द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

130 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
the height of his glory and was expected to achieve great
things for his country. While in memoriam meetings and
processions were going on in the country, the British Cabinet
in London made up their mind as to what they should do.
Their arch-enemy was dead; therefore, things would settle
down now for a while. They would accordingly not decide
anything in a hurry but would watch developments. But
it had already been announced that Lord Birkenhead would
make an important pronouncement about India on July 7th,
1925. Therefore, the announcement carefully prepared on
behalf of the Cabinet had to be entirely suppressed and in its
place Lord Birkenhead, on the previously announced date,
made an uninteresting speech. Besides talking about plati-
tudes, he merely endorsed Lord Reading's panacea for India's
ills in the form of development of industry and the stabilisa-
tion of finance.
The death of the Deshbandhu on June 16th, 1925, was for
India a national calamity of the first magnitude. Though his
active political career consisted of barely five years, his rise
had been phenomenal. With the reckless abandon of a
Vaishnava devotee, he had plunged into the political move-
ment with heart and soul and he had given not only himself
but his all in the fight for Swaraj. When he died, whatever
worldly possessions he still had, were left to the nation. By
the Government he was both feared and admired. They feared
his strength, but admired his character. They knew that he
was a man of his word. They also knew, that though he was
a hard fighter, he was none the less a clean fighter and further,
he was also the man with whom they could bargain for a
settlement. He was clear-headed, his political instinct was
sound and unerring and unlike the Mahatma he was fully
conscious of the rôle he was to play in Indian politics. He
knew more than anyone else, that situations favourable for
wresting political power from the enemy do not come often
and when they do come, they do not last long. While the
crisis lasts, a bargain has to be struck. He knew also that to
sponsor a settlement, when public enthusiasm is at its height,
needs much courage and may involve a certain amount of
unpopularity. But he was nothing if not fearless. He was

DESHBANDHU C. R. DAS IN POWER 131
conscious of his exact rôle, namely that of a practical politician
and he was therefore never afraid of courting unpopularity.
In contrast with the Deshbandhu, the rôle of the Mahatma
has not been a clear one. In many ways he is altogether an
idealist and a visionary. In other respects, he is an astute
politician. At times he is as obstinate as a fanatic; on other
occasions he is liable to surrender like a child. The instinct,
or the judgment, so necessary for political bargaining is
lacking in him. When there is a real opportunity for a
bargain as in 1921, he is liable to stick out for small things
and thereby upset all chances of a settlement. Whenever he
does go in for a bargain, as we shall see in 1931, he gives
more than he takes. On the whole, he is no match in diplo-
macy for an astute British politician.
After the death of Deshbandhu Das the Mahatma spent
several months in Bengal trying to raise a memorial fund in
honour of the departed great and helping to reorganise
the Congress machinery in the absence of the leader. His
public activities, nevertheless, continued on the whole to be
non-political in character and the political mantle of the
Deshbandhu therefore fell on Pandit Motilal Nehru, the
Swarajist leader in the Assembly. While Lord Reading was
still in England and Lord Lytton, the Governor of Bengal,
was acting as the Governor-General of India, the Pandit
attempted to resume the threads of the negotiations which
the Deshbandhu had been carrying on with the Government.
But the Government in London had already decided to drop
the negotiations for the time being and watch developments.
Nothing therefore came out of this attempt of Pandit Motilal
Nehru.
June 1925 proved to be a turning point in the recent history
of India. The disappearance of the towering personality of
the Deshbandhu from the political arena was for India a
colossal misfortune. The Swaraj Party, which owed so much
to him, was paralysed after his death and dissensions gradually
arose within the Party. Nevertheless, the Party at the time
of his death was an institution of which anyone would be
proud. The Capital of Calcutta, the organ of British com-
mercial interests, writing after his death, compared the Swaraj

132 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
Party with the Sinn Fein Party of Ireland and remarked that
during forty years of its existence, it had seen nothing
like it before. The discipline of the Party, according to the
paper, was German in character. The weakening of the
Swaraj Party served to strengthen the forces of reaction in
India and in England, while it let loose a flood of communal
strife in India which had, up till then, been held back by the
superior forces of Nationalism. To-day, as we look back on
the year 1925, we cannot help feeling that if Providence had
spared the Deshbandhu for a few years more, the history of
India would probably have taken a different turn. In the
affairs of nations, it often happens that the appearance or dis-
appearance of a single personality often means a new chapter
in history. Thus has been the influence of Lenin in Russia,
of Mussolini in Italy and of Hitler in Germany in recent
world-history.

CHAPTER VI
THE SLUMP (1925-27)
CONSIDERING the influence of Mahatma Gandhi in 1921 and
1922, the rise of the Swaraj Party must be regarded as some-
thing unaccountably remarkable. Though the leaders and
the rank and file of the Party had the highest respect for the
personality of the Mahatma, the Party was frankly an anti-
Gandhi Party and it was strong enough to force the Mahatma
to voluntary retirement from politics. This retirement con-
tinued virtually till the Calcutta Congress in December 1928.
Now what was the secret of the Swaraj Party’s success? To
understand that one must know more about the practical
shape which Gandhiism took, and as to how the mass mind
reacted to the personality of the Mahatma, during the period
1920-22.
Though Hindu society has never had an established
church like Europe, the mass of the people have been pro-
foundly susceptible to the influence of Avatars,¹ priests and
‘gurus.’² The spiritual man has always wielded the largest
influence in India and he is called a ‘Sant’ or ‘Mahatma’ or
‘Sadhu.’ For various reasons, Gandhiji came to be looked
upon by the mass of the people as a Mahatma before he
became the undisputed political leader of India. At the
Nagpur Congress in December 1920, Mr. M. A. Jinnah, who
was till then a Nationalist leader, addressed him as ‘Mr.
Gandhi’ and he was shouted down by thousands of people
who insisted that he should address him as ‘Mahatma
¹ According to many Hindus, God incarnates Himself from age to age in
order to save the good and destroy the wicked and in order to establish
the reign of Truth on earth. These incarnations are called Avatars. Ac-
cording to other Hindus, these Avatars are not divine incarnations but
human souls in the highest stage of development—that is, when they have
realised their oneness with Godhead. According to popular belief there
have been nine Avatars up till now—and the tenth is to come at the end of
the present wicked age.
² ‘Guru’ is a religious preceptor. In India only a truly spiritual man can
be a religious preceptor.
133

134 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
Gandhi.' The asceticism of Gandhiji, his simple life, his
vegetarian diet, his adherence to truth and his consequent
fearlessness—all combined to give him a halo of saintliness.
His loin-cloth was reminiscent of Christ, while his sitting
posture at the time of lecturing was reminiscent of Buddha.
Now all this was a 'tremendous asset to the Mahatma in com-
pelling the attention and obedience of his countrymen. As
we have already seen, a large and influential section of the
intelligentsia was against him, but this opposition was
gradually worn down through the enthusiastic support given
by the masses. Consciously or unconsciously, the Mahatma
fully exploited the mass psychology of the people, just as
Lenin did the same thing in Russia, Mussolini in Italy and
Hitler in Germany. But in doing so, the Mahatma was
using a weapon which was sure to recoil on his head. He
was exploiting many of the weak traits in the character of his
countrymen which had accounted for India's downfall to a
large extent. After all, what has brought about India's
downfall in the material and political sphere? It is her
inordinate belief in fate and in the supernatural—her in-
difference to modern scientific development—her backward-
ness in the science of modern warfare, the peaceful content-
ment engendered by her latter-day philosophy and adherence
to Ahimsa (non-violence) carried to the most absurd length.
In 1920, when the Congress began to preach the political
doctrine of non-co-operation, a large number of Congressmen
who had accepted the Mahatma not merely as a political
leader but also as a religious preceptor—began to preach the
cult of the new Messiah. As a consequence, many people
gave up eating fish and meat, took to the same dress as the
Mahatma, adopted his daily habits like morning and evening
prayer and began to talk more of spiritual freedom than of
political Swaraj. In some parts of the country the Mahatma
began to be worshipped as an Avatar. Such was the madness
that seized the country at the time that in April 1923 in a
politically-minded province like Bengal, a resolution moved
at the Jessore Provincial Conference to the effect that the goal
of the Congress was not spiritual Swaraj but political Swaraj
—was defeated at the end of a heated debate. In 1922, when

THE SLUMP 135
the writer was in prison, Indian warders in the service of the
Prisons' Department would refuse to believe that the Mahatma
had been cast in prison by the British Government. They
would say in all seriousness that since Gandhiji was a Mahatma,
he could assume the shape of a bird and escape from prison
any moment he liked. To make matters worse, political
issues would no longer be considered in the cold light of
reason, but would be unnecessarily mixed up with ethical
issues. The Mahatma and his followers, for instance, would
not countenance the boycott of British goods because that
would engender hatred towards the British. Even so intel-
lectual a personality as the celebrated poetess, Mrs. Sarojini
Naidu, in her speech at the Gaya Congress in December, 1922,
condemned the Swarajist policy on the ground that councils
were places of ‘Maya’¹, where Congressmen would be tempted
by bureaucratic overtures. And worst of all was the tendency
on the part of the orthodox followers of the Mahatma to regard
everything that he said as gospel truth without reasoning
or arguing and to accept his paper Young India as their Bible.
For a people so prone to mysticism and supernaturalism,
the only hope of political salvation lies in the growth of a sane
rationalism and in the modernisation of the material aspect of
life. It was therefore distressing to many sober Nationalists
to find that through the conscious or unconscious influence
of the Mahatma, some of the above weak traits in the Indian
character were again becoming prominent. Thus there arose
a rationalist revolt against the Mahatma and his Philosophy.
As the Swaraj Party headed this revolt, elements from the
Right and from the Left that were tired of the irrationalism
of the Mahatma—were drawn towards it. Among the Right
elements were those who preferred constitutional action to
civil disobedience and the Deshbandhu by virtue of his social
position and his vocation as an advocate, was able to com-
mand their confidence. Among the Left elements was the
younger generation of Congressmen who did not find the
ideology and method of the Mahatma to be sufficiently radical
for the modern world and who looked upon the Deshbandhu
as a more radical (or revolutionary) force in Indian Politics.
¹ ‘Maya’ means an illusion or something false that charms and tempts.

136 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
It was the unique personality of Deshbandhu Das that was
able to combine into one party such dissimilar elements, to
wrest the Congress machinery from the hands of the orthodox
'No Changers' and to carry on a fight against the bureaucracy
on many fronts. But in his absence, there was no one com-
petent enough to continue his many-sided activities or to
keep together the diverse elements that composed the Swaraj
Party. The result was that the Swaraj Party remained in
power only so long as the Mahatma did not emerge from his
voluntary retirement. When he did emerge in 1929, the
Swarajist leader, Pandit Motilal Nehru, surrendered without
even the show of a fight.
The death of Deshbandhu C. R. Das may be regarded as
the beginning of a period of all-round depression in the
country. If Mahatma Gandhi had come out of his retirement
exactly at this juncture, things might have taken a different
course, but unfortunately for India, he did not do so. The
Deshbandhu's personality was, among other things, a power-
ful cementing factor within the Swaraj Party and also in the
domain of Hindu-Moslem relations. It served, moreover,
to tone up the attitude of the Party to an extremist pitch. In
his absence, dissensions began to appear within the Party.
The most important of these was the revolt of the Mahrash-
trian Swarajists led by Mr. M. R. Jayakar of Bombay and Mr.
N. C. Kelkar of Poona. The Maharashtrian Swarajists had
never fully believed in the 'uniform, continuous and con-
sistent' opposition of the Swaraj Party, but they had never-
theless followed the Deshbandhu and his policy with unques-
tionable loyalty. They believed in the theory of 'responsive
co-operation' propounded by Lokamanya Tilak at the time of
the Amritsar Congress in December 1919. This theory implied
that there should be co-operation with the Government
in so far as they adopted measures calculated to benefit the
country, but non-co-operation or opposition, in so far as
their policy was harmful to the public interest. The Maha-
rashtrian Swarajists looked upon the Deshbandhu as their
leader since the time of Lokamanya's death and had therefore
given their support and allegiance to his policy, regardless of
their personal views. When Pandit Motilal Nehru assumed

THE SLUMP 137
the leadership of the Swaraj Party, differences broke out
between him and his Maharashtrian followers. The breach
gradually widened until in an unlucky moment the Pandit
lost his patience with them and in a fit of temper, charac-
teristic of him, declared that 'the diseased limb (viz., the
Maharashtrian group) of the Swaraj Party should be ampu-
tated.' This statement so offended the Maharashtrians that
they resolved to sever all connection with the Pandit and the
Swaraj Party and to start the Responsivist Party. Other
dissensions also appeared within the Swaraj Party later on.
These developments indicated that while Pandit Motilal
Nehru had superior intellectual qualities and a personality
that could draw admiration and respect, he lacked that
emotional appeal which alone can keep a party together
through fair weather and foul.
In the domain of Hindu-Moslem relations, too, the Desh-
bandhu was a unifying force. His 'Bengal Pact' which had
been rejected by the Coconada Congress in December 1923,
but had been ratified by the Provincial Conference in May
1924, had served to convince all Moslems that he was their
real friend. That such a man was at the head of the Swaraj
Party helped to rally Moslem support for that Party and as a
matter of fact, the Swaraj Party in the Bengal Legislative
Council had a large number of Moslem members who had
been elected on a basis of separate electorate. With the death
of the Deshbandhu, the Moslem community no longer
retained their former confidence in the Swaraj Party. More-
over, the political tension created by the Swaraj Party which
had served to hold back the rising tide of communalism,
subsided after his death and the country was then plunged in
inter-communal strife which usurped the field for about two
years. There was another unfortunate development following
the death of the Deshbandhu—namely the weakening of the
extremist attitude of the Party. When the Swaraj Party first
came into existence, it had drawn elements both from the
Right and from the Left. During the lifetime of the leader
the Left elements had the upper hand because he himself
belonged to the Left. But in his absence the Right elements
were able to raise their head. The emergence of inter-

138 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
communal strife also helped to bring to the fore, people who
generally fought shy of politics and who were averse to doing
anything which involved suffering and sacrifice. In Bengal
the Left Wing was at a disadvantage for some time, because
a large number of Congressmen belonging to that group were
in prison either under Regulation III of 1818 or under the
Bengal Ordinance.
From the middle of 1925 onwards there was a gradual
watering down of the original Swarajist policy of undiluted
opposition. In June, Pandit Motilal Nehru accepted a seat
on the Skeen Committee appointed by the Government to
report on the Indianisation of the Army. Not long after this,
Mr. S. B. Tambe,¹ a prominent member of the Swaraj Party
of the Central Provinces, accepted an appointment as a
member of the Governor's Executive Council and this step
was approved of by Mr. N. C. Kelkar and other prominent
Maharashtrian Swarajist leaders. About this time the Indian
Legislative Assembly was given the right of electing its own
President and Mr. Vithalbhai J. Patel, one of the most
thorough-going obstructionists in the Swaraj Party, stood as a
candidate and was duly elected to this office. Though the
acceptance of that office involved a certain amount of co-
operation with the Government, Mr. Patel performed his
functions with remarkable ability and conspicuous success—so
much so that though he always acted within the limits of the
Constitution and with scrupulous fairness, he came to be
dreaded by the Treasury Benches for his independent and
impartial rulings. The popularity which the Swaraj Party
gained during the period of its existence, was due in no small
measure to his work as President. Working with a wretched
Constitution and without any parliamentary precedents to
back him, Mr. Patel was, nevertheless, able to maintain the
rights and privileges of the members of the House of which he
became the custodian and gave to the Opposition Party and its
leader the status they would be entitled to in a free country
enjoying a democratic Constitution.
In September 1925, the report of the Reforms Enquiry
¹ Mr. Tambe later on became the Acting Governor of the Central Pro-
vinces when the Governor went home on leave for some months.

· THE SLUMP 139
Committee better known as the Muddiman Committee, was
placed before the Assembly. The Home member, Sir
Alexander Muddiman, moved the acceptance of the Majority
Report of the committee and as an amendment to that,
the Swarajist leader, Pandit Motilal Nehru, put forward
what has been called the 'National Demand'. The National
Demand, as formulated by the Pandit, was the result of a
compromise with non-Swarajist members of the Assembly
and represented the Greatest Common Measure of agreement
among the non-official members. The National Demand
was to the effect that constitutional reforms practically
amounting to the immediate grant of Dominion Status should
be conceded by the British Parliament and that a Round
Table Conference between British and Indian representatives
should meet in order to discuss the ways and means for
implementing those reforms. The reply given to the demand
by the official spokesman in the Assembly at the time and
later on by the Viceroy, amounted to a refusal.
Before the end of the year, Lala Lajpat Rai, joined the
Assembly as a Swarajist and was elected Deputy-Leader of the
Party. About this time the Responsivist Party, headed by
Mr. M. R. Jayakar and Mr. N. C. Kelkar, the erstwhile
Swarajist leaders, was launched. It differed from the Swaraj
Party on two main points. It advocated discriminate opposi-
tion, as opposed to the Swarajist policy of indiscriminate
opposition to the Government in the Legislatures. Further,
it did not approve of the pro-Moslem attitude of the Swaraj
Party or of the Indian National Congress and on the contrary,
it allied itself more with the Hindu Mahasabha. The accen-
tuation of Hindu-Moslem differences in 1925 and after, threw
more Hindu Congressmen into the arms of the Hindu Maha-
sabha and the politics of the Hindu-Mahasabha was, generally
speaking, identical with that of the Responsivist Party. Both
the Hindu Mahasabha and the Responsivist Party thought that
the Moslem community by co-operating with the Government
was able to strengthen its position and further its interests, to
the detriment of Hindu interests—while the Indian National
Congress through its policy of indiscriminate opposition was
unable to do anything for the Hindus. This feeling was

140 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
strengthened as a result of the conduct of Mr. (now Sir)
Mian Fazli Hussain, who by accepting the office of Minister
in the Punjab, was able to promote Moslem interests in that
province to the exclusion of Hindu and Sikh interests. The
position of the Hindu Mahasabha and of the Responsivist
Party received further support from the Hindu community
through the reactionary and communal attitude adopted by the
Moslem League at its sitting at Aligarh in December, 1925, in
which prominent leaders like Moulana Mohammed Ali, Mr.
M. A. Jinnah, Sir Abdur Rahim and Sir Ali Imam participated.
The next elections to the Legislatures being due in 1926,
the 1925 session of the Congress held at Cawnpore had to
decide the attitude to be adopted by the Congress on the
occasion. It was considered desirable that the Indian National
Congress should itself take up the task of running the elec-
tions, instead of leaving it to the Swaraj Party. The Cawnpore
Congress, presided over by Mrs. Sarojini Naidu,¹ arrived
at this decision without much controversy, because by then
the opposition of the Mahatma and his orthodox followers
had been disarmed, but the question that raised a storm was
as to the policy to be followed in the Legislatures. Should
it be a policy of unmitigated opposition, or non-co-operation,
as originally advocated by the Swaraj Party, or should it be a
policy of discriminate opposition—or responsive co-operation
—as urged by the newly-formed Responsivist Party? In sup-
port of the Swarajist policy, there stood Pandit Motilal Nehru
and Lala Lajpat Rai, whereas opposed to them were Pandit
M. M. Malaviya, Mr. Jayakar and Mr. Kelkar. The former
won the day but before a year passed, Lala Lajpat Rai left
the Swarajist fold and together with Pandit Malaviya² formed.
¹ Mrs. Naidu was the second woman to be elected President of the Con-
gress, the first being Mrs. Besant who presided over the Calcutta Congress
in 1917. A distinguished poetess, she had been closely associated with
the Mahatma in the non-co-operation movement since 1920. She con-
tinues till to-day as one of his closest adherents and has been a member
of the Congress Working Committee with hardly any break.
² Pandit Malaviya, though a veteran Congressman and an ex-President
of the Congress, did not accept the Swarajist policy. During the period
1923-26, he was a member of the Assembly but did not belong to the
Swaraj Party. After the general election of 1926 he continued as an
Independent. The change in the politics of Lala Lajpat Rai was due to
the Hindu-Moslem tension in the Punjab and the influence of the Hindu
Mahasabha.

THE SLUMP 141
the Independent Party which played the same rôle in Northern
India as the Responsivist Party did in Central and Western
India. By the time Lala Lajpat Rai left the Swaraj Party,
another prominent personality joined that Party. He was Mr.
Srinivasa Iyengar, former Advocate-General¹ of Madras and
the leader of the Madras Bar. Mr. Iyengar on being returned
to the Assembly in 1926 was at once elected Deputy-Leader
of the Party and soon after, was elected President of the 1926
session of the Congress held at Gauhati in Assam.
The general attitude of the Government after the death
of Deshbandhu Das was on the whole reactionary. The only
exception was in the matter of the abolition of the Excise
Duty, which welcome event took place in December 1925..
The Excise Duty was first imposed as a tax on Indian mill-
made cloth in 1894. The ostensible object of this duty was
to obtain revenue for the Government but the real object was
to help the British textile industry, which did not view with
equanimity the growth of an indigenous textile industry in
India. Though since 1916 the duty on textile imports had
been kept at a higher level than the Excise Duty on Indian
mill products, the latter was keenly resented by Indian
Nationalists and especially by the Indian business community.
The abolition of the duty was therefore meant as a sop to the
Indian textile interests. Beyond this Act, no other friendly
gesture was made by the Government in India or in England.
The Labour Party, however, made a friendly move by adopting
the Commonwealth of India Bill drafted by Mrs. Besant for
conferring Home Rule on India and authorised Mr. George
Lansbury to introduce it as a Private Bill in the House of
Commons. The Bill received its first reading in December
1925, but it proved to be still-born. Nevertheless, it had
some value as a gesture.
The history of 1926 is largely a history of Hindu-Moslem
strife. As happens everywhere, the slackening of the Nationalist
movement diverted the energies of the people to internal
questions and disputes. The abolition of the Khalifate by the
Turks in 1924 led many of the Nationalist Moslems in India
¹ The position of the Advocate-General of Madras would correspond to
the position of the Solicitor-General in England.

142 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
to give up the Khilafat movement and to divert their whole
attention to the Nationalist cause. But some of the Nationalists
as well as the more reactionary Moslems continued to keep up
the Khilafat Committees, as Moulana Shaukat Ali did in
Bombay, and where that was not possible, they started other
organisations of a sectarian and reactionary character, under
different names. This reactionary movement among the
Moslems called forth a similar reactionary movement among
the Hindus and branches of the Hindu Mahasabha began to
grow up all over the country. The Hindu Mahasabha, like
its Moslem counterpart, consisted not only of erstwhile
Nationalists, but also of a large number of men who were
afraid of participating in a political movement and wanted a
safer platform for themselves. The growth of sectarian
movements among both Hindus and Moslems accentuated
intercommunal tension. The opportunity was availed of
by interested third parties who wanted to see the two com-
munities fight, so that the Nationalist forces could be
weakened. The causes which generally led to intercommunal
rioting were the slaughter of cows which outraged Hindu
feelings and the playing of music before mosques at prayer-
time, which gave offence to Moslem feelings. Friction would
also be caused if a Moslem mosque or a Hindu temple was
defiled in any way. Once there was a mental tension between
the two communities in a particular locality, such incidents
could easily throw the spark to light the flame of communal
passion and it was not difficult for third parties to employ
agents to do this dirty work.
The worst episode in the events of 1926 was the Hindu-
Moslem riots in Calcutta which broke out in May and again
in July. The trouble arose through an Arya Samajist¹ proces-
sion playing music while passing before a mosque. The Arya
Samajists claimed that they had been having the procession for
many years without any trouble. The Moslems declared on
the contrary that the music was interfering with their worship
inside the mosque. Fighting went on for many days and
many were killed on both sides. Ultimately when both parties
¹ As explained in Section III of the Introduction, the Arya Samaj is
a reformist sect of the Hindus with a large following in Upper India.

THE SLUMP 143
were exhausted, they made peace. Though matters did not
reach a crisis elsewhere as it did in Calcutta, there was con-
siderable tension all over the country. For the Congress
Party the hour was dark. The elections to the Legislatures
were due in November and they were going to be held
under the shadow of Hindu-Moslem riots. The field would
not be as open to Congressmen as it had been in 1923. New
organisations representing reactionary Hindus and reactionary
Moslems had come into existence and they would put up their
own candidates. During the elections of 1926 a strong
propaganda was carried on by a section of the Moslems to the
effect that if the Hindus were going to carry on their non-
co-operation with the Government, the Moslems should have
nothing to do with them, but should endeavour to work the
Constitution. On the other side the Hindu Mahasabha raised
the cry that if the Hindus non-co-operated while the Moslems
secured the help of the Government, they would be placing
themselves at a serious disadvantage as compared with the
Moslems. The Hindu Mahasabha therefore urged the modi-
fication of the Swarajist policy of non-co-operation. Never-
theless, among the Hindu electorate the influence of the
Congress was much greater than that of the Hindusabha,
though among the Moslem electorate, the influence of
reactionary and sectarian organisations proved to be stronger
than that of the Congress at the General Election of 1926.
The General Election of November 1926, being contested
by Nationalists in the name of the Congress, there was a great
improvement in their strength in many of the Provincial
Legislatures, e.g., in Madras and Bihar. The whole-hearted
co-operation of all sections of Congressmen, which was not
forthcoming in 1923 when the Swaraj Party ran the elections,
was responsible for the improvement. But in one respect the
election results were worse than in 1923. In 1923 a large
number of Nationalist Moslems had been elected as Swarajists
but in 1926 their places were generally taken by their reac-
tionary co-religionists. In provinces like Bengal and Punjab
with a large Moslem population, the situation inside the
Legislatures was not favourable for the Congress Party. In
the Central Provinces which had been the stronghold of

144 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
Swarajism and in a portion of the Bombay Presidency, the
Nationalist strength was divided, because of the formation
of the Responsivist Party. With the formation of a Respon-
sivist Party in the Central Provinces Legislative Council and
of a Moslem bloc in the Bengal Legislative Council, it became
possible for the Government to appoint Ministers in these
two provinces, where none had existed for three years. In
the Indian Legislative Assembly also, the Nationalist strength
being somewhat weakened by the formation of a Responsivist
bloc on the one side and by a Moslem bloc on the other, the
Government had a comparatively easier time than they had
in the previous Assembly. Apart from the Legislatures, a
certain amount of disintegration was also visible in the rank
and file of the Congress. In provinces like Punjab, Bombay
Presidency and the Central Provinces, this was due to the
activities of the Responsivist Party. In provinces like Bengal
where the Responsivists had little influence, the disintegration
was caused by warring factions within the Congress Party.
In Bengal after the death of Deshbandhu Das, through the
influence and support of the Mahatma, the late Mr. J. M.
Sengupta had succeeded to the leadership. He had not been
in office for a year before opposition to his leadership appeared.
The opposition ultimately crystallised under the leadership
of Mr. B. N. Sasmal, at one time a most popular figure in
Bengal Congress circles. The fight went on till 1927. For
some time there were two rival Provincial Congress Commit-
tees in Bengal and in the elections to the Calcutta Municipal
Corporation, held in March 1927, two sets of Congress
candidates were set up. Mr. Sasmal’s party was defeated in
this fight and that led to his temporary retirement.
In the face of dissensions outside and inside the Congress,
the leaders had a trying time in 1926. For a time it looked
as if nothing could stem the rot that had set in. The brunt
of the responsibility had to be borne by Pandit Motilal Nehru
who was deprived of the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi,
who had retired from active politics, and of Deshbandhu Das
who had died the year before. The National Demand put
forward by him in the Assembly in September 1925, had been
turned down by the Government. In the circumstances what

THE SLUMP 145
could he do? He was not in a position to start a campaign
of civil disobedience in the country. Therefore he decided
to withdraw from the Assembly as a protest against the attitude
of the Government. Much adverse criticism was made of this
decision at the time—nevertheless, there is hardly any doubt
that there was no alternative to this step except one of abject
acquiescence in the policy of the Government. In March
1926, after a speech exceedingly dignified but somewhat
defeatist in its tone, Pandit Motilal Nehru walked out of the
Assembly followed by all the Swarajist members. Following
this move in the Assembly, the Swaraj Party also withdrew
from the Provincial Legislatures.
But the dark clouds of 1926 had a silver lining. In spite of
inter-communal dissensions and disturbances, the production
of Khadi was going up by leaps and bounds. Freed from
other distractions, the Mahatma was able to concentrate on
this work. Under his leadership the All-India Spinners'
Association was extending its branches all over the country.
Through this organisation, the Mahatma was once again
building up his own party which was to be of invaluable
service to him when he desired to recapture the Congress
machinery once again. To make up partly for the many
defections in the Congress Party, Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar
joined the party wholeheartedly about this time. He had
great reputation and prestige in the Madras Presidency and
this he placed at the disposal of the Congress. Through his
help the movement in the Madras Presidency was greatly
strengthened and a strong Congress Party was set up in the
Madras Legislative Council. In the Assembly he performed
with great ability the duties of the Deputy-Leader of the
Congress Party. After presiding over the Gauhati Congress
in December 1926, he spent a very busy time in going round
the country for restoring inter-communal unity. In this
task he was assisted by the Ali brothers who were actively
associated with the Congress till 1928, though their estrange-
ment with the Mahatma began in 1926.¹
¹ It is generally believed that the estrangement between the Ali brothers
and the Mahatma took place over the Hindu-Moslem riots at Kohat in
Beluchistan. In this dispute the Ali brothers took the side of the Moslems
and complained that the Mahatma had taken the side of the Hindus.
K

146 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
The most encouraging sign of the year was the awakening
among the youth all over the country. They were disgusted
with the narrow sectarianism of the older generation and
wanted to chasten public life with the pure breath of
nationalism. The youth movement appeared under different
names in different provinces, but the impulse behind it was
the same everywhere. There was a feeling of impatience and
revolt at the rotten state of affairs—a sense of self-confidence
and a consciousness of the responsibility which they had
towards their country. In Punjab the movement appeared
under the name of the Naujawan Bharat Sabha and was to
play an important rôle in the years to come. In Nagpur, the
capital of the Central Provinces, the youths started on their
own responsibility, a movement called the Arms Act Satya-
graha.. The object of this campaign was to defy the Arms Act
which prohibited Indians from possessing or bearing arms,
and it was started by a popular local Congress leader, Mr.
Awari, who was given the title of ‘General’ by his followers.
It was announced at the commencement of the campaign,
that the Satyagraha movement was being started as a protest
against the conduct of the Government who had imprisoned
without trial a large number of public workers in Bengal.
Taking advantage of the weakness of the Congress in 1926,
the Government continued its reactionary policy in 1927,
though since April 1926, India had a new Viceroy in Lord
Irwin, who was of a totally different stamp from his pre-
decessor Lord Reading. The report of the Skeen Committee
was published in April 1927 and it provided that one-half of
the cadre of the Indian Army would be completely Indianised
in twenty-five years. The report of the Committee was
disappointing and it was not signed by Pandit Motilal Nehru
who had resigned his membership of the Committee before
the report was drafted. But even the meagre recommendations
of the Committee, which by the way was presided over by the
Chief of Staff of the Indian Army, were not given effect to,
at the instance of the Secretary of State for India, Lord
Birkenhead. The mala fides of the Government will be all
the more evident from the fact that during Sir Tej Bahadur
Sapru's tenure of office as member of the Viceroy’s Executive

THE SLUMP 147
Council, the Army Staff had prepared a plan whereby the
whole army could be Indianised within thirty years.
Another unwelcome move of the Government in 1927 was the
stabilisation of the rupee at 1s. 6d. The traditional exchange
ratio was 1s. 4d. and this was favourable to India. In the
teeth of popular opposition, the Government fixed the
exchange ratio at 1s. 6d. By artificially increasing the value
of the rupee by 12½ per cent., the Finance Member, Sir
Basil Blackett, automatically put a premium on imports into
India. But that was not the only disadvantage which India
was subjected to. As a result of the new ratio, the Indian
peasant producing raw material for the world market received
so much less money than before and his purchasing power in
relation to Indian goods was thereby considerably reduced.
There is no doubt that the new ratio was responsible to a
large extent in accentuating the economic crisis in India.
Along with the new ratio, Sir Basil Blackett wanted to have
an Indian Reserve Bank as a part of his' plan for controlling
the currency—but this Bill¹ was fortunately thrown out by the
Assembly and the Viceroy did not make it law through
'certification.'
The only event of a somewhat satisfactory nature during
the earlier half of 1927 was the Capetown Pact between
India and South Africa. The Government of South Africa
headed by General Hertzog, an ardent nationalist, wanted to
adopt a dual policy of segregation and repatriation with regard
to the Indian settlers. A delegation was sent from India,
composed of Sir Mohammed Habibullah, the Right Hon.
V. S. Sastri and Sir George Paddison to plead the cause of
the Indians. As a result of their persuasion, the following
agreement was arrived at. The Areas Reservation Bill for
segregating Indians was altogether abandoned by the South
African Government. Emigration of Indians was, however,
to be encouraged, though a higher bonus would be given
than before. Indians born in South Africa who wanted to
¹ The Bill was first ruled out of order by the Assembly President, Mr.
V. J. Patel, whereafter it was introduced again in an altered form. The
Congress Party succeeded in throwing out the section relating to the
management of the Bank, whereupon the Bill was withdrawn by Sir
Basil Blackett.

148 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
make that country their home, were to be assisted by the
Government to attain the 'White' standard of life. Though
the Pact was only partially satisfactory, it was better than
nothing and the Viceroy, Lord Irwin, fully supported the
Indian case in this matter. The Pact provided for an 'Agent'
of the Indian Government who would reside in South Africa
and Mr. Sastri was sent out from India as the first 'Agent.'
In the international sphere the step taken by England in
breaking off relations with Russia in 1927, was to have
repercussions in India. Since then the activities of the
Communist Party in India increased considerably. This was
helped by the weakening of the Nationalist forces in the
country and the growth of labour unrest in 1927 and 1928.

CHAPTER VII
IN BURMESE PRISONS¹ (1925-27)
IN the early hours of the morning of October 25th, 1924, I
was roused from my sleep as I was wanted by some police-
officers. The Deputy-Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, on
meeting me, said: 'Mr. Bose, I have a very unpleasant duty
to perform. I have a warrant for your arrest under Regulation
III of 1818." He then produced another warrant authorising
him to search my house for arms, explosives, ammunition,
etc. Since no arms, etc., were forthcoming, he had to content
himself with taking a pile of papers and correspondence. To
avoid public attention, he drove me to prison in his own car
-but so utterly unexpected was my arrest that known faces,
whom I met on my way, never thought that my destination
was His Majesty's Prison at Alipore. At the Alipore New
Central Jail I was surprised to find that there were others in
the same boat with me. The prison authorities did not seem
to be happy to receive us. Special arrangements had to be made
for segregating us from the rest of the prison population and
they had hardly any surplus accommodation. As the day
advanced, our numbers began to swell and to our great
delight (there is nothing so welcome in prison as companion-
ship) when the time for evening lock-up came, we found
that we were eighteen in number.
As I was the Chief Executive Officer of the Calcutta
Municipal Corporation at the time, my sudden arrest dis-
located the work of the Municipality. The Government
therefore gave special orders that till the beginning of Decem-
ber I could attend to my office work in prison and that my
Secretary could see me from time to time with office files
and documents. In all these interviews a police-officer would
¹ The writer has been in custody eight times but he has tried to chronicle
the events of only one such experience, since it is more interesting than
the others.
149