civil disobedience
individually and by August 1933, they found themselves in
prison once again. This time even the Mahatma's incarcera-
tion did not create a great stir.
'Individual' civil disobedience was offered all over India
by the loyal adherents of the Mahatma and a few hundred
persons were thereby thrust back into prison. But it was a
foregone conclusion that where mass civil disobedience had
failed, individual civil disobedience would not produce any
appreciable effect. On reaching prison, the Mahatma found

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 295
that the facilities afforded him since September 1932, during
his last incarceration, for conducting the anti-untouchability
campaign from behind the prison walls—would not be given
*him this time.*¹ He thereupon gave notice to the Government
that if he did not get those facilities, he would feel called upon
to resort to fasting. It is difficult for a layman to reconcile
this attitude of the Mahatma with his lifelong principle that
a Satyagrahi prisoner should voluntarily submit to jail dis-
cipline. However, the Government once again found them-
selves in an uncomfortable position. By that time they had
realised that individual civil disobedience was going to fizzle
out and consequently there would be no risk in setting the
Mahatma at liberty. So once more the Mahatma found
himself a free man. On coming out from prison, the Mahatma
announced that since he had been sentenced to one year's
imprisonment in August 1933, and since he had been released
by the Government before the expiry of his term, he would
consider himself as a prisoner till August 1934, and would
not offer civil disobedience during that period.
Before offering civil disobedience, the Mahatma had issued
a statement in July to the effect that there was too much
secrecy in the affairs of the Congress and in the management
of the civil-disobedience campaign and this secrecy was
largely responsible for the failure that had overtaken the
Congress. In the Mahatma's opinion, the Congress organisa-
tions had become corrupt bodies. Soon after this, at the
instance of the Mahatma, the Acting-President of the Congress,
Mr. M. S. Aney, issued orders, dissolving all Congress
organisations in the country. Confusion worse confounded!
What were the people to do? Normal human reason could
not follow the logic of the Mahatma and those who could be
expected to speak out 'the plain truth, were not available.
At this juncture, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was released from
prison after serving his term of two years' imprisonment. All
eyes were turned on him. He was the one man who could
influence the Mahatma—who could drag the Congress out of
¹ The reason given by the Government was that on the former occasion
he had been incarcerated without trial, whereas on this occasion he was
convicted after trial.

296 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
the mess into which it had fallen. Pandit Nehru had long
talks with the Mahatma and following that, an interchange of
letters. The correspondence was duly published, but on
perusal it was found to be more doctrinaire than practical.
What the public wanted to know urgently was not whether
and wherein Pandit J. L. Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi
agreed or disagreed fundamentally—but how the Congress
could be restored to life and vigour. During his four months
of comparative freedom, Pandit Nehru wrote and spoke
freely and gave expression to his socialistic—or communistic
—ideas, but the Congress did not show any signs of resus-
citation. In an exceedingly interesting and able article under
the caption 'Whither India?'—he pleaded for social and
economic equality—for the ending of all special class-privi-
leges and vested interests—but that did not help the Congress
one jot or tittle. With a popularity only second to that of the
Mahatma, with unbounded prestige among his countrymen,
with a clear brain possessing the finest ideas, with an up-to-
date knowledge of modern world movements—that he
should be found wanting in the essential quality of leadership,
namely the capacity to make decisions and face unpopularity
if need be,¹ was a great disappointment. But there was no help
for it. What had been expected of him had to be accom-
plished by lesser men.
After Pandit Nehru, Mr. K. F. Nariman the Bombay
leader, was released and without delay he began to give public
expression to his views² on the decisions of the Poona
Conference in July 1933. Referring to the Mahatma's decision
to start civil disobedience in August 1933, because the Viceroy
did not grant him an unconditional interview, he said, ' "Inter-
view or Death" is the national slogan for the present. : . .
The renewed fight in August last is not for Swaraj, nor even
for political constitutional advance, but for the assertion of a
supposed "national right" of an unconditional interview. If
¹ This defect in Pandit J. L. Nehru was manifest on other occasions as
well, when the Congress was passing through a crisis—e.g., in the crisis
of 1923-24 and subsequently in the crisis of 1928-29.
² For a full statement of his views one should refer to his book, Whither
Congress? Bombay Book Depot, Girgaon, Bombay, November 1933.
Mr. Nariman has been a member of the Congress Working Committee
since January 1930.

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 297
that right was conceded, even the modified individual fight
would be called off and peace between Government' and the
people restored, though the Congress political goal is not
satisfied.' Speaking of the Mahatma's condemnation of
secrecy, he remarked: 'By what rule of modern warfare or
sport are we bound to disclose our plans and schemes before-
hand to the enemy? But I forget, it is a religious fight and
not political; so neither the rules of sport nor the canons of
modern warfare apply! Secrecy of one's plans and future
actions is the very essence of all modern national movements
and struggles.' On the decision to call off 'mass,' but retain
'individual' civil disobedience, he stated: 'Does it need an
Indian National Congress to tell an individual to break laws
on his own responsibility and take the consequences? . . .
That eternal liberty to act as he likes and take the consequences
is given to man since the days of Adam.' Then he dealt with
the Mahatma's assertion that 'continuance by even one
person (of civil disobedience) ensures revival into such an
irrepressible mass movement as no amount of repression will
suppress.' And Mr. Nariman asserted on the contrary:
'If this "one man" theory were true, India as well as Ireland
should have been transformed after this most inspiring,
unforgettable, blood-curdling, patriotic, heroic example
(referring to the self-immolation of Terence MacSwiney and
Jatin Das).... The whole misconception is again based on
the same unsustainable theory and slippery foundation—the
"change of heart" theory exploded above, that the Britisher
would pine at the suffering and yield.' Criticising the decision
to dissolve or suspend all Congress organisations, he main-
tained: 'None can dissolve the National Assemblies that have
come into existence by popular vote.' Then finally he asked:
'How can we induce Gandhiji to rid himself of this almost
incorrigible habit . . . this perpetual blundering, blending of
religion and politics?' Mr. Nariman opined that the remedy lay
in securing for Gandhiji, in place of the late Pandit Motilal Nehru,
another political taskmaster—'a plain-speaking outspoken
giant and not lip-sealed mummies who always shake their
heads like spring dolls, perpendicularly or horizontally, accord-
ing as the Mahatma pulls the strings straight or sideways.'

298 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
It was refreshing and heartening to find in the Working
Committee, at least one man who could think boldly and have
the courage to call a spade a spade. But though Mr. Nariman
was brilliant in his analysis, he was weak in action. His
suggestion for summoning the All-India Congress Committee
to end the existing stalemate was not taken seriously by the
General Secretary, Pandit Nehru and when the latter was
clapped in prison in January 1934, for making an alleged
seditious speech in Calcutta, no silver lining was visible in the
dark horizon. It was left to Dr. M. A. Ansari, the Moslem
leader of Delhi, to tackle the situation. During his visit to
England in 1933 he had been pained and humiliated by the
arrogance of the Conservative politicians and their assertion
that the Congress was down and out. That feeling was
heightened on finding on his return to India that the Congress
was in a state of suspended animation. After appealing to
the Mahatma to bring the Congress back to life once again,
he along with Dr. B. C. Roy of Calcutta, summoned a con-
ference of Congressmen of their way of thinking at Delhi in
March 1934. By that time, civil disobedience was as dead as
a door-nail, but the Congress could not function because of
the Ordinances and the Ordinances would not be withdrawn
by the Government till civil disobedience was unconditionally
withdrawn. The only way out of the mess was for the
Congress leaders to eat the humble pie, call off the civil-
disobedience campaign and thereby secure the withdrawal or
suspension of the Ordinances. The Delhi Conference pre-
pared the ground for that by resolving to revive the All-India
Swaraj Party to contest the elections to the Legislatures.¹ The
next month a larger Conference was summoned to pursue the
same topic and Ranchi (in Bihar) was chosen as the venue,
because the Mahatma would be there at the time. The
Conference confirmed the decision arrived at at Delhi to
revive the All-India Swaraj Party and the prime-movers,
Drs. Ansari and Roy, were able to secure the support of the
¹ Before the Delhi Conference, another Conference, called the Democratic
Swarajya Party Conference, had been held at Bombay at the instance of
Mr. N. C. Kelkar of Poona and Mr. Jamnadas Mehta of Bombay for
popularising the idea of fighting the next elections. This Conference had
large support from all parts of Maharashtra.

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 299
Mahatma. The next month in May—a meeting of the All-
India Congress Committee was summoned at Patna after an
interval of about three years. This meeting offered a surprise
to the public in as much as Mahatma Gandhi himself spon-
sored the idea that Congressmen should enter the Legislatures.
This decision had added importance in view of the fact that
meanwhile the Government had decided to dissolve the
Indian Legislative Assembly and hold a General Election in
November. The All-India Congress Committee decided that
instead of permitting the Swaraj Party to function, the Con-
gress should itself undertake the responsibility and a Parlia-
mentary Board was therefore set up for running the elections.
The Committee further decided to call off the civil-dis-
obedience campaign, the Mahatma, however, retaining the
right to offer civil disobedience.¹ Once again the Government
came to know in advance what the decision of the All-India
Congress Committee would be and no obstacles were there-
fore placed in the way of the Committee meeting openly,
though it was still an unlawful body. After the meeting,
when the Government felt that the defeat and humiliation of
the Congress were complete—they withdrew the ban on most
of the Congress organisations in the country and allowed
them to function.
The decision of the All-India Congress Committee to
contest the coming elections did not pass unchallenged. There
was a solid group opposed to it—but this time it was not the
old ‘No-Change’ Party that was opposing, because the leader
of that Party, the Mahatma, was himself the sponsor of the
council-entry proposal—but the newly-formed Congress
Socialist Party. While the All-India Congress Committee
was deliberating, the oppositionists held an All-India Con-
ference of their Party. This Party had strong support from
the United Provinces and Bombay, besides a fair measure of
support from all parts of India. From such information as is
¹ As early as April 7th, 1934, the Mahatma issued a statement advising
all Congressmen to suspend civil disobedience as a means of obtaining
Swaraj and asserting that in the existing circumstances, only one person,
and that himself, should bear the responsibility of civil disobedience.
This curious reservation was accepted by the All-India Congress Committee
in May and the Bombay Congress in October 1934.

300 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
available, it appears that the Congress Socialist Party has
offered a platform not only to those who are Socialists by
conviction, but also to those who are dissatisfied with the
Congress policy of council-entry. It is unfortunate that the
opposition to council-entry came from the Socialist Party,
because there is nothing anti-Socialist in fighting within the
Legislatures, if such a policy is otherwise deemed expedient.
But it may be that the Socialist Party, representing some of
the radical forces in the Congress, instinctively felt called
upon to oppose a party that had rallied all the moderate
elements. And there is no doubt that those who have taken a
leading part in the Swarajist revival of 1934, are of a different
calibre from that militant group which formed the backbone
of the Swaraj Party in 1923. It is interesting to note here
that as in 1928, the erstwhile Swarajists and 'No-Changers'
made common cause against the Independence-wallahs—so
also in 1934, these two groups seem to have closed up their
ranks against the common enemy. Though the Congress
Socialist Party has, in some respects, been harking back to
the ideas and shibboleths that were popular forty or fifty
years ago, it does stand for a radical tendency in the Nationalist
movement and the formation of such a party is a very hopeful
feature of the times. The latest reports go to show that the
organisation of the party is making headway in most of the
provinces and in the recent elections to the Bombay Congress
Committee, the Socialists claimed to have captured half the
seats.
In spite of the menace of the Socialists, the official bloc in
the Congress have not been a happy family. At the meetings
of the Working Committee held at Bombay and Benares, after
the Patna meeting in May, differences appeared over the
attitude that should be adopted towards the so-called 'Com-
munal Award' of the British Government. Pandit M. M.
Malaviya and Mr. M. S. Aney held that the Communal
Award, like the White Paper, should be strongly condemned.
The rest of the Working Committee under the influence of
the Moslem members, maintained that the Congress should
'neither accept nor reject' the Communal Award, though
they admitted that the Award was thoroughly obnoxious.

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 301
Why the Moslem leaders in the Congress have taken up this
attitude, it is difficult to say—especially when one remembers
that after the Karachi Congress, it was they, who by their
firm attitude, prevented the Mahatma from yielding to the
demand of the communalist Moslems for separate electorate.
Whatever the reason may be, the fact remains that to-day they
are holding a pistol at the Working Committee—and because
of their insistence, the Committee has been forced to take up
this ridiculous attitude of neither accepting nor rejecting the
Award. The argument ordinarily urged in favour of not
rejecting the Award is a twofold one. Firstly, the Congress
should represent all parties in the country, including the
Communalist Moslems, and secondly, that until the parties
arrive at an agreed solution, the present solution should
stand. Both the arguments are fallacious. The Congress
does not represent all the parties in the land—for instance, it
certainly does not represent the loyalists, whether Hindus or
Moslems. Secondly, it is the rejection of a bad solution that
will force us to arrive at a good solution. Like the White
Paper, the Communal Award should be straight away
rejected—no matter whether an alternative solution is
immediately available or not. Moreover, this ‘all parties’
idea is a false and dangerous idea. The party that is fighting
for freedom is the party that is solely responsible for producing
the Constitution. And so far as the Communal question is
concerned, the Congress solution is already there. Be that
as it may, in the present circumstances one is reluctantly
driven to the conclusion that the Nationalist Moslems have
been gradually—may be unconsciously—coming into line
with their Communalist co-religionists.
All attempts at a compromise having failed, Pandit Malaviya
and Mr. Aney resigned from the Congress Working Committee
and the Parliamentary Board and proceeded to form a separate
party—under the name of the Congress Nationalist Party—
with the object of fighting the Communal Award and the
White Paper. This Party held an All-India Conference in
Calcutta on August 19th, under the Presidentship of Pandit
M. M. Malaviya—the Chairman of the Reception Com-
mittee being Sir P. C. Roy, the well-known chemist and

302 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
philanthropist. The Conference was a successful one
and it was evident that public opinion in Bengal—especially
of the Hindu community—was behind the Party. Bengal
Hindus have been suffering from a just grievance because the
Communal Award has allotted them only 80 seats out of 250
in the new Legislature, while Moslems have been given 119
seats.¹ To add to this, the Poona Agreement concluded at
the time of the Mahatma's fast, has allotted 30 seats to the
depressed classes, out of these 80 seats, as against the pro-
vision for 10 in the Communal Award, though the depressed
classes issue hardly exists in Bengal. Bengal Hindus² have
therefore been greatly offended by the decision of the Work-
ing Committee not to reject the Communal Award. It is
difficult to say at this stage what will be the result of the
elections. It may, however, be a safe forecast to say that the
majority of the elected seats for Hindus will be captured by
the official Congress Party. But though the Congress
Nationalist Party will have a smaller number of seats, they
will have the solid support of the Hindu community in their
propaganda as also in their work in the Assembly. In non-
communal matters, the two Congress groups will be found
in the same lobby. So far as the Nationalist Moslems are
concerned, they hope to capture a fair percentage of the seats.
The last meeting of the Congress Working Committee and
of the Congress Parliamentary Board was held at Wardha
(Central Provinces) on September 8th, 9th and 10th. An
eleventh-hour attempt was made to bring about a com-
promise between the two Congress groups, but the effort
failed. At this meeting it transpired that the Mahatma had
been thinking seriously of retiring from active politics. It
was first surmised that the split among the Congress leaders
over the Communal Award had upset him seriously. But one
of his trusted lieutenants, Mr. Rajagopalachariar of Madras,
issued a statement on September 7th, saying: 'The cause of
¹ Under the existing Constitution, Hindus have 60 per cent. of the elected
seats in the Bengal Legislative Council. This is in accordance with the
Lucknow Pact of 1916—the agreement arrived at between the Indian
National Congress and the All-India Moslem League.
² This is also the case with the Punjab Hindus. Many of the Hindu
constituencies in Bengal and Punjab have therefore returned members
of the Congress Nationalist Party to the Assembly.

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 303
the rumour that Gandhiji is giving up the leadership of the
Congress is to be traced to the fact that Gandhiji has been
thinking of introducing reforms in the Constitution of the
Congress in order to make it more definitely purged of all
forms of violence. . . . If the Congress does not adopt his
reforms, he may even be prepared after the ensuing Congress
session to start an independent organisation to have a body
of strictly non-violent workers.' About ten days later, the
Mahatma himself issued a statement confirming the rumour
that `he had the intention of retiring, but saying that at the
request of friends, he had postponed his decision until after
the session of the Congress at Bombay. He referred to
corruption in the ranks of the Congress and declared that he
' proposed to move the following three amendments to the
constitution of the Congress:

1. Replacing the words 'legitimate and peaceful' by
   'truthful and non-violent' means to achieve the aims
   of the Congress.
2. Replacing the four-anna (anna is one-sixteenth of a
   rupee; Rs. 13½ = £1 approximately) franchise¹ by
   the delivery by every member to the Congress Depot
   of 8,000 feet of well-tested even yarn of not less
   than fifteen counts spun by himself.
3. No one to be entitled to vote in a Congress election
   unless he has been on the Congress register for six
   months and has been a habitual wearer of Khaddar
   only during the same period.
   The Mahatma concluded by saying that he apprehended
   that his suggestions would not be acceptable to the majority,
   but there was room for compromise, and if they wanted him
   as leader, they would have to give due consideration to his
   proposals.
   The annual session of the Indian National Congress is to
   be held at Bombay on October 26th, 27th and 28th, 1934,
   and the elections to the Indian Legislative Assembly under the
   ¹ According to the present constitution of the Congress, every member
   has to pay a minimum annual subscription of four annas. The Mahatma's
   idea is to make spinning obligatory on the members instead of merely
   paying a subscription.

304 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
existing Constitution are due in November. The withdrawal
of the Congress Party from the Assembly in January 1930,
made it possible for the Government to get the Ottawa
Agreement ratified by the Assembly for three years and to
have the Ordinances for suppressing the civil-disobedience
movement placed on the Statute Book. The presence of
Congressmen in the Assembly once again will cause embar-
rassment to the Government, but the Government will then
have no law-breaking campaign in the country to keep them
pre-occupied. So far as the ensuing Congress session is
concerned, a lively fight is expected on two issues. Firstly,
the Congress Nationalist Party will appeal to the All-India
Congress Committee and to the plenary session of the Con-
gress to reject the Communal Award. Secondly, the Congress
Socialist Party will press for the adoption of a Socialist
programme. Both these attempts are sure to be defeated.
On both these questions the Mahatma will get the support of
the majority of his erstwhile opponents—the Swarajists. If
they were to oppose him to a man, then he would run the
risk of being defeated on either of the above two issues. But
by sponsoring their proposal of entering the Legislatures, the
Mahatma has won the majority of them over to his side and
has thereby ensured his position within the Congress. The
present intention of the Mahatma to retire¹ from active
politics and strengthen his own Satyagrahi organisation,
or in the alternative to alter the Congress constitution accord-
ing to his own ideas, will not come as a surprise to those who
know him well. It is reminiscent of his attitude after his
release from prison in 1924 and at the Belgaum Congress that
year, when he left the field to his opponents, allowing them to
stew in their own juice. The ultimate challenge to his leader-
ship will, however, arise from the side of the Congress Socialist
Party but not from that of the Congress Nationalist Party.²
¹ After the above was written, the Mahatma announced his retirement
to the plenary session of the Congress which met in Bombay on October
26th, 1934. This so-called retirement has been referred to in Chapter XVIII.
² A message from India dated the 1st October, 1934, said that a Con-
ference of the Congress Socialist Party was recently held at Benares.
It was decided not to assist in the election campaign of the Congress
nor to accept office in any Congress organisation which did not carry
out the economic policy of the Party. Both the official Congress Party and
the Congress Nationalist Party were condemned by the Socialist Party.

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 305
During the period of 1933-34 while the Congress proceeded
from step to step in the direction of surrender, the Govern-
ment was able to strengthen its position in other directions as
well. In January 1933, judgment was finally delivered in the
long-drawn Meerut Conspiracy Case, and out of thirty-one
accused, twenty-seven were sentenced to various terms of
imprisonment. About this time the leader of the Chittagong
revolutionaries, Mr. Surjya Sen, who had successfully
evaded arrest for three years, was captured, and after a trial
before a special tribunal, was hanged together with another
comrade. In February and March, there was trouble with
some of the independent frontier tribes. But with the
assistance of the friendly Afghan Government of King Nadir
Shah and with the help of aerial bombing, the Government
were able to cope successfully with the menace. After the
publication of the White Paper in March, the Assembly
passed the following resolution moved by Sir Abdur Rahim,
the leader of the opposition:
'Unless the proposals for constitutional reform are
substantially amended in the direction of conceding greater
responsibility and freedom of action to the people's
representatives in the central and provincial spheres of
government, it will not be possible to ensure peace, content-
ment and progress of the country.'
The Government, it is hardly necessary to add, had no need
to feel embarrassed at this milk-and-water resolution.
There was some amount of public agitation over the ill-
treatment of political prisoners. For instance, in the Nasik
Jail on October 27th, 1932, Mr. Amritlal Morarji, a political
prisoner who had been given bar-fetters, was taken to a cell,
beaten by five jail-officials with batons and lifted up and
dashed down till he became unconscious. There was intense
indignation, when the news saw the light of day and Govern-
ment had to order the prosecution of the jail-officials respon-
sible for the incident. Likewise, in the Amraoti Jail in the
Central Provinces some political prisoners had been severely
assaulted on April 22nd, 1932. Agitation and inquiry went
on for about a year. Ultimately, on March 1st, 1933, the
U