पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

A CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SOURCES
(PUBLISHED AND UNPUBLISHED)
1 Kashiraj •
Persian account of the battle of Panipat and the events leading to it
(Oxford University Press, 1926) Corrected by the translation of Sir JADUNATH
SARKAR, published in Indian Historical Quarterly, 1934 and 1935
Kashiraj Shivdev was a Deshastha Brahmin (native of the Nizam's
Dominions) at the court of Shuja ud daulah of Oudh, who was present through
out the campaign in the camp of his master His narrative is taken as the
best authority on the battle of Panipat He seems to have been working in
the north for some twenty five years before Panipat since the time of Safdar
Jang He had occasional correspondence with the Peshwas¹ for more than
twenty years His exact status at the court of Shuja-ud daulah is not quite
clear He is called a Vakil or a diplomat, but is scarcely sent anywhere as an
emissary with full powers In his account he is found assuming superior airs,
standing tightly on his dignity But there is no mention of him in the whole
range of Marathi political correspondence,² an omission which seems to us
rather significant His account was written nineteen years after the battle of
Panipat, and from memory It appears to have been purposely written for some
one inquisitive on the point, possibly a British official at the Oudh Court In
1780 when this account was written, the British power in India was already
combating with that of the Maratha power The glory of the Maratha power
was on the wane Kashiraj, though racially a Maratha, had culturally, by this
time, become by his long sojourn in northern India, almost a U P Kayasth
with all that it means When he wrote his account he was almost seventy, an
age when the mental faculties are on the decline He seems to have been, at
first, a disappointed candidate for service under the Peshwa,³ and later on moved
to the north in search of employment, which he secured on account of his profi-
ciency in the Persian language That there was no particular love lost between
him and the Maratha nation or their Empire is evident from the tone of his ac-
count. According to him, Sadashivrao Bhau was defeated on account of his
arrogance and pride⁴ Throughout his narrative, he seems to have been con-
vinced that fate had ordained the miscarriage of the Maratha enterprise⁵
On the other hand, whenever he had occasion to write about Ahmad Shah
Abdali, he is found completely over awed by his superior prowess and his divine
role of punishing the Marathas for their wicked pride, for in the eyes of
Kashiraj, pride is sin This much for the mental make up of the man
Bhau's munshi once wrote a letter to Kashiraj at which Kashiraj was
offended on account of some deficiency in the proper form of address due to
his station It means that the Maratha Court did not think Kashiraj to be
1 SPD 40.25 dated Feb 1741
2 KASHIRAJ 14
3 SPD 30.329
4 KASHIRAJ 52
5 Ibid. 8 IHQ 11.552, 10.266.
[128]

CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 129
a superior official, but thought him to be an ordinary munshi Kashiraj is
self contradictory in his account of Bhau's behaviour On the one hand, he
condemns Bhau on his pride and obstinacy, on the other he depicts Bhau as
ready to submit to any conditions mediated through the agency of such persons
as Kashiraj himself Now to judge Bhau from his own letters, one thing is
certain about him and that is that he was never proud, though his tone was
often harsh and his manner peremptory Bhau should be the last person to
assume a cringing role before a man of Kashiraj's position or to be over confi
dent about him
There seems to be some discrepancy in the account of Kashiraj, as is
acknowledged by Sir Jadunath SARKAR who has carefully studied the original
manuscript. He thinks it due to lapse of memory or loose narrative of events ⁶
We cannot treat it so lightly Kashiraj tells us of Bhau's writing his last chit
just before the battle of Panipat, a thing which no thoughtful person will be
ready to believe A commander in chief intimating in his autograph the last
desperate movement of his army, just before the commencement of the fatal
battle, is a thing which cannot be inserted or allowed in fiction or poetry, much
less can it be believed in a primary source of history Was Bhau such a fool
as to believe and hope that his last note would bear any good and immediate
results, after his experience in diplomacy for six months? Would he not rather
fear the fatal consequence of pre-intimating his movement to such a consummate
general as Ahmad Shah Abdali? It was a matter of astonishment to us when
we tried to study this point deeply and found none of the previous writers
even suspecting the full import of this, to us, a cock and bull story We call it
such because fortunately for the historian there is the clear evidence of a con-
temporary letter directly falsifying Kashiraj's narrative Sir Jadunath in his
new translation of Kashiraj's narrative has given the name of Bhau's valet who
took the last chit to Kashiraj as Balakram, who is styled as Bhau's betel bearer,
and is taken as the most confidential servant of his master ⁷ Anybody with an
acquaintance with the Maratha names knows that Balakram is not a common
Maratha name On the other hand, a letter from the Purandare Archives pub-
lished by RAJWADE in his sixth volume clearly gives the name of Bhau's valet
as Balaram, a common name amongst the Marathas ⁸ Anupgir Gosawi writes
in this post Panipat letter to Nana Purandare that the Peshwa's valet, Balaram
Vaghoji Naik, and some others also had gone to Shuja ud daulah's camp on
some errand on the Sunday prior to the battle of Panipat, fought on Wednesday,
14th January, 1761 This proves that the chit Kashiraj is talking of as hav
ing been dramatically sent three hours prior to the battle had been actually
sent (if at all) three days previous to it We suggest from this small but vital
point that Kashiraj had not only forgotten the days and their proper order, but
was narrating the whole story with a dramatic touch, as the battle of Panipat
is a good theme for such treatment.
6 Fall, 2.369
7 Ibid 2 320
8 RAJWADE 6 No 407, p 472
P. F-9

130 PANIPAT: 1761
Bhau Sahebanchi Bakhar,⁹ on the other hand, gives quite the opposite
story It tells us of Abdali's Vakil coming to Bhau just before the battle and
asking him to postpone the fight for the day in order to give a last chance fot
peace talks Bhau is reported to have unceremoniously driven him back, be-
ginning the fight at once thereafter Sir Jadunath, though he considers the
Marathi Bakhars "as later gossipy fabrications no better than opium-eaters'
tales,"¹⁰ has still to acknowledge that "there are some true traditions (as proved
by authentic records) and some statements .which have every appearance of
being true though unsupported elsewhere" We do not know whether Sir
Jadunath would like to believe in this Bakhar story, which, we think, as most
improbable and written to suit the whole tenor of the author, who was out to
condemn Bhau and make a scapegoat of him
Kashiraj was on the battle field that whole day, no doubt, but that fact
cannot make any person see the whole line of battle with his own eyes, much
less can it give him a correct idea of the order of the battle on the opposite
side Kashiraj, with all his sagacity, was a civil official and not a soldier who
could judge military matters correctly For the most part, he was standing
ready in his own camp throughout the day of the battle He himself confesses
that Shuja's side was the least affected part in the line of battle, because none
came to attack it The whole line of battle is taken by Sir Jadunath to cover
some seven miles So it was physically impossible for Kashiraj to see anything
but a small part of the actual battle, and that, too, from a distance His value
as an eye-witness must, therefore, be discounted to a great extent, and his
version of the battle must be taken as gathered after the event from the gen-
eral reports which came to his ears This work of collecting news from various
sources and afterwards collating and correlating it into the form of a running
narrative could be done by others also, and, therefore, we have no valid ground
to reject the version given in the Marathi Bakhars and letters only because we
are unaware of the status of the narrators We have shown in the detailed de-
scription of the battle the various points wherein Kashiraj is proved to be
wrong
2 Bhau Sahebanchi Bakhar (1922) and 3 Shrimant Bhau Saheb Yanchi
Kaifiyat (1887)
These two are the most important primary sources about the battle of
Panipat in Marathi Their authors are unknown but they were certainly much
nearer to the event than Kashiraj when they wrote, as can be proved from the
language, the tone and the textual criticism of their manuscripts Certain pas-
sages in the narration of the events in the Kaifiyat are found bodily incorporated
in the Bakhar¹¹ which is a bigger narrative of the event From this we can say
that the Kaifiyat, small and to the point, was the earlier narrative of the two,
of which the Bakhar was an amplified edition with enlarged paraphrase. The
Kaifiyat gives the life of Bhau from the point of his start for the Udgir cam-
paign of 1759-60 and closes with the retreat from Panipat. The Bakhar, on
the other hand, narrates the Maratha activities in the north from 1753 on-
9 Bhau Bakhar (1922) p 115
10 Fall 2.367
11 Cf Kaifiyat 21 and Bakhar 141, K 22, B 144, K. 23, B. 143.

CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 131
wards It is ostensibly written to glorify the achievements of the Shindes and
these have no direct connection with the battle of Panipat. The author is
evidently a biased person and on that account tries to supply and explain the
genesis, the events and the activities behind the scenes of actual narration with
all the personal bickerings of the actors in their full gusto The reports of
these bickerings and their actual wording may or may not be true in their full
import, but it is clear that they throw a necessary light on the seamy side of
history We shall have to discount much of this report due to the bias of
the author Another thing which has to be borne in mind is the fact that
these reports must have necessarily come from the persons who ran away from
the field of battle and as such were dubbed as renegades by the people at
large The odium of this obloquy and the guilty conscience of having failed
to be with their leaders in the thick of the fight, made the reports from these
survivors naturally colourful and excusatory Most of these persons had di
rect blame attached to their conduct and in sheer self-justification they gave
such a retrospective turn to their own and Bhaus conduct as to lead to the
disaster which would then appear inevitable If we compare the tone of the
letters¹² which some of these survivors sent previous to the battle with those
they wrote after it, we can understand the difference worked out in the minds
of these writers by the fatal disaster When the authors of the Kaifiyat and
the Bakhar wrote their accounts after a few years, the public in Maharashtra
had come to form some sort of plausible opinion about the great disaster, after
hearing, explaining, accounting and guessing about the various reports brought
from the distant field The boiled essence of all these is found written in the
Bakhar Sadashivrao Bhau was out to give a new turn to the ancient mode
of Maratha warfare which was taken to be of the guerilla type Bhau had
introduced the trained infantry tactics and tried to combine them with the
original mode The good result of this innovation had been reaped in the
Udgir campaign The Udgir victory had naturally increased the prestige of
Ibrahim Khan Gardi and his mode of warfare Throughout the Panipat cam-
paign, Bhau had put his main confidence in these infantry corps and they
also gave a very good account of themselves The idea of entrenching at
Panipat was a result of these tactics It made the Marathas unassailable so
long as they remained within their entrenchments Bhau expected Abdali to
attack them in this strong position, as he was sure of victory in the event of
such an attack But Abdali had understood it equally well He himself never
once tried to attack, and had strictly forbidden any one from his camp to go
out with a view to attacking He played a game of waiting and hoped to get
a victory when the Maratha army would come out due to starvation That is
why Bhau is found raging and almost railing against Govindpant Bundele for
not attacking Abdali from behind and making him compulsorily fall on the
Maratha entrenchments to his sure destruction When, due to the failure of
Govindpant and due to starvation, Bhau himself had to come out, that combi
nation of artillery, infantry and cavalry tactics which it was necessary to keep
12 RAJ Vol. 6 Cf Satvoji Jadhavrao's letters No 404 dated 18-9-1760 and No 409
dated 10-3-1761 also cf Nana Purandare's letters No 391 of 14-11-1760 in Purandare

• Daftar Pt. 1, and No 118 in Pt. III

132 PANIPAT 1761
with an army on the march with all their camp followers, could not be
kept up and the disaster inevitably followed The Maratha army was
mainly composed of veteran horsemen with a life long belief in the guerilla mode
of warfare It seems they neither understood nor had a mind to follow the cor-
rect orders of their commander based on the tactics advised by Ibrahim Khan
Gardi, and when the inevitable disaster followed, due to their misunderstand-
ing and faint heartedness in the fight, they laid the whole blame on the new
mode of "entrenched warfare" On this point the whole opinion in Maha-
rashtra seems to be unanimous and it is reflected in these chronicles
Notwithstanding these prepossessions, however, the Bakhar correctly
reports Bhau's plan of the battle which was unknown to Kashiraj Pandit on
the other side and which was not followed to the end Unaware of the plan
and the aim, Kashiraj reports the battle in an inexplicable way, while the
author of the Bakhar charges Bhau himself with breaking the plan decided on
the previous night and thus becoming the author of the disaster All the his-
torians up till now have been so much obsessed with the idea of the complete
reliability of Kashiraj s report that they have never stopped to inquire how
the account in the Bakhars is to be explained and why it should be disbe-
lieved and set aside The full import of the intended plan in the Bakhar can-
not be understood unless one studies the detailed maps of the battle-field in their
complete environment, and tries to construe a connected idea with the help of
every line reported in the Bakhar in combination with it The authors of the
chronicles seem to be well acquainted with the topography of the battle field and
its surroundings, and they might have been personally present in the Maratha
camp themselves The chronicles correctly report the changes in Abdali's camp-
ing ground during the two months and a half, while the impression created by
Kashiraj's account fixes Abdali's camp once for all, a very serious discrepancy
on the part of this eye witness ¹³ When one begins to re read the Bakhars in
the light of the original letters, one is impressed by the substantiality of their
account.
THE COMMON POINTS IN KASHIRAJ'S NARRATIVE AND THE BAKHAR
Comparison
That Kashiraj wrote his account after reading some other accounts is
proved by certain curious coincidences in the arrangement of his writing and
that of Bhau Bakhar, which was definitely a northern Indian production The
short Kaifiyat was definitely written earlier than the Bakhar But what seems
strange to the reader is that the correct consecutive narration of events is fol-
lowed by the writer of the Kaifiyat, and an absence of the sense of time char-
acterises the writer of the gossipy Bakhar Thus the Bakhar gives Govindpant
Bundele's death as the first event while it was actually the fourth during the
beleagurement Similarly, the cutting off of Parashar Dadaji's treasure carry-
ing party was the last event which is subsequently dealt with by the Bakhar
¹³ Bhau Kaifiyat pp. 14, 21

CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 133
The first event of the Shinde Ruhela fight is given next and Balvantrao Mehen-
dale's event the last¹ Kashiraj is found following the incorrect order of the
Bakhar in his narrative, giving the events of Govindpant, Parashar Dadaji,
Shinde and Balvantrao consecutively. We cannot treat this as a mere accident
in writing. Either Kashiraj had the Bakhar in his mind when writing his nar-
rative, or both the Bakhar and Kashiraj copied from a third unknown, com
mon source. This is further proved by Kashiraj's attempt at giving dates of
certain events which are proved to be utterly wrong by other direct evidence.
The Ka ffyat gives the correct dates wherever it has given these, while Kashiraj
is found to be wrong—even in his date of the great battle, reckoning by the
Muslim calendar. Sir Jadunath treats these points as 'lapses of memory or
hurried writing.' But no serious student of textual criticism can be satisfied
with this explanation. Kashiraj tries to foist authenticity on his hearsay nar-
rative by introducing dates into it, thereby impressing upon the reader the cor-
rectness thereof. We do not think he had kept a diary of the events. Had
there been no verifying proofs for the events he narrates, he would have passed
on as the writer on Panipat, eye witness as he was for the events from begin-
ning to end. Unfortunately for Kashiraj, a few Marathi papers have survived
the ravages of time, exposing him to the hilt. A man who treats the whole
episode as a sort of play of destiny, who charges Bhau with pride, who though
a Maharashtra Brahmin himself, cannot properly know Bhau's relationship
to Balvantrao Mehendale, a man who could not understand the constitutional
thread behind the Maratha politics in the north, a man who treats Surajmal's
episode without understanding the politics behind it, who introduces rumours to
heighten the romantic effect of his narrative, a man who omits important facts
which militate against the tenor of his narrative (e.g. Bhau's deposition of Shah
Jahan Sani and the proclamation of Shah Alam as Emperor), a man who
gives incorrect dates, a man who does not report Abdali's shifting of camps,
a man who is incorrect even in his narration of the actual battle in certain par-
ticulars, and finally a man who would not mention the important fact of
Abdali's appointment of the regicide Maratha protege Ghazi ud din as the
Wazir with full powers before his departure because it would mar the effect
of his whole narrative, shedding a powerful light as it does on the whole of the
Panipat episode from beginning to end,—to call such a man's narrative as the
most trustworthy authority on the Panipat campaign and to say that "no other
author can be set against him in point of authenticity," is something beyond
the range of historical research.
The main points on which the chronicles differ from Kashiraj's ac-
count are the following:
(1) Changes in the sites of Abdali's camp.
(2) Bhau's plan of battle.
(3) The directions of the rival armies on the battle field.
(1) The cause of the so-called Maratha right wing and the Durrani
left wing never coming to grips throughout the battle.

134 PANIPAT 1761
(5) The actual site of the battle
On all these points Kashiraj is proved to be wrong and loose in his
account by the evidence of original letters. Because Sir Jadunath and others
have placed their faith in Kashiraj, they have been completely misled in their
account of the battle. Kashiraj's account should be relied upon only in so far
as the Durrani side is concerned. The Maratha side cannot be understood un-
less we rely upon the evidence of the Marathi chronicles and original letters.
4-5. Purandare Daftar Vols. 1 and 3 (1929 and 1934). These form
a valuable primary source not only for the events after the battle of Panipat,
but also for the events prior to it, because they throw a rare flood of light on
the mental make-up and character of some of the chief characters in the Pani-
pat episode. What Sadashivrao Bhau was really like cannot be understood
without his early personal letters. The characters of Nanasaheb Peshwa, Nana
Purandare, Sakharam Bapu and Raghoba Dada are properly understood in
all their setting by a study of these volumes of intimate personal letters. Sir
Jadunath has missed this point and so cannot properly appraise their part in
the great drama of history.
6-7-8. RAJWADE V. K. Marathyanchya Itihasachin Sadhane Vols. 1,
3 and 6. They are the basic sources containing original letters direct from the
scene of the battle as well as throughout the campaign and for events leading to
it from the very beginning. When RAJWADE published his first volume in 1898
after accidentally getting possession of a number of original letters addressed
to Govindpant Bundele, it was the only, and therefore, partial side of the cam-
paign that was open to him. He should have corrected it when his own third
and sixth volumes were published later on. But RAJWADE, after his own man-
ner, left the scathing criticism of Govindpant in the first volume untouched
throughout his life, though he lived twenty-eight years thereafter. Whatever
excuse he had in his day for obstinately sticking to his own view based on one
source only, we in 1946 have none. After the publication of the Peshwa
Daftar in its forty-five volumes a decade ago, a flood of light has been thrown
on the Maratha activities in the north in all their bearings. It is clear from
evidence adduced in these volumes that Govindpant was not the only, if
culprit he was, who should be made the scapegoat for the whole disaster.
How historical perspective is blurred when only a part of the material is avail-
able and historians try to draw a complete picture out of it, is best exempli-
fied by RAJWADE's classical introduction to his first volume on the Panipat
period. We shall have occasion to point out how far RAJWADE had been car-
ried astray¹⁴ in his attempt. Psychological proof for it is available in that volume
itself though none of his deep students uptil now have either detected it or
have shown the candour to point it out openly.
9-10-11. Selections from The Peshwa Daftar Vols. 2, 21, 27. These
directly deal with the north Indian activities of the Marathas for a period of
almost two decades previous to the battle of Panipat, though cross-references.
¹⁴ RAJ. I. 1-5 and Note, 170. 183. 181. 181. 182. Note 325.

CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 135
will be found interspersed in many other volumes also For studying the char-
acters of the main actors in the Panipat drama it is necessary to study most
of the other volumes for the pre Panipat period, and sometimes even the later
volumes The characters of the individuals are the one sure and constant guide
from which we can correctly judge their activities in a proper perspective A
man's life is never compartmental, and it is unjust and unhistorical to judge
events in the lives of these individuals, from the bare data concerning particu
lar events and, therefore, from a partial angle What a man will do under
given circumstances mainly depends on his past, which is reflected in his char-
acter Historians are not the advocates of the historical characters but their
post mortem judges Unfortunately, very few historians correctly understand
their proper role and praise or blame the historical characters in detail We
have tried to study each single character separately, completely and in detail,
and then come to form certain notions about the proper manner of judging
their actions in this study, a procedure we think absolutely essential To at-
tain this end, we had to utilize all the available material in the var ous volumes
of original letters concerning these individuals
12-13-14 Shindeshahi Itihasach n Sadhane Part I (1929), Part II
(1930), and Part III (1937) These contain a few original letters from Panipat
itself Others throw a flood of light on the inner workings of Shinde affairs.
Specially valuable is the correspondence of the diplomats connected with the
Shinde family which is collected for publication in the third volume Ramaji
Anant Dabholkar who was the Diwan of the Shindes from 1750 to 1761, and
died after Panipat, was the chief director of Shinde affairs and his corre-
spondence is the most valuable of all Sir Jadunath has overlooked these
volumes and his description of the battle is deficient on that account.
15 16 17-18 Four Incomplete Manuscript Bakhars about Panipat
were examined by us but they contain no authentic or new material They are
gossipy in their contents and their burthen is all the same Malika Zamani is
given as the ch ef instigator in calling Ahmad Shah Abdali Bhau and Bal-
vantrao Mehendale are depicted as proud and bad Holkar and Shinde were
against the war, but Bhau was adamant and bent on honour Only three per
sons remained fighting to the last, v.z Bhau, Jankoji and Tukoji Shinde A
portion of these Bakhars, especially that containing Malika Zamani's part in it
is found incorporated in Bhausahebanchi Bakhar, the Bakhar published by
Parasnis in his Marathyanche Parakrama (Bundelkhand part) and similar
other attempts The theme was a favourite one with all Maratha clerks of the
Peshwa times and they copied the story from wherever they could
19 A few pages of Bhausahebanchi Ka fijat were supplied to us by
Mr K V PURANDARE These pages contain a few verbal changes but no new
information We note this fact here to show that even the Ka fijat, though it
was over shadowed by the more complete and the enlarged Bakhar, was still
copied by a few in Maharashtra Rao Bahadur SANE was able to get only one
copy of this Ka fijat and had to rely on that one alone He concluded there-
from, that the Kaifijat was a rare brochure But this does not seem to have
been the case

136 PANIPAT 1761
20 Raghunath Yadav's Panipat Bakhar Though ostensibly written
by a court clerk and that by order of a member of the Peshwa's family, this is
the most worthless of all the Panipat Bakhars
21 Aitihasik Lekha Samgraha Vol I (1897) by V V KHARE con
tains a few letters on the Panipat Campaign
22 23 Chandrachuda Daftar Vol I (1920), and Vol II (1934) also
contain a few letters dealing with the northern India affairs and bear evidence
to the Maratha advance and rule upto Attock on the Indus
24 25 Holkarachin Kaifiyat (published in the Kavyetihasa Samgraha
by K N SANE (1886), and Holkarachi Thaili (RAJ III, No 172 and
Itihasa Samgraha) These are both explanatory after-thoughts, to justify Mal
harrao Holkar's conduct in the Panipat affair That he ran away at the
previous behest of Bhau in order to escort Parvatibai, the wife of Bhau, is now
proved to be false, on the authority of contemporary letters How an imaginary
turn can be given to historic events is proved by these attempts
26 Aitihasik Patren, Yadi Vagaire Lekha (2nd Ed 1929) This
contains the autobiography of Nana Phadnis which we take to be written some-
time soon after the event when the author was extremely grieved and repentant
and almost on the point of forsaking the world to lead the life of a recluse, and
not after thirty years as assumed by Sir Jadunath There is nothing incorrect
in it when compared with the original letters Other letters in this volume are
also important for the northern Indian affairs of the Marathas
27 Aitihasik Patravyavahara (1930) This volume also contains
valuable correspondence, amongst them being an important letter by Nana
Phadnis from the Panipat camp Sir Jadunath has wrongly understood it, as
his translation of a line in it gives exactly the reverse meaning
28 Persian Akhbars (news letters) in manuscript form existing in the
archives of the Bharat Itihasa Samshodhak Mandal contain valuable material
not found elsewhere about the Panjab campaign of the Marathas, ending in
the far famed carrying of the Maratha banners beyond the Attock to Peshawar
29 Bhau's Ballad (published in BDCRI 4 3) in the Jathi dialect of
Hindusthani copied for us after the dictation of a Muslim ballad singer of Siwa,
five miles to the south of Panipat, contains a more complete version of the
ballad than that published in the Sardesai Commemoration Volume by Dr
KANUNGO and also one given in pieces in the Marathi publication 'Bhaunchya
Virakatha' Our copy which contains both prose and poetry, gives valuable
information in deciding the field of battle, the environment and the actual point
on the river Jamuna where Abdali crossed
30 ELLIOT and DOWSON, History of India (1877), Vol VIII, con
tains selected translations of
(1) Tarikh i Alamgir-Sani, (E & D CII)
(ii) Manazil ul Futuh, by Md Ja'far Shamlu (E & D CIII)

CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 137
(iii) Nigar-nama-i-Hind, of-Saiyid Ghulam Ali (E. & D. CXLIII)
(iv) Ibratnamah by Faqir-ud-din Md. of Allahabad (E. & D. CXIX)
(v) Tarikh-i-Ibrahim Khan (E. & D. CXXI).
Of these Ibratnamah and Tarikh-i-Alamgir-Sani are used for Ghazi-ud-
din's acts, especially the assassinations of the Emperor and others. Tarikh-i-
Ibrahim Khan and Nigar-namah practically copy their accounts of the Panipat
battle from Kashiraj. But Shamlu was present on the battle-field as a servant
of Shah Pasand Khan who commanded the left wing of Abdali's army. His
figures are inflated no doubt but certain casual references of his are helpful
in deciding a few controversial points. Though both Kashiraj and Shamlu
were eye-witnesses, present on the battle-field during the battle, both could see
only a corner of the battle, and that which was least engaged, in the first half
of the day. But Shamlu knew much more of the Abdali side than Kashiraj
from the inside, just as Kashiraj naturally knew more of the Maratha side.
Shamlu's remark that Ahmad Shah drove away the Shindes from the banks of
the river Attock and pursued them as far as Burya and Sarangpur (p. 146) is
helpful in pointing out the farthest line of Maratha advance in the Panjab. It
had not stopped at the Chinab as Sir Jadunath says,¹⁵ but had reached the
Indus itself as can now be proved by other contemporary material. Shamlu
also gives the account of the precarious passage of Abdali's army across the
Jamuna by the Budhia Ghat to Sarangpur, which is also so written in Marathi
papers, while later on it somehow has assumed the form of Saharanpur, which
it retains today. This is one of the instances where bad pronunciation and in-
correct writing has changed a purely Hindu name into a Muslim-looking one.
Shamlu's account of the battle which ensued before crossing, corroborates the
account in Bhau Sahebanchi Bakhar. He also gives the behaviour of the Abdali
troops when they entered Delhi after defeating Dattaji Shinde. They looted
it, notwithstanding the fact that they had come to protect the city from the
Marathas and even the earnest intercession of Malika-i-Zamani who was the
chief instigator of Ahmad Shah in calling him to India was not able to stop it.
Shamlu's account of Ahmad Shah's cantonment at Anupshahar is useful in
visualizing the difficulties in the Doab. His account of the patrol round the
Maratha camp and cutting off of Maratha parties bringing cash from Delhi,
corroborates the Marathi chronicles. But Shamlu is most useful in deciding
the beginning of the battle and falsifying Kashiraj in his palpably untrue state-
ment that just before the battle in the early hours of the morning a Maratha
valet of Bhau came with the last chit. Shamlu states that Ahmad Shah, after
noticing "clouds of dust ascended upto heaven" ordered Shah Pasand Khan
to go forth and ascertain the cause thereof. He rode through the plain between
Abdali's camp and the Maratha camp by an unfrequented path and took
"four hours to advance half a kos." As Shamlu was accompanying Shah
Pasand Khan, there is no cause to suspect his statement as untrue though
written after thirty-five years, because no man would forget such an event
¹⁵ Fall 2.76.

on such a day $^{16}$ Shamlu's account of Ahmad Shah's arrangement of his army
also supplies a clue in correctly visualizing the battle array, which
seems to differ a little from Kashiraj's account The last important
point made clear from Shamlu's account is the fact of Ahmad Shah's
apprehension in the first half of the day that "he would not be able to with
stand" the impetuous Maratha attack led by Bhau on the Abdali centre, and
his despatch of a person "to mount the ladies of his household on fleet steeds
and keep them ready for any eventualities That shows that Ahmad Shah was
not at all sure of certain victory as made out by later historians and com
mentators Incidentally it shows Ahmad Shah's wisdom and precaution
against any mishap Shamlu openly says that "by Ahmad Sultan's good for
tune one Zamburak ball struck Vishwasrao on the forehead and another hit
Bhau on the side," meaning thereby that good fortune and accidents had not
a little to do with the Maratha defeat Shamlu also corroborates the fact of
the Maratha army's sudden desertion from the battle field and the stampede
which followed Shah Pasand Khan received the news of this central struggle
through couriers (p 154), which again shows the distance separating the
various divisions on the battle field Shah Pasand Khan had not possibly
moved much from his original place in the battle array and charged Malharrao
and Janakoji only after knowing the defeat of the centre Shamlu only shows
that they fled, though Malharrao fled westwards and Janakoji eastwards Sham-
lu's account of the Maratha camp after the battle when 30,000 matchlockmen
were so struck with terror and consternation that they would not lift their hand
to strike anybody who came amidst them for loot, is most illuminative of the
psychic effect of defeat We think that the Marathas had exhausted their
ammunition and hence were helpless to do anything They were only putting
on a bold face to conceal their deficiency Shamlu also notes that a Maratha
chief had been stationed in hindmost rank of their army and was later on seen
fleeing towards the south side with six or seven thousand horse, and would not
meet even "three individuals," but ran away pell-mell "at the mere firing of
the guns and took another direction," shows that Bhau had not, as assumed
by Sir Jadunath, left his camp unprotected in the last resort He had prop-
erly arranged everything, but everything went astray as luck would have it
Altogether we do not think of Shamlu as a worthless witness as Sir Jadunath
seems to think, and have fully utilised his account for what it is worth As
Shamlu was in the latter part of his life living in India, he had ample oppor-
tunities of conversing with other survivors from the field and of refreshing his
memory of the Panipat battle field That he had not lost interest in the af-
fairs of the Marathas is clear from his mention of Shah Alam's return to Delhi
in the company of the Marathas, and his anecdotes about Mahadaji Shinde's
lameness and the skeletons of the Maratha horses at the caravanserai of Sone
pat—incidents which he only relates
31 Sayyid Nuruddin Hasan Khan's Life of Najib-ud-daulah, transla-
tion by Sir Jadunath SARKAR in the Islamic Culture, 1933, presents one view
of the life of this unscrupulous and mischievous man in Indian history Najib
$^{16}$ ELLIOT 8.152.

CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 139
it was who gave a crooked turn to the whole trend of Indian politics in the
middle of the 18th century He fooled all who came into contact with him,
both friend and foe He rose as a servant of Ghazi ud-dın, the Wazir, and
ultimately ruined him, by his treachery He made use of Malharrao Holkar
as a god father and did mortal harm to the Maratha politics in the north He
brought Shuja over to the side of Abdali and sent him empty handed back to
Oudh for fear of being looted by his allies Shuja did not think even of
taking leave of Ahmad Shah Abdali before decamping! Najib had not done
any good to Ahmad Shah either, through whose help he became what he was
He made use of the Shah by the argument of race and religion, and that way
completely ruined the Marathas But what permanent benefit accrued to
Islam from his acts? He had misinformed Ahmad Shah about the relative
strength of the political parties in India as a result of which Ahmad Shah could
not reap any permanent advantage His troops could not get even their salary
from him and the forty lakhs of rupees a year which Najib promised to him
from the Indian lands he had conquered were never paid Not only that
politically at the end of the great battle Ahmad Shah had to bestow the Wazir
ship of the Indian Empire on the hated regicide Ghazi ud din, a creature of
the Marathas, and not on Shuja, his ally in the late war All this is well ex
emplified by this life, written by an admirer though it is
32 Bihari Lal Munshi's Short Life of Najib-ud daulah, translated
by Sir Jadunath SARKAR, in the Islamic Culture, 1936 Though sketchy, it
still adds a few more facts to his life It supplies details in his dealings with
Dattaji Shinde, especially Najib's ruse of instructing the Afghans of Kunjpura
to put on scarlet caps and move like the Persian Qzzlbashas in order to start
the rumour of the coming of Abdali to India This rumour makes it clear
why Sabaji Shinde, the Governor of the Panjab, returned long before the ac
tual coming of Abdali and why Govindpant Bundele is found writing, very
early, letters about the Shah's coming It had the effect of demoralizing the
Maratha side It does not add anything to our knowledge of Panipat, however
33 Samin Shaikh Ghulam Hasan's (pen name Samin) narrative,
translated by W IRVINE in Indian Antiquary, 1907
This narrative gives a vivid picture of Ahmad Shah's camp, army and
political behaviour, in his Indian campaign of 1756 57 The writer is poeti-
cally minded He possesses the journalist's facile pen supplying vivid descrip-
tion He is gossipy too, introducing anecdotes and stories amidst his narrative
In fact, he tries to reproduce from memory things reported to him by others,
such as Imad ul mulk's story He wrote his piece in 1782 at the behest of
Captain Jonathan Scott To judge from the production, this man's memory
seems to be unusually strong, but it is idle to call it a diary as is done by Sir
Jadunath SARKAR (p 293, Fall, Vol 2) The picture of Ahmad Shah's army
on the march, his camp discipline, etc seem exaggerated and are more in the
form of psychic vision than of sober description His introduction of poetry at
intervals exemplifies his mind Sir Jadunath has used Samin's description of
Ahmad Shah's army

140 PANIPAT 1761
army We have no quarrel with the comparison, we only wish that Sir Jadu
nath had also taken into account the methodology of Abdali's iron discipline
and his barbarous methods in his dealings with both friends and foes, Hindus
no less than Muslims, for comparison with the methods followed by "the lesser
breeds beyond the law," (p 291, Fall, Vol, 2) by which epithet he introduces
the Marathas into the comparison Where the Marathas found it impossible
to recover even eighty lakhs proffered for their services in going through a politi
cal revolution for deposing one Emperor and his Wazir and seating others in
their places, after a sojourn of eight months in the Delhi region, Ahmad Shah
gained crores from the city of Delhi alone in less than a month by threatening,
bastonading of a Wazir and torture to his mother, and digging of (floors)
houses, two years later The Marathas suffered historically because they stood
on a different moral plane from their competitors
34 Ichalkaranji State History with its original papers edited by V V
KHARE, 1913 A few letters giving news of the Panipat campaign and after
are found in this collection, which are useful for deciding the point of the
Peshwa's responsibility Abdali was intercepting the letters from Panipat to
the Deccan and making use of the information for his own purpose As the
Peshwa had not received any news from the north for more than a month, his
plans naturally went astray Malharrao Holkar's line of conduct is illustrated
in Govind Hari Patwardhan's letter (No 66)
35 The Earliest Persian Account of Panipat, translated by Sir Jadu
nath SARKAR in the Sardesai Commemoration Volume, 1938
The account is for the most part accurate, and not inaccurate as read
by the learned translator It correctly reports as far as it does and, what is
more, supplies a few facts not noted in other documents, viz Abdali's crossing
between Bagpat and Kheora (wrongly deciphered as Khekra by Sir Jadunath,
which puts him on the wrong track), Bhau's posting of troops on the farther
side of the Jamuna to stop Abdali's supplies (at Bhau Fort near Isapur?),
Chimaji Pandit's raid across the Jamuna, winter rains, famine, Shah's pre
carious position at noon, the panic caused by Bhau's getting down from
elephant, slaughter and running away of the Marathas, women captives *
36 Vad and others—Selections from the Peshwa Diaries—useful for
administrative details with correct dates and the itinerary
37 Itihasa Sangraha A defunct Marathi magazine, Vols I VIII,
edited by Parasnis (1909-1917), contain a few stray but primarily important
letters about the Panipat campaign, events leading to it and the aftermath
They are interspersed under various headings and parts, viz Aitihasika Tipane-
Charcha-Sphuta Lekha Goshti, etc Sir Jadunath has overlooked these letters
for the most part and hence his treatment has turned defective in certain par-
ticular

CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 141
38. Parasnis—Marathyanche ' Parakrama—Bundelkhand Prakarana
(1895) contains casual information about Govindpant Bundele and his sons,
also a worthless Panipat chronicle.
39. Bharata Itihasa Samshodhaka Mandal Quarterly Vols. I-XXIV,
as well as its Annals and Conference Reports. These also contain valuable in-
formation and discussions on the various topics connected with Panipat, its per-
sonalities and politics.
40. Hingne Daftar Vol. I (1945), is useful for judging the Delhi
politics during the pre-Panipat as well as post-Panipat period. Unfortunately
here, too, no direct evidence bearing on the campaign is forthcoming.

BHAVAN'S LIBRARY
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13 APR 1961
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18 OCT 1970